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Los estados normativos solo pueden ser percibidos a partir de su frustración. Partiendo de esta premisa, el presente artículo propone una definición filosófica de la inseguridad social, basada en la reciente revisión de la función práctica y cognitiva de dos emociones tradicionalmente entendidas como negativas: el resentimiento y la ansiedad. Se analizará el resentimiento como un potencial generador de vínculos políticos en la memoria de un pasado de protección arrebatada, y la ansiedad como un indicador epistémico en condiciones de incertidumbre objetiva. Se colige una definición de la inseguridad acotada entre la retención resentida del pasado y la proyección preventiva del futuro. Normative states can only be experien-ced from their frustration. Based on this premise, this article proposes a philosophical definition of social insecurity, based on the recent review of the practical and cognitive function of two emo-tions traditionally understood as negative: resen-tment and anxiety. Resentment will be analyzed as a potential generator of political links in the memory of a past of rapt protection, whereas anxiety will be understood as an epistemic indi-cator in conditions of objective uncertainty. A definition of insecurity will be set between the resentful retention of the past and the preventive projection of the future. El presente artículo ha sido realizado en el marco de los proyectos de investigación «Sujetos, emociones y estructuras. Para un proyecto de teoría social crítica» (FFI2016-75073-R), «Gobierno de sí y políticas de la subjetividad en la crisis de la racionalidad neoliberal» (FFI2016-76856-R).

In this article, I attempt to analyse the way in which the world order that resulted from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has altered the relationship between security and the future. Security entails an epistemological relation to the future, on the basis of which the present is shaped. The radically unprecedented nature of the new terrorism has called into question the possibility of ordering the present in relation to knowledge of the future. The terms of the political have, since 2001, been redefined due to a fear and uncertainty that have modified even the logic of criminal law. That the contemporary preventive state exercises excessive control over civil society, in which security and rights enter into conflict, is a fact that the social sciences have been dealing with in the past few years. The specificity of my approach in this article lies in an understanding of the present and of the organising capacity of politics on the basis of the type of epistemological relation that is established with respect to the future. My final objective is to try to clarify whether the contemporary preventive logic responds to a specific need of our times or whether, on the contrary, it reveals a structural trait of our political and juridical configuration. To this effect, I shall first examine the political–juridical state of exception, a mechanism whereby the law is suspended in order to neutralise circumstances that are unforeseen in the ordinary provisions of the law. According to Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2003), the state of exception has become a paradigm for government. This thesis, which has greatly engaged current academic reflection, implies that the obsession with protecting order from any contingency not envisaged in the regulatory and criminal codes entails the generalisation of decisions that, in seeking to protect law and order, lie outside the law. The dire consequence is that they end up denying what they sought to protect. The scope of my analysis is the conflict between civil rights and security in the United States, not only because of its obvious geopolitical relevance, but also because the idiosyncrasy of US constitutional logic radically reveals the conflict between the normativity of the law and the unpredictability of the future. Nevertheless, my objective will be to outline the connections between the concrete case of the United States and the international reality of this issue. Another approach I shall take into account are the recent critical security studies, which, despite their internal diversity, share a development and an application to the present of the research carried out by Michel Foucault on governmentality and biopolitics. From this perspective, contingency becomes the principal reason of government, an occasion to legislate. Gonzalo Velasco Arias is based in the Department of Philosophy of the Universidad Autonoma of Madrid and also at the Universidad Camilo Jose Cela. He holds a PhD in the “Philosophy of History” from the same institution and he is a Fellow of the Research Project “Remains of Evil in PostTotalitarian Societies: Responses from Democratic Politics” (FFI2012-31635). He has recently co-edited the book Normalidad de la crisis/crisis de la normalidad (Madrid and Buenos Aires: Katz). He was a Visiting Researcher at Cornell University in 2010 and, under Professor Roberto Esposito, at the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane di Napoli in 2009. Email: gvelasco@ucjc.edu, gonzalovelascoarias@gmail.com

Com o presente artigo propomos o ambiciosoobjetivo de expor e integrar duas das diferentestradicoes que no ultimo decenio tem abordado atematica da excecao. Por um lado, as ferramentasconceituais de filosofos como Giorgio Agamben ouRoberto Esposito nos servirao como marcos para tracarnossa hipotese de pesquisa: o estado de excecao e umanecessidade estrutural ou temporaria dos Estados deDireito? Por outro lado, daremos resposta a tal questaopor meio da literatura politico-juridica que, desde ahistoria da “ditadura constitucional” de Rossiter ate o nosso presente, nos tem advertido acerca dos riscos, tentando articular mecanismos de contencao do poder soberano que se manifesta durante os periodos de excecao. O fio condutor sera o ideal politico da prevencao do imprevisivel e do desconhecido, as formas de saber que engendra e os riscos que acarreta para a sociedade democratica. Nesse sentido, concluimos que a analise meramente legal e insuficiente, dado que nao contempla todos os efeitos normativos da normalizacao da excecao.

El presente artículo trata de caracterizar la “invención de lo social” como una estrategia para neutralizar el antagonismo capital trabajo que domina el siglo XIX. Para ello, se sigue un método arqueológico y genealógico, que toma en consideración las transformaciones epistemológicas que posibilitaron el advenimiento de la racionalidad social, así como las luchas de poder en las que estas transformaciones deben ser enmarcadas.Palabras clave: genealogía, dispositivo, bloqueo epistemológico, liberalismo, responsabilidad, accidente, riesgo, seguros (tecnología de), solidaridad. Abstract:This paper attempts to outline the “invention of the social” as a strategy whose goal was to neutralize the XIXth century work-capital antagonism. With this purpose in mind, we follow an archeological and genealogical procedure that takes into account both the epistemological transformations which made possible the advent of the new social rationality, and the power struggles in which those may be enshrined.Keywords: genealogy, dispositive, epistemological block, liberalism, responsibility, accident, risk, insurance (technology of), solidarity.