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This article explores China's ambitions to become a global hegemon in the 21st century. The research traces the origins of these ambitions in China's strategic culture and system of ideas and representations. Forming a geopolitical study in this way, this article zooms in the concepts of 'middle', 'Middle Kingdom' and Tianxia. 'Middle' symbolises China's centrality and moral authority; 'Middle Kingdom' embodies the idea of a state where political power is concentrated; and Tianxia represents China's historical visions of the global order. The research results show that China's traditional worldviews suggest ambitions for a leading status in the international chessboard, which is confirmed by China's aspects of revolutionary mentality and development of the military power. While the extent to which China will ascend to a leading role remains uncertain, understanding China's identity—via its strategic culture—is crucial for grasping both China's ambitious policy and its impact on the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I. Petro’dan miras kalan büyük güç olma ideali, Rus dış politikasının esasını oluşturmaktadır. Ülkede rejimler değişse de Rus yönetimlerinin büyük güç olma ideali hiç değişmemektedir. Putin’in işbaşına gelmesiyle Rusya, ülke içinde ve yakın çevresinde gücünü pekiştirdikten sonra büyük güç olma idealine geri dönmüştür. Bu dönüşte, konjonktürel gelişmelerin yanında NATO’nun doğuya genişlemesinin etkisi büyüktür. Rusya’nın tepki olarak Gürcistan ve Ukrayna’ya müdahalelerinin etkileri devam etmektedir. Özellikle Mart 2014’te Kırım’ı ilhakının ardından Batı’nın siyasi ve ekonomik yaptırımlarından kurtulmak amacıyla başlattığı girişimleri, Rusya’nın Afrika’ya yönelişiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Son olarak 24 Şubat 2022’de Ukrayna’yı müdahale kararının bu yönelişi hızlandırdığı söylenebilir. Bu dönemde Afrika’daki jeopolitik ortamın dengeleyici bir güce ihtiyaç duyması, Rusya’ya avantaj sağlamıştır. Batı’dan (ABD ve AB) sonra Çin için de bölgede sömürgeci algısının güçlenmeye başlamasıyla, Rusya’nın bu avantajdan yararlanması, gücüne, bölgede takip edeceği stratejiye ve dış politika vasıtalarının etkinliğine bağlıdır. Rusya’nın bölge ülkelerinin siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik sorunlarının çözümüne yardımcı olması, kıtadaki ilişkilerinin gelişmesinde belirleyici olacaktır. Bu yöndeki beklentileri bilerek hareket etmesi, diğer büyük güçlerle rekabetinde kazanan tarafta olmasını sağlayacaktır. Rekabette istediği sonuçları elde etmesi ise, büyük güç hayalinin gerçekleşmesiyle sonuçlanabilecektir. Bu genel esaslar çerçevesinde çalışmanın amacı, Rusya’nın bu konudaki niyetiyle kapasitesi arasındaki uyumun ortaya konulması ve bölgede yaratacağı etkinin belirlenmesidir.

Russian foreign policy is a piece of conundrum which is covered by its national interest. The policy has been changed timely following pragmatic approach. The study examines in the initial phase of the post-Soviet period, Russia endeavored its hard and sole to integrate with the "civilized" Western world. But this integration did not achieve Russia's national interest which led Russia to an anti-west-centric approach, the multi-polar world. In the stage Russia strategically engaged with Asia and the Middle East to reconstruct its post-soviet transitional period's subdued image. In relation to former post-soviet republics, Russia gained modest profile in terms of security and economic. However, for showing great power identity, Russia directly betrothed in Syrian and Ukraine war which demands Russia needs a seat in great power table. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to analyze the relationship between China's maritime security policy and territorial disputes in the gray zone in the South China Sea. The study examines this relationship through the strategy and means of Chinese maritime security policy, aiming to clarify the factors that influenced this policy to drag its territorial disputes into the gray zone. The article argues that the rivalries between countries in the region fostered by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) operated as an external pressure on China. Furthermore, geopolitical factors and the perception of the Chinese ruling elite have contributed to considering the UNCLOS as a threat to China's maritime interests in the South China Sea. Consequently, the Chinese maritime security policy seeks to shift the status quo in the region to establish China as a hegemonic regional power with its sphere of influence while avoiding an open war with its neighbors and the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The amplification of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022 marked a turning point in relations between Russia and the "Collective West." Moscow was cut off from Europe and subjected to sanctions and diplomatic isolation. In response, Russia turned to new partners in the Global South (especially in Africa) and intensified its criticism of the Western-dominated liberal international order. It has also unleashed propaganda narratives that depict the existing world system as a hegemonic and oppressive arrangement aimed at preserving the privileged position of the West at the expense of the non-West. This paper contextualizes these developments using the popular Larson-Shevchenko framework of social identity theory. I argue that Russia not only challenges the existing order by invading countries, but seeks to undermine its normative foundations with weaponized narratives, while also cynically attempting to frame Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine as an anti-colonial response to Western hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between the US and Russia during the George W. Bush era were marked by a dramatic shift from cooperation to confrontation. Russia's unequivocal support for the US-led War on Terror in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 gave way to a sustained rise in anti-Western sentiment in the Russian political narrative. This article analyses US-Russia relations during the presidency of George W. Bush through the lens of great power relations and status. It explores the distinctive aspects of the Bush administration's foreign policy approach and how they impacted the US-Russia relationship: notably increasing US unilateralism and its apparent rejection of multilateralism, liberal interventionism and the pursuit of democracy promotion around the world. These continue to shape the Russian view of the US, its intentions and attitude towards international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the strategy of self-exclusion in the foreign policy of small states, considering their goals and expected results of this strategy, that is, the main conditions for its implementation, the main determinants, and also identifies and characterizes its varieties and practical manifestations. In this context, global transformations also cause changes related to the positions and roles of small states in world politics and international relations. At the same time, global transformations change the understanding of the security of small states, which in turn leads to an increase in the number of studies in this area. Together, these factors become the rationale for the relevance of studying the security problems of small states in modern conditions. In conclusion, the results of the analysis are summarized, the features of the strategy of self-exclusion, common features and differences in its varieties are shown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Based on the literature on rising powers, we contend that India has historically perceived itself as a civilizational entity and benefited from the loopholes opened by power transition periods to connect its material capabilities with its normative ambition. Our methodology compares how India behaved after the Cold War (from 1991) with China’s emergence (2008 onwards) through three variables: (i) the acquisition of economic and military power, (ii) the quest for globalized authority, and (iii) the deliberate pursuit of international leadership. We conclude that if the first was already present after the Cold War, the other two only followed more recently, when India employed a deliberate strategy to shape global issues.

This article examines the impact the war in Ukraine has had on Russia's great power status. Post-Soviet Russia has been one of the most active status-seekers and sought to re-establish its rank among the existing great power status community. In its claim to high status, Russia has historically relied on traditional status markers, including its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, diplomatic prominence at the summits with other great powers, and the strength of its military. However, as this paper shows, Moscow's fateful choice to launch a war against Ukraine has led to considerable slippage of its status. Russia now struggles to get things done at international fora and has also faced increased diplomatic isolation. Moreover, the war – especially the struggles of the Russian armed forces – challenged Russia's claim of great military power and an exclusive security provider in the former Soviet space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Erciyes Akademi is the property of Erciyes Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores how the Great Powers have employed different forms of disarmament law as tools of governance for constructing and reinforcing global hierarchies since the end of the nineteenth century. I argue that some of the laws have affected entities' statehood, some have impacted states' sovereignty, some have worked to symbolically lower the status of states in the eyes of the international community, and some have been infused with civilisational rhetoric that has portrayed the Great Powers as civilised entities while casting others as uncivilised. The article then turns to consider what impact the handful of disarmament law initiatives that have not been spearheaded by the Great Powers have had on global hierarchies. I contend that these treaties have done little to challenge the hierarchies entrenched by the Great Powers' disarmament practices but that a few of them can, in limited ways, be understood as attempting to create alternative hierarchies in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demography is one of the factors determining and influencing the geopolitical balance of power in international relations. Politicians are the main actors in international relations, but powerful human dynamics are at work behind them. The study of geopolitics describes these dynamics, linked to human and physical geography. In the evolution of great power competition, economic, military and technological factors are taken into account, but the importance of demographic trends, which will play a key role in the struggle for world power, is often underestimated as a political and geopolitical factor. Demography works over long periods of time, i.e., over generations. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the importance of the above theory by looking at the demographic shock that France experienced in the 19th century and the geopolitical resulting consequences. As a result of this demographic shock, France lost its supremacy as the most populous country in Europe and was definitively overtaken by Germany. It is a scenario that can be useful for understanding the evolution of demographic competition in the 21st century, such as that of China versus India. In 2023, China will lose its supremacy as the world's most populous country to India. This will be the first time that China has lost its primacy since the United Nations began tracking global demographic trends in 1950. China, like France in the past, is in danger of never catching up with its demographic disadvantage. History suggests that once a country crosses the threshold of negative population growth, regardless of the differences in national experiences, there is little that its government can do to reverse it.

One of the most distinctive features of the 21st century has been the return of the competition of great powers to international politics. In this century, the three leading geopolitical actors and military-economic powers of the world, the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, and the Russian Federation, found themselves in a complex power competition. In the power competition, the gap between resources and power has become a central role in the survival of the three great powers in the international system. As a result of the lateral pressure driven by the need of the three great powers to obtain, diversify and secure resources beyond their borders, global competition has started to intensify. In this study, resource and power rivalry of great powers are analyzed within the framework of lateral pressure theory developed by Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North. In this context, the international expansion of great powers and the need for resources, which are the catalysts of conflict, were emphasized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New Delhi's taking on the G20 Presidency represents a highly important—if not watershed—moment for Indian diplomacy. For an India that is transitioning from being a developing to a developed economy and whose great power rise centres upon core goals relating to development, modernisation, status, leadership, importance, prestige and pride, assuming the G20 Presidency seems transformational. A central part of the G20's remit also concerns constructing and maintaining global financial architectures and governance mechanisms, which India can now crucially influence as her own economic clout increases on the global stage. Moreover, New Delhi's Presidency signifies a pivotal time for the legitimacy of the G20 and one which potentially heralds a more representative era for the grouping, which will only enhance India's global pre-eminence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unevenness has become a moral category. It is something to be protected and preserved. The moral essence of unevenness is the assertion that certain elements of underdevelopment are more valuable than a state of development. However, the masters of semi-detachment have another challenge to meet. Its believers must also separate their societies from each other. Towards their Eastern conquerors they try to present themselves as more Eastern (i.e., more communist more pro-Russian). If the conqueror is Western (e.g., National Socialist Germany) then they endeavor to present themselves as more pro-German than their neighbors, and in joining the democratic West they try to present themselves as more Western, consciously pushing back their neighbors. Moreover, if they approach the East and the West at the same time, they argue both ways simultaneously. This attitude also motivates the specific role of nationalism in our region. In our case, the role of national identity is not only the same as it used to be in the most developed parts of Europe, but here in Central Europe it has also had to justify the unevenness of state and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demography is one of the factors determining and influencing the geopolitical balance of power in international relations. Politicians are the main actors in international relations, but powerful human dynamics are at work behind them. The study of geopolitics describes these dynamics, linked to human and physical geography. In the evolution of great power competition, economic, military and technological factors are taken into account, but the importance of demographic trends, which will play a key role in the struggle for world power, is often underestimated as a political and geopolitical factor. Demography works over long periods of time, i.e., over generations. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the importance of the above theory by looking at the demographic shock that France experienced in the 19th century and the geopolitical resulting consequences. As a result of this demographic shock, France lost its supremacy as the most populous country in Europe and was definitively overtaken by Germany. It is a scenario that can be useful for understanding the evolution of demographic competition in the 21st century, such as that of China versus India. In 2023, China will lose its supremacy as the world's most populous country to India. This will be the first time that China has lost its primacy since the United Nations began tracking global demographic trends in 1950. China, like France in the past, is in danger of never catching up with its demographic disadvantage. History suggests that once a country crosses the threshold of negative population growth, regardless of the differences in national experiences, there is little that its government can do to reverse it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with trade tensions and technological competition between the United States and China, have severely disrupted global supply chains. As businesses and policymakers grapple with “building back better” in a tense trade environment, they face the dilemma of balancing the traditional benefits of global production with the security demands of new geopolitical realities. This policy brief, part of a series on great power competition, highlights the productive role that intellectual property (IP) can play in navigating supply chain disruptions resulting from great power competition in a post-pandemic world. Rather than reinforcing the vicious cycle of techno-nationalist confrontation, it is possible for businesses and policymakers to promote virtuous cycles of competition with a more robust focus on intellectual property. Specifically, businesses and policymakers can look to IP licensing and allocation of rights to play a key role in tariff mitigation strategies and supply chain restructuring. At the same time, competitive pressures can lead to enhanced IP regimes in China and other economies, which argues for a more nuanced discussion of supply chains beyond physical relocation and economic decoupling.

This paper reassesses Russia's policy vis-à-vis the Western Balkans in terms of its pursuit of status. The region has been historically significant to Russia. It saw centuries of interaction between rulers in Moscow (or St. Petersburg) with the local Orthodox Slavs and other great powers of the day. Following the end of the Cold War, the Russian state emerged as a very different entity from imperial Russia or the Soviet Union. In the Western Balkans, it found a stage for not just rekindling centuries-long ties but also rebuilding its image as a great power in cooperation and, as this paper shows, increasing competition with primarily the West. However, as this research attests by referring to the Larson–Shevchenko framework of the Social Identity Theory (SIT), status must be conferred through a voluntary recognition by other great powers, which recognize status-aspirant's actions as non-threatening to their standing and as having a positive value. So far, Russia's Balkan policies have primarily been seen negatively as either promoting retrograde ideology or outright spoiler behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article questions the offensive realist explanation of the war in Ukraine found in the work of John Mearsheimer. It argues that Mearsheimer's failure to take seriously predispositional factors means his account of the war offers an incomplete basis for discerning motives, predicting the conflict's evolution, or responding to Russian aggression. To address this deficit and explain how ideological beliefs and meanings expressed in discourse are shaping Russia's prosecution of the war, the article sets out an interpretive framework that draws on insights into armed conflict and ideology from the likes of Michael Freeden and Jonathan Leader Maynard as well as contributions to Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) primarily in the work of Teun van Dijk. To explore the Russian ideological and discursive aspects at play in the Ukraine war, the article fixes its analytical gaze on an address delivered by Putin to the Russian nation on February 24, 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Book review: Doshi Roshi. 2021. The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. The USA: Oxford University Press. 432 p.

This article is Part II of a survey of Russia's position as one of the great powers and how it has evolved from 1815 to the present day. Part 1 ended on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (1941‒1945), and Part II begins where Part 1 left off, with some data on the Great Patriotic War and its influence on the USSR's position as a great power. It deals with post-war reconstruction and then considers the Cold War and post-Soviet Russia (1992‒2022). Attention is paid to Soviet economic policies, the reasons for the long-run decline in Soviet economic growth, and the state collapse of 1991. Explanatory theories used include List's economic recommendations for medium-developed countries, Wintrobe's political economy of dictatorship, and Tilly's analysis of the war–state relationship. It is concluded that a relatively poor country can become a great power and maintain that position for long periods if it has institutions that enable it to squeeze its population for military purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the case of EU foreign and security policy we reconsider the concept of great power. According to common wisdom, the EU cannot be a great power, whatever the pronouncements of its top officials may be. We argue that ‘great power’ has been miscast in IR theory as a status rather than as a social role, and, consequently, that the EU can indeed be viewed as playing the great power role. Such a conceptual shift moves analytical attention away from questions of what the EU is ‘big’, ‘small’, ‘great’, and so on to what it is expected to do in international politics. We focus on the expectation that great powers engage in the management of the international system, assessing the EU as a great power manager in two senses: First, in the classical sense of ‘great power management’ of Hedley Bull which centers on great powers’ creation of regional spheres of influence and the maintenance of the general balance of power and second, in light of recent corrections to Bull’s approach by Alexander Astrov and others, who suggest great power management has changed toward a logic of governmentality, i.e. ‘conducting the conduct’ of lesser states.

This article is Part 1 of a survey of Russia's position as one of the great powers and how it has evolved from 1815 to the present day. It begins with the situation in 1815 and the path to it, and devotes attention to important Russian institutions then, soldiers' cooperatives, autocracy and serfdom. The subsequent wars and their consequences are discussed. The end of the Empire, the creation of the USSR and Soviet institutions are considered. Consideration is also given to the relative economic position of Russia/USSR and its changes over time. Attention is paid to the economic policies of Witte and Stalin. Explanatory theories used include List's economic recommendations for medium-developed countries, the institutional theories of Acemoglu, North and others, Modelski's evolutionary analysis of global politics and Tilly's analysis of the war–state relationship. Part 1 ends on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (1941). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Lex Humana is the property of Lex Humana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The foreign policy realized by Turkeys president clearly evidences the fact that Erdogan does not accept todays world order as a model for the near future. This has led to the proposition of The World Is Bigger than Five formula since 2013. At least in several key regions, Ankara attempts to change the world order through more than emotional declarations; it uses both hard and soft power in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Black Sea region, Caucasus, and Central Asia. The main indicators of Turkish soft and hard power (military, economic, technological factors, and attractiveness of mass culture) are examined to identify possibilities of Turkey to change the balance of power in key regions and on a global scale. From 2007, the vision of Turkey as an influential actor globally has been propagated by the Turkish elite of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Geopolitical, civilizational, and systematic approaches are used. The research process is carried out within the paradigm of classical and critical geopolitics. During the AKPs time in power, moderate Islamists gave Turkey a new impetus - a return to its civilizational roots. One must note the states development of its economy, military-industrial complex, and the new national position globally as a patron of every Muslim. Modern Turkey can be considered a great regional power with sectoral global leadership in its military attainment, and due to the attractiveness of its model of development. Ankara invests heavily in soft power, its success is based on the Turkish development ideology, which represents a synthesis of neo-Ottoman, neo-Pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideas. The revival of Turkey as a regional power and its desire to become a world power will inevitably increase the space of contradictions in Russian-Turkish relations, reducing the sphere of cooperation between the two countries.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had repercussions in regions beyond Europe. One of these regions is Asia, including Northeast Asia. This region is home to China and North Korea, two authoritarian countries often lumped together with Russia as potential threats to the liberal international order. The relationship between China and North Korea has thus been affected by Russia's aggression toward Ukraine. Beijing and Pyongyang share a decades-old alliance. Despite its ups and downs, the alliance survives as of 2022. Russia's actions in Ukraine have only reinforced it, bringing China and North Korea closer to each other. Both of them have sided with Moscow, and for similar reasons, including their opposition to what they see as the US's and NATO's aggressive stance. And both have taken the same actions to support Russia, further strengthening their connection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has made iterative changes to its National Security Strategy (NSS) to bolster its position in the world. The initial intent of the NSS was to provide aspirational foreign policy goals and ambitions the Kremlin could work towards. In 2021, President Putin viewed Russia to be in a position to change the Kremlin's status in the world and decided to take action. In addition to publishing the 2021 NSS, President Putin also penned a personal history essay about Russia and Ukraine. President Putin's article provides the Kremlin with a narrative to garner popular domestic support and superficial justification for Russia's actions against Ukraine. The ultimate goal of the NSS is to reestablish the Cold War world order. President Putin is using Ukraine as a means to reassert Russia's position in the world while at the same time attempting to discredit the Euro-Atlantic rules-based order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of strong state in the general theory of state and law has not been studied in sufficient detail. In political science, the science of administrative law and in international legal doctrines, this concept is considered mainly from geopolitical, military-strategic and political-administrative positions. In the presented article, a theoretical and legal analysis of the concept of a strong state is carried out. Methodologically, the author adheres to the approaches of political realism and realistic theory of law, which are aimed not at building a model of an ideal strong state, but at studying really functioning strong states with all their problems and contradictions. It is proposed to understand a strong state as a state that effectively uses any legal means to carry out the functions assigned to it in its own political interests. The article in the format of a scientific discussion analyzes the signs and criteria of a strong state, characteristics of the law of the strong. The research subjects also include the problem of a strong state legitimacy, the category of the great power and the process of legal expansion.

In this article I argue that the increasingly three-sided competition for influence – between Russia, China and the West in and over Ukraine – has created a new space for autonomous decision making and can increase Ukraine’s own agency when it comes to strategic geopolitical and geo-economic choices in its foreign policy. Relying on competition theory to determine competitive influence-seeking policies of great powers and strategies of smaller states, I propose a ‘smart leadership’ strategy for Ukraine, aimed at the management of its status in the Russia-China-West triangle. In the first part of article, I outline Ukraine’s national interests. This is followed by a consideration of the geopolitical and geo-economic environment in which Ukraine has operated until recently before I detail the changes in this environment that are related to the increased economic significance that China has assumed for Ukraine. In the second part, I consider what smart leadership would look like if Ukraine were to escape its current dual entrapment of positioning of a small state in the geopolitical competition of great powers.

China's rapid economic growth in recent decades and its rise as a great power in the international system has a milestone recognized by Chinese space researchers: the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. This was the moment to launch the reforms that transformed China from an isolated and self-sufficient state in one of the greatest powers of our times.