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During an Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, calculating the exposure window of a confirmed case can assist field investigators in identifying the source of infection and establishing chains of transmission. However, field investigators often have difficulty calculating this window. We developed a bilingual (English/French), smartphone-based field application to assist field investigators in determining the exposure window of an EVD case. The calculator only requires the reported date of symptoms onset and the type of symptoms present at onset or the date of death. Prior to the release of this application, there was no similar electronic capability to enable consistent calculation of EVD exposure windows for field investigators. The Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Health endorsed the application and incorporated it into trainings for field staff. Available for Apple and Android devices, the calculator continues to be downloaded even as the eastern DRC outbreak resolved. We rapidly developed and implemented a smartphone application to estimate the exposure window for EVD cases in an outbreak setting

On December 14, 2020, the United Kingdom reported a SARS-CoV-2 variant of concern (VOC), lineage B.1.1.7, also referred to as VOC 202012/01 or 20I/501Y.V1.* The B.1.1.7 variant is estimated to have emerged in September 2020 and has quickly become the dominant circulating SARS-CoV-2 variant in England (1). B.1.1.7 has been detected in over 30 countries, including the United States. As of January 13, 2021, approximately 76 cases of B.1.1.7 have been detected in 12 U.S. states.† Multiple lines of evidence indicate that B.1.1.7 is more efficiently transmitted than are other SARS-CoV-2 variants (1-3). The modeled trajectory of this variant in the U.S. exhibits rapid growth in early 2021, becoming the predominant variant in March. Increased SARS-CoV-2 transmission might threaten strained health care resources, require extended and more rigorous implementation of public health strategies (4), and increase the percentage of population immunity required for pandemic control. Taking measures to reduce transmission now can lessen the potential impact of B.1.1.7 and allow critical time to increase vaccination coverage. Collectively, enhanced genomic surveillance combined with continued compliance with effective public health measures, including vaccination, physical distancing, use of masks, hand hygiene, and isolation and quarantine, will be essential to limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Strategic testing of persons without symptoms but at higher risk of infection, such as those exposed to SARS-CoV-2 or who have frequent unavoidable contact with the public, provides another opportunity to limit ongoing spread.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has spread globally, resulting in >300,000 reported cases worldwide as of March 21st, 2020. Here we investigate the genetic diversity and genomic epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in Northern California using samples from returning travelers, cruise ship passengers, and cases of community transmission with unclear infection sources. Virus genomes were sampled from 29 patients diagnosed with COVID-19 infection from Feb 3rd through Mar 15th. Phylogenetic analyses revealed at least 8 different SARS-CoV-2 lineages, suggesting multiple independent introductions of the virus into the state. Virus genomes from passengers on two consecutive excursions of the Grand Princess cruise ship clustered with those from an established epidemic in Washington State, including the WA1 genome representing the first reported case in the United States on January 19th. We also detected evidence for presumptive transmission of SARS-CoV-2 lineages from one community to another. These findings suggest that cryptic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Northern California to date is characterized by multiple transmission chains that originate via distinct introductions from international and interstate travel, rather than widespread community transmission of a single predominant lineage. Rapid testing and contact tracing, social distancing, and travel restrictions are measures that will help to slow SARS-CoV-2 spread in California and other regions of the USA.

Among 146 nasopharyngeal (NP) and oropharyngeal (OP) swab pairs collected ≤7 days after illness onset, Real-Time Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction assay for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR) diagnostic results were 95.2% concordant. However, NP swab cycle threshold values were lower (indicating more virus) in 66.7% of concordant-positive pairs, suggesting NP swabs may more accurately detect the amount of SARS-CoV-2.

A series of unfortunate events The history of how severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) spread around the planet has been far from clear. Several narratives have been propagated by social media and, in some cases, national policies were forged in response. Now that many thousands of virus sequences are available, two studies analyzed some of the key early events in the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Bedford et al. found that the virus arrived in Washington state in late January or early February. The viral genome from the first case detected had mutations similar to those found in Chinese samples and rapidly spread and dominated subsequent undetected community transmission. The other viruses detected had origins in Europe. Worobey et al. found that early introductions into Germany and the west coast of the United States were extinguished by vigorous public health efforts, but these successes were largely unrecognized. Unfortunately, several major travel events occurred in February, including repatriations from China, with lax public health follow-up. Serial, independent introductions triggered the major outbreaks in the United States and Europe that still hold us in the grip of control measures. Science, this issue p. 571, p. 564, The first case of SARS-CoV-2 in Washington state occurred at the end of January and, by going undetected, sparked community transmission., After its emergence in Wuhan, China, in late November or early December 2019, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) virus rapidly spread globally. Genome sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 allows the reconstruction of its transmission history, although this is contingent on sampling. We analyzed 453 SARS-CoV-2 genomes collected between 20 February and 15 March 2020 from infected patients in Washington state in the United States. We find that most SARS-CoV-2 infections sampled during this time derive from a single introduction in late January or early February 2020, which subsequently spread locally before active community surveillance was implemented.

Rapid advances in DNA sequencing technology ("next-generation sequencing") have inspired optimism about the potential of human genomics for "precision medicine." Meanwhile, pathogen genomics is already delivering "precision public health" through more effective investigations of outbreaks of foodborne illnesses, better-targeted tuberculosis control, and more timely and granular influenza surveillance to inform the selection of vaccine strains. In this article, we describe how public health agencies have been adopting pathogen genomics to improve their effectiveness in almost all domains of infectious disease. This momentum is likely to continue, given the ongoing development in sequencing and sequencing-related technologies.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has spread globally, resulting in >300,000 reported cases worldwide as of March 21st, 2020. Here we investigate the genetic diversity and genomic epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in Northern California using samples from returning travelers, cruise ship passengers, and cases of community transmission with unclear infection sources. Virus genomes were sampled from 29 patients diagnosed with COVID-19 infection from Feb 3rd through Mar 15th. Phylogenetic analyses revealed at least 8 different SARS-CoV-2 lineages, suggesting multiple independent introductions of the virus into the state. Virus genomes from passengers on two consecutive excursions of the Grand Princess cruise ship clustered with those from an established epidemic in Washington State, including the WA1 genome representing the first reported case in the United States on January 19th. We also detected evidence for presumptive transmission of SARS-CoV-2 lineages from one community to another. These findings suggest that cryptic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Northern California to date is characterized by multiple transmission chains that originate via distinct introductions from international and interstate travel, rather than widespread community transmission of a single predominant lineage. Rapid testing and contact tracing, social distancing, and travel restrictions are measures that will help to slow SARS-CoV-2 spread in California and other regions of the USA.

Muin Khoury and co-authors discuss anticipated contributions of genomics and other forms of large-scale data in public health.

Background Without intervention, up to 25% of individuals chronically infected with hepatitis B virus (HBV) die of late complications, including cirrhosis and liver cancer. The United States, which in 1991 implemented a strategy to eliminate HBV transmission through universal immunization, is a country of low prevalence. Approximately 3,000–5,000 U.S.-acquired cases of chronic hepatitis B have occurred annually since 2001. Many more chronically infected persons migrate to the United States yearly from countries of higher prevalence. Although early identification of chronic HBV infection can reduce the likelihood of transmission and late complications, immigrants are not routinely screened for HBV infection during or after immigration. Methods To estimate the number of imported cases of chronic hepatitis B, we multiplied country-specific prevalence estimates by the yearly number of immigrants from each country during 1974–2008. Results During 1974–2008, 27.9 million immigrants entered the U.S. Sixty-three percent were born in countries of intermediate or high chronic hepatitis B prevalence (range 2%–31%). On average, an estimated 53,800 chronic hepatitis B cases were imported to the U.S. yearly from 2004 through 2008. The Philippines, China, and Vietnam contributed the most imported cases (13.4%, 12.5%, and 11.0%, respectively). Imported cases increased from an estimated low of 105,750 during the period 1974–1977 to a high of 268,800 in 2004–2008. Conclusions Imported chronic hepatitis B cases account for approximately 95% of new U.S. cases. Earlier case identification and management of infected immigrants would strengthen the U.S. strategy to eliminate HBV transmission, and could delay disease progression and prevent some deaths among new Americans.

Despite substantial progress, global polio eradication has remained elusive. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission in 4 endemic countries (Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan) persisted into 2010 and outbreaks from imported WPV continued. By 2013, most outbreaks in the interim were promptly controlled. The number of polio-affected districts globally has declined by 74% (from 481 in 2009 to 126 in 2013), including a 79% decrease in the number of affected districts in endemic countries (from 304 to 63). India is now polio-free. The challenges to success in the remaining polio-endemic countries include (1) threats to the security of vaccinators in each country and a ban on polio vaccination in areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan; (2) a risk of decreased government commitment; and (3) remaining surveillance gaps. Coordinated efforts under the International Health Regulations and efforts to mitigate the challenges provide a clear opportunity to soon secure global eradication.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative began in 1988 with the goal of interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission. Progress continues, but poliomyelitis remains endemic in Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan [1]. In addition, outbreaks due to importations have occurred in countries where indigenous WPV transmission had been interrupted, such as in Tajikistan, Ivory Coast, and China in 2010–2011 [2–4]. In some countries that had achieved the goal of interrupting WPV transmission, such as Angola, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), importations have resulted in ongoing, reestablished transmission, creating the threat of WPV spread to other polio-free countries. The Expanded Programme on Immunization began in the Republic of Congo (ROC) in 1981. However, civil unrest during 1993–2003, including a civil war in 1997–1999, disrupted routine immunization services for multiple birth cohorts. The recommended routine schedule includes 4 doses of trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV) administered at birth and at 6, 10, and 14 weeks of age. National reported routine immunization coverage for ≥3 doses of tOPV3 rose from 42% in 1980 to 90% in 2010; however, tOPV3 coverage dropped to 20% during the civil unrest in 1993–2003 (Figure 1) [5]. In 2010, administrative tOPV3 coverage of 90% was reported among 1-year-olds; however, a survey found tOPV3 coverage to be 68% [6]. Supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) targeting children aged

Background Salmonella enterica serovar Typhi causes an estimated 22 million cases of typhoid fever and 216 000 deaths annually worldwide. We investigated an outbreak of unexplained febrile illnesses with neurologic findings, determined to be typhoid fever, along the Malawi-Mozambique border. Methods The investigation included active surveillance, interviews, examinations of ill and convalescent persons, medical chart reviews, and laboratory testing. Classification as a suspected case required fever and ≥1 other finding (eg, headache or abdominal pain); a probable case required fever and a positive rapid immunoglobulin M antibody test for typhoid (TUBEX TF); a confirmed case required isolation of Salmonella Typhi from blood or stool. Isolates underwent antimicrobial susceptibility testing and subtyping by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Results We identified 303 cases from 18 villages with onset during March-November 2009; 214 were suspected, 43 were probable, and 46 were confirmed cases. Forty patients presented with focal neurologic abnormalities, including a constellation of upper motor neuron signs (n = 19), ataxia (n = 22), and parkinsonism (n = 8). Eleven patients died. All 42 isolates tested were resistant to ampicillin, chloramphenicol, and trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole; 4 were also resistant to nalidixic acid. Thirty-five of 42 isolates were indistinguishable by PFGE. Conclusions The unusual neurologic manifestations posed a diagnostic challenge that was resolved through rapid typhoid antibody testing in the field and subsequent blood culture confirmation in the Malawi national reference laboratory. Extending laboratory diagnostic capacity, including blood culture, to populations at risk for typhoid fever in Africa will improve outbreak detection, response, and clinical treatment.

The long-term duration of recombinant hepatitis B vaccine-induced immunity among persons vaccinated starting at birth is still not well understood. Waning of vaccine-induced immunity could leave young adults at risk of hepatitis B virus infection due to behavioral or occupational exposures. We followed a cohort of children immunized starting at birth with a 3-dose regimen of recombinant hepatitis B vaccine (5 mcg, 2.5 mcg, 2.5 mcg). They were challenged with a booster dose of the hepatitis B vaccine 10 and 15 years after vaccination to assess anamnestic response as a measure of persistence of protection. Among 108 participants who had lost protective antibody levels against hepatitis B, the majority (>70%) had an anamnestic response to the booster dose; response rates did not decline significantly between 10 and 15 years follow-up periods. A high antibody concentration following primary vaccination was independently associated with an anamnestic response later on in life. Nonetheless, ~20-30% of participants were unable to mount an immune response after boosting. Hepatitis B revaccination might be required for persons vaccinated starting at birth if opportunities for hepatitis B virus exposure exist. Future vaccine recommendations should be based on studies ascertaining protection against clinically significant disease.

During the 2009 influenza pandemic, weekly mortality data were analyzed to estimate excess mortality above a seasonally adjusted baseline modeled from prior years' data. Between the 1962-1963 and 2008-2009 seasons, among persons ≥ 25 years old, excess mortality had been substantially higher during influenza A(H3N2)-dominant years than during A(H1N1)-dominant years. Among persons ≥ 15 years of age, excess mortality was higher in the 1968-1969 influenza pandemic season than during any other season. During the 2009-2010 pandemic, among all age groups

We investigated the first documented university outbreak of the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) to identify factors associated with disease transmission. An online student survey was administered to assess risk factors for influenza-like illness (ILI), defined as fever with cough or sore throat. Of 6049 survey respondents, 567 (9%) experienced ILI during 27 March to 9 May 2009. Studying with an ill contact (adjusted risk ratios [aRR], 1.29; 95% confidence intervals [CI], 1.01-1.65) and caring for an ill contact (aRR, 1.51; CI, 1.14-2.01) any time during 27 March to 9 May were predictors for ILI. Respondents reported that 680 (6%) of 11,411 housemates were ill; living with an ill housemate was a predictor for ILI (RR, 1.38; CI, 1.04-1.83). Close contact or prolonged exposures to ill persons were likely associated with experiencing ILI. Self-protective measures should be promoted in university populations to mitigate transmission.

Background In late April 2009, the first documented 2009 pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) virus infection outbreak in a university setting occurred in Delaware, with large numbers of students presenting with respiratory illness. At the time of this investigation, little was known about the severity of illness, effectiveness of the vaccine, or transmission factors of pH1N1 virus infection. We characterized illness, determined the impact of this outbreak, and examined factors associated with transmission. Methods Health clinic records were reviewed. An online survey was administered to all students, staff, and faculty to assess influenza-like illness (ILI), defined as documented or subjective fever with cough or sore throat. Results From 26 April-2 May 2009, the health clinic experienced a sharp increase in visits for respiratory illness, with 1080 such visits among a total of 1430 student visits, and then a return to baseline visit levels within 2 weeks. More than 500 courses of oseltamivir were distributed, and 24 cases of influenza A (pH1N1) virus infection were confirmed. Of 29,000 university students and faculty/staff, 7450 (30%) responded to the survey. ILI was reported by 604 (10%) of the students and 73 (5%) of the faculty/staff. Travel to Mexico (relative risk [RR], 2.9; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.8-4.7) and participation in "Greek Week" activities (RR, 2.2; 95% CI, 1.8-2.8) were associated with ILI. Recipients of the 2008-2009 seasonal influenza vaccine had the same risk of ILI as nonrecipients (RR, 1.0). Four (3%) of the students with ILI were hospitalized; there were no deaths. Conclusions pH1N1 spread rapidly through the University of Delaware community with a surge in illness over a 2-week period. Although initial cases appear to be associated with travel to Mexico, a rapid increase in cases was likely facilitated by increased student interactions during Greek Week. No protective effect from receiving seasonal influenza vaccine was identified. Although severe illness was rare, the outbreak caused a substantial burden and challenge to the university health care system. Preparedness efforts in universities and similar settings should include enhancing health care surge capacity.

Objective To examine hepatitis C virus (HCV) seroprevalence among injection drug users in 4 US cities from 1994 through 2004. Methods Demographic characteristics, behaviors, and prevalence of HCV antibody among 5088 injection drug users aged 18-40 years from Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; and New York, New York, enrolled in 3 related studies--Collaborative Injection Drug User Study (CIDUS) I (1994-1996), CIDUS II (1997-1999), and CIDUS III/Drug User Intervention Trial (2002-2004)--were compared using the chi(2) and Mantel-Haenszel tests of significance. Trends over time were assessed by logistic regression. Results Prevalence of HCV infection was 65%, 35%, and 35% in CIDUS I, CIDUS II, and CIDUS III, respectively. The adjusted prevalence odds ratio (OR) of being HCV antibody positive increased with the number of years of injection drug use (OR, 1.93 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 1.68-2.21] for each year of injecting within the first 2 years; OR, 1.09 [95% CI, 1.07-1.11] for each year of injecting beyond the first 2 years). Significant decreases were observed in the prevalence of HCV antibody between CIDUS I and CIDUS III in Baltimore (OR, 0.30; 95% CI, 0.20-0.43) and Los Angeles (OR, 0.17; 95% CI, 0.09-0.31) and among people of races other than black in Chicago (OR, 0.12; 95% CI, 0.08-0.17). No decrease in prevalence was seen in New York (OR, 1.04; 95% CI, 0.69-1.58) or among blacks in Chicago (OR, 0.55; 95% CI, 0.16-1.90). Conclusion Although regional differences exist, our data suggest that the incidence of HCV infection among injection drug users in the United States decreased from 1994 through 2004.

BACKGROUND: Human metapneumovirus (HMPV) infection causes respiratory illness, including bronchiolitis and pneumonia. However, national HMPV seasonality, as it compares with respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) and influenza seasonality patterns, has not been well described. METHODS: Hospital and clinical laboratories reported weekly aggregates of specimens tested and positive detections for HMPV, RSV, and influenza to the National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System from 2008 to 2014. A season was defined as consecutive weeks with ≥3% positivity for HMPV and ≥10% positivity for RSV and influenza during a surveillance year (June through July). For each virus, the season, onset, offset, duration, peak, and 6-season medians were calculated. RESULTS: Among consistently reporting laboratories, 33 583 (3.6%) specimens were positive for HMPV, 281 581 (15.3%) for RSV, and 401 342 (18.2%) for influenza. Annually, 6 distinct HMPV seasons occurred from 2008 to 2014, with onsets ranging from November to February and offsets from April to July. Based on the 6-season medians, RSV, influenza, and HMPV onsets occurred sequentially and season durations were similar at 21 to 22 weeks. HMPV demonstrated a unique biennial pattern of early and late seasonal onsets. RSV seasons (onset, offset, peak) were most consistent and occurred before HMPV seasons. There were no consistent patterns between HMPV and influenza circulations. CONCLUSIONS: HMPV circulation begins in winter and lasts until spring and demonstrates distinct seasons each year, with the onset beginning after that of RSV. HMPV, RSV, and influenza can circulate simultaneously during the respiratory season.

OBJECTIVES. Because of the herd-immunity phenomenon, the benefits of immunization against hepatitis A extend beyond those received by those who are vaccinated. This analysis estimates the impact of herd immunity on the cost-effectiveness of routine hepatitis A immunization among US children. PATITENS AND METHODS. In an economic model, the costs and benefits of hepatitis A immunization were estimated for immunizing all US children at age 1 year over a 10-year period starting in 2005. The future burden of disease from hepatitis A was also estimated with this model, and the fraction that would be prevented by herd immunity was modeled by using a previously published analysis of the relationship between hepatitis A vaccination coverage and declines in hepatitis A incidence. RESULTS. Without accounting for herd-immunity effects, the costs of routine immunization would average $32000 per quality-adjusted life-year gained for the first 10 cohorts immunized starting with the 2005 birth cohort. Herd-immunity effects would be expected to produce substantial additional benefits, lowering the cost of the immunization program to $1000 per quality-adjusted life-year gained for the first 10 cohorts. Herd-immunity benefits would be greatest for the first few cohorts, more than doubling the benefits of immunization, and would decline over time. In a univariate sensitivity analysis, estimates were most sensitive to vaccination costs but remained below $20000 per quality-adjusted life-year under all of the assumptions. CONCLUSIONS. Herd-immunity effects more than double the savings from hepatitis A immunization during the first 10 years of the program. After accounting for these effects, immunization is close to cost-neutral on a cost-per-quality-adjusted-life-year basis.

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is an enterically transmitted RNA virus that causes both epidemic and sporadic cases of acute hepatitis. Despite sero-surveys showing antibody to HEV in up to 36% of the US population, acute hepatitis E has been reported among individuals with no history of international travel only three times in the United States. We report a case of apparently locally-acquired hepatitis E that occurred in El Paso, Texas that was 98% similar to a previously isolated HEV found in swine in the United States. Like the three previous cases, a thorough investigation found no conclusive sources of infection. Active case surveillance found no additional cases.

Hepatitis A rates have declined to historically low rates in the United States. To assess the degree to which this decline was attributable to immunization, we correlated changes in the incidence of hepatitis A with increases in immunization coverage in a Poisson regression model. In a model allowing for herd immunity, an estimated 97,800 hepatitis A cases were averted due to immunization between 1995-2001, including 39% of potential cases in 2001. Assuming no herd immunity; 32,300 cases of hepatitis A would have been prevented. Sensitivity analysis showed that the number of averted cases in this period could range from 45,500 to 172,900. Among children 2-18 years old, vaccination coverage averaged 10% in 2001 and is estimated to have prevented 51% of cases in this age group. These results suggest that much of the recent reduction of hepatitis A rates is attributable to immunization and that immunization has been associated with a strong herd immunity effect.

As part of the 2000 Global Burden of Disease study, we quantified the death and disability from injection-associated infections with hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). We modelled the fraction of incident infections attributable to health care injections in the year 2000 on the basis of the annual number of injections, the proportion of injections administered with reused equipment, the probability of transmission following percutaneous exposure, the prevalence of active infection, the prevalence of immunity and the total incidence. Infections in 2000 were converted into disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) in 2000–2030 using natural history parameters, background mortality, duration of disease, disability weights, age weights and a 3% discount rate. Four Global Burden of Disease regions where reuse of injection equipment in the absence of sterilization was negligible were excluded from the analysis. In the remaining 10 regions, in 2000, persons received an average of 3.4 injections per year, 39.3% of which were given with reused equipment. In 2000, contaminated injections caused an estimated 21 million HBV infections, two million HCV infections and 260,000 HIV infections, accounting for 32%, 40% and 5%, respectively, of new infections for a burden of 9,177,679 DALYs between 2000 and 2030. Injection overuse and unsafe practices account for a substantial burden of death and disability worldwide. There is a need for policies and plans for the safe and appropriate use of injections in countries where practices are poor.

On November 19, 2001, a suspected case of inhalational anthrax in a 94-year-old woman was reported to the Connecticut Department of Public Health (CTDPH) (1–3). This was the first case of Bacilus anthracis infection reported to the CTDPH since 1968 and the eleventh inhalational anthrax case in the United States since October 4, 2001 (1–6). The patient’s symptoms of fever, fatigue, malaise, dry cough, and shortness of breath began 20 days after the last confirmed inhalational anthrax patient became ill and 36 days after the last known intentionally contaminated letters, addressed to U.S. Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy, were postmarked in Trenton, New Jersey (1–4) (Figure 1).The patient in Connecticut was not in the known categories of intentionally contaminated letter recipients and was not a postal worker or a mailhandler (1,5). This report describes the epidemiologic and environmental investigation conducted to determine whether her case was related to the other bioterrorism-related cases; whether she was the only case in Connecticut or a sentinel of a larger outbreak; and the source, place, and time of her exposure. The clinical aspects of the case have been described (2,3). Figure 1 Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax cases by week of symptom onset—United States, 2001.The first two cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in Florida. Though no direct exposure source was found, environmental samples of the media company ...

In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate polio worldwide. Since then, four of the six World Health Organization (WHO) regions have been certified as polio-free: the Americas in 1994, the Western Pacific Region in 2000, the European Region in 2002, and the South-East Asia Region in 2014. Currently, nearly 80% of the world's population lives in areas certified as polio-free. Certification may be considered when ≥3 years have passed since the last isolation of wild poliovirus (WPV) in the presence of sensitive, certification-standard surveillance. Although regional eradication has been validated in the European Region and the Western Pacific Region, outbreaks resulting from WPV type 1 (WPV1) imported from known endemic areas were detected and controlled in these regions in 2010 and 2011, respectively. The last reported case associated with WPV type 2 (WPV2) was in India in 1999, marking global interruption of WPV2 transmission. The completion of polio eradication was declared a programmatic emergency for public health in 2012, and the international spread of WPV1 was declared a public health emergency of international concern in May 2014. The efforts needed to interrupt all indigenous WPV1 transmission are now being focused on the remaining endemic countries: Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. WPV type 3 (WPV3) has not been detected in circulation since November 11, 2012. This report summarizes the evidence of possible global interruption of transmission of WPV3, based on surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and environmental surveillance.

Background Transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) has never been interrupted in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Since 2003, infections with WPV of Nigerian origin have been detected in 25 polio-free countries. In 2012, the Nigerian government created an emergency operations center and implemented a national emergency action plan to eradicate polio. The 2013 revision of this plan prioritized (1) improving the quality of supplemental immunization activities (SIAs), (2) implementing strategies to reach underserved populations, (3) adopting special approaches in security-compromised areas, (4) improving outbreak response, (5) enhancing routine immunization and activities implemented between SIAs, and (6) strengthening surveillance. This report summarizes implementation of these activities during a period of unprecedented insecurity and violence, including the killing of health workers and the onset of a state of emergency in the northeast zone. Methods This report reviews management strategies, innovations, trends in case counts, vaccination and social mobilization activities, and surveillance and monitoring data to assess progress in polio eradication in Nigeria. Results Nigeria has made significant improvements in the management of polio eradication initiative (pei) activities with marked improvement in the quality of SIAs, as measured by lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS). Comparing results from February 2012 with results from December 2013, the proportion of local government areas (LGAs) conducting LQAS in the 11 high-risk states at the ≥90% pass/fail threshold increased from 7% to 42%, and the proportion at the 80%-89% threshold increased from 9% to 30%. During January-December 2013, 53 polio cases were reported from 26 LGAs in 9 states in Nigeria, compared with 122 cases reported from 13 states in 2012. No cases of WPV type 3 infection have been reported since November 2012. In 2013, no polio cases due to any poliovirus type were detected in the northwest sanctuaries of Nigeria. In the second half of 2013, WPV transmission was restricted to Kano, Borno, Bauchi, and Taraba states. Despite considerable progress, 24 LGAs in 2012 and 7 LGAs in 2013 reported ≥2 cases, and WPV continued to circulate in 8 LGAs that had cases in 2012. Campaign activities were negatively impacted by insecurity and violence in Borno and Kano states. Conclusions Efforts to interrupt transmission remain impeded by poor SIA implementation in localized areas, anti-polio vaccine sentiment, and limited access to vaccinate children because of insecurity. Sustained improvement in SIA quality, surveillance, and outbreak response and special strategies in security-compromised areas are needed to interrupt WPV transmission in 2014.

Objective. To estimate the number of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infections among US children younger than 10 years before implementation of routine childhood hepatitis B immunization. Methods. Incidence of HBV infection in children was modeled from existing prevalence data by means of regression analysis. Sources of data for the models included published and unpublished surveys that determined the prevalence of HBV infection in US-born children. The number of nonperinatal HBV infections in children younger than 10 years was estimated by applying these infection rates to 1991 population data according to maternal race, ethnicity, and birthplace. Results. Estimated annual rates of infection ranged from 24 per 100 000 in non-Asian children to 2580 per 100 000 in children of Southeast Asian immigrant mothers. These rates indicate that by the early 1990s, HBV was infecting 16 000 children who were younger than 10 years (8700 non-Asian children and 7300 Asian-American children) annually. The total estimate, not including perinatal infections, ranged from 12 000 (95% confidence interval: 5500–27 700) to 24 900 (95% confidence interval: 16 700–42 300) infections and depended on how the estimated rates were applied to the population data. Conclusion. Thousands of US children were infected each year with HBV before routine infant hepatitis B immunization, placing them at high risk of death from cirrhosis or hepatocellular carcinoma later in life.

Because chronic liver disease may develop many years after acute hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection, the past incidence of acute infections is a major determinant of the future burden of HCV-associated complications. We estimated past incidence of acute HCV infection using national seroprevalence data and relative age-specific incidence data from a sentinel counties surveillance system. Projections of the future prevalence of HCV-infected patients were derived from models that included an 85% drop in HCV infection incidence as observed for reported cases in the early 1990s. The models showed a large increase in the incidence of HCV infections from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The degree of increase was dependent on the assumed rate of antibody loss; a model with 2.5% annual antibody loss showed annual incidence increasing from 45,000 infections (95% confidence interval [95% CI]: 0-110,000) in the early 1960s to 380,000 infections (95% CI: 250,000 to 500, 000) in the 1980s. Projections showed that although the prevalence of HCV infection may be declining currently because of the decline in incidence in the 1990s, the number of persons infected for >/=20 years could increase substantially before peaking in 2015. If the incidence of new HCV infections does not increase in the future, persons born between 1940 and 1965 will be at highest lifetime risk of acquiring the infection.

Recurrent epidemics of meningococcal disease have been reported throughout the African meningitis belt since description of the disease in 1912. Meningooccal polysaccharide vaccines can effectively prevent disease but the optimum strategy for their use in this setting has been controversial. We used data from an outbreak of meningococcal disease in northern Ghana in 1997 to assess the potential effect of different vaccination strategies.We identified all reported cases of meningococcal meningitis and estimated the number of cases and deaths that could have been prevented by vaccination through use of a simple mathematical model. We then assessed the potential effect of different vaccination strategies and the burden of these strategies on the public-health system.In the three affected regions in northern Ghana there were 18703 cases and 1356 deaths reported between November, 1996, and May, 1997. Vaccination began in the third week of February and continued to April, reaching 72% of the at-risk population and preventing an estimated 23% of cases and 18% of deaths. A strategy of routine childhood and adult immunisation would have prevented 61% of cases had this same rate of vaccine coverage been achieved and maintained before the epidemic. If vaccination had started after the onset of the epidemic in January, as currently advocated by WHO guidelines, a similar proportion (61%) of cases could have been prevented.Prevention of epidemics of meningococal disease in west Africa will be difficult until long-lasting conjugate vaccines capable of interrupting transmission of Neisseria meningitidis can be incorporated into routine infant-immunisation schedules. Until then, the strategy of surveillance and response advocated by WHO is as effective and more practical than a strategy of routine childhood and adult vaccination with currently available polysaccharide vaccines.This study assessed the potential effects of different vaccination strategies using data from the 1997 meningococcal outbreak in northern Ghana. Since the description of the disease in 1912, recurrent epidemics of meningococcal disease have been reported throughout the African meningitis belt. The use of meningococcal polysaccharide vaccines has been proven to effectively prevent the disease, although the method of vaccine distribution was disputable. Using a simple mathematical model, meningococcal meningitis cases and deaths, which could have been forestalled by vaccination, were identified, and the effect of developed vaccination strategies on the public health system was analyzed. About 18,703 cases and 1356 deaths were reported in 3 regions of northern Ghana between November 1996 and May 1997. Vaccination was conducted between February and April, which covered 72% of the high-risk population and prevented approximately 23% of cases and 18% of deaths. Routine childhood and adult immunization would have prevented 61% of cases had this same rate of vaccine coverage been achieved and maintained before the epidemic. This study suggests that the prevention of the meningococcal disease epidemic in West Africa would be difficult unless long-lasting conjugate vaccines are incorporated into routine infant immunization schedules. For now, the surveillance and response strategies advocated by the WHO serve as an effective and practical intervention.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: During 2009–2010, a northeastern US religious community experienced a large mumps outbreak despite high 2-dose measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine coverage. A third dose of MMR vaccine was offered to students in an affected community in an effort to control the outbreak. METHODS: Eligible sixth- to 12th-grade students in 3 schools were offered a third dose of MMR vaccine. Baseline and follow-up surveys and physician case reports were used to monitor mumps attack rates (ARs). We calculated ARs for defined 3-week periods before and after the intervention. RESULTS: Of 2265 eligible students, 2178 (96.2%) provided documentation of having received 2 previous doses of MMR vaccine, and a high proportion (1755 or 80.6%) chose to receive an additional vaccine dose. The overall AR for all sixth- to 12th-grade students declined from 4.93% in the prevaccination period to 0.13% after vaccination (P < .001). Villagewide, overall AR declined by 75.6% after the intervention. A decline occurred in all age groups but was significantly greater (96.0%) among 11- to 17-year-olds, the age group targeted for vaccination, than among all other age groups. The proportions of adverse events reported were lower than or within the range of those in previous reports of first- and second-dose MMR vaccine studies. CONCLUSIONS: This is the first study to assess the impact of a third MMR vaccine dose for mumps outbreak control. The decline in incidence shortly after the intervention suggests that a third dose of MMR vaccine may help control mumps outbreaks among populations with preexisting high 2-dose vaccine coverage.

Human enterovirus 68 (EV68) infections are rarely reported. We describe a respiratory outbreak associated with EV68 among 18 children admitted to a remote Indian Health Service facility during August 11, 2010 through September 14, 2010. Clinical illness was characterized by pneumonia and wheezing. EV68 should be considered as an etiology in outbreaks of lower respiratory tract illness.

Objectives.The United States eliminated indigenous wild polioviruses (WPVs) in 1979 and switched to inactivated poliovirus vaccine in 2000, which quickly ended all indigenous live poliovirus transmission. Continued WPV circulation and use of oral poliovirus vaccine globally allow for the possibility of reintroduction of these viruses. We evaluated the risk of a U.S. polio outbreak and explored potential vaccine needs for outbreak response.Methods.We synthesized information available on vaccine coverage, exemptor populations, and population immunity. We used an infection transmission model to explore the potential dynamics of a U.S. polio outbreak and potential vaccine needs for outbreak response, and assessed the impacts of heterogeneity in population immunity for two different subpopulations with potentially low coverage.Results.Although the risk of poliovirus introduction remains real, widespread transmission of polioviruses appears unlikely in the U.S., given high routine coverage. However, clusters of un- or underimmunized children might create pockets of susceptibility that could potentially lead to one or more paralytic polio cases. We found that the shift toward combination vaccine utilization, with limited age indications for use, and other current trends (e.g., decreasing proportion of the population with immunity induced by live polioviruses and aging of vaccine exemptor populations) might increase the vulnerability to poliovirus reintroduction at the same time that the ability to respond may decrease.Conclusions.The U.S. poliovirus vaccine stockpile remains an important resource that may potentially be needed in the future to respond to an outbreak if a live poliovirus gets imported into a subpopulation with low vaccination coverage.

Background Malaria is a major health concern for displaced persons occupying refugee camps in sub-Saharan Africa, yet there is little information on the incidence of infection and nature of transmission in these settings. Kakuma Refugee Camp, located in a dry area of north-western Kenya, has hosted ca. 60,000 to 90,000 refugees since 1992, primarily from Sudan and Somalia. The purpose of this study was to investigate malaria prevalence and attack rate and sources of Anopheles vectors in Kakuma refugee camp, in 2005-2006, after a malaria epidemic was observed by staff at camp clinics. Methods Malaria prevalence and attack rate was estimated from cases of fever presenting to camp clinics and the hospital in August 2005, using rapid diagnostic tests and microscopy of blood smears. Larval habitats of vectors were sampled and mapped. Houses were sampled for adult vectors using the pyrethrum knockdown spray method, and mapped. Vectors were identified to species level and their infection with Plasmodium falciparum determined. Results Prevalence of febrile illness with P. falciparum was highest among the 5 to 17 year olds (62.4%) while malaria attack rate was highest among the two to 4 year olds (5.2/1,000/day). Infected individuals were spatially concentrated in three of the 11 residential zones of the camp. The indoor densities of Anopheles arabiensis, the sole malaria vector, were similar during the wet and dry seasons, but were distributed in an aggregated fashion and predominantly in the same zones where malaria attack rates were high. Larval habitats and larval populations were also concentrated in these zones. Larval habitats were man-made pits of water associated with tap-stands installed as the water delivery system to residents with year round availability in the camp. Three percent of A. arabiensis adult females were infected with P. falciparum sporozoites in the rainy season. Conclusions Malaria in Kakuma refugee camp was due mainly to infection with P. falciparum and showed a hyperendemic age-prevalence profile, in an area with otherwise low risk of malaria given prevailing climate. Transmission was sustained by A. arabiensis, whose populations were facilitated by installation of man-made water distribution and catchment systems.

(See the editorial commentary by Ostroff, on pages 1507–9.)Background. On 12 February 2008, an infected Swiss traveler visited hospital A in Tucson, Arizona, and initiated a predominantly health care–associated measles outbreak involving 14 cases. We investigated risk factors that might have contributed to health care–associated transmission and assessed outbreak-associated hospital costs.Methods. Epidemiologic data were obtained by case interviews and review of medical records. Health care personnel (HCP) immunization records were reviewed to identify non–measles-immune HCP. Outbreak-associated costs were estimated from 2 hospitals.Results. Of 14 patients with confirmed cases, 7 (50%) were aged ≥18 years, 4 (29%) were hospitalized, 7 (50%) acquired measles in health care settings, and all (100%) were unvaccinated or had unknown vaccination status. Of the 11 patients (79%) who had accessed health care services while infectious, 1 (9%) was masked and isolated promptly after rash onset. HCP measles immunity data from 2 hospitals confirmed that 1776 (25%) of 7195 HCP lacked evidence of measles immunity. Among these HCPs, 139 (9%) of 1583 tested seronegative for measles immunoglobulin G, including 1 person who acquired measles. The 2 hospitals spent US$799,136 responding to and containing 7 cases in these facilities.Conclusions. Suspecting measles as a diagnosis, instituting immediate airborne isolation, and ensuring rapidly retrievable measles immunity records for HCPs are paramount in preventing health care–associated spread and in minimizing hospital outbreak–response costs.

Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as home isolation, social distancing, and infection control measures, are recommended by public health agencies as strategies to mitigate transmission during influenza pandemics. However, NPI implementation has rarely been studied in large populations. During an outbreak of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) virus infection at a large public university in April 2009, an online survey was conducted among students, faculty, and staff to assess knowledge of and adherence to university-recommended NPI. Although 3924 (65%) of 6049 student respondents and 1057 (74%) of 1401 faculty respondents reported increased use of self-protective NPI, such as hand washing, only 27 (6.4%) of 423 students and 5 (8.6%) of 58 faculty with acute respiratory infection (ARI) reported staying home while ill. Nearly one-half (46%) of student respondents, including 44.7% of those with ARI, attended social events. Results indicate a need for efforts to increase compliance with home isolation and social distancing measures.

Background Without intervention, up to 25% of individuals chronically infected with hepatitis B virus (HBV) die of late complications, including cirrhosis and liver cancer. The United States, which in 1991 implemented a strategy to eliminate HBV transmission through universal immunization, is a country of low prevalence. Approximately 3,000–5,000 U.S.-acquired cases of chronic hepatitis B have occurred annually since 2001. Many more chronically infected persons migrate to the United States yearly from countries of higher prevalence. Although early identification of chronic HBV infection can reduce the likelihood of transmission and late complications, immigrants are not routinely screened for HBV infection during or after immigration. Methods To estimate the number of imported cases of chronic hepatitis B, we multiplied country-specific prevalence estimates by the yearly number of immigrants from each country during 1974–2008. Results During 1974–2008, 27.9 million immigrants entered the U.S. Sixty-three percent were born in countries of intermediate or high chronic hepatitis B prevalence (range 2%–31%). On average, an estimated 53,800 chronic hepatitis B cases were imported to the U.S. yearly from 2004 through 2008. The Philippines, China, and Vietnam contributed the most imported cases (13.4%, 12.5%, and 11.0%, respectively). Imported cases increased from an estimated low of 105,750 during the period 1974–1977 to a high of 268,800 in 2004–2008. Conclusions Imported chronic hepatitis B cases account for approximately 95% of new U.S. cases. Earlier case identification and management of infected immigrants would strengthen the U.S. strategy to eliminate HBV transmission, and could delay disease progression and prevent some deaths among new Americans.

Background. In September 2008, an outbreak of pneumonia associated with an emerging human adenovirus (human adenovirus serotype 14 [HAdV-14]) occurred on a rural Southeast Alaska island. Nine patients required hospitalization, and 1 patient died. Methods. To investigate the outbreak, pneumonia case patients were matched to control participants on the basis of age, sex, and community of residence. Participants in the investigation and their household contacts were interviewed, and serum samples and respiratory tract specimens were collected. Risk factors were evaluated by means of conditional logistic regression. Results. Among 32 pneumonia case patients, 21 (65%) had confirmed or probable HAdV-14 infection. None of 32 matched control participants had evidence of HAdV-14 infection (P< .001 for the difference). Factors independently associated with pneumonia included contact with a known HAdV-14-infected case patient (odds ratio [OR], 18.3 [95% confidence interval {CI}, ≥2.0]), current smoking (OR, 6.7 [95% CI, ≥0.9]), and having neither traveled off the island nor attended a large public gathering (OR, 14.7 [95% CI, ≥2.0]). Fourteen (67%) of 21 HAdV-14-positive case patients belonged to a single network of people who socialized and often smoked together and infrequently traveled off the island. HAdV-14 infection occurred in 43% of case-patient household contacts, compared with 5% of control-participant household contacts (P = .005) Conclusions. During a community outbreak in Alaska, HAdV-14 appeared to have spread mostly among close contacts and not widely in the community. Demographic characteristics and illness patterns among the case patients were similar to those observed in other recent outbreaks of HAdV-14 infection in the United States.

To evaluate the impact of routine hepatitis B (HB) vaccination on the prevalence of chronic hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection among children in Pacific Island countries where HBV infection was highly endemic, we conducted HB serosurveys during 2000 to 2007 among women of childbearing age born before implementation of HB vaccination and among children born after its implementation.Serum specimens were collected from children aged 2 to 6 years and their mothers in Chuuk, Federated States of Micronesia in 2000, children aged 2 to 9 years and their mothers in Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia in 2005, and 5- to 9-year-old children and prenatal clinic patients in 2007 in Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). Specimens were tested for HB surface antigen (HBsAg) and antibodies to HB core antigen (total anti-HBc). HB vaccination coverage was determined from health department vaccination registries. We defined chronic HBV infection as the presence of HBsAg.Birthdose and 3 dose HB vaccination coverage was 48% and 87%, respectively, in Chuuk, 87% and 90% in Pohnpei, and 49% and 93% in RMI. Chronic HBV infection prevalence among children was 2.5% (9/362) in Chuuk, 1.5% (7/478) in Pohnpei and 1.8% (6/331) in RMI. Chronic HBV infection prevalence among women was 9.2% (21/229) in Chuuk, 4.4% (10/229) in Pohnpei, and 9.5% (11/116) in RMI.Hepatitis B vaccination has resulted in a substantial decline in chronic infection in children in the Pacific Islands. HB vaccine effectiveness is high in this region, despite challenges in providing HB vaccine at birth and completing vaccination series on schedule.

We identified 27 cases of hepatitis A among international adoptees (5 persons), their direct or indirect contacts (20 persons), and unvaccinated travelers to the adoptees' countries (2 persons). Most cases occurred among nontraveling contacts of adoptees, suggesting the need to extend prevention guidelines to include hepatitis A vaccination for at-risk nontravelers.

Objective To prevent perinatal transmission of hepatitis B virus (HBV), WHO recommends that the first dose of hepatitis B (HepB) vaccine be given within 24 hours after birth. This presents a challenge in remote areas with limited cold-chain infrastructure and where many children are born at home. Methods Rural townships in three counties in China’s Hunan Province were randomized into three groups with different strategies for delivery of the first dose of HepB vaccine. In group 1, vaccine was stored within the cold chain and administered in township hospitals. In group 2, vaccine was stored out of the cold chain in villages and administered by village-based health workers to infants at home. Group 3 used the same strategy as group 2, but vaccine was packaged in a prefilled injection device. Training of immunization providers and public communication conveying the importance of the birth dose was performed for all groups. Findings Among children born at home, timely administration (within 24 hours after birth) of the first dose of HepB vaccine increased in all groups after the study: group 1, from 2.4% to 25.2%; group 2, from 2.6% to 51.8%; and group 3, from 0.6% to 66.7%; P < 0.001 in each case. No significant difference in antibody response to vaccine was observed between the groups. Conclusion Timely administration of the first dose of HepB vaccine was improved by communication and training activities, and by out-of-cold-chain storage of vaccine and administration at the village level, especially among children born at home. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2007;85:688–694.

Background Injection drug use (IDU) is important in the epidemiology of blood-borne pathogens. Herein, trends in IDU from 1979 to 2002 are analyzed. Methods The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse is an ongoing survey of drug use among the US population 12 years and older. Participants were chosen using a multistage sampling design and interviewed by written questionnaire (1979-1998) or audio computer-assisted self-interviewing (1999-2002). Herein, we examine the prevalence of a history of IDU at any time in the past (IDU-ever) or within the past year. Results In the 2000-2002 surveys, 1.5% (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.4%-1.6%) reported IDU-ever (weighted estimate, 3.4 million persons). Prevalence was highest in persons aged 35 to 49 years (3.1%; 95% CI, 2.8%-3.4%), was higher in men (2.0%; 95% CI, 1.8%-2.2%) than women (1.0%; 95% CI, 0.9%-1.1%), and was higher in whites (1.7%; 95% CI, 1.5%-1.8%) than blacks (0.8%; 95% CI, 0.7%-1.1%) or Hispanics (1.1%; 95% CI, 0.8%-1.4%). Prevalence decreased with increasing annual income and educational level. Of all participants, 0.19% (95% CI, 0.16%-0.23%) reported IDU within the past year (weighted estimate, 440 000 persons). Ten years earlier (1990-1992), 1.6% (95% CI, 1.5%-1.8%) reported IDU-ever; prevalence did not differ by race. From 1979 through 2002, the mean age of participants with IDU within the past year increased from 21 to 36 years; the age of participants with IDU-ever increased from 26 to 42 years. From 2000 to 2002, 59.4% of all persons with IDU-ever were aged 35 to 49 years. Conclusions The mean age of injection drug users has increased substantially. Persons born between the late 1940s and early 1960s have the highest prevalence of IDU-ever. Self-reported IDU rates are now lower among young blacks than young whites.