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One objection to xenotransplantation is that it will require the large-scale breeding, raising and killing of genetically modified pigs. The pigs will need to be raised in designated pathogen-free facilities and undergo a range of medical tests before having their organs removed and being euthanised. As a result, they will have significantly shortened life expectancies, will experience pain and suffering and be subject to a degree of social and environmental deprivation. To minimise the impact of these factors, we propose the following option for consideration-ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be eliminated by other means. Despite not being a morally ideal 'solution', it is morally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Until recently, scientific consensus held firm that genetically manipulated embryos created through methods including Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy or human germline genome editing should not be used to initiate a pregnancy. In countries that have relevant laws pertaining to heritable human germline modifications, the vast majority prohibit or restrict this practice. In the last several years, scholars have observed a transformation of scientific and policy restrictions with insistent calls for creating a regulatory pathway. Multiple stakeholders highlight the role of social consensus and public engagement for governance of heritable human germline modifications. However, in the drive to gain public acceptance and lift restrictions, some proponents provide distorted or misleading narratives designed to influence public perception and incrementally shift the consensus. This article describes eight discrete strategies that proponents employ to influence framing, sway public opinion, and revise policymaking of human germline modifications in a manner that undermines honest engagement., (© 2023. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Pty Ltd.)

The characteristics of RNA editing, including the lower risk compared with genome editing, may loosen the ethical barriers that are currently imposed on genetic engineering, thus opening new possibilities for research, therapy, and human enhancement. We should start considering the future ethical and social implications of this new and promising technology., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus (SARS-CoV)-2's origin is still controversial. Genomic analyses show SARS-CoV-2 likely to be chimeric, most of its sequence closest to bat CoV RaTG13, whereas its receptor binding domain (RBD) is almost identical to that of a pangolin CoV. Chimeric viruses can arise via natural recombination or human intervention. The furin cleavage site in the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 confers to the virus the ability to cross species and tissue barriers, but was previously unseen in other SARS-like CoVs. Might genetic manipulations have been performed in order to evaluate pangolins as possible intermediate hosts for bat-derived CoVs that were originally unable to bind to human receptors? Both cleavage site and specific RBD could result from site-directed mutagenesis, a procedure that does not leave a trace. Considering the devastating impact of SARS-CoV-2 and importance of preventing future pandemics, researchers have a responsibility to carry out a thorough analysis of all possible SARS-CoV-2 origins., (© 2020 The Authors. BioEssays published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

Mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs, also referred to as mitochondrial replacement therapies) have given hope to many women who wish to have genetically related children but have mitochondrial DNA mutations in their eggs. MRTs have also spurred deep ethical disagreements and led to different regulatory approaches worldwide. In this review, we discuss the current regulation of MRTs across several countries. After discussing the basics of the science, we describe the current law and policy directions in seven countries: the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, Israel, and Singapore. We also discuss the emerging phenomenon of medical tourism (also called medical travel) for MRTs to places like Greece, Spain, Mexico, and Ukraine. We then pull out some key findings regarding similarities and differences in regulatory approaches around the world.

Transhumanism advances an ideology promising a positive human advance through the application of new and as yet unrealized technologies. Underlying the whole is a libertarian ethos married to a very Christian eschatology promising a miraculous transformation that will answer human needs and redress human failings. In this paper, the supposedly scientific basis on which transhumanist promises are built is critiqued as futurist imaginings with little likelihood of actualization. Transhumanists themselves are likened to the affable con man Professor Harold Hill who, in The Music Man, describes as dire social problems whose solution is a youth band he seeks to sell but has no intention of building. Even were some of the transhumanist imaginings to be realized, I argue, the result would be a dystopia in which the few received benefits denied to the many. In advancing imaginary technologies as a solution to human needs, transhumanists and their bioethical fellow travelers handily avoid discussion of or advocacy for the kind of pedestrian social actions that demonstrably could achieve many of their purported goals. So their enthusiasms, I conclude, are not merely fanciful but damaging to the humanist goals they pretend to advance., (© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

In this essay, the bioethical implications of the recent genetic manipulation in human embryos with CRISPR-Cas9 to eliminate the CCR5 gene and the birth of a pair of discordant twin girls are analyzed. The experiment was disseminated via social media. The main bioethical flaws identified include the justification of the model, the informed consent process and the lack of disclosure of evident conflicts of interest. The consequences of the experiment on the life of the twins that were born were not properly evaluated, such as the impact on their autonomy, the alleged benefits to be received and the future risks of harm during their lifetime. Having manipulated the germ cell line, the effects on their future offspring were not considered. This type of actions negatively affects the way society conceives science. Genetic engineering should be reserved to the basic experimental context or as clinical research for the correction of known serious diseases of genetic origin under strict regulatory and bioethical supervision and using a gradualist approach in accordance with the advances of gene editing techniques., (Copyright: © 2019 Permanyer.)

The human genome is commonly regarded as a 'natural' connection between all human beings, as it has been handed down to us by our predecessors. As such, it is believed to represent common heritage of humanity, e.g. a resource of outstanding value that should be the object of special protection and international concern. Some critics argue that germline manipulation would disrupt this natural heritage and that we have a duty to preserve the integrity of the human germline. However, a closer look reveals that the concept of common heritage of humanity does not necessarily imply the impermissibility of germline manipulation. If it is restricted to the prevention of severe diseases, germline manipulation does not represent a threat to the unity and identity of the human species, even though this would create a new form of relationship between human beings, namely that between a designer and a genetically designed person., (© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

In his book The future of human nature, Jürgen Habermas argues against a scenario of liberal eugenics, in which parents are free to prenatally manipulate their children's genetic constitution via germline interventions. In this paper, I draw attention to the fact that his species-ethical line of argument is pervaded by a substantial ambiguity between an argument from actual intervention (AAI) and an argument from mere controllability (AMC). Whereas the first argument focuses on threats for the autonomy and equality of prenatally modified persons, the second argument takes all human beings, whether they have been modified or not, into account. Hence, when invoking Habermas in these debates, bioethicists need to consider carefully which argument they are referring to., (© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Given recent advancements in CRISPR-Cas9 powered genetic modification of gametes and embryos, both popular media and scientific articles are hailing CRISPR's life-saving, curative potential for people with serious monogenic diseases. But claims that CRISPR modification of gametes or embryos, a form of germline engineering, has therapeutic value are deeply mistaken. This article explains why reproductive uses of CRISPR, and germline engineering more generally, do not treat or save lives that would otherwise have a genetic disease. Reproductive uses of CRISPR create healthy people whose existence is not inevitable in the first place. Creating healthy lives has distinct and lesser moral value from saving or curing lives that would otherwise have genetic disease. The real value in reproductive uses of CRISPR is in helping a very limited population of people have healthy, genetically related children. This diminished value cannot compete with the concerns in opposition to germline engineering, nor is it worth the investment of research money., (© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

In 2018, Dr. He Jiankui reported that he had edited human embryos and transferred them to a woman, causing her to give birth to twin girls with modified genomes. An international group of scientists and ethicists responded by proposing a global moratorium on heritable genome editing (HGE). In this article, I oppose this proposal on several grounds. A global moratorium might encourage participating nations to ban HGE or postpone access to it indefinitely. It might also deter or delay basic research that could lead to safe and effective HGE. Lastly, a global moratorium might induce participating nations to adopt or maintain laws and regulations that stigmatize children born with modified genomes. As an alternative, I argue that nations should regulate HGE for safety and efficacy only and without distinguishing between therapeutic and enhancing modifications.

Approximately 80% of rare and often incurable and serious conditions affect newborns and children, and roughly half of all rare diseases are considered to have an onset in childhood. Somatic gene therapies are already in clinical trials for spinal muscular atrophy, beta thalassemia, and macular degeneration. If proven to be safe and effective, could heritable genome editing be seen as a form of preventive personalized medicine and as fostering the right to health of the child? The latest calls for global moratoria on clinical applications of heritable genome editing are troubling in that they may create an illusion of control over rogue science and stifle the necessary international debate surrounding an ethically responsible translational path forward. Children are people with distinct rights and interests. An arbitrary moratorium neither fosters their best interests or health nor respects their right to benefit from the advancements of science.

Germline genome editing (GGE) holds the potential to mitigate or even eliminate human heritable genetic disease, but also carries genuine risks if not appropriately regulated and performed. It also raises fears in some quarters of apocalyptic scenarios of designer babies that could radically change human reproduction. Clinical need and the availability of alternatives are key considerations in the ensuing ethical debate. Writing from the perspective of a fertility clinic, we offer a realistic projection of the demand for GGE. We lay out a framework proposing that GGE, hereditary genetic disorders, and in vitro fertilization are fundamentally entwined concepts. We note that the need for GGE to cure heritable genetic disease is typically grossly overestimated, mainly due to the underappreciated role of preimplantation genetic testing. However, we might still find applications for GGE in the correction of chromosomal abnormalities in early embryos, but techniques for that purpose do not yet exist.

There is no shortage of enthusiasm for the clinical potential of CRISPR-based genome editing: many life-changing cures appear to be just around the corner. However, as mature genetic therapies reach the market, it seems that million-dollar price tags are the new normal. Several factors contribute to the extreme pricing of next-generation medicines, including the need to recoup development costs, the undeniable value of these powerful therapies, and the inherent technical challenges of manufacture and delivery. CRISPR technology has been hailed as a great leveler and a democratizing force in biomedicine. But for this principle to hold true in clinical contexts, therapeutic genome editing must avoid several pitfalls that could substantially limit access to its transformative potential, especially in the developing world.

When writing about CRISPR and similar technologies, many bioethicists use science-fiction references to help readers picture the ramifications of germline gene editing. By a large margin, the most frequently referenced novel in this debate is Aldous Huxley's 1932 dystopia Brave New World . Despite its iconic status and effectiveness at communicating specific ethical issues, Brave New World provides relatively poor examples of interventions such as gene therapy or enhancement. In addition, the eugenic tropes that Huxley promotes in much of his work make Brave New World an uncomfortable choice for authors who oppose the use of CRISPR for illiberal purposes. Ethicists should consider bringing a wider variety of fiction references into the discourse on genome editing, especially stories that can complement Brave New World with insights about the ethical issues left undeveloped in Huxley's novel.

The bioethical principle of autonomy is problematic regarding the future of the embryo who lacks the ability to self-advocate but will develop this defining human capacity in time. Recent experiments explore the use of clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)/Cas9 for germline engineering in the embryo, which alters future generations. The embryo's inability to express an autonomous decision is an obvious bioethical challenge of germline engineering. The philosopher Joel Feinberg acknowledged that autonomy is developing in children. He advocated that to reserve this future autonomy, parents should be guided to make ethical decisions that provide children with open futures. Here, Feinberg's 1980 open future theory is extended to the human embryo in the context of CRISPR germline engineering. Although the embryo does not possess the autonomous decision-making capacity at the time of germline engineering, the parental decision to permanently change the unique genetic fabric of the embryo and subsequent generations disregards future autonomy. Therefore, germline engineering in many instances is objectionable considering Feinberg's open future theory.

Since its advent in 2012, CRISPR has spawned a cottage industry of bioethics literature. One principal criticism of the technology is its virtually instant widespread adoption prior to deliberative bodies conducting a meaningful ethical review of its harms and benefits-a violation, to some, of bioethics' "precautionary principle." This view poorly considers, however, the role that the law can play-and does, in fact, play-in policing the introduction of ethically problematic uses of the technology. This Perspective recounts these legal regimes, including regulatory agencies and premarket approval, tort law and deterrence, patents and ethical licenses, funding agencies and review boards, as well as local politics. Identifying these legal regimes and connecting them to the precautionary principle should be instructive for bioethicists and policy makers who wish to conduct ethical reviews of new applications of CRISPR prior to their introduction.

Genetically engineered (GE) organisms have been at the center of ethical debates among the public and regulators over their potential risks and benefits to the environment and society. Unlike the currently commercial GE crops that express resistance or tolerance to pesticides or herbicides, a new GE crop produces two bioactive nutrients (eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA)) that heretofore have largely been produced only in aquatic environments. This represents a novel category of risk to ecosystem functioning. The present paper describes why growing oilseed crops engineered to produce EPA and DHA means introducing into a terrestrial ecosystem a pair of highly bioactive nutrients that are novel to terrestrial ecosystems and why that may have ecological and physiological consequences. More importantly perhaps, this paper argues that discussion of this novel risk represents an opportunity to examine the way the debate over genetically modified crops is being conducted.

Principlist Bioethics by Beauchamp and Childress has reached a prominent status in contemporary Bioethics. Nevertheless, it includes some important theoretical problems: some lacks when defining some concepts, a tendency to ethical relativism, etc. Among the ethical alternative approaches from which such problems can be solved, we think that the most appropiate is the Natural Law theory. It offers a reasoned reflection on the concept of good and on human basic goods and their relation with moral general principles. From such goods, this ethical theory supports the existence of actions that are always maleficent acts, that is, intrinsically and universally evil acts. The article applies the Natural Law theory to issues related to the protection of human life (abortion, euthanasia, self-defense and genetic manipulation)..

In the ongoing discussion about the risks of reproductive human germline modification, scant attention has been paid to whether it could be reconciled with theories of psychological well-being. Even if safety and feasibility challenges could be overcome and germline engineering technology could be implemented in ways that avoid exacerbating social inequality, we would still have to question whether germline modification would promote circumstances that lead to better psychological experiences for parents, society, and the genetically edited person. This paper posits that germline engineering would produce expectations of being able to control the manifestation of an individual's characteristics, which will inevitably be upset by our limited understanding of how genes interact with each other and with the environment. Drawing on self-discrepancy and relative deprivation theories, it is suggested that both editing and being edited could lead to unmet expectations and thus negative emotional states that would offset benefits of successful intended genetic changes.

I challenge the "convenient consensus" that He Jiankui is a "bad apple" in order to consider alternative explanations for why He may have ventured down the ill-considered path in his research that he did. The answer I want to proffer is that He was ill-equipped by his education and training in biomedical research to appropriately weigh the competing goods he encountered and thus was not able to be swayed by the clear guidance that basic ethical considerations would have provided. If true, this shows us why, much as we would like to take solace in him being a bad apple, we should be prompted by this episode to focus instead on systems level contributors to He's decisions that, if left unaddressed, will surely lead to similarly reckless episodes by other researchers in the future.

Advances in genomic technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and in vitro gametogenesis may soon give us more precise and efficient tools to have children with certain traits such as beauty, intelligence, and athleticism. In this paper, I propose a new approach to the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering, a human rights approach. This approach relies on two claims that have certain, independent plausibility: (a) human beings have equal moral status, and (b) human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. I first argue that the human rights approach gives us a lower bound of when reproductive genetic engineering would be permissible. I then compare this approach with other approaches such as the libertarian, perfectionist, and life worth living approaches. Against these approaches, I argue that the human rights approach offers a novel, and more plausible, way of assessing the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering., (© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

This paper explores whether egg donation could still be ethically justified if in vitro gametogenesis (IVG) became reliable and safe. In order to do this, issues and concerns that might inform a patient's reasoning in choosing to use donor eggs instead of IVG are explored and assessed. It is concluded that egg donation would only be ethically justified in a narrow range of special cases given the (hypothetical) availability of IVG treatment and, further, that egg donation could itself be replaced by donation through IVG techniques. Two possible criticisms of this position are then considered: Ones based on respect for patient wishes, and on loss of donor benefit. It is concluded that whilst neither argument constitutes a strong enough reason to continue with programmes of egg donation, egg-sharing programmes could still be permitted come the advent of IVG; these could then provide a morally acceptable source of "natural" donor eggs., (© 2018 The Authors Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) is believed to be the next big breakthrough in reproductive medicine. The prima facie acceptance of this possible future technology is notable when compared to the general prohibition on human reproductive cloning. After all, if safety is the main reason for not allowing reproductive cloning, one might expect a similar conclusion for the reproductive application of IVG, since both technologies hold considerable and comparable risks. However, safety concerns may be overcome, and are presumably not the sole reason why cloning is being condemned. We therefore assess the non-safety arguments against reproductive cloning, yet most of these can also be held against IVG. The few arguments that cannot be used against IVG are defective. We conclude from this that it will be hard to defend a ban on reproductive cloning while accepting the reproductive use of IVG., (© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Critics of the use of advanced biotechnologies in the agri-food sector ("New Breeding Techniques", comprising CRISPR) demand a strict regulation of any such method, even more severe than rules applied to so-called "Genetically Modified Organisms" (i.e. recombinant DNA processes and products). But their position is unwarranted, since it relies on faulty arguments.While most life scientists have always explained that the trigger for regulation should be the single product and its phenotypic traits, opponents insist that the target should be certain biotech processes.The antagonists maintain that NBTs are inherently risky: this belief is exactly the opposite of a long-standing, overwhelming scientific consensus. NBTs involve unpredictable effects, but it is the same for the results of any other technique. The critics wrongly equate "unintended" with "harmful" and misunderstand two meanings of "risk": the "risk" of not achieving satisfactory results does not automatically translate into health or environment "risks". Generic claims that allergenic or toxic properties are a hidden danger of outcomes from NBTs are unsubstantiated - as they would be for traditional techniques.Among several errors, we criticize the misuse of the Precautionary principle, a misplaced alarm about "uncontrolled spreading" of genetically engineered cultivars and the groundless comparison of (hypothetical) agricultural products from NBTs with known toxic substances.In order to "save" traditional techniques from "GMO"-like regulations, while calling for the enforcement of similar sectarian rules for the NBTs, the dissenters engage in baseless, unscientific distinctions.Important and necessary socio-economic, ethical and legal considerations related to the use of agri-food biotechnologies (older and newer) are outside the scope of this paper, which mostly deals with arguments from genetics, biology, and evolutionary theory that are provided by those who are suspicious of NBTs. Yet, we will provide some hints on two additional facets of the debate: the possible motivations for certain groups to embrace views which are utterly anti-scientific, and the shaky regulatory destiny of NBTs in the European Union.

Background: The first live birth following the use of a new reproductive technique, maternal spindle transfer (MST), which is a mitochondrial replacement technique (MRT), was accomplished by dividing the execution of the MST procedure between two countries, the USA and Mexico. This was done in order to avoid US legal restrictions on this technique., Sources of Data: Academic articles, news articles, documents obtained through freedom of information requests, laws, regulations and national reports., Areas of Agreement: MRTs are new reproductive techniques that present novel ethical and legal challenges, since genetic material from three people is employed to create a child., Areas of Controversy: Could the first MST procedure that culminated in a live birth negatively impact reproductive medicine in Mexico?, Growing Points: The USA and Mexico need specific and clear legislation on MRTs, in order for such techniques not to be governed by prior existing legislation on assisted reproduction that is inadequate for dealing with the new challenges that these techniques present., Areas Timely for Developing Research: There is a pressing need for work to be done on the international governance of new reproductive techniques.

The Human Practice (HP) work of the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition can serve as a great example of integrating ethical considerations into synthetic biology research. By highlighting three independent perspectives from those involved in various aspects of iGEM, here we aim to provide an informative picture of how ethical issues are approached within the iGEM competition., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The emerging field of synthetic biology, the (re-)designing and construction of biological parts, devices and systems for useful purposes, may simultaneously resolve some issues and raise others. In order to develop applications robustly and in the public interest, it is important to organize reflexive strategies of assessment and engagement in early stages of development. Against this backdrop, initiatives related to the concept of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) have also appeared. This paper describes such an initiative: the construction of future scenarios to explore the plausibility and desirability of potential synthetic biology innovations. We guided teams of synthetic biology students who participated in the large international Genetically Engineered Machines (iGEM) competition, in constructing scenarios aimed at exploring the plausibility and desirability of potential synthetic biology innovations. In this paper we aim to examine to what extent, and how, constructing such future scenarios contributes to RRI. In order to do so, we conducted observations and interviews to understand what kind of learning and reflection was promoted by constructing the scenarios in terms of four dimensions, which are discussed prominently in the literature on RRI: anticipation, inclusion, reflexivity and responsiveness. While we focus on how constructing future scenarios can contribute to strengthening RRI at a project (and individual) level, we also consider how far our experiment may foster RRI in the iGEM competition in general, and perhaps even inspire constructive collaboration between 'social scientists' and 'natural scientists' in the context of larger scientific research programmes.

For most of human history children have been a byproduct of sex rather than a conscious choice by parents to create people with traits that they care about. As our understanding of genetics advances along with our ability to control reproduction and manipulate genes, prospective parents have stronger moral reasons to consider how their choices are likely to affect their children, and how their children are likely to affect other people. With the advent of cheap and effective contraception, and the emergence of new technologies for in vitro fertilization, embryo selection, and genetic engineering, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify rolling the genetic dice by having children without thinking about the traits they will have. It is time to face up to the awesome responsibilities that accompany our reproductive choices.

Recent results from studies on animals suggest that functional germ cells may be generated from human pluripotent stem cells, giving rise to three possibilities: research with these so-called artificial gametes, including fertilization experiments in vitro; their use in vivo for therapy for the treatment of human infertility; and their use in assisted reproductive technologies in vitro. While the legal, philosophical, and ethical questions associated with these possibilities have been already discussed intensively in other countries, the debate in Germany is still at its beginning. A systematic and detailed analysis of the legal framework in Germany is provided with regard to the three possibilities, including the applicable statutory laws as well as the constitutional law. The question emerges as to whether the statutory laws as well as the constitution justify a distinction to be made between embryos of artificial and natural origin. This question is subject to philosophical analysis, discussing the distinction between person and thing, dignity and price, personality and property, and nature and technique. As a result, the criterion of naturalness alone may not be sufficient to differentiate between embryos of natural and artificial origin, and other criteria need to be identified., (© 2018 The Authors. Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

In debates on the ethics of artificial gametes, concepts of naturalness have been used in a number of different ways. Some have argued that the unnaturalness of artificial gametes means that it is unacceptable to use them in fertility treatments. Others have suggested that artificial gametes are no less natural than many other tissues or processes in common medical use. We suggest that establishing the naturalness or unnaturalness of artificial gametes is unlikely to provide easy answers as to the acceptability of using them in fertility medicine. However, we also suggest that we should be cautious about repudiating any relationship between nature and moral evaluation. The property of being natural or man-made may not per se tell us anything about an entity's moral status, but it has an important impact on the moral relationship between the creator and the created organism., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

This essay considers one argument used to defend parents who use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to select for deafness and other disabilities. Some bioethicists have argued that a distinction should be drawn between genetically modifying embryos to possess disabilities and using PGD to select embryos that already present markers of them, and that the former is unethical because it inflicts avoidable harms onto the resulting children, whereas the latter is permissible because it allows children with potentially impaired abilities to exist. This essay raises doubts about whether a meaningful moral distinction can be drawn between modification and selection. Arguments which distinguish modification from selection can be understood in two ways. One is to read them as presenting a No Harm, No Foul argument. Another is to read them as presenting a Harming Versus Letting Be argument. Neither succeeds, however, either in establishing a meaningful moral distinction between modification and selection, or in showing that the second is morally permissible in contradistinction to the first.

Bioscience novels use selected technologies of genetic engineering and synthetic biology to create entertaining stories. These novels are usually based on scientific knowledge, but they may arouse public concerns about technology and drive public reluctance to accept innovative technologies. The scientific community must adopt more efficient communication and transparency., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)