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In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke's critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke's critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue that certain conditional modal judgments, which Kripke regards as a priori, are, in fact, a posteriori. An example is the conditional modal judgment that if gold is a metal, then it is necessary that gold is a metal (if gold exists). However, Chalmers has developed a general frontloading strategy for turning a posteriori conditionals into a priori ones. So, I consider whether the frontloading strategy may be applied in a development of a modest modal rationalist account of the necessary a posteriori. Although the frontloading strategy is attractive for the modal rationalist, I argue for a twofold conclusion. First, I conclude that a posteriori conditionals constitute a serious and unanswered challenge to modal rationalists. Second, I conclude that the frontloading strategy does not by itself provide a response to this challenge and that substantiating the strategy is problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who should be the author(s) of an academic paper? This question is becoming increasingly pressing due to the increasing prevalence and scale of scientific collaboration and the corresponding diversity of authorship practices in different disciplines and sub-disciplines. This article addresses the conceptual issues underlying authorship, with an eye to ameliorating authorship practices. The first part of the article distinguishes five roles played by authorship attributions: allocating credit, constructing a speaker, enabling credibility judgements, supporting accountability, and creating an intellectual marketplace. The second part of the article argues that distinguishing these functions helps us see that at least some of the confusions around authorship are due to tensions between these functions. The final part of the article suggests a way to resolve these conceptual confusions. This proposal suggests replacing authorship with a bundle of roles tailored to the functions of authorship—contributor, spokesperson, writer, and guarantor—which can be distributed in a number of different ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]