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The principle objective will be to explain the reasons behind a non-recognition of the statehood of Kosovo. This situation has led to international sanctions on Kosovo that prevent the maintenance of regular relations with some key actors on the world stage, as well as the threatening possible accession to European Union. Our premise is that some non-recognizing EU member states have adopted a new understanding of what constitutes 'nationhood' since a more pragmatic approach taken in the early 90s. Spain has been chosen as a case study, both due to its failure to recognize Kosovo, but also due to its hardening position, which has become even more extreme than that of Cyprus. We will assess the extent to which the domestic situation in Spain has affected actions taken in regard to Kosovo. This relationship will be shown by looking at the political discourse since 2007, covering the months before the Kosovo Unilateral of Declaration Independence (UDI), to the events of the Bulgarian Presidency of the EU in the first semester of 2018. Parliamentary debates, official documents and press conferences will be analysed as the main sources of information, together with interviews being held between Spanish and Kosovar officials between 2014 and 2018. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How, amidst a crisis of sovereignty and identity, did once-rejected national symbols become meaningful to Kosovo's Albanians? Having declared independence in 2008, a 2014 study found that less than one-third of Kosovo's citizens identified with their newly adopted state symbols. As meanings are always shifting, depending on the contexts in which their forms appear and the actors involved, theories of social construction have focused on the representational aspects of meaning-making: the ways in which the forms stabilize (or destabilize) the constructs they depict. Instead of focusing on the representational—the determinable, measurable, and rational aspects, this article investigates the discursive mechanisms that mobilize meanings and configure contexts, extending Robin Wagner-Pacifici's alternative theory of events. Through discourse and semiotic analysis, it tracks Kosovo's new flag and anthem through the construction, crisis, and transformation of three social realities: political independence, national identity, and the world of international competitive judo, illuminating how changing meanings change, shifting contexts shift, and how to interpret actors' fleeting emotions. In the Kosovo case, the construction is the crisis, as well as the change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intra-Serbian dialogue is as necessary for normalisation as is resumed dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Serbia and Kosovo have initiated a process of territorial exchange that could have serious repercussions, both in the Western Balkans and internationally. Historically speaking, territorial exchanges have a mixed record. In some instances, these projects have inaugurated periods of protracted cooperation and reconciliation. However, on a number of occasions, such agreements have had devastating consequences and have led to carnage, violence, and ethnic cleansing. Whereas Serbia and Kosovo have the sovereign and democratic right to engage in a genuine dialogue and decide on adjustments to their borders, it is important for the international community to pay close attention to the dynamics of the process and to consider the stability and security of the wider region should this project materialize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the effectiveness of power-sharing arrangements and how they influence the identity building process in the particular case of Kosovo Serbs. Based on original data collected during a nine-month fieldwork conducted by the author in Kosovo Serbs villages, this paper aims to present local dynamics of everyday resistance to power-sharing arrangements and their implications. I argue that ordinary people’s everyday resistance to power-sharing provisions engenders a marginalization process, which contributes to the emergence of multiple Serbian identities within the Kosovo entity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, it did so not as a nation-state, but as a “state of communities,” self-defining as multiethnic, diverse, and committed to extensive rights for minorities. In this paper, this choice is understood as a response to a dual legitimation problem. Kosovo experienced both an external legitimation challenge, regarding its contested statehood internationally, and an internal one, vis-à-vis its Serb minority. The focus on diversity and minority rights was expected to confer legitimacy on the state both externally and internally. International state-builders and the domestic political elite in post-conflict Kosovo both pursued this strategy. However, it inadvertently created an additional internal legitimation challenge, this time from within Kosovo’s majority Albanian population. This dynamic is illustrated by the opposition movement “Lëvizja Vetëvendosje” (Self-Determination Movement), which rejects the framing of Kosovo as first and foremost a multiethnic state. The movement’s counter-narrative represents an additional internal legitimation challenge to the new state. This paper thus finds that internationally endorsed “diversity management” through minority rights did not deliver as a panacea for the legitimacy dilemmas of the post-conflict polity. On the contrary, the “state of communities” continues to be contested by both majority and minority groups in Kosovo. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Kosovar authorities in Pristina in 2008 has generated heavy legal and political controversies. The delivery by the International Court of Justice of its advisory opinion on Kosovo unilateral declaration of independence in 2010 has not led to the elimination of unilateralist positions as to Kosovo's status. Such unilateralist approach, favouring Kosovo's independence either in principle or in practice, has since been adopted by the local Kosovar authorities, a number of governments and by the European Union. This contribution addresses the merit of such unilateralist positions and examines whether these positions could adversely affect the legal position as to Kosovo's status under general international law as well as un Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the Ukrainian Revolution, Ukraine's autonomous region of Crimea declared independence and filed an application to subsequently join the Russian Federation. In seeking to justify these acts, both the Crimean authorities and the Russian Federation referred to international law, including the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. In this Advisory Opinion, the Court indeed found that the principle of territorial integrity merely applies in the relationship between States and concluded that general international law does not contain a prohibition on unilateral declarations of independence. These findings and the interpretation of the Advisory Opinion as put forward by the Crimean and Russian authorities, however, raise pertinent questions. This article therefore aims to shed light on the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States and its implications for the legality of and perceived legal neutrality concerning unilateral secession under international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008, but substantial proportions of its population are expressing their lack of confidence by preparing to emigrate. In this paper, we present evidence from a customized post-independence survey (1,367 face-to face interviews) on emigration intentions in Kosovo, carried out in June 2008. Thirty per cent of the respondents from the Albanian-speaking majority have taken concrete steps to move abroad, and emigration intentions have again risen to their pre-independence peak. Strikingly, it is the better educated and those with higher incomes that are more likely to exit. Ethnic Serbs (the largest minority group) are less likely to emigrate than Kosovo's ethnic majority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an explanation for the Kosovo secession from Serbia/Yugoslavia. This is achieved by disaggregating the 'reality' of the state through the process tracing method, which compares the cases of the Tito and Milosevic triangles of accommodation practices. The focus is on the games of survival practiced at the middle levels ofpolitical life, around the local state policy implementer and the consequences of his removal. This paper examines not only why, but how the secession of Kosovo occurred when it did. It shows that the strength of authoritarianism or the regime-oppression capability is not what held the Serbia and Kosovo together; rather, it was the policies of accommodations which one leader did better than the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines approaches and official discrepancies characterizing Western European rhetoric with regard to the Kosovo status question. Since the early 1980s, Kosovo has been increasingly present in European debates, culminating with the 1999 international intervention in the region and subsequent talks about its final status. Although the Kosovo Albanians proclaimed independence in February 2008 and the majority of the EU member-states decided to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, Western European rhetoric has been rather divided. This article shows that in addition to the five EU members who decided not to recognize Kosovo from the very beginning, and thus are powerful enough to affect its further progress both locally and internationally, some of the recognizers, although they have abandoned the policy of ‘standards before status’, have also struggled to develop full support for the province – a discrepancy that surely questions the overall Western support for Kosovo's independence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Until 1999, Kosovo was a little-known province of Serbia. NATO's intervention, however, changed this. Suddenly, everyone was talking about Kosovo and the plight of the Kosovo Albanians. Today, Kosovo is no longer a major talking point; few authors are now writing about post-independence Kosovo and the many challenges that confront the young state. Particularly striking is the relative absence of scholarly writings that discuss the Gordian knot of northern Kosovo. Seeking to rectify this neglect, this article has three core aims: to provide new empirical insights into the situation on the ground in northern Kosovo, to explore Serb and Albanian viewpoints regarding the status of the north (and in particular to examine Serb fears and concerns) and to discuss possible solutions. It argues that granting the north a special, autonomous status within Kosovo is the ultimate way to resolve the “northern problem,” and indeed this now seems the most likely solution following the recent conclusion of the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations. This research is based on five weeks of fieldwork in Kosovo in July and August 2012. During this time, the author conducted 56 semi-structured interviews, 29 of which took place in northern Kosovo. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the process of visa liberalisation Serbia made significant and unexpected adjustments in its Kosovo policy, which demonstrate the European Union's leverage. Serbia's compliance on Kosovo cannot be explained either by rational institutionalism, which accounts for domestic change based on cost–benefit calculations, or sociological institutionalism, which predicts domestic adaptation based on convergence of norms and identities. Applying discursive institutionalism, this empirical study of Serbia's Europeanisation identifies discursive denial as a strategy of the Serbian elite in pursuing costly policy implementation. It contributes a novel perspective on ‘shallow’ Europeanisation by highlighting a lack of discursive reinforcement of adopted rules. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the issue of international representation of Kosovo as it evolved from the establishment of an international administration by UNSC Resolution 1244 in June 1999, to Kosovo's declaration of independence of 17 February 2008, to the present day. It summarizes external relations powers exercised by UNMIK and analyses the changes brought by Kosovo's declaration of independence. In particular, it deals with the issue of Kosovo's representation in regional fora. The article will also demonstrate how the issue of international representation has influenced the wider story of Kosovo's contested statehood and, in particular, its on-going dispute with Serbia. Moreover, it will also discuss the EU's involvement in the dispute and how the prospect of potential EU membership/association for Serbia and Kosovo, respectively, has served as a powerful incentive in the negotiations. In that sense, it will show how this particular dispute can be, and has been, managed by external and internal actors and what methods and incentives can facilitate compromise and agreement between the parties; how their own positions can either solidify or evolve; and how external mediators can either exacerbate the problem or contribute to the solution. The article also argues that conflicting attitudes towards international representation of Kosovo concern not just its external relations but also relate to the legitimacy of its independence, its statehood and its representatives. It shows that despite disputed statehood there is undoubtedly a “creeping legitimacy” of Kosovo and its representatives even among those who are vigorously opposed to Kosovo's independence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that there is a difference in what constitutes the sources of recognition prior to countries' membership in the Euro-Atlantic community represented by NATO and after countries become its members. While prior to membership, countries are recognized for their compliance with NATO standards and policies, upon membership countries get the opportunity to promote specific interests legitimately and may seek recognition via non-compliance with NATO mainstream. The paper explores this dynamic of recognition on the issue of Kosovo independence where Slovakia went from supporting NATO in its effort to protect civilians in Kosovo in the late 1990s to non-recognition of Kosovo in defiance of the majority of NATO member states less than a decade later. The crucial point proposed here is that there was a shift in how recognition by NATO worked prior to Slovakia's membership and upon membership in these frameworks. While prior to membership recognition was achieved by compliance and identification with NATO standpoints, policies and actions, upon membership, recognition is achieved by differentiation from these patterns. More generally, the study shows that NATO membership is a powerful source of conditionality in relation to future members and a powerful source of legitimacy in relation to current members' actions, While this has been discussed in the literature, the point here is that recognition in its various forms is an important driving force in these conditionality processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion of the book "Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System," by Nina Caspersen. Topics include the notion of sovereignty in relation to unrecognized states, the relevance of the notion of weak states, and the role of formal independence declarations in assessing de facto states. Also addressed are the roles of major powers in recognizing states, the effects of recognition on political legitimacy, and the influence of the recognition of Kosovo on other unrecognized states.

While the breakup of Yugoslavia produced divided loyalties and competing claims, leading to the establishment of seven separate states ending with the de facto independence of Kosovo, Crimea was a source of geopolitical instability that threatened to engulf the region in ethnic and geopolitical conflict. As a result of the negotiations during the 1990s and a de facto settlement between Slavs and the Ukrainian state, between Slavs and returning Crimean Tatars, and between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, Crimea has remained a peaceful and even increasingly wealthy area of Ukraine. Reflecting on the case of Kosovo, this paper looks at the prospect for a similar conflict in and over Crimea. Our primary question concerns the degree to which the Kosovo case sheds light on a somewhat similar case of co-ethnics, religious differences and a weakened state. We argue that the greatest source of instability lies not with ethnic claims or geopolitics, but with Ukrainian political and commercial interests that threaten the de facto settlement between the region and the centre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution focuses on the consequences of the international controversy over Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) for domestic debates over sub-state territorial restructuring. The main argument is that, in the absence of a clear distinction in international politics between secessionist and non-secessionist claims, state elites employ ‘Kosovo’ effectively for invoking the spectre of secessionist violence even in consistently non-secessionist and non-violent settings, delegitimising all culturally framed claims for territorial restructuring. This strategy leads to radicalised group claims and increased democratic fragility. The Romanian case highlights the imperative to take seriously non-secessionist claims as a separate category of study and international norm-setting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of circumstances. Kosovo was not a precedent; it was asui generiscase in international politics. This essay considers the arguments underpinning this claim to exclusivity and argues that, taken either individually or collectively, the main justifications used to support Kosovo's ‘unique’ statehood—such as the abuse of human rights—in fact have serious consequences for other separatist conflicts elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the meaning of self-determination in its historical and contemporary contexts and examines the different options available for the accommodation of contested self-determination claims. Among these, the creation of a new state, arguably, is the most radical of options and one that has significant regional and global implications beyond the territory to which it is applied. Detailing these implications in relation to the case of Kosovo, we make a broader argument that, even if secession is one mechanism to resolve self-determination disputes, this does not do away with the need to continue exploring settlements short of secession as alternatives to changing established international boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In instances of international negotiations over state recognition, the way the violence sustained by a given group is categorised becomes a critical factor in the international community's decision to support independence or not. This essay argues that the recognition of Kosovo in February 2008 was made possible by the use of justifications based on Kosovo Albanians' collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The essay bridges the gap between two bodies of literature that have not been used in conjunction up to now, namely normative theories of ‘remedial’ secession and works on the logic of mass violence against ethnically defined groups. It finds that the international community has used the ‘remedial argument’ for Kosovo's recognition because it allowed it to minimise the risk of further unilateral declarations of independence in a volatile region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To complete its work in Kosovo and maintain peace, stability, and development in the western Balkans as a whole, the European Union must do a better job of coordinating its agencies on the ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan model of conflict transformation and the Kosovo model of conflict settlement have specific features, and are useful for analyzing the Georgian and Russian policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is a similarity between the Georgian strategy of engagement and the Taiwan model, with its declared readiness to interact with the other party regardless of any setbacks arising over the issue of status. Unlike the Taiwan model, however, the Georgian strategy includes no concrete view on how to involve the authorities controlling the breakaway territories or, in particular, how to have a positive impact on their relations with the outside world. A comparison between the Kosovo model and Russian policies toward these two entities demonstrates that, in deciding to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow largely drew on the moral and legal arguments put forward for the recognition of Kosovo. Russia has established political oversight over these entities, to a certain extent mirroring the Western policy of supervised independence for Kosovo. But Russia is still unable to adopt a conflict resolution policy toward Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia that is based on regional integration prospects, in contrast to Western policies toward the Balkans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented to a special section that discusses the February 2008 Western recognition of Kosovo's independence and the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War over South Ossetia as instances of state recognition and of conflict between the West and Russia.

This paper assesses state recognition, the practice historically employed to regulate membership in international society, since the United States–led recognition of Kosovo and the Russian-led recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Its main goal is to succinctly examine the question of whether these two controversial episodes have signaled change in the existing norms of recognition of new states. The paper argues that there is not enough evidence for the claims of some observers and governments that unilateral secession is, as such, becoming legitimate internationally. The leading recognizing powers took great care in all three cases to reject the applicability of their decision to other situations of unilateral secession, and they have since approached those other situations as if no acknowledgment of the three territories had taken place. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the deeply contested nature of these cases has introduced confusion and uncertainty into the practice and that this has had, and will have, important implications elsewhere in the world, in terms of both re-invigorated claims of statehood and the potential for unilateral recognition decisions by powerful outsiders. In fact, it is extremely unlikely that Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008 would have ever occurred without the prior US-led recognition of Kosovo in February 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the efforts of external actors to influence opportunities for national political elites to gain or maintain positions of power in post-conflict societies. The analysis compares the cases of Liberia and Kosovo, both of which have been characterized by high levels of external intervention though with significant differences in the scope of authority of external actors. Despite these differences, similar dynamics have characterized elite formation in both countries. The impact of external actors on elite systems is mostly indirect, and chances for accumulating authority provided by the national setting determine elite careers. External actors bow to these national conditions rather than decisively changing them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In international law, the right of peoples to self-determination as applied to remedial secession is anything but clear. The International Court of Justice had an opportunity to clarify this area of law in its recent advisory opinion concerning the unilateral declaration of independence made by Kosovo. Much to the disappointment of international commentators, the Court expressly declined to adjudicate whether Kosovo had, by its declaration, attained state status. Instead, the Court declared that international law does not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence. This Note argues that the proper method for the United Nations to articulate international law of secession is via resolution of the General Assembly combined with application of that resolution by the International Court of Justice. This is the method the United Nations used when it articulated another form of the right to self-determination, the right to be free from colonization. The method's success in this latter area demonstrates its viability for the right to secession, a similarly situated right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the aspects of the declaration of independence in Kosovo and the issues it raised to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The author offers a concise history of the conflict in Kosovo and analyzes the General Assembly's questions. He discusses a survey of the international law rules relevant to the concerns. He concludes that ICJ must be vigilant to sustain its processes' integrity.

The article discusses the legal precedent of the advisory opinion issued in June 2010 by the International Court of Justice stating that the February 17th, 2008, declaration of independence of Kosovo was not a violation of international law. The author argues that the precedent threatens Eurasia with armed conflicts in an effort to realign state borders among separatist Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albanians in Macedonia, and Hungarians in Rumania. The article compares the process determining the status of Kosovo with other international conflicts in which international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were involved and argues that the Kosovo process was inferior, inadequate, and unfair.

For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the 'parent state.' Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, in February 2008. As a result, Belgrade referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 July 2010, it came back with its long-awaited decision. Taking a narrow view of the question, the majority argued that, in general, declarations of independence, as mere statements, do not violate international law unless stated otherwise by the Security Council. Thus, Kosovo's declaration of independence cannot be considered as being wholly 'unique' - as those states that supported its statehood have claimed. On the key questions of whether Kosovo's secession is legal, or if it is even a state, they chose to avoid controversy. On these points, the international community is no clearer now than it was before the case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent opinion by the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence has not provided a definitive answer to Kosovo's status. The International community remains divided. For this reason, a political solution will need to be found. Possible scenarios for the future of Kosovo include continuation of the status quo; enforcing Pristina's full authority across all of Kosovo; partition or partial territorial readjustment between Kosovo and Serbia; or some form of extended autonomy for northern Kosovo. While each of the models has its advantages and drawbacks, on balance the case for some form of extensive autonomy or a territorial readjustment remain the most compelling options for resolving the conflict in a manner most acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina, and which would open the way for Kosovo to gain wider, if not full, international acceptance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After Kosovo's independence, which is recognized by numerous members of International Society; a new wave of discussions started about the entities like TRNC, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, and Transylvania, Quebec which share similar time of life with Kosovo. The main discussions re flamed from Kosovo's independence were essentially on real politics, contradictions to law, injustice and double standards. NATO's Kosovo intervention supposedly based on humanitarian ground, brought a new situation to be reexamined and re judged on not only ethical, political and humanitarian grounds but also on international law. Besides a threat to international security and peace, events in Kosovo were seen as a humanitarian disaster which can not be ignored. Because of this, a view emerged in academic and political circles which do not find it necessary anymore to discuss the issue related to international law. Results of this view which sees domestic or international law negligible or violable when it finds it legitimate should be evaluated very carefully. Just as NATO's Kosovo intervention and following independence, Turkey's Cyprus Intervention and following independence of TRNC caused great debates on International Law. Despite both the intervention and the independence have serious legal, political and moral grounds, it has not been accepted by the international community. The main objective of this paper is to compare two long standing issues, namely Kosovo and Cyprus, according to justice and international law. In the first stage, Kosovo and Cyprus operations will be examined through "just war" theory, and evaluated they suit the principles. In the second stage, "just war" theory and principles will be implemented to Kosovo's and TRNC's independence in the name of "just secession/independence". Arguments on both the operations and the independence decisions will be supported by international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A table of contents for the issue is presented, with information about the magazine's Editorial Board and the Editor Dr. Howard Duncan.