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This paper presents a mixed integer linear programming solution approach for the equilibrium problem with equi- librium constraints (EPEC) problem of finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) in strategic bidding in short-term electricity markets. A binary expansion (BE) scheme is used to transform the nonlinear, nonconvex, NE problem into a mixed integer linear problem (MILP), which can be solved by commercially available computational systems. The BE scheme can be applicable to Cournot, Bertrand, or joint price/quantity bidding models. The approach is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 95-CW Brazilian system, including unit-commitment decisions to the price-maker agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Renewable sources have recently emerged as a generation option for many countries in order to promote clean energy development. In the case of Brazil, small hydro plants and cogeneration from sugarcane waste (bagasse) have been attractive alternatives during the past years, with hundreds of MW installed since 2004. Despite their advantages, both alternatives are hindered by seasonal yet complementary availability. This forces producers to discount (or price) the risks faced when selling firm energy contracts and may ultimately lead to projects being commercially unattractive. We propose a stochastic optimization model that defines the optimal composition of a portfolio based on these two renewable sources in order to maximize the revenue of an energy trading company. At the same time, this model mitigates hydrological and fuel unavailability risks, thus allowing the participation of both sources in the forward market environment in a competitive manner. A case study is presented, based on data from the Brazilian system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The firm energy of generation plants is a critical component in some electricity markets. It is usually calculated by the regulator and sets a cap to the amount a plant can trade in capacity markets (or auctions), in order to avoid free-riding behaviors. Firm energy is a systemic property and, in case of hydro plants, a synergy is observed whenever a cooperative operation occurs, i.e., the firm energy of a system is greater than the sum of the individual plants. This immediately raises the question of how to divide the system's firm energy among the individual hydro plants. The objective of this work is to investigate the application of different allocation methods of firm energy rights among hydro plants using a game-theoretic framework. It is shown that there is not an optimal and unique approach to make this allocation. The paper investigates the advantages and disadvantages of different methods, such as marginal allocation, average production during the critical period, incremental allocation, finally recommending the Aumann-Shapley as the allocation method. This method is tested for the Brazilian power system, which has around 100 hydro plants. The results obtained are compared with the current allocation adopted by the electricity regulatory agency of Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]