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How do organizations sustain a stable group of members in a world full of competing obligations and opportunities? Lewis Coser (1974) provided an answer to this question by arguing that organizations deploy "greedy" mechanisms to weaken or even cut off ties with institutions or persons that might demand time and energy from members. While monopolizing the social networks of members shields them from competing claims from outside, it also suppresses the opportunity to attract new recruits. We use McPherson's ecological affiliation (1983) model to explore the dynamics of organizational membership as a competition process among organizations for scarce resource of human time. Diverging from this approach, we examine two strategies that organizations employ to harness resources, demand of time and energy and the rewiring of social networks. Both strategies can predict either growth or decline of membership size. In an agent based model, we model human time as finite vector of time slots allocated to organizational demands as well as other activities, and model transmission of organizational typical behavior in an urn-based influence model. Complementary to Coser's theory of greedy institutions, we identify the moderate demanding spots in strategy space where organizations grows most quickly in membership size. We also examine the behavior of organization when they are surrounded by other greedy or lenient organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to shed light on the process of radicalization (the adoption of violence as a strategy to achieve political ends) we constructed a computational simulation of a community in which radicalization occurs. In this simulated society we varied parameters such as population size, homogeneity, and migration, and examined how they affect the formulation of self-starter radical cells. We have also looked at social venues, which we call "magnets", and modeled how they create new ties between agents. In agreement with case studies, we found that such venues radicalize even when they attract radicals and non-radicals alike. Interestingly, we found among others, that population size has little effect on radicalization, but greater diversity strongly suppresses it. By understanding how radical cells form, the model facilitates better prediction of terrorist-cell formation and suggests possible counter-radicalization policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents a theory of how and why in-groups develop cues to differentiate themselves from out-groups. It makes a distinction between two kinds of in-group cues: open and closed, arguing that the later often survive because they more effectively contribute to in-group solidarity (expressed in resiliency of the group to factionalism and attrition), commitment to the group (expressed attitudinally), and group durability (expressed in the objective longevity of the group). In making this argument the paper draws on findings in signaling theory, social identity theory, and optimal distinctiveness theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to give a social capital account of the development of fascism. It builds on the theoretical ideas of vertical and horizontal ties, developed by Robert Putnam. The paper's thesis is that fascist states emerge under conditions of strong horizontal and strong vertical ties. A careful examination of Germany (1933 -1945), Italy (1922-1943) , and Japan (1936-1945) is used to support the argument. The paper concludes with drawing some lessons for contemporary efforts to impose democracy abroad. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on Michael Hechter who uses the rational choice framework to give an account of how solidarity emerges and is maintained in groups in his book "Principles of Group Solidarity." The book is written in a discursive style and the theory lacks explicitness. Hechter describes concepts one way but uses them in another way in a different section of the book. "Economizing on Control Costs in Intentional Communities" is the most ambiguous chapter of the book. In this chapter, Hechter sets institutional arrangements that help groups to save on control costs.