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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 666 II. Background 667 A. Labor Violations in Public Procurement 667 B. The Power of Procurement 671 III. International Labor Laws and the FAR 674 [...], No part of the world is untouched by workplace violations. As a result, governments involuntarily procure from contractors who have some involvement in illegal labor practices. Although many countries have denounced and prohibited the use of illegal labor, fewer have taken concrete steps to enforce the prohibitions and ensure the eradication of these practices in government supply chains. This Note argues that the United States should use the market power of its public procurement regime as a tool to promote regulation of labor violations, rather than continuing to rely on mandatory reporting and passive tools of prohibition. Through an analysis of recent successful implementations of social considerations in European procurement systems, this Note explores ways that the United States procurement system can similarly set more stringent enforcement mechanisms against labor violators. It finds solutions in adding social considerations to responsibility determinations, investigating and auditing contractors in high-risk sectors to ensure compliance with labor standards, and increasing the use of suspensions and debarments to deter noncompliance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 525 II. Bid Protests: Background and Processes 528 A. An Overview of Bid Protests 529 B. The History of Bid Protests 530 1. Bid Protests [...], The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) bid protest decisions often create standards that are followed to nearly the same degree as statutes, Executive Orders (EOs), and regulations and are often given similar deference. GAO decisions, however, are much harder for contracting officers (COs) to find, read, and understand than statutes, regulations, and EOs. This confusion fundamentally undermines the intent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to create a single source for all acquisition regulations that is written in simple, easy to understand language and creates an untenable situation for COs who are unaware of these additional rules. Codification of the standards created by GAO decisions would allow public participation and comment during the rule-making process and provide clearer, more consistent guidance on topics where the FAR has left room for interpretation that is currently being filled by standards created in GAO's bid protest decisions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 688 II. Background 691 A. FIFA: The Dark History of Our Beloved Tournament 691 1. World Cup Bidding Process 691 2. Requirements to Host the [...], Qatar is a Middle Eastern country that attracted the international spotlight for its improbable award of the 2022 World Cup back in 2010. This was an historic event in the history of the World Cup because it was the first time a Middle Eastern country was awarded the right to host the games. However, this tremendous event has been overshadowed by stories of abuse of migrant workers tasked with building the infrastructure for this momentous event. Due in part to FIFA's history of corruption and Qatar's procurement process of employing companies without investigating their employment practices, a sporting event that was meant to be enjoyed by millions of people is shrouded in disgust and death. Without the intervention of FIFA's member nations enforcing more stringent practices to avoid the atrocities of Qatar and World Cups before it, more people will continue to be taken advantage of. Introducing an independent governing body that is separate from FIFA would alleviate some of the problems facing the procurement issues that plagued Qatar by allowing independent investigators to determine whether a host country has sufficiently developed and mature procurement practices to build infrastructure for the greatest tournament in the world.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 461 II. Background 463 A. Trade Secret Protections Generally: What Is a Trade Secret, Anyway? 463 B. Overview of Trade Secret Protections Currently Available to [...], When a company enters into a contract with the federal government, it often faces a considerable risk: the risk that its trade secrets may be exposed and misappropriated, first by the government, and then by its competitors. Although government contractors have several tools that they can use to protect their trade secrets in the procurement context, including data rights, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 4, and other precautionary measures, the balance of risk still tends to tip against even the most diligent and well-counseled contractor. This Note outlines the various ways that trade secret issues arise in government contracts, identifies avenues for relief for contractors, and argues that the lack of trade secret protection in the procurement context may chill companies from contracting with the government at all. Finally, this Note proposes that the government should implement better trade secret protections, including amending FOIA Exemption 4, adding an additional data rights provision in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and/or expanding the use of Other Transactions Agreements (OTAs) to assure contractors that their intellectual property is secure. Such reforms will offer contractors the type of flexibility that they enjoy in the private sector and thus incentivize them to transact with the federal government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 314 II. Background on Protest Timeliness Rules and Communications Regarding the Terms of a Solicitation 315 A. Timeliness Rules at the GAO and the Court [...], A potential offeror that is dissatisfied with the terms of a solicitation may communicate with an agency regarding those terms prior to the close of the solicitation and request that the agency amend the terms or otherwise take action to address the potential offeror's concern. Indeed, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) expressly encourages the offeror to do so. However, by communicating with an agency regarding solicitation terms and requesting a remedy, a potential offeror may inadvertently trigger the start of the protest period at the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) if it receives an adverse agency response. That same communication, however, may also preserve the offeror's ability to timely file a protest regarding the terms of the solicitation at the United States Court of Federal Claims, including, in certain circumstances, after award. This article examines the divergent timeliness rules at those fora.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 706 II. Background 711 A. Immigration Enforcement Prior to 1996 711 B. Immigration Enforcement Post-1996 713 III. How Things Work: An Overview of Contract Vehicles [...], In implementing its immigration enforcement regime, the federal government has favored the use of three-party contracts, known as Intergovernmental Service Agreements (IGSAs), wherein the federal government contracts with a state or local government for the provision of detention space and services. The state or local government then subcontracts with a private entity, which provides the necessary space and services. This Note discusses the government's current immigration detention regime within the context of federal procurement regulations. Specifically, it analyzes the problems arising out of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) preferential use of IGSAs, as opposed to directly contracting with public and private entities, in procuring detention facilities and services. No governmental entity has taken affirmative and effective ownership of overseeing private companies that participate in IGSAs. Those firms then provide subpar detention facilities and services, thus running afoul of underlying principles governing the U.S. immigration law regime. This Note asserts that the use of IGSAs in acquiring detention facilities and services is an irredeemable ill in the United States' immigration enforcement regime. Consequently, it recommends that Congress enact legislation to cure these deficiencies by explicitly (1) prohibiting the use of IGSAs in acquiring detention bedspace and services; (2) articulating a stated preference for the use of direct contracts to meet ICE's detention needs; and (3) permitting ICE to meet exigent and compelling detention needs through limited use of interagency contracts ("riders") with the United States Marshals Service. Only then will ICE be forced to recalibrate its efforts and affirmatively prioritize detainees' health and safety over administrative flexibility and ease.

World Trade Organization--General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994--government procurement derogation--general exceptions--public health--localization requirement--shortage of supply of pharmaceutical products TURKEY--CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING THE PRODUCTION, IMPORTATION AND MARKETING OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, [...]

ACA has issued Guidance on Application of the Build America, Buy America Act (BABA) on Coatings Supplied to Federally Funded Infrastructure Projects. The guide focuses specifically on applying the domestic [...]