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This project uses multilevel modeling techniques to estimate state-level policy preferences for more and less affluent Americans. We then relate these preferences to actual state policy to assess the responsiveness of state policymakers to public preferences and the extent to which that responsiveness differs for the poor, the middle-class and the affluent. Finally, we examine the influence on representation and representational inequality of state-level characteristics like economic inequality, party competition, partisan polarization, campaign finance regulations, interest group environment, term limits, and legislative professionalization. This paper details our analytic strategy and presents some preliminary results based on the first 12 policy issues we have examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports findings from a project that examines the extent to which different social groups find their policy preferences reflected in actual government policy and the variation in these patterns across time and policy domains. For example, when Americans with low and high incomes disagree, are policy outcomes more likely to reflect the preferences of affluent Americans? If so, does the advantage of more affluent Americans differ over time (e.g., depending on which party controls the congress and presidency) or across policy domains? Similarly, are Republicans or Democrats in the population more likely to get the policies they prefer when their party is in control of national political institutions? Because my database contains policy preferences broken down by income, education, partisanship, sex, race, region, religion, and union/non-union status, I will be able to address a multitude of questions concerning government responsiveness to public preferences. In the following pages I use data on public preferences and policy outcomes based on 1,935 national survey questions from 1981 through 2002 and restrict my attention to income as a moderating factor in the preference/policy link. Overall, I find a fairly strong relationship between what the public wants and what the government does, though with a considerable bias toward the status quo. But I also find that when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor or middle income Americans. The vast discrepancy I find in government responsiveness to citizens with different incomes stands in stark contrast to the ideal of political equality that Americans hold dear. Although perfect political equality is an unrealistic goal, representational biases of this magnitude call into question the very democratic character of our society. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the first findings from a project that examines the extent to which different social groups find their policy preferences reflected in actual government policy and the variation in these patterns across time and policy domains. For example, when Americans with low and high incomes disagree, are policy outcomes more likely to reflect the preferences of affluent Americans? If so, does the advantage of more affluent Americans differ over time (e.g., depending on which party controls the congress and presidency) or across policy domains? Similarly, are Republicans or Democrats in the population more likely to get the policies they prefer when their party is in control of national political institutions? Because my database contains policy preferences broken down by income, education, partisanship, age, sex, race, and region, I will be able to address a multitude of questions concerning government responsiveness to public preferences. In the following pages I use data on public preferences and policy outcomes based on 754 national survey questions from 1992 through 1998 and restrict my attention to divergent policy preferences of low- and high-income Americans. The larger project will consist of about 1,800 survey questions collected between 1980 and 2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we challenge convention wisdom that bemoans the perceived deterioration of the presidential election information environment in the U.S. We begin by acknowledging the much lamented decline in both news quality and news viewership, but argue that the rise in paid political advertising has served as a substitute information source for many Americans. As a consequence, presidential voting decisions are as firmly based on the candidates’ policy stances and personal characteristics today as they were 50 years ago. Moreover (and also contrary to conventional wisdom) the shift toward paid advertising as an information source has led to an increase in the extent to which Americans draw upon policy-related as opposed to character-related considerations in making their presidential vote decisions. The proposed paper will be our first presentation of findings form this ongoing project. Our analyses combine three kinds of data: measures of the public’s knowledge and perceptions of presidential candidates from the National Election Studies, records of political advertising by media market from the CMAG data, and our own coding of presidential election news coverage, candidate speeches, and paid advertising. To date, our analyses show that (1) the total number of reasons Americans offer to vote for or against the major party candidates (their candidate likes and dislikes) as been remarkably steady over the pat 50 years; (2) there is a slight trend toward more policy-oriented and less character-oriented likes and dislikes; (3) the variation from election to election in the ratio of policy- to character-oriented likes and dislikes tracks quite closely with the ratio of policy- to character-oriented content in candidates’ paid advertising but not with the ratio of policy- to character-oriented content in news coverage of the elections; and (4) NES respondents living in media markets with more presidential campaign advertising offer more policy-oriented likes and dislikes than those living in media markets with less advertising (net of education, partisan identification, etc.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]