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Abstract This report provides an update of the epidemiology of African swine fever (ASF) in the European Union during the period November 2018 to October 2019. In this period, ASF has been confirmed in Slovakia, whereas Czechia became officially ASF‐free in March 2019, bringing the number of affected countries in the EU to nine. The report provides a narrative update of the situation in the different countries and an analysis of the temporal and spatial patterns of the disease. There has been no increase in the proportion of seropositive hunted wild boar in the affected areas. In hunted animals, the proportions of wild boar testing polymerase chain reaction‐positive and enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay‐positive has remained low (

African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious hemorrhagic disease that causes high rates of death among domestic pigs. The disease is caused by ASF virus (ASFV), and the extreme [...]

This report provides a descriptive analysis of the African swine fever (ASF) Genotype II epidemic in the affected Member States in the EU and two neighbouring countries for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 August 2021. ASF continued to spread in wild boar in the EU, it entered Germany in September 2020, while Belgium became free from ASF in October 2020. No ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs nor cases in wild boar have been reported in Greece since February 2020. In the Baltic States, overall, there has been a declining trend in proportions of polymerase chain reaction (PCR)‐positive samples from wild boar carcasses in the last few years. In the other countries, the proportions of PCR‐positive wild boar carcasses remained high, indicating continuing spread of the disease. A systematic literature review revealed that the risk factors most frequently significantly associated with ASF in domestic pigs were pig density, low levels of biosecurity and socio‐economic factors. For wild boar, most significant risk factors were related to habitat, socio‐economic factors and wild boar management. The effectiveness of different control options in the so‐named white zones, areas where wild boar densities have been drastically reduced to avoid further spread of ASF after a new introduction, was assessed with a stochastic model. Important findings were that establishing a white zone is much more challenging when the area of ASF incursion is adjacent to an area where limited control measures are in place. Very stringent wild boar population reduction measures in the white zone are key to success. The white zone needs to be far enough away from the affected core area so that the population can be reduced in time before the disease arrives and the timing of this will depend on the wild boar density and the required population reduction target in the white zone. Finally, establishing a proactive white zone along the demarcation line of an affected area requires higher culling efforts, but has a higher chance of success to stop the spread of the disease than establishing reactive white zones after the disease has already entered in the area. This publication is linked to the following EFSA Journal article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2022.EN-7320/full [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report provides an update of the epidemiology of African swine fever (ASF) in the European Union during the period November 2018 to October 2019. In this period, ASF has been confirmed in Slovakia, whereas Czechia became officially ASF-free in March 2019, bringing the number of affected countries in the EU to nine. The report provides a narrative update of the situation in the different countries and an analysis of the temporal and spatial patterns of the disease. There has been no increase in the proportion of seropositive hunted wild boar in the affected areas. In hunted animals, the proportions of wild boar testing polymerase chain reaction-positive and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay-positive has remained low (< 0.05). In addition to the obvious seasonal peak in summer in domestic pigs, seasonality of ASF in wild boar was statistically confirmed. A network analysis demonstrated that the median velocity of the natural propagation of the disease in wild boar populations was between 2.9 and 11.7 km/year. Human-mediated spread, both in pigs and wild boar, however, remains important. Several wild boar- and domestic pig-related risk factors for ASF occurrence in non-commercial farms in Romania were identified with a case–control study. This report also updates an extensive literature review on control measures to stop the spread of the disease in wild boar and on measures to separate wild boar populations. Several new studies have been identified in this reporting period, but these did not alter the conclusions of the previous reporting period. Field experience with the use of fences as part of the control strategy deployed in the Belgian focal outbreak of ASF in wild boar is described. So far, the measures have proven effective to keep ASF virus inside the affected area. This strategy included a combination of different measures, namely zoning, carcass removal, a complete feeding ban, specific hunting regulations and depopulation actions depending on the zone, a partial ban of people and logging, and setting up a network of concentric fences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study was to develop mesoporous containers for entrapment of imidazopyridines, such as sedative-hypnotic medicine zolpidem, anxiolytic agent alpidem and their derivatives. For this purpose, calcium carbonate (size 1.2 µm (PDI: 0.6), zeta potential: −10 mV), manganese carbonate (2.5 µm (PDI: 0.5), zeta potential: −12 mV) and titanium dioxide particles (3.7 µm (PDI: 0.4), zeta potential: −15 mV) were used. The compounds were encapsulated applying two techniques: adsorption on the preformed particles and co-precipitation during the synthesis of the particles. The polymer shell of the containers was formed by electrostatic adsorption of polyelectrolytes on the surface of the particles. The best encapsulation efficacy was shown for zolpidem incorporated into calcium carbonate (5.4%) and manganese carbonate (4.6%) by adsorption. Release of the compounds from the containers based on the proposed particles were characterised by the short time burst effect (<10 min) followed by desorption prolongation by formation of polymer shell. X-ray microtomography results demonstrate the prolonged retention of the containers with the mucoadhesive shell in the nasal cavity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA assisted four countries in the analysis of epidemiological data on African swine fever (ASF), collected until September 2017. The temporal analysis demonstrated that the average proportions of PCR and antibody-ELISA positive samples from the hunted wild boar remained below 3.9 and 6.6, respectively. A peak in the ASF incidence was observed 6 months after the first observed case, followed by a significant reduction of the number of cases and low levels of African swine fever virus (ASFV) circulation at the end of 38 months follow-up period at different spatial resolutions. The spatial analysis concluded that human-mediated spread of ASFV continues to play a critical role in the ASF epidemiology, despite all measures currently taken. 'Wild boar density', 'total road length' (as proxy for human activity) and 'average suitable wild boar habitat availability' were identified as predictors for the occurrence of ASF in Estonia by a Bayesian hierarchical model, whereas 'wild boar density' and 'density of pig farms' were predictors according to a generalised additive model. To evaluate the preventive strategies proposed in EFSA's Scientific Opinion (2015) to stop the spread of ASFV in the wild boar population, a simulation model, building on expert knowledge and literature was used. It was concluded that reduction of wild boar population and carcass removal to stop the spread of ASFV in the wild boar population are more effective when applied preventively in the infected area. Drastic depopulation, targeted hunting of female wild boar and carcass removal solely implemented as measures to control ASF in the wild boar population need to be implemented in a highly effective manner (at or beyond the limit of reported effectivity in wild boar management) to sustainably halt the spread of ASF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African swine fever virus (ASFV) has been notified in the Baltic countries and the eastern part of Poland from the beginning of 2014 up to now. In collaboration with the ASF-affected Member States (MS), EFSA is updating the epidemiological analysis of ASF in the European Union which was carried out in 2015. For this purpose, the latest epidemiological and laboratory data were analysed in order to identify the spatial-temporal pattern of the epidemic and a risk factors facilitating its spread. Currently, the ASF outbreaks in wild boar in the Baltic countries and Poland can be defined as a small-scale epidemic with a slow average spatial spread in wild boar subpopulations (approximately from 1 in Lithuania and Poland to 2 km/month in Estonia and Latvia). The number of positive samples in hunted wild boar peaks in winter which can be explained by human activity patterns (significant hunting activity over winter). The number of positive samples in wild boar found dead peaks in summer. This could be related to the epidemiology of the disease and/or the biology of wild boar; however, this needs further investigation. Virus prevalence in hunted wild boar is very low (0.04-3%), without any apparent trend over time. Apparent virus prevalence at country level in wild boar found dead in affected countries ranges from 60% to 86%, with the exception of Poland, where values between 0.5% and 1.42%, were observed. Since the beginning of the epidemic, the apparent antibody prevalence in hunted wild boar has always been lower than the apparent virus prevalence, indicating an unchanged epidemiological/immunological situation. The risk factor analysis shows an association between the number of settlements, human and domestic pigs population size or wild boar population density and the presence of ASF in wild boar for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most significant knowledge gaps in the prevention and control of African swine fever (ASF) were identified by the EU Veterinary services and other stakeholders involved in pig production and wild boar management through an online survey. The respondents were asked to identify the major research needs in order to improve short‐term ASF risk management. Four major gaps were identified: 'wild boar', 'African swine fever virus (ASFV) survival and transmission', 'biosecurity' and 'surveillance'. In particular, the respondents stressed the need for better knowledge on wild boar management and surveillance, and improved knowledge on the possible mechanism for spread and persistence of ASF in wild boar populations. They indicated the need for research on ASFV survival and transmission from the environment, different products such as feed and feed materials, and potential arthropod vector transmission. In addition, several research topics on biosecurity were identified as significant knowledge gaps and the need to identify risk factors for ASFV entry into domestic pig holdings, to develop protocols to implement specific and appropriate biosecurity measures, and to improve the knowledge about the domestic pig–wild boar interface. Potential sources of ASFV introduction into unaffected countries need to be better understood by an in‐depth analysis of the possible pathways of introduction of ASFV with the focus on food, feed, transport of live wild boars and human movements. Finally, research on communication methods to increase awareness among all players involved in the epidemiology of ASF (including truck drivers, hunters and tourists) and to increase compliance with existing control measures was also a topic mentioned by all stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In agreement with Article 6(2) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 on protective measures against pests of plants, the European Commission has been tasked by the Council and European Parliament to establish a list of Union quarantine pests which qualify as priority pests. The prioritisation is based on the severity of the economic, social and environmental impact that these pests can cause in the Union territory. The Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) is in charge of developing a methodology based on a multi‐criteria decision analysis and composite indicators. In this context, EFSA has provided technical and scientific data related to these pests, in particular: (i) the potential host range and distribution of each of these pests in the Union territory at the level of NUTS2 regions; (ii) parameters quantifying the potential consequences of these pests, e.g. crop losses in terms of yield and quality, rate of spread and time to detection. Expert knowledge elicitation methodology has been applied by EFSA in order to provide those parameters in a consistent and transparent manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2018, no lumpy skin disease (LSD) outbreaks were reported in the Balkan region, after the decline reported in 2017 (385) compared to 2016 (7,483). This confirms the effectiveness of the vaccination campaign based on the LSD homologous vaccine strain which continued throughout 2018 with over 2.5 million animals vaccinated, keeping the mean vaccination coverage above 70%. In 2018, LSD outbreaks were reported in Russia, Turkey and Georgia. In Russia, the LSD epidemics expanded northward and eastward, while in Turkey, the most affected region was in the east. LSD is spreading in Turkey since 2013, despite large vaccination campaigns with heterologous vaccine performed since 2014. This might support the hypothesis that the use of heterologous vaccines results in insufficient protection, and therefore, the use of homologous LSD vaccine in Turkey should be considered to prevent further spread. As the LSD epidemic in Turkey is a risk for reintroduction into the EU, it is recommended to continue the vaccination campaigns in 2019 in the high‐risk areas of Balkan region. Spread rates of LSD within a village were estimated from outbreak data for Albania, which can be used to inform the level of vaccination required to control an outbreak in a village. In terms of vaccine safety, the reports from the field suggest that, compared to the large number of animals vaccinated in the Balkan region since 2015, a very limited number of side effects have been recorded so far, although from published literature, local or even systemic side effects in some animals may occur after vaccination. However, due to inadequate study design in the reviewed studies, there is no consensus on the magnitude of such effects and on their real consequences on production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 16 August and 15 November 2018, 14 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry establishments in Bulgaria and seven HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks, one in captive birds in Germany and six in wild birds in Denmark and the Netherlands were reported in the European Union (EU). No human infection due to HPAI A(H5N8) and A(H5N6) viruses have been reported in Europe so far. Seroconversion of people exposed during outbreaks in Russia has been reported in one study. Although the risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low, appropriate personal protection measures of people exposed will reduce any potential risk. Genetic clustering of the viruses isolated from poultry in Bulgaria suggests three separate introductions in 2016 and a continuing circulation and transmission of these viruses within domestic ducks. Recent data from Bulgaria provides further indication that the sensitivity of passive surveillance of HPAI A(H5N8) in domestic ducks may be significantly compromised. Increased vigilance is needed especially during the periods of cold spells in winter when aggregations of wild birds and their movements towards areas with more favourable weather conditions may be encouraged. Two HPAI outbreaks in poultry were reported during this period from western Russia. Low numbers of HPAI outbreaks were observed in Africa and Asia, no HPAI cases were detected in wild birds in the time period relevant for this report. Although a few HPAI outbreaks were reported in Africa and Asia during the reporting period, the probability of HPAI virus introductions from non‐EU countries via wild birds particularly via the north‐eastern route from Russia is increasing, as the fall migration of wild birds from breeding and moulting sites to the wintering sites continues. Furthermore, the lower temperatures and ultraviolet radiation in winter can facilitate the environmental survival of any potential AI viruses introduced to Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This update on the African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in the EU demonstrated that out of all tested wild boar found dead, the proportion of positive samples peaked in winter and summer. For domestic pigs only, a summer peak was evident. Despite the existence of several plausible factors that could result in the observed seasonality, there is no evidence to prove causality. Wild boar density was the most influential risk factor for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar. In the vast majority of introductions in domestic pig holdings, direct contact with infected domestic pigs or wild boar was excluded as the route of introduction. The implementation of emergency measures in the wild boar management zones following a focal ASF introduction was evaluated. As a sole control strategy, intensive hunting around the buffer area might not always be sufficient to eradicate ASF. However, the probability of eradication success is increased after adding quick and safe carcass removal. A wider buffer area leads to a higher success probability; however it implies a larger intensive hunting area and the need for more animals to be hunted. If carcass removal and intensive hunting are effectively implemented, fencing is more useful for delineating zones, rather than adding substantially to control efficacy. However, segments of fencing will be particularly useful in those areas where carcass removal or intensive hunting is difficult to implement. It was not possible to demonstrate an effect of natural barriers on ASF spread. Human‐mediated translocation may override any effect of natural barriers. Recommendations for ASF control in four different epidemiological scenarios are presented. This publication is linked to the following EFSA Supporting Publications article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2018.EN-1521/full [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The duration of the vaccination campaign sufficient to eliminate lumpy skin disease (LSD) mainly depends on the vaccination effectiveness and coverage achieved. By using a spread epidemiological model, assuming a vaccination effectiveness of 65%, with 50% and 90% coverage, 4 and 3 years campaigns, respectively, are needed to eliminate LSD. When vaccination effectiveness is 80% to 95%, 2 years of vaccination at coverage of 90% is sufficient to eliminate LSD virus (LSDV). For shorter campaigns, LSD is predicted to persist. When the infection is eliminated by vaccination, two pathways for disease recurrence are possible, (i) by new introduction from a neighbouring affected area, especially by introduction of infected animals, or, less likely (ii) the infection persisting either in the environment, in vectors or in wild animals. For planning surveillance, several elements should be considered: the objectives and related design prevalence, the epidemiological situation, the immunological status of the host population, the geographical area and the season, the type of surveillance (active or passive), the diagnostic methods including clinical detection (considered the most effective method for early detection of LSD), the target population, the sample size and frequency. According to the model, for early detecting new introductions of LSD, it may be needed to clinically check a large number of herds (e.g. 2–3,000 herds) monthly. Lower sample sizes can be considered, when a greater delay in detecting the virus is acceptable. Where vaccination is maintained, active surveillance for verifying the effectiveness of vaccination would be needed. Demonstrating disease absence can rely on serological surveillance, which should consider the test sensitivity, the design prevalence (estimated value: 3.5%), the onset and duration of serum antibodies. Important knowledge gaps on LSD are about within‐herd transmission, duration of protective immunity, role of vectors, diagnostic tests, farm location and type in the at‐risk countries and the epidemiological status of neighbouring countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission requested EFSA to estimate the risk of spread of African swine fever (ASF) and to identify potential risk factors (indicators) for the spread of ASF, given introduction in the south-eastern countries of Europe (region of concern, ROC), namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. Three EU Member States (MS) - Croatia, Greece and Slovenia - were included in the ROC due to their geographical location and ASF-free status. Based on collected information on potential risk factors (indicators) for each country and the relevant EU regulations in force, the estimated probability of spread of ASF within the ROC within one year after introduction into the ROC was assessed to be very high (from 66% to 100%). This estimate was determined after considering the high number of indicators present in most of the countries in the ROC and the known effect that these indicators can have on ASF spread, especially those related to the structure of the domestic pig sector, the presence of wild boar and social factors. The presence of indicators varies between countries in the ROC. Each country is at risk of ASF spread following introduction; however, some countries may have a higher probability of ASF spread following introduction. In addition, the probability of ASF spread from the ROC to EU MSs outside the ROC within one year after introduction of ASF in the ROC was estimated to be very low to low (from 0% to 15%). This estimate was based on the comparison of the indicators present in the ROC and the already affected countries in south-eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where there was no evidence of ASF spread to other EU MS within one year., (© 2019 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

In 2018, no lumpy skin disease (LSD) outbreaks were reported in the Balkan region, after the decline reported in 2017 (385) compared to 2016 (7,483). This confirms the effectiveness of the vaccination campaign based on the LSD homologous vaccine strain which continued throughout 2018 with over 2.5 million animals vaccinated, keeping the mean vaccination coverage above 70%. In 2018, LSD outbreaks were reported in Russia, Turkey and Georgia. In Russia, the LSD epidemics expanded northward and eastward, while in Turkey, the most affected region was in the east. LSD is spreading in Turkey since 2013, despite large vaccination campaigns with heterologous vaccine performed since 2014. This might support the hypothesis that the use of heterologous vaccines results in insufficient protection, and therefore, the use of homologous LSD vaccine in Turkey should be considered to prevent further spread. As the LSD epidemic in Turkey is a risk for reintroduction into the EU, it is recommended to continue the vaccination campaigns in 2019 in the high-risk areas of Balkan region. Spread rates of LSD within a village were estimated from outbreak data for Albania, which can be used to inform the level of vaccination required to control an outbreak in a village. In terms of vaccine safety, the reports from the field suggest that, compared to the large number of animals vaccinated in the Balkan region since 2015, a very limited number of side effects have been recorded so far, although from published literature, local or even systemic side effects in some animals may occur after vaccination. However, due to inadequate study design in the reviewed studies, there is no consensus on the magnitude of such effects and on their real consequences on production., (© 2019 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The European Commission requested EFSA to compare the reliability of wild boar density estimates across the EU and to provide guidance to improve data collection methods. Currently, the only EU-wide available data are hunting data. Their collection methods should be harmonised to be comparable and to improve predictive models for wild boar density. These models could be validated by more precise density data, collected at local level e.g. by camera trapping. Based on practical and theoretical considerations, it is currently not possible to establish wild boar density thresholds that do not allow sustaining African swine fever (ASF). There are many drivers determining if ASF can be sustained or not, including heterogeneous population structures and human-mediated spread and there are still unknowns on the importance of different transmission modes in the epidemiology. Based on extensive literature reviews and observations from affected Member States, the efficacy of different wild boar population reduction and separation methods is evaluated. Different wild boar management strategies at different stages of the epidemic are suggested. Preventive measures to reduce and stabilise wild boar density, before ASF introduction, will be beneficial both in reducing the probability of exposure of the population to ASF and the efforts needed for potential emergency actions (i.e. less carcass removal) if an ASF incursion were to occur. Passive surveillance is the most effective and efficient method of surveillance for early detection of ASF in free areas. Following focal ASF introduction, the wild boar populations should be kept undisturbed for a short period (e.g. hunting ban on all species, leave crops unharvested to provide food and shelter within the affected area) and drastic reduction of the wild boar population may be performed only ahead of the ASF advance front, in the free populations. Following the decline in the epidemic, as demonstrated through passive surveillance, active population management should be reconsidered., (© 2018 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) is an emerging fungal pathogen of salamanders. Despite limited surveillance, Bsal was detected in kept salamanders populations in Belgium, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and in wild populations in some regions of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. According to niche modelling, at least part of the distribution range of every salamander species in Europe overlaps with the climate conditions predicted to be suitable for Bsal. Passive surveillance is considered the most suitable approach for detection of Bsal emergence in wild populations. Demonstration of Bsal absence is considered feasible only in closed populations of kept susceptible species. In the wild, Bsal can spread by both active (e.g. salamanders, anurans) and passive (e.g. birds, water) carriers; it is most likely maintained/spread in infected areas by contacts of salamanders or by interactions with anurans, whereas human activities most likely cause Bsal entry into new areas and populations. In kept amphibians, Bsal contamination via live silent carriers (wild birds and anurans) is considered extremely unlikely. The risk-mitigation measures that were considered the most feasible and effective: (i) for ensuring safer international or intra-EU trade of live salamanders, are: ban or restrictions on salamander imports, hygiene procedures and good practice manuals; (ii) for protecting kept salamanders from Bsal, are: identification and treatment of positive collections; (iii) for on-site protection of wild salamanders, are: preventing translocation of wild amphibians and release/return to the wild of kept/temporarily housed wild salamanders, and setting up contact points/emergency teams for passive surveillance. Combining several risk-mitigation measures improve the overall effectiveness. It is recommended to: introduce a harmonised protocol for Bsal detection throughout the EU; improve data acquisition on salamander abundance and distribution; enhance passive surveillance activities; increase public and professionals' awareness; condition any movement of captive salamanders on Bsal known health status., (© 2018 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

A specific concept of strain was developed in order to classify the BTV serotypes ever reported in Europe based on their properties of animal health impact: the genotype, morbidity, mortality, speed of spread, period and geographical area of occurrence were considered as classification parameters. According to this methodology the strain groups identified were (i) the BTV strains belonging to serotypes BTV-1-24, (ii) some strains of serotypes BTV-16 and (iii) small ruminant-adapted strains belonging to serotypes BTV-25, -27, -30. Those strain groups were assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7, Article 5 on the eligibility of bluetongue to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to bluetongue. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection, expert judgement at individual and collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. The strain group BTV (1-24) can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL, while the strain group BTV-25-30 and BTV-16 cannot. The strain group BTV-1-24 meets the criteria as in Sections 2 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (b) and (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL. The animal species that can be considered to be listed for BTV-1-24 according to Article 8(3) are several species of Bovidae, Cervidae and Camelidae as susceptible species; domestic cattle, sheep and red deer as reservoir hosts, midges insect of genus Culicoides spp. as vector species., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

After a request from the European Commission, EFSA's Panel on Animal Health and Welfare summarised the main characteristics of 36 vector-borne diseases (VBDs) in https://efsa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/PublicGallery/index.html?appid=dfbeac92aea944599ed1eb754aa5e6d1. The risk of introduction in the EU through movement of livestock or pets was assessed for each of the 36 VBDs individually, using a semiquantitative Method to INTegrate all relevant RISK aspects (MINTRISK model), which was further modified to a European scale into the http://www3.lei.wur.nl/mintrisk/ModelMgt.aspx. Only eight of the 36 VBD-agents had an overall rate of introduction in the EU (being the combination of the rate of entry, vector transmission and establishment) which was estimated to be above 0.001 introductions per year. These were Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, bluetongue virus, West Nile virus, Schmallenberg virus, Hepatozoon canis , Leishmania infantum , Bunyamwera virus and Highlands J. virus. For these eight diseases, the annual extent of spread was assessed, assuming the implementation of available, authorised prevention and control measures in the EU. Further, the probability of overwintering was assessed, as well as the possible impact of the VBDs on public health, animal health and farm production. For the other 28 VBD-agents for which the rate of introduction was estimated to be very low, no further assessments were made. Due to the uncertainty related to some parameters used for the risk assessment or the instable or unpredictability disease situation in some of the source regions, it is recommended to update the assessment when new information becomes available. Since this risk assessment was carried out for large regions in the EU for many VBD-agents, it should be considered as a first screening. If a more detailed risk assessment for a specific VBD is wished for on a national or subnational level, the EFSA-VBD-RISK-model is freely available for this purpose., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

African swine fever virus (ASFV) has been notified in the Baltic countries and the eastern part of Poland from the beginning of 2014 up to now. In collaboration with the ASF-affected Member States (MS), EFSA is updating the epidemiological analysis of ASF in the European Union which was carried out in 2015. For this purpose, the latest epidemiological and laboratory data were analysed in order to identify the spatial-temporal pattern of the epidemic and a risk factors facilitating its spread. Currently, the ASF outbreaks in wild boar in the Baltic countries and Poland can be defined as a small-scale epidemic with a slow average spatial spread in wild boar subpopulations (approximately from 1 in Lithuania and Poland to 2 km/month in Estonia and Latvia). The number of positive samples in hunted wild boar peaks in winter which can be explained by human activity patterns (significant hunting activity over winter). The number of positive samples in wild boar found dead peaks in summer. This could be related to the epidemiology of the disease and/or the biology of wild boar; however, this needs further investigation. Virus prevalence in hunted wild boar is very low (0.04-3%), without any apparent trend over time. Apparent virus prevalence at country level in wild boar found dead in affected countries ranges from 60% to 86%, with the exception of Poland, where values between 0.5% and 1.42%, were observed. Since the beginning of the epidemic, the apparent antibody prevalence in hunted wild boar has always been lower than the apparent virus prevalence, indicating an unchanged epidemiological/immunological situation. The risk factor analysis shows an association between the number of settlements, human and domestic pigs population size or wild boar population density and the presence of ASF in wild boar for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)