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Following the Global Settlement, analysts extensively use a top pick designation allowing for greater granularity of information among buy recommended stocks, but conflicts of interest can potentially influence this designation. Examining a novel sample of top picks, we find that a calendar-time portfolio of top picks generates an abnormal performance of 17.6% per year. Top picks have greater investment value than do buy recommendations and alternative analyst investment strategies. Both institutional and retail investors trade in response to top picks. However, only institutional investors appear to identify top picks that have greater investment value when they are announced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combining novel data on analyst employment history and mutual fund commission payments, we show that client funds generate higher returns on stocks for which they have access to research by industry expert analysts. The outperformance is greater when funds are more important clients and cannot be attributed to tipping. Client funds place modestly higher weights on stocks covered by industry expert analysts and allocate more commissions to brokers providing such coverage. For identification, we exploit exogenous analyst coverage disruptions. Our findings contribute to the debate on whether mutual funds obtain any investment value from access to analysts through the soft-dollar arrangement. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Washington policy research analysts (WAs) monitor political developments and produce research to interpret the impact of these events. We find institutional clients channel more commissions to brokerages providing policy research and commission-allocating institutional clients generate superior returns on their politically sensitive trades. We find that WA policy research reports are associated with significant price and volume reactions. Finally, we find sell-side analysts with access to WA issue superior stock recommendations on politically sensitive stocks. These effects are particularly acute during periods of high political uncertainty. Overall, we uncover a unique and an important conduit through which political information filters into asset prices. This paper was accepted by David Sraer, finance. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4919. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]