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BackgroundWe examined the association between cannabis use and cardiovascular outcomes among the general population, among never-tobacco smokers, and among younger individuals.Methods and resultsThis is a population-based, cross-sectional study of 2016 to 2020 data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey from 27 American states and 2 territories. We assessed the association of cannabis use (number of days of cannabis use in the past 30 days) with self-reported cardiovascular outcomes (coronary heart disease, myocardial infarction, stroke, and a composite measure of all 3) in multivariable regression models, adjusting for tobacco use and other characteristics in adults 18 to 74 years old. We repeated this analysis among nontobacco smokers, and among men

BACKGROUND: E-cigarettes are promoted as less harmful than cigarettes. There has not been a direct comparison of health effects of e-cigarettes or dual use (concurrently using e-cigarettes and cigarettes) with those of cigarettes in the general population. METHODS: Studies in PubMed, EMBASE, Web of Science, and PsychINFO published through October 1, 2023, were pooled in a random-effects meta-analysis if five or more studies were identified with a disease outcome. We assessed risk of bias with Risk Of Bias In Non-randomized Studies of Exposure and certainty with Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluations. Outcomes with fewer studies were summarized but not pooled. RESULTS: We identified 124 odds ratios (94 cross-sectional and 30 longitudinal) from 107 studies. Pooled odds ratios for current e-cigarette versus cigarette use were not different for cardiovascular disease (odds ratio, 0.81; 95% confidence interval, 0.58 to 1.14), stroke (0.73; 0.47 to 1.13), or metabolic dysfunction (0.99; 0.91 to 1.09) but were lower for asthma (0.84; 0.74 to 0.95), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (0.53; 0.38 to 0.74), and oral disease (0.87; 0.76 to 1.00). Pooled odds ratios for dual use versus cigarettes were increased for all outcomes (range, 1.20 to 1.41). Pooled odds ratios for e-cigarettes and dual use compared with nonuse of either product were increased (e-cigarette range, 1.24 to 1.47; dual use, 1.49 to 3.29). All included studies were assessed as having a low risk of bias. Results were generally not sensitive to study characteristics. Limited studies of other outcomes suggest that e-cigarette use is associated with additional diseases. CONCLUSIONS: There is a need to reassess the assumption that e-cigarette use provides substantial harm reduction across all cigarette-caused diseases, particularly accounting for dual use.

BackgroundExposure to tobacco or marijuana smoke, or e-cigarette aerosols, causes vascular endothelial dysfunction in humans and rats. We aimed to determine what constituent, or class of constituents, of smoke is responsible for endothelial functional impairment.MethodsWe investigated several smoke constituents that we hypothesized to mediate this effect by exposing rats and measuring arterial flow-mediated dilation (FMD) pre- and post-exposure. We measured FMD before and after inhalation of sidestream smoke from research cigarettes containing normal and reduced nicotine level with and without menthol, as well as 2 of the main aldehyde gases found in both smoke and e-cigarette aerosol (acrolein and acetaldehyde), and inert carbon nanoparticles.ResultsFMD was reduced by all 4 kinds of research cigarettes, with extent of reduction ranging from 20% to 46% depending on the cigarette type. While nicotine was not required for the impairment, higher nicotine levels in smoke were associated with a greater percent reduction of FMD (41.1±4.5% reduction versus 19.2±9.5%; P=0.047). Lower menthol levels were also associated with a greater percent reduction of FMD (18.5±9.8% versus 40.5±4.8%; P=0.048). Inhalation of acrolein or acetaldehyde gases at smoke-relevant concentrations impaired FMD by roughly 50% (P=0.001). However, inhalation of inert carbon nanoparticles at smoke-relevant concentrations with no gas phase also impaired FMD by a comparable amount (P

ImportanceThe cannabis industry has sought to normalize itself and expand its markets in the 21st century. One strategy used by companies to generate positive public relations is corporate social responsibility (CSR). It is critical to understand these efforts to influence the public and politicians given the risks of increased cannabis use.ObjectivesTo analyze cannabis industry CSR behaviors, determine their characteristics, and compare their practices with those of the tobacco industry.Design, setting, and participantsThis qualitative study of CSR activities conducted between January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2021, evaluated 9 of the 10 largest publicly traded cannabis companies in the US and Canada. Data were collected from August 1 to December 31, 2021. The 10th company was excluded because it engaged in cannabis-based pharmaceutical sales but not CSR. A systematic review of corporate websites and Nexis Uni was performed, resulting in collection of 153 news articles, press releases, and Web pages. Charitable and philanthropic actions were included. Themes were identified and interpreted using modified grounded theory.Main outcomes and measuresCSR activities and spending.ResultsNine major cannabis companies in the US and Canada engaged in CSR activities that encouraged increased consumption and targeted marginalized communities. Companies claimed these activities would mitigate the harms of cannabis prohibition, promote diversity, expand access to medical cannabis, and support charitable causes. They developed educational programs, sustainability initiatives, and voluntary marketing codes and used strategies similar to those used by tobacco companies to recruit public interest organizations as allies.Conclusions and relevanceThese findings suggest that cannabis companies developed CSR strategies comparable to those used by the tobacco industry to influence regulation, suggesting that cannabis companies should be included when addressing commercial determinants of health.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued orders in July 2020 authorising Philip Morris Products S.A. to market its heated tobacco product (HTP) IQOS inside the USA with claims that it reduces exposure to some dangerous substances. FDA's 'reduced-exposure' orders explicitly prohibit the marketing of IQOS with claims that IQOS will reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-related diseases. Under US law, FDA's IQOS orders are problematic because FDA disregarded valid scientific evidence that IQOS increases exposure to other dangerous toxins and that Philip Morris Products S.A. failed to demonstrate that consumers understand the difference between reduced-exposure and reduced-harm claims. Unfortunately, both 'reduced-exposure' and 'reduced-harm' are classified as 'modified risk tobacco products' under US law. Exploiting this confusion, Philip Morris International used the FDA decision as the basis for marketing and public relations campaigns outside the USA to press governments to reverse policies that ban or regulate the sales and marketing of HTPs, including IQOS. Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control should reject tobacco companies' unsubstantiated explicit or implied claims of reduced harm associated with HTPs and resist Philip Morris International's and other companies' calls to relax HTP regulations based on the FDA's actions. Instead, parties should adopt policies aligned with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control when dealing with HTPs and other novel tobacco products.

In this paper, we examine efforts by health organizations seeking comprehensive smokefree ordinances over Louisiana casinos and bars between 2010 and 2020 to determine best practices for increasing coverage. Bars and casinos remain less protected from secondhand smoke compared to other workplaces in the United States. Casino behavior is compared to the Policy Dystopia Model (PDM), a tobacco industry strategy framework. We performed a historical case study using snowball searches for news on the Access World News Database and the internet. We performed web searches using the names of key actors, organizations, and locations and interviewed nine participants. Starting in 2010, the Louisiana Campaign for Tobacco-Free Living ran ordinance campaigns supplemented by an ongoing statewide smokefree media initiative. Utilizing consistent strategies, including promoting performers as cultural emblems deserving protection, health organizations coalesced in New Orleans during 2014 and Baton Rouge in 2016 and 2017 to pursue ordinances. The coalitions secured ordinances in Louisiana's population and tourism centers despite business resistance. Organizations obtained 30 smokefree laws across Louisiana by 2021. Casinos used PDM strategies to resist ordinances, indicating the framework may predict strategies by non-tobacco entities resisting tobacco control. Louisiana shows that ongoing local campaigns, social justice themes and cultural messaging with coalitions in cities can secure smokefree laws covering casinos and bars and that local ordinance campaigns are a viable method for advancing smokefree protections over those venues in states where the state legislatures are resistant to action.

BackgroundIn June 2018, San Francisco voters upheld the first comprehensive prohibition on sales of flavoured tobacco products (all products including menthol, everywhere in the city with no exceptions).MethodsThis paper used data collected by the San Francisco Department of Public Health as part of its implementation and enforcement of San Francisco's city-wide ban on the sale of flavoured tobacco products. Every licensed tobacco retailer was visited and inspected. The San Francisco Department of Public Health and volunteers conducted an educational campaign from September 2018 to December 2018, including emailing all licensed tobacco retailers about the law, mailing a fact sheet poster, conducting four listening sessions and visiting permitted tobacco retailers to educate them about the law and solicit questions.ResultsCompliance inspections started in December 2018, which found that compliance was 17%. Compliance increased in January 2019 and averaged 80% between January 2019 and December 2019. After the phase-in period, all retailers were visited as part of routine inspections. This effort resulted in 80% compliance.ConclusionIncluding retailer education prior to enforcement can result in compliance with a comprehensive ban on the sale of menthol and other flavoured tobacco products.

ObjectiveTo determine if the declining trend in U.S. youth cigarette smoking changed after e-cigarettes were introduced, and if youth e-cigarette users would have been likely to smoke cigarettes based on psychosocial and demographic predictors of smoking.MethodsAn interrupted time series analysis was used for cross-sectional data from the 2004 to 2018 National Youth Tobacco Surveys (NYTS) to assess changes in cigarette and e-cigarette use over time. A multivariable logistic regression model used 2004-2009 NYTS data on psychosocial risk factors to predict individual-level cigarette smoking risk from 2011 to 2018. Model-predicted and actual cigarette smoking behavior were compared.ResultsThe decline in current cigarette smoking slowed in 2014 (-0.75 [95% CI: -0.81, -0.68] to -0.26 [95% CI: -0.40, -0.12] percentage points per year). The decline in ever cigarette smoking accelerated after 2012 (-1.45 [95% CI: -1.59, -1.31] to -1.71 [95% CI: -1.75, -1.66]). Ever and current combined cigarette and/or e-cigarette use declined during 2011-2013 and increased during 2013-2014 with no significant change during 2014-2018 for either variable. The psychosocial model estimated that 69.0% of current cigarette smokers and 9.3% of current e-cigarette users (who did not smoke cigarettes) would smoke cigarettes in 2018.ConclusionsThe introduction of e-cigarettes was followed by a slowing decline in current cigarette smoking, a stall in combined cigarette and e-cigarette use, and an accelerated decline in ever cigarette smoking. Traditional psychosocial risk factors for cigarette smoking suggest that e-cigarette users do not fit the traditional risk profile of cigarette smokers.

Cigarette smoking patterns vary within the population, with some individuals remaining never smokers, some remaining occasional users, and others progressing to daily use or quitting. There is little research on how population-level tobacco control policy interventions affect individuals within different smoking trajectories. We identified associations between tobacco control policy interventions and changes across different smoking trajectories among adolescents and young adults. Using 15 annual waves of data drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), we applied a group-based trajectory model to identify associations between days smoked per month, comprehensive smoke-free laws, cigarette tax rates, and known socio-demographic risk factors for membership in different smoking trajectories. Comprehensive smoke-free laws were associated with reduced risk of initiation and reductions in days smoked per month for all trajectories other than occasional users. Higher tax rates were associated with reduced risk of initiation and days smoked for all trajectories other than established users. Overall, population-based tobacco control policies, particularly comprehensive smoke-free laws, were associated with reduced smoking. Tobacco taxes primarily reduced risk of initiation and use among never smokers, experimenters, and quitters, consistent with previous research suggesting that tobacco manufacturers lower prices after tax increases to reduce the cost of continued smoking for established users. These results provide support for expanding smoke-free laws and establishing a minimum tobacco floor price, which could improve public health by reducing the risk of initiation as well as use among occasional and established smokers.

BackgroundThe tobacco industry works to block, delay, and weaken national tobacco control legislation to implement the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This article reviews how Nepal overcame industry opposition and to a comprehensive tobacco control law implementing the FCTC.MethodsWe triangulated newspaper articles and policy documents with key informant interviews.ResultsWith the support of international health groups, local tobacco control advocates worked with policymakers in Nepal to pass a comprehensive tobacco control law that exceeded FCTC obligations. The tobacco industry exploited a time of political transition to block consideration by Parliament, arranged and sponsored foreign tours for legislators, made death threats to tobacco control advocates and their families, and argued for the economic importance of tobacco farms. Despite strong interference from Health, and Law and Justice ministers, a 2009 Supreme Court ruling helped tobacco control advocates secure a comprehensive tobacco control law in 2011 that included rotating pictorial health warning labels covering 75% of both sides of cigarette packages, 100% smoke free public places and workplaces, private homes and vehicles, and a tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship ban.ConclusionsAdvocates in developing countries should utilize Nepal's experience to reject tobacco industry offers of compromise and continue educating politicians and legislators to generate political support to pass a comprehensive tobacco control law. Technical and financial support from international agencies, and effective collaboration and coordination of civil societies, and utilization of domestic litigation are helpful in LMICs where governance is weak (the abstract in Nepali is available as a Supplementary Material).ImplicationsThe tobacco industry exploited a time of political transition in Nepal in its effort to block comprehensive tobacco control policy in Parliament by sponsoring foreign tours of legislatures, making death threats to tobacco control advocates and their families, and arguing for the economic importance of tobacco farms. Tobacco control advocates used litigation to raise awareness and educate legislators and promote strong legislation with the involvement of international health groups. Technical and financial support from international agencies, and effective collaboration and coordination of civil societies, and utilization of domestic litigation are helpful in LMICs where governance is weak.

IntroductionNepal passed a comprehensive tobacco control law in 2011. Tobacco control advocates successfully countered tobacco industry (TI) interference to force implementation of law.Aims and methodsPolicy documents, news stories, and key informant interviews were triangulated and interpreted using the Policy Dystopia Model (PDM).ResultsThe TI tried to block and weaken the law after Parliament passed it. Tobacco control advocates used litigation to force implementation of the law while the TI used litigation in an effort to block implementation. The TI argued that tobacco was socially and economically important, and used front groups to weaken the law. Tobacco control advocates mobilized the media, launched public awareness campaigns, educated the legislature, utilized lawsuits, and monitored TI activities to successfully counter TI opposition.ConclusionsBoth tobacco control advocates and the industry used the discursive and instrumental strategies described in the PDM. The model was helpful for understanding TI activities in Nepal and could be applied to other low- and middle-income countries. Civil society, with the help of international health groups, should continue to track TI interference and learn the lessons from other countries to proactively to counter it.ImplicationsThe PDM provides an effective framework to understand battles over implementation of a strong tobacco control law in Nepal, a low- and middle-income country. The TI applied discursive and instrumental strategies in Nepal in its efforts to weaken and delay the implementation of the law at every stage of implementation. It is important to continuously monitor TI activities and learn lessons from other countries, as the industry often employ the same strategies globally. Tobacco control advocates utilized domestic litigation, media advocacy, and engaged with legislators, politicians, and other stakeholders to implement a strong tobacco control law. Other low- and middle-income countries can adapt these lessons from Nepal to achieve effective implementation of their laws.

BackgroundIncreasing the price of tobacco products has the potential to reduce tobacco consumption. As other forms of promotion have been increasingly restricted over time, tobacco manufacturers have relied more on trade discounts. Minimum price laws that prevented the use of manufacturer promotions were once common; however in most US jurisdictions these discounts are now legally protected.MethodsWe collected tobacco industry documents, state legislation and court cases between 1987 and 2016 to review tobacco manufacturer strategies to change minimum price laws in the USA.ResultsBeginning in 2000, tobacco manufacturers lobbied to amend minimum price legislation after state regulators indicated that manufacturer promotions were illegal under existing laws. Companies viewed changing these laws as critical to maintaining tobacco sales, and after the initiation of an industry lobbying campaign, at least 20 states changed the way they calculated tobacco prices.ConclusionsModifying existing minimum price laws so that manufacturer discounts are no longer protected, and implementing new minimum price policies with comparable scope, would likely increase prices and reduce tobacco use.

BackgroundNepal was a monarchy, then a dictatorship, then a democracy. This paper reviews how tobacco control progressed in Nepal in the context of these changes in government from 1950 through 2006.MethodsWe triangulated tobacco industry documents, newspaper articles and key informant interviews.ResultsUntil 1983, the tobacco industry was mostly state owned. Transnational tobacco companies entered the Nepalese market through ventures with Surya Tobacco Company Private Limited (with Imperial Tobacco Company and British American Tobacco) in 1983 and Seti Cigarette Factory Limited (with Philip Morris International [PMI]) in 1985. Seminars and conferences on tobacco, celebrations of World No Tobacco Day (WNTD) and efforts by WHO helped promote tobacco control in Nepal beginning in the 1970s. Tobacco advocates in Nepal pushed the government to issue executive orders banning smoking in public places in 1992 and tobacco advertising in electronic media in 1998, and to introduce a tobacco health tax in 1993. The tobacco industry lobbied against these measures and succeeded in keeping the tobacco tax low by challenging it in court. Tobacco advocates sued the government in 2003 and 2005, resulting in a June 2006 Supreme Court decision upholding the smoking and advertising bans and requiring the government to enact a comprehensive tobacco control law.ConclusionsPolitical instability, conflict, weak governance and the dictatorship significantly affect tobacco control activities in low-income and middle-income countries. Nepal shows that tobacco control advocates can take advantage of global events, such as WNTD, and use domestic litigation to maintain support from civil societies and to advocate for stronger tobacco control policies.

BackgroundIncreasing tobacco taxes, and through them, prices, is an effective public health strategy to decrease tobacco use. The tobacco industry has developed multiple promotional strategies to undercut these effects; this study assessed promotions directed to wholesalers and retailers and manufacturer price changes that blunt the effects of tax and price increases.MethodsWe reviewed tobacco industry documents and contemporaneous research literature dated 1987 to 2016 to identify the nature, extent, and effectiveness of tobacco industry promotions and price changes used after state-level tobacco tax increases.ResultsTobacco companies have created promotions to reduce the effectiveness of tobacco tax increases by encouraging established users to purchase tobacco in lower-tax jurisdictions and sometimes lowering manufacturer pricing to "undershift" smaller tax increases, so that tobacco prices increased by less than the amount of the tax.ConclusionsPolicymakers should address industry efforts to undercut an effective public health intervention through regulating minimum prices, limiting tobacco industry promotions, and by enacting tax increases that are large, immediate, and result in price increases.ImplicationsTobacco companies view excise tax increases on tobacco products as a critical business threat. To keep users from quitting or reducing tobacco use in response to tax increases, they have shifted manufacturer pricing and developed specific promotions that encourage customers to shop for lower-taxed products. Health authorities should address tobacco industry efforts to undercut the effects of taxes by regulating prices and promotions and passing large and immediate tax increases.

Objectives. To investigate the transfer of marketing knowledge and infrastructure for targeting racial/ethnic minorities from the tobacco to the food and beverage industry in the United States.Methods. We analyzed internal industry documents between April 2018 and April 2019 from the University of California San Francisco Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library, triangulated with other sources.Results. In the 1980s, Philip Morris Companies purchased General Foods and Kraft Foods and created Kraft General Foods. Through centralized marketing initiatives, Philip Morris Companies directly transferred expertise, personnel, and resources from its tobacco to its food subsidiaries, creating a racial/ethnic minority-targeted food and beverage marketing program modeled on its successful cigarette program. When Philip Morris Companies sold Kraft General Foods in 2007, Kraft General Foods had a fully integrated minority marketing program that combined target marketing with racial/ethnic events promotion, racial/ethnic media outreach, and corporate donations to racial/ethnic leadership groups, making it a food industry leader.Conclusions. The tobacco industry directly transferred racial/ethnic minority marketing knowledge and infrastructure to food and beverage companies. Given the substantial growth of food and beverage corporations, their targeting of vulnerable populations, and obesity-related disparities, public policy and community action is needed to address corporate target marketing.

Forthcoming in the Marquette Law Review

ObjectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).MethodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.ResultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments' law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs' claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.ConclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

BackgroundIn 1976, the U.S. Sugar Association (SA), a globally networked trade organization representing the cane and beet sugar industry, won the Public Relations Society of America's (PRSA) Silver Anvil Award for a crisis communication campaign. Their campaign successfully limited the diffusion of sugar restriction policies to control obesity, heart disease, diabetes, and dental caries, and marked the beginning of the modern-day SA. The sugar industry continues to resist measures to reduce sugar consumption, therefore understanding and addressing industry opposition is crucial to achieving global targets to reduce non-communicable disease.MethodsWe critically analyze common crisis management rhetorical strategies used by SA to defend itself from perceived wrongdoing, and sugar from perceptions of harm using a thematic content analysis based on Hearit's Corporate Apologia theory. Data sources were internal SA documents related to the 1976 Silver Anvil Award in 1) PRSA records, 2) Great Western Sugar Company records, and 3) William Jefferson Darby Papers.ResultsSA, using prototypical apologia stances (counterattack, differentiation, apology, and corrective action) and rhetorical dissociation strategies (appearance/reality, opinion/knowledge, and act/essence) constructed a persuasive narrative to successfully defend sugar from a product safety crisis, and the sugar industry from a social legitimacy crisis. SA's overarching narrative was that restricting sugar, which it claimed was a valuable food that makes healthy foods more palatable, would cause harm and that claims to the contrary were made by opportunists, pseudoscientists, food-faddists, lay nutritionists or those who had been misled by them. SA's apologia does not meet criteria for truthfulness or sincerity.ConclusionCorporate apologia theory provides an accessible way of understanding sugar industry crisis communication strategies. It enables public health actors to recognize and predict industry corporate apologia in response to ongoing product safety and social legitimacy challenges. Industry counterarguments can be examined for truthfulness and sincerity (or the lack thereof), and explained to policymakers considering sugar restriction policies, and to the public, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of illegitimate industry communication efforts to oppose regulation and legislation.

BackgroundNigeria is a significant tobacco market and influential country in Africa. Nigeria ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005. We reviewed Nigeria's tobacco control legislation since 2000 and compliance of the National Tobacco Control Act (NTCA) 2015 with the FCTC.MethodsWe reviewed the National Tobacco Control Bills 2011 (proposed by legislature) and 2014 (proposed by Executive), the NTCA 2015, and media stories on tobacco control from 2008 to 2017.ResultsThe NTCA, despite being more comprehensive than Nigeria's first Tobacco Smoking (Control) law of 1990, maintained provisions promoted by the tobacco industry, for example: allowing designated smoking areas in hospitality venues, higher educational institutions, and transportation venues; a loophole in the advertising restrictions allowing communications with consenting adults; and having the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) (which includes tobacco companies) on the National Tobacco Control Committee charged with working with the Ministry of Health to implement the law. The industry is also directly involved with the Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) in preparing regulations on cigarette constituents and emissions. In an unprecedented step globally, the law requires that implementing regulations be approved by the National Assembly, giving the industry another opportunity to weaken this law further by lobbying the legislators to favor the industry. As of January 2018, the law was still not being enforced.ConclusionThe NTCA can be strengthened through implementation guidelines still being developed. The industry should be prevented from interfering with through MAN and SON, as required by FCTC Article 5.3.ImplicationsThe tobacco industry works to block Framework Convention on Tobacco Control implementation even after a country ratifies the treaty. The Nigerian case illustrates that it is essential for health authorities to remain vigilant and ensure that the tobacco industry does not play a decision-making role in the process of tobacco legislation and regulation either directly or indirectly. The unprecedented step of requiring approval of implementing regulations for the Nigerian law should not be allowed to become a precedent in other countries.

IntroductionNigeria ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005. Tobacco control advocates in Nigeria achieved some success in countering tobacco industry interference to implement the FCTC.MethodsWe triangulated interviews with key informants from local and international organisations who worked in Nigeria with documentation of the legislative process and Nigerian newspaper articles. Data were analysed and interpreted using the Policy Dystopia Model and WHO categories of tobacco industry interference that had been developed mostly based on experience in high-income countries.ResultsAs in high-income countries, the tobacco industry continued to oppose tobacco control policies after Nigeria ratified the FCTC, including weakening Nigeria's 2015 National Tobacco Control Act. Both tobacco control advocates and industry used discursive (argument-based) and instrumental (activity-based) strategies. The industry argued self-regulation and the economic importance of tobacco. They exploited legislative procedures, used front groups and third parties to push for pro-industry changes. Advocates, with help from international organisations, mobilised prominent Nigerians and the public. Advocates pre-empted and countered the industry through traditional and social media, monitoring and exposing tobacco industry activities, and by actively engaging lawmakers and citizens during the legislative process.ConclusionThe Policy Dystopia Model and WHO categories of industry interference provide a helpful framework for understanding tobacco control debates in low/middle-income countries (LMICs) as in high-income countries. One difference in LMIC is the important role of international tobacco control advocates in supporting national tobacco control advocates. This partnership is important in pushing for FCTC-compliant legislation and countering industry activities in LMIC.

BackgroundCigarette packs are a form of advertising that distributes brand information wherever smokers go. In the 21st century, tobacco companies began using onserts on cigarette packs to communicate new advertising messages to smokers.MethodsWe reviewed tobacco industry documents dated 1926 to 2017 to identify how the tobacco industry developed and used onserts in marketing and to serve the industry's political and legal objectives.ResultsOnserts added to cigarette packs became a more cost-effective way for brands to market in the year 2000. Manufacturers then began studying them, finding that new messages were appealing, while repeated messages were ignored. By 2005, tobacco companies were using onserts to effectively communicate about new tobacco products and packaging changes. They also used repeated 'corporate responsibility' messages that were, according to the industry's own research, likely to be ignored.ConclusionsTobacco companies have expanded on cigarette pack-based advertising. Twenty-first century onserts simultaneously seek to increase sales using materials that are novel, attractive and provide independent value, while undercutting public health messages about the risks of tobacco use using materials that repeat over time and are comparatively unattractive. Health authorities can use this industry research to mandate onserts to communicate effective health messages.

BackgroundIn response to a changing regulatory and consumer landscape, tobacco companies developed new strategies to promote cigarettes and smoking. We examined one of these strategies: to fund and conduct scientific research related to potential benefits of nicotine, and to use their findings to promote nicotine.MethodsQualitative analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents from the Truth (formerly Legacy) Tobacco Documents Library (industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco), triangulated with data from other sources, including the online search engine Google, from the 1970s to December 2017.ResultsAfter publication of the 1988 Surgeon General's report on nicotine addiction, tobacco companies (particularly RJ Reynolds) intensified efforts to promote the benefits of nicotine while downplaying its addictiveness and health risks. Activities included building relationships with academic institutions and funding scientific studies of the benefits of nicotine on cognition and other performance areas through intramural and extramural programmes. Companies then promoted their research findings through public relations campaigns, often minimising nicotine's health risks by comparing it to caffeine or coffee. These comparisons appeared in highly publicised scientific meetings and interviews with the press. Nicotine-positive messages reappeared in the popular press and on some company websites in the 2010s.ConclusionsTobacco companies implemented strategies to promote benefits of nicotine to scientific and general audiences while minimising its health risks. These strategies reappeared at the time novel tobacco products like electronic cigarettes were introduced. A greater awareness of the source of claims related to purported benefits of nicotine could inform discussions about emerging tobacco products.

There has been a global decline in tobacco consumption that, if continued, will negatively impact the tobacco industry's profits. This decline led the industry to invent and market new products, including heated tobacco products (HTP). HTP are an extension of the industry's strategies to undermine government's tobacco regulatory efforts as they are being promoted as part of the solution for the tobacco epidemic. Under the moniker of 'harm reduction', the tobacco companies are attempting to rehabilitate their reputation so they can more effectively influence governments to roll back existing tobacco control policies or create exemptions for their HTP. Rolling back tobacco control policies will make it easier for the companies to renormalise tobacco use to increase social acceptability for all their products. When regulations are absent or when loopholes exist in classifying HTP as a tobacco product (thus subject to all tobacco control regulations), the industry's marketing of HTP is making these products more visible to the public and more accessible. Governments need to ensure that HTP are regulated as tobacco products or drugs and reject partnerships with the tobacco companies to promote 'harm reduction'. The tobacco companies remain the vector of the tobacco-caused epidemic and cannot be part of the global tobacco control solution.

Electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) are thought to pose low risk of cancer because the components of e-cigarette liquid are not carcinogens. We analyzed the effects of the two major components, PG/VG and nicotine, on tumor development in preclinical models. We found that PG/VG promoted tumor cell migration in migration assays and contributed to more aggressive, metastatic, and immunosuppressive tumors in vivo, aggravated by the presence of nicotine. Whole body exposure of mice to PG/VG and nicotine rendered animals more susceptible to developing tumors with high frequencies of infiltrating proinflammatory macrophages expressing IL-6 and TNFα. Moreover, tumor-infiltrating and circulating T cells in e-cigarette exposed mice showed increased levels of immune checkpoints including CTLA4 and PD-1. Treatment with anti-CTLA4 antibody was able to abrogate metastasis with no detrimental effects on its ability to induce tumor regression in exposed mice. These findings suggest that the major components used in e-cigarette fluid can impact tumor development through induced immunosuppression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BackgroundThe United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), a UN initiative to engage corporations in supporting the UN's mission, sets out principles that companies should follow for more ethical business practices. Since its inception in 2000, at least 13 tobacco companies, subsidiaries and tobacco industry affiliates joined the UNGC. In a September 2017 integrity review, the UNGC Board excluded from UNGC participation companies who derive revenue from tobacco production or manufacturing.ObjectiveTo determine, from the tobacco industry's perspective, tobacco companies' motives for joining the UNGC.MethodTobacco industry documents search using the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library, and search of published reports and documents on the tobacco industry and the UNGC.ResultsTobacco companies sought to join the UNGC for two reasons: (1) to improve their reputation, in keeping with other corporate social responsibility efforts; (2) to gain proximity to UN agencies and weaken the WHO's influence, part of an overall strategy to undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.ConclusionsExcluding tobacco manufacturers from UNGC participation is an important step to limit the tobacco industry's ability to influence the UN and promote its image and, by extension, its deadly products. It is important to monitor enforcement of this policy and resist the engagement of tobacco industry front groups, such as industry-funded foundations, with the UNGC.

The manufacture, use, and marketing of tobacco present a serious threat to children's right to health. This makes the Convention on the Rights of the Child a potentially powerful tobacco-control tool and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which oversees the convention's implementation, a potential leader in tobacco control. UNICEF actively supported tobacco control initiatives in the late 1990s, but since the early 2000s UNICEF's role in tobacco control has been minimal. Using the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents library, an online collection of previously secret tobacco industry documents, we sought to uncover information on the tobacco industry's ties with UNICEF. We found that from 1997 to 2000, when UNICEF was actively promoting tobacco control to support children's rights, the tobacco industry saw children's rights and UNICEF as potentially powerful threats to business that needed to be closely monitored and neutralized. The industry then positioned itself as a partner with UNICEF on youth smoking prevention initiatives as a way to avoid meaningful tobacco control measures that could save children's lives. After UNICEF's corporate engagement guidelines were loosened in 2003, tobacco companies successfully engaged with UNICEF directly and via front groups, including the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation. This was part of an overall tobacco industry strategy to improve its corporate image, infiltrate the United Nations, and weaken global tobacco-control efforts. As part of its mission to protect children's rights, UNICEF should end all partnerships with the tobacco industry and its front groups.

BackgroundIt has been shown that never-smoking adolescents who try electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) are at increased risk of subsequent conventional cigarette smoking. We evaluated associations between e-cigarette use and progression to established smoking among adolescents who had already tried cigarettes.MethodsAmong participants (age 12-17 years) in the nationally representative Population Assessment of Tobacco and Health survey who had smoked a cigarette (≥1 puff) but not yet smoked 100 cigarettes (N = 1295), we examined 3 outcomes at 1-year follow-up as a function of baseline e-cigarette use: (1) having smoked ≥100 cigarettes (established smoking), (2) smoking during the past 30 days, and (3) both having smoked ≥100 cigarettes and past 30-day smoking (current established smoking). Survey-weighted multivariable logistic regression models were fitted to obtain odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) adjusted for smoking risk factors.ResultsVersus e-cigarette never use, having ever used e-cigarettes was positively associated with progression to established cigarette smoking (19.3% vs 9.7%), past 30-day smoking (38.8% vs 26.6%), and current established smoking (15.6% vs 7.1%). In adjusted models, e-cigarette ever use positively predicted current established smoking (OR: 1.80; 95% CI: 1.04-3.12) but did not reach statistical significance (α = .05) for established smoking (OR: 1.57; 95% CI: 0.99-2.49) and past 30-day smoking (OR: 1.32; 95% CI: 0.99-1.76).ConclusionsAmong adolescent cigarette experimenters, using e-cigarettes was positively and independently associated with progression to current established smoking, suggesting that e-cigarettes do not divert from, and may encourage, cigarette smoking in this population.

INTRODUCTION:Electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) are often promoted to assist with cigarette smoking cessation. In 2016-2017, the relationship between e-cigarette use and having stopped smoking among ever (current and former) smokers was assessed in the European Union and Great Britain by itself. METHODS:Cross-sectional logistic regression of the association between being a former smoker and e-cigarette use was applied to the 2014 Eurobarometer survey of 28 European Union countries controlling for demographics. RESULTS:Among all ever smokers, any regular ever use of nicotine e-cigarettes was associated with lower odds of being a former smoker (unadjusted OR=0.34, 95% CI=0.26, 0.43, AOR=0.43, 95% CI=0.32, 0.58) compared with smokers who had never used e-cigarettes. In unadjusted models, daily use (OR=0.42, 95% CI=0.31, 0.56); occasional use (OR=0.25, 95% CI=0.18, 0.35); and experimentation (OR=0.24, 95% CI=0.19, 0.30) of nicotine e-cigarettes were associated with lower odds of being a former smoker compared with having never used nicotine-containing e-cigarettes. Comparable results were found in adjusted models. Results were similar in Great Britain alone. Among current smokers, daily cigarette consumption was 15.6 cigarettes/day (95% CI=14.5, 16.7) among those who also used e-cigarettes versus 14.4 cigarettes/day (95% CI=13.4, 15.4) for those who did not use them (p

The great potential for reducing the cancer burden and cancer disparities through prevention and early detection is unrealized at the population level. A new community-based coalition, the San Francisco Cancer Initiative (SF CAN), focuses on the city and county of San Francisco, where cancer is the leading cause of death. SF CAN is an integrated, cross-sector collaboration launched in November 2016. It brings together the San Francisco Department of Public Health; the University of California, San Francisco; major health systems; and community coalitions to exert collective impact. Its goals are to reduce the burden of five common cancers-breast, lung and other tobacco-related, prostate, colorectal, and liver-for which there are proven methods of prevention and detection, while reducing known disparities. We describe the infrastructure, coalition building, and early progress of this initiative, which may serve as a model for other municipalities.

IntroductionIt has been argued that as smoking prevalence declines, the remaining smokers represent a "hard core" who are unwilling or unable to quit, a process known as hardening. However, as recently shown, the general smoking population is softening not hardening (i.e., as prevalence falls, more quit attempts and lower consumption among continuing smokers). People with psychological distress smoke more, so they may represent hard-core smokers.MethodsUsing cross-sectional time series analysis, in 2016-2017 changes in quit attempts and cigarette consumption were evaluated over 19 years among smokers with serious psychological distress (Kessler-6 score ≥13) based on the National Health Interview Survey (1997-2015), controlling for sociodemographic variables.ResultsPeople with psychological distress had higher smoking prevalence and consumed more cigarettes/day than people without distress. The percentage of those with at least one quit attempt was higher among those with psychological distress. The increase in quit attempts over time was similar among smokers in each of the distress levels. For every 10 years, the OR of a quit attempt increased by a factor of 1.13 (95% CI=1.02, 1.24, p

In 1965, the Sugar Research Foundation (SRF) secretly funded a review in the New England Journal of Medicine that discounted evidence linking sucrose consumption to blood lipid levels and hence coronary heart disease (CHD). SRF subsequently funded animal research to evaluate sucrose's CHD risks. The objective of this study was to examine the planning, funding, and internal evaluation of an SRF-funded research project titled "Project 259: Dietary Carbohydrate and Blood Lipids in Germ-Free Rats," led by Dr. W.F.R. Pover at the University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom, between 1967 and 1971. A narrative case study method was used to assess SRF Project 259 from 1967 to 1971 based on sugar industry internal documents. Project 259 found a statistically significant decrease in serum triglycerides in germ-free rats fed a high sugar diet compared to conventional rats fed a basic PRM diet (a pelleted diet containing cereal meals, soybean meals, whitefish meal, and dried yeast, fortified with a balanced vitamin supplement and trace element mixture). The results suggested to SRF that gut microbiota have a causal role in carbohydrate-induced hypertriglyceridemia. A study comparing conventional rats fed a high-sugar diet to those fed a high-starch diet suggested that sucrose consumption might be associated with elevated levels of beta-glucuronidase, an enzyme previously associated with bladder cancer in humans. SRF terminated Project 259 without publishing the results. The sugar industry did not disclose evidence of harm from animal studies that would have (1) strengthened the case that the CHD risk of sucrose is greater than starch and (2) caused sucrose to be scrutinized as a potential carcinogen. The influence of the gut microbiota in the differential effects of sucrose and starch on blood lipids, as well as the influence of carbohydrate quality on beta-glucuronidase and cancer activity, deserve further scrutiny.