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The chapter on the Swiss parliament offers an introduction of the institutional characteristics and functioning of the National Council and the Council of States, the two parliamentary chambers of the Swiss parliament. It elaborates how the Swiss parliamentarians are elected and discusses the composition and functions of this parliament. The specificities of this system, characterized by two equally powerful chambers, part-time national parliamentarians, very few administrative resources, and a lack of transparency in party and campaign financing, are outlined and explained in detail. In addition, the chapter measures the power of the Swiss parliament with an institutional power index based on its formal rights and compares the result with qualitative estimates of parliamentary and political experts to provide an encompassing estimate of the power of parliament. As two key developments that are particularly characteristic for this parliament in recent years, the increase in professionalization and the growing influence of interest groups and how they impact the Federal Assembly are discussed.

Global economic integration and global political restraint—this fine balance has characterized Switzerland’s relationship with the international community since the Swiss federal state was founded in 1848. Geopolitical change and crises, globalization, and the European integration process, however, have increasingly challenged this traditional model of Swiss foreign relations. With its entry into the UN (2002) and two sets of bilateral treaties with the EU (2000, 2005) Switzerland has taken significant steps towards a stronger political involvement in the international arena, even if a clear majority of Swiss voters, parliament, and the government remain opposed to EU membership. This chapter situates Switzerland in the global economy and in international politics. It begins by contextualizing Switzerland in its international environment and comparing it with its neighbours as well as some additional countries. The chapter then shows that Switzerland is one of the most ‘globalized’, i.e., most open countries in the world. Finally, it shows that the political system of Switzerland has slowly but noticeably reacted to European as well as the global political and economic changes of the recent past. Nevertheless, in respect of foreign policy, voters remain divided into two camps; these camps view the implications of increasing integration into the European and global arena very differently, in particular with regard to the consequences for sovereignty, neutrality, federalism, and direct democracy. This division generates considerable political controversies about the challenges Switzerland faces.

Direct democracy—instruments that allow for citizens’ direct participation in legislative politics—is one of the corner stones of the Swiss political system. The chapter starts with a descriptive exercise of illustrating the historic emergence of direct-democratic institutions in Switzerland, how the institutions were introduced, and how access to these instruments was made easier over time. Apart from this de jure perspective, it also looks at the de facto use of these institutions over the last 170 years and shows that the use of the different institutions follows different patterns. Building on the descriptive part, it turns to the direct and indirect effects of direct democracy on the working of representative democracy. Direct-democratic institutions disperse power by either adding a potential veto player (e.g., the optional referendum) or by extending the set of actors that have agenda-setting power (e.g., initiative). There is a discussion of how the presence of these institutions alters the rationale of political actors and by doing so affects political processes and outcomes. In the last part of the chapter, the discussion broadens the geographic focus and compares direct-democratic institutions in Swiss cantons with direct-democratic institutions in subnational units in Germany and Austria as well as in states in the US. The chapter concludes with an outlook on the future prospects of direct democracy, namely how the working of these institutions could be affected by increasing societal polarization and by the digital transformation.

This chapter focuses on the Swiss federal administration and its role in agenda-setting, decision-making, policy implementation, and providing an interface between elected politicians, interest groups, and citizens; it begins with an outline of the federal administration and its evolution over time and notes the ministerial structures of the federal administration. The history of administrative reforms is retraced through a discussion regarding ‘New Public Management’. Then, the Swiss administration is placed in an international perspective. Finally, the chapter presents the human resource management issues that the federal administration has faced since the ending of the permanent status of civil servants. The concluding section highlights four upcoming challenges related to the organization and management of the Swiss federal administration.

Recent studies of representation in advanced democratic systems have emphasized that class preference profiles toward social policies diverge between different logics and fields of social policy. We leverage newly collected data on voters’ social policy priorities, as well as their perception of parties’ priorities on these same policies, to empirically study social policy representation across these different fields. We show that class biases in perceived social policy representation persist in all areas of social policy; in particular, citizens in lower social classes perceive political parties to deviate from their preferences by not supporting pension and unemployment spending enough, as well as by putting more emphasis than they do on the expansion of education and of benefits supporting immigrants. In a second step, we test whether the presence of strong radical left and/or radical right challenger parties improves perceived social policy representation for citizens in lower social classes. We find some evidence for a mitigating effect of challenger – especially radical left – parties, but basic patterns of class-biased representation persist throughout.

Family policy has become an increasingly important policy area in Switzerland since the 1990s. Benefits and services to families have undergone profound transformations. Some reforms became possible because family policy was increasingly defined not only as social policy but also as social investment policy promoting employment and human capital formation. This ambiguity enabled reforms to be supported by heterogeneous reform coalitions, even if long-term coalitions remain unstable and depend on the specific reform proposal. Despite these changes, Swiss family policy is still underdeveloped and falls behind that of other continental European countries. Government spending on family policy is low by international standards, and the use of formal childcare is strongly stratified by income. Important factors contributing to this slow pace of family policy modernization in Switzerland are the decentralized distribution of competences with different levels of government and the use of various direct democratic instruments to prevent or delay reform initiatives at different levels of governance. Moreover, the party system’s increasing political polarization slows down reform efforts and undermines reform coalitions between socially progressive and economically liberal forces. In the face of these challenges, the adaptation of family policy to changing social and economic needs has become a litmus test for the reform capacity of the Swiss welfare state.

Opposition between the far right and the new left has transformed West European politics, mainly through increasing sociocultural conflicts. We ask what the new cleavage articulated by these parties implies for the politicization of inequalities in advanced knowledge societies. We contrast two diverging expectations in existing literature: A first, more rational-choice-based perspective expects a trade-off, with new left voters "privileged" by economic transformations emphasizing sociocultural inequalities over socioeconomic ones–and vice versa for "disadvantaged" far right voters. A second, more sociological perspective, predicts attitudes on inequalities to be aligned along a single dimension from new left "universalists" being inequality-averse to right-wing "particularists" being more inequality-tolerant. Our evidence based on original survey data from Germany supports the second perspective. Studying the structural (educational, class, etc.) foundations of inequality aversion suggests that even the transformed (new) left electorate is more sensitive to all dimensions of inequality than voters on the (far) right.

Several developments over the past decade in Western democracies have sparked worries about political stability. Among them, the rise of radical political parties, heated polarization around questions of immigration, nationalism, or social liberalism, and – in some instances – even attacks on democratic institutions, stand out. However, conflict and choice between clearly distinctive alternative ideas of how societies and economies should be governed are at the heart of democracy. Democracy needs competition and conflict. But where is the line between healthy and harmful conflict and polarization? In this paper, we explain that an interpretation of today’s state of democratic conflict as chaotic, fragmented or volatile is misleading. Rather, Western democracies are in a process of a fundamental restructuring of the main political dividing lines: a new social cleavage between universalistic and particularistic ideas of social, economic, and political organization, between openness and closure, has been emerging over the past decades. This conflict is rooted in social groups defined by education, occupation, and territory, it relates to underlying collective identities on both sides, and it will dominate democratic party competition for the foreseeable future. It is not per se harmful to democracy, but reflects genuinely different visions of desirable social order. However, under certain conditions, it can turn on democracy itself. The last part of this paper then discusses the functional and dysfunctional implications of polarized political conflict for democracy. To what extent is conflict and polarization healthy and under what conditions is it likely to endanger the very legitimacy and institutional stability of democracies? Building on existing knowledge about the dynamics of polarization, we discuss political and institutional means to contain polarization and to protect democratic stability.

Many recent studies have underlined the importance of inequality perceptions as determinants of political demands and behavior. Yet, this literature often focuses on the public perception of one single, often economic, dimension of inequality. This study aims to broaden our perspective and provides a comprehensive assessment of public perceptions of socioeconomic (income, education, and class inequality) and sociocultural inequalities (gender, sexual orientation, and migration background inequality). Furthermore, we disentangle different components of inequality perceptions: the assessed importance of differences, as how problematic they are judged, and who thinks that these inequalities are central to political debates nowadays. We find that highly educated respondents attribute more importance and mostly judge inequalities across the board as more important than the less educated. While information on the extent of inequality can move the assessment of how important inequality is in society, the judgment of these divides remains unchanged, hinting to more deep-seated beliefs that are not as easily changed.

The growth of the knowledge economy alters the risks and opportunities citizens experience in the labor market. Governments attempt to steer and support the adaptation of the workforce, enhance and spread opportunities, and mitigate the negative implications of these changes, in particular via skill-developing labor market policies. However, many recent studies document a puzzling discrepancy between the needs of knowledge economy losers in terms of skill development and their policy preferences. In particular, those most threatened by the knowledge economy prioritize compensation and protection over investments in human capital. Our study theorizes and studies four mechanisms – two ego-tropic, one socio-tropic and one group-tropic – to explain this preference pattern: they a) may have distorted perceptions of the distributive effects of policy reforms, b) may assign less importance to human capital investment as opposed to transfers and protection, c) may think that investment reforms do not contribute to societal equality, or d) may feel that the reforms do not deliver social recognition for themselves and their social ingroups. To test the relative importance of these mechanisms, we analyze novel data from an original survey in nine European countries, using both observational and experimental evidence. Our findings provide evidence for the group-specific recognition mechanism. Knowledge economy losers do think that they would benefit from social investment, and they also think that investment would deliver on equality, but they do not perceive a distinctive benefit for themselves or their ingroups. In their eyes, compensation reforms are the only type of reforms that benefit their ingroups exclusively. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of policy responses to the knowledge economy depends not only on material effects of reforms but is conditional on cultural and recognition-based mechanisms.

Several developments in Western democracies over the past decade have sparked worries about political stability. Standing out are the rise of radical political parties, heated polarization around questions of immigration, nationalism, or social liberalism, and – in some cases – attacks on democratic institutions. However, conflict and choice between clearly distinctive alternative ideas of how societies and economies should be governed are at the heart of democracy. Democracy needs competition and conflict. But where is the line between healthy and harmful conflict and polarization? In this paper, Silja Häusermann and Simon Bornschier explain that an interpretation of today’s state of democratic conflict as chaotic, fragmented, or volatile is misleading. Rather, Western democracies are in a process of a fundamental restructuring of the main political dividing lines. Over the past decades a new social cleavage has been emerging between universalistic and particularistic ideas of social, economic, and political organization, between openness and closure. This conflict is rooted in social groups defined by education, occupation, and territory. It relates to underlying collective identities on both sides, and it will dominate democratic party competition for the foreseeable future. It is not per se harmful to democracy but reflects genuinely different visions of desirable social order. However, under certain conditions, it can turn on democracy itself. The authors thus examine the functional and dysfunctional implications of polarized political conflict for democracy. To what extent is conflict and polarization healthy and under what conditions is it likely to endanger the very legitimacy and institutional stability of democracies? Building on existing knowledge about the dynamics of polarization, they discuss political and institutional means to contain polarization and to protect democratic stability.

Recent studies take increasingly refined views of how socioeconomic conditions influence political behaviour. We add to this literature by exploring how voters' prospective evaluations of long-term economic and social opportunities relate to electoral contestation versus the stabilization of the political-economic system underpinning the knowledge society. Using survey data from eight West European countries, we show that positive prospects are associated with higher support for mainstream parties (incumbents and opposition) and lower support for radical parties on all levels of material well-being. Our results support the idea that ‘aspirational voters’ with positive evaluations of opportunities (for themselves or their children) represent an important stabilizing force in advanced democratic capitalism. However, we also highlight the importance of radical party support among ‘apprehensive voters’, who are economically secure but perceive a lack of long-term opportunities. To assess the implications of these findings, we discuss the relative importance of these groups across different countries.

As countries transition from industrial to post-industrial knowledge economies, education and skills are crucial. Consequently, policy-makers around the globe have increasingly focused on social investment, that is, policies aiming to create, mobilize, or preserve skills. Yet, countries around the globe have developed social investments to different degrees and in highly different forms. Our goal is twofold: First, we introduce a new typology of social investment policies, distinguishing nine types along two dimensions: three distributive profiles (inclusive, stratified, targeted) and three functions (skill creation, preservation, mobilization). This differentiation allows fine-grained analyses of the causes and consequences of different kinds of social investments, thus offering a perspective to study the relationship between efficiency and inclusiveness in a way that goes beyond the mere discussion how social investment policies grosso modo affect inequalities (‘equalizing’ versus ‘Matthew Effects’). Second, we theorize on the politics of social investment. We argue that the interaction of policy legacies and socioeconomic factors is the main explanation for which functions of social investment policies are introduced, whereas their distributive profiles are crucially shaped by political coalitions. We illustrate with empirical material from democracies around the globe.