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This paper presents a typology of state policies toward pirates, as seen through the trickster lens. Tricksters are mischievous, shape-shifting characters, archetypical troublemakers and change agents. They are simultaneously the creators and the symptoms of structural fault lines and peripheries. Originating in various world mythologies, they have been appropriated by literary theorists and anthropologists to describe figures given to transformation and disruption. Since at least Classical Greece, pirates have been such actors, benefiting from both legitimacy and illegitimacy, often causing great upheaval. Drawing on the role of the trickster, and on the outcomes of traditional trickster narratives, we offer an analytical typology of historical state policies toward pirates, focusing on three possible approaches to governing the ungovernable: The first is domestication, wherein pirates are legitimated into the system as agents of the state. The second is eradication, wherein the state sets out to eliminate piracy entirely. The third is management, wherein the state treats piracy as chronic and attempts to limit the scope and depth of its impact. We then show how this simple typology can be used to evaluate the pitfalls of contemporary piracy governance, emphasizing recent events in Somalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trickster is a mischievous, shape-shifting character, an archetypical trouble-maker and change agent in various world mythologies. It has been appropriated by literary theorists and anthropologists to describe figures given to transformation and disru ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post 9/11 world has generated renewed interest in the problematic implications of asymmetrical conflictual interaction between states and non state actors. This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on asymmetrical warfare by focusing on ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the rise of evolutionary approaches to international relations. It discusses evolutionary theory and the two ideal typical evolutionary models of Charles Darwin and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, focusing especially on mechanisms of variation and selection found in both. It analyzes significant works in the international relations literature in three areas, including the rise of the state as a dominant institutional form, change in state structures, and international organization.

The Kantian Peace theory emphasizes the mutually enforcing pacifying effects of democracy and economic interdependence. This apparent relation between democracy, interdependence and peace became one of the most fundamental guiding principles of American foreign policy in recent years. Nevertheless, the last decade, which has seen record levels of interdependence and democratization, provides us with ample anecdotal evidence that can challenge the simplicity of the democracy~interdependence~peace argument. In this paper I will contrast Kant's approach to this conundrum with that of Rousseau. While Kant's well known argument suggests a mutually reinforcing relation between democracy, interdependence and peace, Rousseau postulates that the pacifying effects of democracy are not sustainable under conditions of heightened interdependence. Rousseau's analysis adds complexity to the familiar Kantian argument by qualifying the conditions under which we can expect democracy and/or democratization to reduce the probability of conflict, and by adding an important social and ideational component to the largely material approach of the Kantian Peace theory (especially regarding the effects of interdependence). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Naval superiority has long been correlated with superpower status and hegemony. However, the growing importance of aviation raises doubts regarding the functional value of navies in the 21st century. Nevertheless, navies remain the most expensive service in the military, and form a heavy burden for many nations’ security budget. This paper tries to examine the motivations behind naval procurement across all coastal states. It does so by revisiting Mahan’s classic theory of naval power and offering a statistical test for its validity. The results show that it is hard to explain naval procurement in traditional strategic terms. The paper proceeds by offering a prestige driven explanation for naval procurement. While Naval power started as a prerequisite for great power status, it became so closely associated with being a great power, that by now it operates as a status symbol desired by great powers contenders, even when its functional value is increasingly challenged. Naval power is one of several institutions of prestige in the international system that serve as a mechanism for establishing hierarchy and deference. An effective system of institutions of prestige is essential for the stability of non-coercive hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of the effects of military expenditures on macroeconomic performance is an important topic of study and debate. In this paper we examine an important, yet relatively unexamined element of this debate, the effect of military expenditures on inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). In a number of empirical tests we study the effects of military expenditures on FDI for over 100 countries from 1980-1997. Our primary result is that military expenditures generally have a negative impact on FDI inflows from 1980-1998, but this results varies greatly by level of development. In the less developed non-OECD countries, military expenditures are associated with large decreases in FDI inflows. In the developed countries of the OECD, we find that there is some, although limited, evidence that military expenditures are associated with higher levels of FDI inflows. Our final set of empirical tests estimate the impact of changing levels of FDI inflows on both developed and less developed countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to highlight the role and the implications of prestige as a motivating force behind 'Big Science' programs by examining one of the earliest examples of modern 'Big Science'- the international race to observe the Transits of Venus in the 18th and 19th century. The Transits of Venus provide us with an interesting and uniquely structured set of case studies of the politics of 'Big Science'. By looking at the first 'races to space' we can gain a better understanding of the motivations behind the current race to space, as well as the motivation behind other notable examples of' Big Science'. The paper demonstrates that 'Big Science' cannot be fully understood without realizing its role as a prestige enhancing act, following the logic of conspicuous waste in international affairs. The theory of conspicuous waste provides a parsimonious theoretical explanation for the attractiveness of 'Big Science' mega project and highlights the recurring tension between such mega-projects and the accumulation of scientific knowledge. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hegemonic stability theory suggests that the policies of hegemonic powers contribute to system stability. By enforcing international regimes and engaging in activities that are frequently referred to as policing the system, the theory predicts that a hegemon could limit conflict both at the inter- and intra-state level. This is a common explanation for Pax Britannica and Pax Americana. What happens then to levels of stability, when a hegemon is busy at war? If hegemonic stability is derived from a reputation for defending international regimes, states and sub-state groups should perceive hegemonic wars as a signal of interest in intervention and as a result limit threats. Alternatively, if stability arises merely due to the hegemons' power, states and sub-state groups should perceive a hegemonic war as providing a window of opportunity to challenge the status quo. This paper provides an empirical test of five competeing interpetations of hegemonic intervention in MID's and wars by using a negative binomial model to analyze a set of interaction terms looking both at the effects of systemic power distribution and of different hegmonic policy choices. We show that although, as hegemonic stability and other structural theories of international relations suggest, hegemonic power distibution does influence the systemic propensity for conflict, it is a very complex effect that relies more on the behavior and policy choice of the hegemon than on power distribution alone. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expanding from the logic of hegemonic stability theory and the role of the hegemon in providing stability, this paper explores the implications of a hegemon?s involvement in war on the incidence of conflict elsewhere in the world system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]