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Some scholars have presented models of the United States as a set of “nations” with distinct settlement histories and contemporary cultures. We examined personality differences in one such model, that of Colin Woodard, using data from over 75,000 respondents. Four nations were particularly distinct: The Deep South, Left Coast, New Netherland, and the Spanish Caribbean. Differences between nations at the level of the individual person were typically small, but were larger at the level of community, revealing how aggregation can contribute to differences in the lived experience of places in nations such as Yankeedom or Greater Appalachia. We represented effects in a three-dimensional model defined by Authoritarian conventionalism (which differentiated ‘Red’ and ‘Blue’ nations) as well as Cognitive resilience and Competitiveness (which differentiated among the Blue nations). Finally, we adjusted Woodard’s model to better fit the data, and found that nations largely maintained their boundaries, with the most drastic changes occurring on the East Coast.

We compare the contents of Fox and MSNBC weekday evening telecasts using natural language analysis with Linguistic Inventory Word Count (LIWC) and sociopolitical dictionaries tapping into moral foundations, values, grievances, and personality. Across time, the two networks differed substantially across many constructs, particularly those from LIWC. The core of the difference between the networks was captured by a four‐component measure which we labeled Personalizing versus Formal speech. Scores on this measure were particularly volatile during 2019 and 2020, a period which included Trump's first impeachment, the beginning of the COVID pandemic, and the 2020 presidential campaign. In comparison with prior presidential election years, only MSNBC showed a drop in positive emotions in 2020, while both networks increased in the use of communal and analytic language. Contrary to our expectations, the language style of the two networks did not demonstrate increasing divergence over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Social scientists have long discussed and empirically demonstrated how attitudes toward lesbians and gay men are determined in part by sexism and endorsement of gender roles, but only at the psychological level of analysis. We present data that considers these relationships at the cross-national level of analysis, using country-level measures of gender equality (the Gender Global Gap Index), aggregate measures of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men in a country, and a newly constructed measure of the progressiveness of sexual orientation laws. We show for the first time to our knowledge that countries that have the greatest gender equality also have (a) the most positive aggregate attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and (b) the strongest legislative protections for lesbians and gay men. These results hold even when controlling for plausible third variables such as a country’s level of religiosity and its economic and political development, each with their own separate effects. We discuss the results within the context of the various forces that contribute to, and work against, ensuring more accepting attitudes of, and equal rights for, lesbians and gay men. In conclusion, to fully understand support for lesbians and gay men and the laws that protect them, one should also consider how women are treated in a country.

Prior research suggests that conservatives are more fear-motivated, disgust-sensitive, and happy than liberals. Yet when it comes to political targets (e.g., politicians), both liberals and conservatives can get very emotional. We examined whether the ideological differences in emotion seen in past research apply to emotions towards specific ideologically similar vs. dissimilar targets, or whether these emotions are instead equivalent between liberals and conservatives. Across two studies, liberals and conservatives rated their anger, contempt, disgust, fear, and happiness towards Democratic and Republican congresspersons. We compared participants’ levels of each emotion towards their respective ideologically dissimilar and ideologically similar congresspersons. Liberals and conservatives both experienced stronger negative emotions towards ideologically dissimilar congresspersons than they did towards ideologically similar ones. Neither liberals nor conservatives differed in negative emotions towards politicians overall (i.e., on average). However, there were ideological differences in emotional bias. In Study 1, liberals exhibited a greater contempt bias (i.e., a larger gap in contempt ratings between ideologically similar and ideologically dissimilar politicians) than conservatives did. In Study 2, liberals exhibited greater contempt, anger, disgust, and happiness biases than conservatives did. The need to consider context in the study of ideological differences in emotion is discussed.

Sharing beliefs, particularly moral beliefs, is a way to establish social connections. We hypothesized that ostracism leads people who are high in the need to belong to adhere to the moral beliefs of an ingroup, and that moralizing the beliefs of one's group increases the willingness to endorse extreme behavior on behalf of the group. Across two studies, participants were ostracized or included, rated the moral relevance of their group values, and indicated their endorsement of extreme behavior on behalf of the group. Across studies, ostracism increased group moralization in participants high in the need to belong. In Study 2, group moralization translated into endorsement of extreme behavior. Our findings suggest that morality serves a binding function that may be channeled into extreme behaviors. (120 words).

Much of the justification for granting foreign aid is to support nations and international policies promoting one's national values. However, little to no research has examined how perceptions of similarity between nations, especially value similarity, drive feelings toward other nations and policy preference. In 3 studies using United States samples, we examine relationships between dimensions of country-level similarity, perceptions of value similarity and threat, and policy support. Correlational data and manipulations of value similarity suggest that perceptions of value similarity are the most consistent predictor of support for foreign aid and are consistently driven by ally status and cultural similarity.

Democracy as an abstract belief system bestows rights to individuals and serves egalitarian principles. However, the language of democracy may be used to justify harmful treatment of others in the world. Data from 3 representative samples of adults are presented demonstrating that satisfaction with and support for democracy are associated with support for militarism, a hierarchy-maintaining tool, among those who oppose equality compared with those who support equality. Furthermore, these data highlight the importance of political (Study 2) and historical (Study 3) contexts, demonstrating that democracy is associated with militarism particularly when people oppose equality, in contexts in which democracy is especially valued, and at historical moments when it is militarily expedient (i.e., wartime).

Members of stigmatized social groups are typically more authoritarian than their nonstigmatized or higher status counterparts. We draw on research demonstrating that authoritarianism compensates for the negative effects of stigma to predict that this endorsement will be more psychologically beneficial (and less harmful) for the stigmatized compared to their high-status counterparts. Consistent with this idea, data from the 2008 ( N = 2,322) and 2012 ( N = 5,916) American National Election Study indicate that for members of stigmatized social groups (low income, low education, and ethnic minority), authoritarian child rearing values have more positive psychological effects than for members of high-status groups. These results were robust to covariates, including demographics, religiosity, political ideology, and cognitive style.

Previous research has demonstrated that death reminders influence how we perceive art. In the context of terror management theory, this has been explained by the death-transcending quality of art to convey cultural meaning. In two studies, we examined psychological and neurocognitive responses to naturalistic and surrealistic art when death was primed. We found that naturalistic paintings were evaluated similarly in terms of personal reassurance in both mortality salience and control condition, whereas surrealistic paintings were evaluated as more reassuring in the mortality salience condition than in the control condition. Using high-field functional magnetic resonance imaging in a second study, we found a similar pattern of results, showing specific activation in the precuneus, a brain area associated with self-related operations, in all prime conditions for the viewing of naturalistic paintings, but only in the death and disgust prime conditions when viewing surrealistic paintings. Our results suggest motivated self-reference when viewing both naturalistic and surrealistic artworks under mortality salience. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Social trust is a psychological variable important to politics, the community, and health. Theorists have predicted that socioeconomic status determines social trust, but also that social trust determines socioeconomic status. The current study tested the viability of both causal directions using longitudinal data from representative samples of the United States and the United Kingdom. Results demonstrated that a model where increases in socioeconomic status (measured by income) predict increases in social trust is more viable than a model where increases in social trust predict increases in socioeconomic status.

Attributions for sexual orientation strongly predict opposition to gay rights policies; however, we propose that beliefs that gays and lesbians violate important values drive gay rights opposition and account for the relationship between attributions and anti-gay discrimination. In two studies, we found that beliefs that gays and lesbians violate values accounted for much of the relationship between attributions and anti-gay discrimination. In addition, these stereotypes were the most powerful predictors of opposition to gay rights when both value violations and attributions were included in the model. Results also demonstrated that violations of specific values predicted opposition to policies relevant to those values. This suggests that attributions of choice over sexual orientation are less relevant for predicting opposition to gay rights than beliefs about choice to uphold or violate values.

Decades of research in social and political psychology have demonstrated that political conservatives appear more intolerant toward a variety of groups than do political liberals. Recent work from our three independent labs has challenged this conventional wisdom by suggesting that some of the psychological underpinnings of intolerance are not exclusive to people on either end of the political spectrum. These studies have demonstrated that liberals and conservatives express similar levels of intolerance toward ideologically dissimilar and threatening groups. We suggest directions for future research and discuss the psychological and political implications of our conclusions.

Despite ample research linking conservatism to discrimination and liberalism to tolerance, both groups may discriminate. In two studies, we investigated whether conservatives and liberals support discrimination against value violators, and whether liberals’ and conservatives’ values distinctly affect discrimination. Results demonstrated that liberals and conservatives supported discrimination against ideologically dissimilar groups, an effect mediated by perceptions of value violations. Liberals were more likely than conservatives to espouse egalitarianism and universalism, which attenuated their discrimination; whereas the conservatives’ value of traditionalism predicted more discrimination, and their value of self-reliance predicted less discrimination. This suggests liberals and conservatives are equally likely to discriminate against value violators, but liberal values may ameliorate discrimination more than conservative values.Keywords: prejudice/stereotyping, political psychology, stereotypes, discrimination, quantitative models

Americans' conflicted attitudes toward immigrants and immigration has stymied immigration reform for decades. In this article, we explore the nuanced nature of stereotypes about immigrants and how they relate to ambivalent attitudes toward immigrant groups and the disparate array of immigration policies that affect them. Using item response theory and multiple regression analysis, we identified and related stereotypes of different immigrant groups to group-based and policy attitudes. Results demonstrate that ambivalent stereotypes mapped onto ambivalent group-based and immigration policy attitudes. Specifically, stereotypes that portray groups in positive or sympathetic ways predicted positive attitudes toward the group and more supportive attitudes toward policies that facilitate their immigration to the United States. Conversely, negative qualities predicted negative attitudes toward the same group and support for policies that prevent the group from immigrating. Results are discussed in light of current theory related to stereotype content, complementarity of stereotypes, and broader implications for immigration attitudes and policy.

The debate over healthcare reform in the United States has been divisive. Research demonstrates that beliefs that policy beneficiaries violate values strongly predict opposition to these policies. Similar dynamics may be happening regarding opposition to healthcare reform. Specifically, this study tested the hypothesis that opposition to a public option in healthcare reform results from stereotypes that public-option beneficiaries violate values. In two studies utilizing three samples, beliefs about beneficiaries violating values of hard work consistently predicted opposition to a public option and an alternative market-based healthcare reform plan, often proposed by public-option opponents. Results also suggest that assertions that a public option would lead to bigger government increases opposition to a public option by indirectly masking underlying stereotypes about value violations.

Openness to experience is consistently associated with tolerance. We suggest that tests of the association between openness to experience and tolerance have heretofore been incomplete because they have primarily focused on prejudice toward unconventional target groups. We test (a) the individual difference perspective, which predicts that because people who are high in openness are more open to diverse and dissimilar people and ideas, they will express more tolerance than people who are low in openness and (b) the worldview conflict perspective, which predicts that people high and low in openness will both be intolerant toward those with different worldviews. Four studies, using both conventional and unconventional target groups, find support for an integrative perspective. People high in openness do appear more tolerant of diverse worldviews compared with people low in openness; however, at the same time, people both high and low in openness are more intolerant of groups whose worldviews conflict with their own. These findings highlight the need to consider how individual difference variables and features of the target groups may interact in important ways to influence the expression of prejudice.

Negativity bias may underlie the development of political ideologies, but liberals and conservatives are likely to similarly respond to threats. We review evidence from research on intolerance, basic psychological threats, and motivated reasoning that suggests liberals and conservatives are more similar than different when confronting threatening groups, situations, and information.

Decades of research in social and political psychology have demonstrated that political conservatives appear more intolerant toward a variety of groups than do political liberals. Recent work from three independent labs (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, in press; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, in press) challenges this conventional wisdom by suggesting that the psychological underpinnings of intolerance are not exclusive to people on either end of the political spectrum. These studies demonstrate that liberals and conservatives express similar levels of intolerance towards ideologically-dissimilar and threatening groups. We suggest future research and discuss the psychological and political implications of our conclusions.

Negativity bias may underlie the development of political ideologies, but liberals and conservatives are likely to respond to threats similarly. We review evidence from research on intolerance, motivated reasoning, and basic psychological threats that suggest liberals and conservatives are more similar than different when confronting threatening groups, situations, and information.