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peer-reviewed, The Presidency plays a crucial role in the management and organisation of the Council’s work and the institution’s interactions with third parties. Formally, the Presidency just chairs the meetings of Council bodies; but over time, member states have endowed it with a range of procedural prerogatives to structure the Council’s agenda and broker agreements, which post holders can potentially use to advance their own private interests. The potential for abuse of these powers raises two related questions: first, why would member states grant these powers to the Presidency; and second, is the Presidency actually able to use these powers to advance its own priorities and policy preferences? In response to the first question, functionalist theories suggest that member states delegate powers to the Presidency to reduce transaction costs and solve collective action. Member states grant the Presidency procedural prerogatives and provide it with administrative resources to ensure an efficient management of the Council’s agenda, avoid inadvertent negotiation failure or sub-optimal negotiation outcomes, and provide adequate representation of the institution vis-à-vis external actors (Tallberg 2006, 2010). Another theory suggests that the Presidency acts as an adjudicator of the legitimacy of demands for concessions by member states that find themselves in the minority but claim to experience strong domestic pressures for non-compliance. By making impartial and thus credible recommendations about whether the formal voting rule or consensus decision-making should apply in these situations, the Presidency contributes to the long-term sustainability of international cooperation (Kleine 2013b, 2013a). The two explanatory accounts disagree about whether the growing role of the Presidency reflects an incremental accumulation of powers over time in response to new tasks or just an extension of already existing powers into new areas. Historical research on the development of Presidency, ACCEPTED, Peer reviewed

peer-reviewed, Little firm knowledge exists about the allocation of the Council's political attention across policy areas and over time. This article presents a new dataset of the date, duration, and policy coding of more than 70,000 meetings of Council working parties, covering all areas of the Council's policy activities between 1995 and 2014. In terms of both scope and resolution, the data allow for the generation of unprecedented insights into what issues occupy the Council's agenda, how that varies between and within policy areas, and how that changes over time. After discussing conceptual issues and explaining the construction of the dataset, the article demonstrates its usefulness and versatility through analyses of the Council's political attention at various levels of aggregation., ACCEPTED, peer-reviewed

peer-reviewed, Does the Presidency of the Council of the European Union have the ability to direct the political attention of this body by emphasising and de-emphasising policy issues according to its own priorities? This study examines this question empirically by relying on a new dataset on the monthly meeting duration of Council working parties in different policy areas between 1995 and 2014. The results of variance component analyses show that a considerable part of the over-time variation in the relative amount of political attention devoted to a policy area is systematically related to different Presidency periods. While not negating the constraints imposed on the Presidency by inherited agendas, programming, and coordination requirements with other actors, the findings are consistent with the view that the Presidency has substantial scope for agenda-setting by determining what issues are being discussed, when they are being discussed, and how much time is devoted for their discussion., ACCEPTED, peer-reviewed

peer-reviewed, The similarity of states' foreign policy positions is a standard variable in the dyadic analysis of international relations. Recent studies routinely rely on Signorino and Ritter's (1999, Tau-b or not tau-b: Measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions. International Studies Quarterly 43:115-44) S to assess the similarity of foreign policy ties. However, S neglects two fundamental characteristics of the international state system: foreign policy ties are relatively rare and individual states differ in their innate propensity to form such ties. I propose two chance-corrected agreement indices, Scott's (1955, Reliability of content analysis: The case of nominal scale coding. The Public Opinion Quarterly 19:321-5) pi and Cohen's (1960, A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and Psychological Measurement 20:37-46) kappa, as viable alternatives. Both indices adjust the dyadic similarity score for a large number of common absent ties. Cohen's kappa also takes into account differences in individual dyad members' total number of ties. The resulting similarity scores have stronger face validity than S. A comparison of their empirical distributions and a replication of Gartzke's (2007, The capitalist peace. American Journal of Political Science 51: 166-91) study of the 'Capitalist Peace' indicate that the different types of measures are not substitutable., ACCEPTED, peer-reviewed

peer-reviewed, Research on the intra-institutional consequences of differences in the EU's inter-institutional rule configurations is rare. This study investigates the effect of the empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) on the active involvement of ministers in Council decision-making. The empowerment of the EP is likely to increase the incentives for bureaucrats in the Council's preparatory bodies to refer decisions on legislative dossiers to ministers. The empirical analysis examines this claim with data on about 6,000 legislative decision-making processes that were concluded between 1980 and the end of 2007. The analysis demonstrates a strong and robust association between the type of legislative procedure and different decision-making levels in the Council: a more powerful EP makes Council decision-making more politicised., ACCEPTED, peer-reviewed

peer-reviewed, This article introduces the European Union Policy - Making (EUPOL) dataset. The dataset contains the complete records of the European Commission's PreLex database, which tracks the interactions between the European institutions on legislative proposals and non-legislative policy documents over time. To be of maximum use to the research community, the dataset is both comprehensive and replicable. It relies on 2600 variables to describe the detailed event histories of more than 29,000 inter-institutional decision-making processes between 1975 and 2009. The data collection has been completely automated, enabling scholars to scrutinize and replicate the generation of the dataset. To illustrate the dataset's general utility and discuss specific pitfalls, I present a descriptive analysis of the outcome and duration of Council decision-making., ACCEPTED, peer-reviewed

peer-reviewed, Little is known about the effects of the inter-institutional linkages created through the establishment of the codecision procedure on decision-making in the Council of the European Union. After a review of the existing literature and theories on this topic, we examine to what extent the codecision procedure leads to more involvement of ministers in Council decision-making and to a more powerful position of the Presidency in the internal negotiation process of the Council. The results show that the initially positive effect of codecision on the politicization of Council decision-making has been offset in recent years by a growing lack of transparency in inter-institutional proceedings caused by the use of informal trialogue negotiations to conclude the procedure early. However, our study also suggests that the country holding the Presidency does not occupy a more privileged position in the Council's internal co-operation network as a result of these developments. Thus, with respect to the Council, informal inter-institutional negotiation practices seem to decrease the transparency of the decision-making process and the accountability of the actors involved, but they may not have as adverse an effect on who gets what in terms of policy as previously thought., ACCEPTED, peer-reviewed

non-peer-reviewed, No abstract available, PUBLISHED, non-peer-reviewed

peer-reviewed, Although qualified-majority voting is possible, member states in the Council of the European Union (EU) still adopt most policies by consensus. The agent-based model of coalition building in multilateral negotiations presented here addresses this puzzle. The model demonstrates that consensual decisions may emerge as an unintended by-product of government representatives' desire to form blocking coalitions. A qualitative case study demonstrates the plausibility of the model's assumptions and resulting coalition-building dynamics. Moreover, a quantitative test shows that the model's predictions correspond closely to the observed consensus rates. Finally, computational experiments predict a positive effect of the voting threshold but no effect of increases in membership on winning coalition size, which has important practical implications for institutional design and enlargement policy., ACCEPTED, peer-reviewed

Committees of national officials play a major role in the decision-making of the European Union's main legislative body, the Council of Ministers. The study investigates the conditions under which bureaucrats decide on legislative dossiers without direct involvement of ministers. A statistical analysis is performed to examine this question, using an original data set of 439 legislative proposals. The results of the analysis indicate that formal institutional features such as the voting rule in the Council and the involvement of the European Parliament affect committee decision-making, whereas no effects of committee socialization and preference divergence among member states are identified. The results diminish concerns about the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making to some extent, as the findings demonstrate that bureaucrats tend to decide only the less salient and more complex proposals.

peer-reviewed, Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s collective policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This study sheds light on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative insights from practitioner interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur data from the 7th European Parliament (2009-2014) indicate that the appointment process is primarily one of bottom-up self-selection by group members based on their policy interests. The party group leadership, in the form of group coordinators, plays an important coordinating role when there is competition for a shadow rapporteurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a thirdparty arbiter of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, as suggested by principal-agent theory.

peer-reviewed, Supranational bureaucracies are often promoted as a solution to collective action problems. In the European Union context, investing the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) with new agenda-setting powers was expected to improve the coherence, continuity, and efficiency of foreign policy-making. Relying on novel fine-grained and comprehensive data about the content and duration of working party meetings, the study maps and analyses the allocation of political attention to different foreign policy issues between 2001 and 2014. The results show that the empowerment of the HR by the Lisbon Treaty had little immediate effect on the Council’s foreign policy agenda. However, the study also indicates that this result might be due to a lack of capability and ambition rather than weak institutional prerogatives.

peer-reviewed, Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s collective policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This study sheds light on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative insights from practitioner interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur data from the 7th European Parliament (2009-2014) indicate that the appointment process is primarily one of bottom-up self-selection by group members based on their policy interests. The party group leadership, in the form of group coordinators, plays an important coordinating role when there is competition for a shadow rapporteurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a thirdparty arbiter of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, as suggested by principal-agent theory.

peer-reviewed, Supranational bureaucracies are often promoted as a solution to collective action problems. In the European Union context, investing the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) with new agenda-setting powers was expected to improve the coherence, continuity, and efficiency of foreign policy-making. Relying on novel fine-grained and comprehensive data about the content and duration of working party meetings, the study maps and analyses the allocation of political attention to different foreign policy issues between 2001 and 2014. The results show that the empowerment of the HR by the Lisbon Treaty had little immediate effect on the Council’s foreign policy agenda. However, the study also indicates that this result might be due to a lack of capability and ambition rather than weak institutional prerogatives.

peer-reviewed, This thesis assesses the ability of prominent international relations theories to explain the ceding of governmental authority to an international institution in a region where state sovereignty had traditionally been considered a sacrosanct principle. Since its establishment in 2002, the African Union (AU) has utilised the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as its framework for responding to regional conflicts and crises. Through APSA, the AU’s remit includes issues such as democracy and human rights promotion that historically had been considered internal matters for African governments. Furthermore, the Architecture provides the Union with a mandate to intervene on a member’s territory under certain circumstances, such as genocide or war crimes. Using the core assumptions of three theoretical approaches – neorealism, liberalism and constructivism – predictions are formulated across two stages of institution creation and design. The first set relates to the process of preference formation within states, while the second addresses the progression and outcome of negotiations between governments. By using the establishment and design of APSA as a case study to test the accuracy of the predictions, the ability of each approach to explain social reality is assessed. The analysis focuses primarily on South Africa and Nigeria, two of the most influential states involved in the process of creating APSA, though the preferences and negotiation strategies of other states are also considered. An extensive selection of primary and secondary documents is drawn upon, as well as interviews with a variety of participants. The interview sample includes several AU officials and some of the most high-ranking foreign policy actors from the governments of South African President Thabo Mbeki and his Nigerian counterpart Olusegun Obasanjo. Ultimately, the research demonstrates that the interests of influential domestic actors in achieving and consolidating political and devel

peer-reviewed, This thesis assesses the ability of prominent international relations theories to explain the ceding of governmental authority to an international institution in a region where state sovereignty had traditionally been considered a sacrosanct principle. Since its establishment in 2002, the African Union (AU) has utilised the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as its framework for responding to regional conflicts and crises. Through APSA, the AU’s remit includes issues such as democracy and human rights promotion that historically had been considered internal matters for African governments. Furthermore, the Architecture provides the Union with a mandate to intervene on a member’s territory under certain circumstances, such as genocide or war crimes. Using the core assumptions of three theoretical approaches – neorealism, liberalism and constructivism – predictions are formulated across two stages of institution creation and design. The first set relates to the process of preference formation within states, while the second addresses the progression and outcome of negotiations between governments. By using the establishment and design of APSA as a case study to test the accuracy of the predictions, the ability of each approach to explain social reality is assessed. The analysis focuses primarily on South Africa and Nigeria, two of the most influential states involved in the process of creating APSA, though the preferences and negotiation strategies of other states are also considered. An extensive selection of primary and secondary documents is drawn upon, as well as interviews with a variety of participants. The interview sample includes several AU officials and some of the most high-ranking foreign policy actors from the governments of South African President Thabo Mbeki and his Nigerian counterpart Olusegun Obasanjo. Ultimately, the research demonstrates that the interests of influential domestic actors in achieving and consolidating political and devel

peer-reviewed, Specialization and delegation of policy leadership within committees is the norm rather than the exception in legislatures around the world. Yet, little research has studied the sub-groups of lawmakers who serve as policy-leaders on particular bills. This paper uses conceptual and methodological tools from social network analysis to investigate the groups’ composition and relational structure. It tests the proposition that limited human resources lead lawmakers from small parties to more frequently engage with a greater number of colleagues from other parties across a wider range of policy areas. This may have important relational benefits that have the potential to outweigh the structural disadvantages of small party size. We examine whether small party lawmakers participate more, are more central, and have greater potential for brokerage in policymaking networks, or if the constraints associated with small party size and/or particular ideological leanings prevent their realization. Empirically, our analyses focus on working relationships between rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in the adoption of reports by standing committees of the 7th European Parliament (2009-2014). Methodologically, we employ a mixed methods approach. Our quantitative analyses show that small party size does not affect legislators’ participation in policymaking networks, but that it increases legislators’ centrality and brokerage potential. Regarding ideology, being committed to democratic participation as a good in itself has a positive association with all three outcomes, while attitudes to European integration show no effect. Our qualitative data suggest that the relational benefits of belonging to a small party partially mitigate the structural disadvantages associated with it. They also indicate that policymaking in the European Parliament is quite inclusive, as any systematic exclusion tends to be the result of self-marginalisation.