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We examine how beliefs about the debt-to-GDP ratio affect people’s attitudes towards government spending and taxation. Using representative samples of the US population, we run a series of experiments in which we provide half of our respondents with information about the debt-to-GDP ratio in the US. Based on a total of more than 4,000 respondents, we find that most people underestimate the debt-to-GDP ratio and reduce their support for government spending once they learn about the actual amount of debt, but do not substantially alter their attitudes towards taxation. The treatment effects seem to operate through changes in expectations about fiscal sustainability and persist in a four-week follow-up.\ud \ud

We ask whether epidemic exposure leads to a shift in financial technology usage and who participates in this shift. We exploit a dataset combining Gallup World Polls and Global Findex surveys for some 250,000 individuals in 140 countries, merging them with information on the incidence of epidemics and local 3G internet infrastructure. Epidemic exposure is associated with an increase in remote-access (online/mobile) banking and substitution from bank branch-based to ATM activity. The temporary nature of the effects we identify is more consistent with a demand channel rather than that of supply with high initial fixed costs. Exploring heterogeneity using a machine-learning driven approach, we find that young, high-income earners in full-time employment have the greatest tendency to shift to online/mobile transactions in response to epidemics. Baseline effects are larger for individuals with better ex ante 3G signal coverage, highlighting the role of the digital divide in adaption to new technologies necessitated by adverse external shocks.

Performance-based financing (PBF) is advocated as an effective means to improve the quality of care by changing healthcare providers’ behavior. However, there is limited evidence on its effectiveness in low- and middle-income countries and on its implementation in primary care settings. Evidence on the effect of discontinuing PBF is even more limited than that of introducing PBF schemes. We estimate the effects of discontinuing PBF in Egypt on family planning, maternal health, and child health outcomes. We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) model with fixed effects, exploiting a unique dataset of six waves of spatially constructed facility-level health outcomes. We find that discontinuing performance-based incentives to providers had a negative effect on the knowledge of contraceptive methods, iron supplementation during pregnancy, the prevalence of childhood acute respiratory infection, and, more importantly, under-five child mortality, all of which were indirectly targeted by the PBF scheme. No significant effects are reported for directly targeted outcomes. Our findings suggest that PBF can induce permanent changes in providers’ behavior, but this may come at the expense of non-contracted outcomes.

PurposeThis paper aims to examine stakeholders’ expectations of accountability in non-profit organisations (NPOs) in general, and State Islamic Religious Councils (SIRCs) in particular.Design/methodology/approachAn online survey was used to collect data, which was then analysed descriptively. Furthermore, the differences between stakeholder groups were evaluated using the Mann–Whitney and Kruskal–Wallis tests.FindingsThe findings indicate that NPOs generally and SIRCs specifically need to clarify the meaning of accountability to meet the expectations of their stakeholders, especially the public, and to address accountability inquiries.Research limitations/implicationsThe research method was a limitation of this study. The data was collected using a survey. Generally, surveys contain restricted numbers and types of questions that the authors have outlined. Consequently, respondents might be constrained in their choice of how they perceive accountability. So, surveys used to collect respondents’ opinions may have an adverse effect on their responses. In addition, a number of respondents may also give superficial answers, particularly if they are required to answer a number of questions over a long period of time. Finally, the data collected using surveys might show what respondents think about accountability, but they do not show the actual practice.Practical implicationsOwing the highest accountability to the Board of Directors is akin to the practices of corporations. The findings of this study could assist their top officials to understand the accountability chain within SIRCs. This is consistent with the findings regarding accountability within SIRCs, whereby they perceived that they are responsible to their board for performance. Therefore, this should encourage the reporting of performance to both internal and external stakeholders.Originality/valueOverall, perceptions on accountability are an ongoing debate, and they depend on the role of the organisation and expectations of stakeholders. Identifying a clear accountability chain is essential to develop the best reporting practices for SIRCs. The paper contributes to the literature by addressing two questions on accountability for NPOs: to whom and for what.

Funding: This study was funded under the UN-WIDER contract 605UU-000000003380. This paper empirically investigates the link between the level of government revenue per capita and six indicators of the quality of governance in an unbalanced panel data set consisting of all countries in the world (217 countries; due to some missing data, (this was reduced to 196) using data from 1996 to 2020. It uses single-equation generalised method of moment (GMM) techniques and a vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction model (VECM) approach to investigate this issue. The results suggest a strong effect over time whereby an increase in government revenue leads to a steady improvement in governance. These findings suggest an important virtuous circle between government revenue and governance. As a result, additional government revenue can significantly impact the Sustainable Development Goals more than our previous work has suggested. Publisher PDF

Background The COVID-19 pandemic and the climate emergency threaten progress in reaching many of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets by 2030. The under-5 mortality and maternal mortality rates are well below the targets, and if we progress at the current pace, there is a high risk of not meeting the 2030 goals. Furthermore, the initial progress in the decline in child and maternal mortality since 1990 is likely to be eroded. Much of this progress has resulted from increased sanitation, drinking water, education, and health service coverage. The adequate provision of public services is possible if there is sufficient government funding. When governments have more income, they spend more on public services, which increases access to fundamental economic and social rights and, thus, contributes to the SDGs. One of the key drivers of government financing, taxation, constitutes 70% of government revenue in low- and lower-middle-income countries. Corporate income tax constitutes 18.8% of tax revenue in African countries compared to 10% of tax revenue in OECD countries. Therefore, it plays a critical role in SDG progress. This paper aims to quantify the contribution of one large taxpayer, that publishes their tax payments, (Vodafone Group Plc) on progress towards SDGs in six African countries. We use econometric modelling to estimate the impact of an increase in government revenue equivalent to Vodafone's average tax paid between 2007–2017. Results We find that government revenue equivalent to Vodafone’s taxes made a significant contribution to progress in attaining selected SDGs. We found that the revenue equivalent to Vodafone’s taxes allowed 966,188 people to access clean water and 1,371,972 people to access basic sanitation each year. Over the time period studied, 858,054 children spent an extra year in school and 54,275 children under five years and 3,655 mothers survived. In just one of these countries, Tanzania, the revenue equivalent to Vodafone's tax contribution allowed 174,121 people to access clean water and 223,586 to access sanitation each year. Over the time studied 187,023 children spent an additional year at school, 6,569 additional children under five and 625 additional mothers survived. Conclusions These findings demonstrate that the reported contributions from a single multinational corporation drive SDG progress. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of transparent taxes and explores the responsibilities of global institutions, governments, investors, and multinational corporations.

Can institutionalized transfers of resource rents be a source of civil conflict? Are cohesive institutions better in managing distributive conflicts? We study these questions exploiting exogenous variation in revenue disbursements to local governments together with new data on local democratic institutions in Nigeria. We make three contributions. First, we document the existence of a strong link between rents and conflict far away from the location of the actual resource. Second, we show that distributive conflict is highly organized involving political militias and concentrated in the extent to which local governments are non-cohesive. Third, we show that democratic practice in form having elected local governments significantly weakens the causal link between rents and political violence. We document that elections (vis-a-vis appointments), by producing more cohesive institutions, vastly limit the extent to which distributional conflict between groups breaks out following shocks to the available rents. Throughout, we confirm these findings using individual level survey data.

Northern Ireland (NI) has pervasively been a fragile and often disputed city-regional nation. Despite NI’s slim majority in favour of remaining in the EU, de facto Brexit, post-pandemic challenges, and the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) have revealed a dilemma: people of all political hues have started to question aspects of their own citizenship. Consequently, this article suggests an innovative approach called ‘Algorithmic Nations’ to better articulate its emerging/complex citizenship regimes for this divided and post-conflict society in which identity borders and devolution may be facilitated through blockchain technology. This article assesses implications of this dilemma for a city-regionalised nation enmeshed within the UK, Ireland, and Europe. The article explores digital citizenship in NI by applying ‘Algorithmic Nations’ framework particularly relating to intertwined (i) cross-bordering, (ii) critical awareness, (iii) digital activism, and (iv) post-pandemic realities and concludes with three dilemmas and how ‘Algorithmic Nations’ framing could better integrate NI’s digital citizenship.

PurposeThe procurement and supply of crucial healthcare products in the early stages of the COVID-19 emergency were chaotic. To prepare for future crises, we must be able to describe what went wrong, and why, and map out ways to build agility and resilience. How can this be done effectively, given the highly complex and diverse network of actors across governments, care providers and supply chains, and the extreme uncertainty and dynamism in the procurement system and supplier markets? The purpose of this study was to capture learning from practitioners in “real time” in a way that could frame and inform capacity building across healthcare systems with varying procurement and supply management maturity.Design/methodology/approachThis exploratory study involved interviews with 58 senior public procurement practitioners in central and regional governments, NGOs and leaders of professional organizations from 23 countries, very early in the COVID crisis. Following the first, inductive phase of analysis leading to five descriptive dimensions, the awareness-motivation-capability (A-M-C) framework was applied in a further round of coding, to understand immediate challenges faced by procurement practitioners, how the complex, multi-level procurement system that shaped their motivations to respond and critical capabilities required to face these challenges.FindingsDevelopments across 23 countries and practitioners' learning about procurement and supply in the pandemic crisis can be captured in five overarching themes: governance and organization, knowledge and skills, information systems, regulation and supply base issues. Together these themes cover the strengths and gaps in procurement and supply capability encountered by procurement leaders and front-line personnel. They highlight the various facets of structure, resource and process which constitute organizational capability. However, to account better for the highly dynamic situation characterized by both unprecedented rivalry and cooperation, analysts must also pay attention to actors' emerging awareness of the situation and their rapidly changing motivations.Originality/valueThe application of the A-M-C framework is unique in the healthcare supply chain and disaster management literature. It enables a comprehensive overview of healthcare procurement from a system perspective. This study shows how increasing system preparedness for future emergencies depends both on developing critical capabilities and understanding how awareness and motivation influence the effective deployment of those capabilities.

In this paper, we review the existing empirical evidence on how individuals respond to the incentives created by a net wealth tax. Variation in the overall magnitude of behavioural responses is substantial: estimates of the elasticity of taxable wealth vary by a factor of 800. We explore three key reasons for this variation: tax design, context and methodology. We then discuss what is known about the importance of individual margins of response and how these interact with policy choices. Finally, we use our analysis to systematically narrow down and reconcile the range of elasticity estimates. We argue that a well-designed wealth tax would reduce the tax base by 7–17 per cent if levied at a tax rate of 1 per cent.

We propose an extension of the incomplete markets general equilibrium model with production to situations in which firms can default (bankruptcy). In the model, firms are owned by a single individual whose roles as entrepreneur and consumer are anonymous. Assets are exogenously collateralised and are seized together with future output in case of default. Default is thus endogenous as output determines the deliveries from the assets issued. In turn, the receipts from each asset purchased are assumed to depend on a fraction of the firm’s output. This fraction is anonymous and is treated as given by individuals who will anticipate it, in equilibrium, as a proportion of aggregate output, generating counter-cyclical default. We show that, in this context, the financial policies of the firm are, in general, not irrelevant. We establish the existence of equilibria and discuss the nature of the inefficiencies introduced by the presence of bankruptcy.

The financial stability of the eurozone depends on its macroeconomic stability and vice versa. We construct a macro DSGE model of the eurozone and its two main regions, the North and the South, with the aim of matching the macro facts of these economies by indirect inference and using the resulting empirically-based model to assess possible new policy regimes that could maintain financial stability. The model we have found to fit the facts suggests that substantial gains in stability and consumer welfare are possible if the fiscal authority in each region is given the freedom to respond to its own economic situation. Further gains could come with the restoration of monetary independence to the two regions, in effect creating a second `southern euro' bloc. Enhanced fiscal flexibility increases fluctuations in debt and deficit ratios to GDP while keeping average ratios stable, maintaining solvency. A reformed Stability and Growth Pact could be limited to monitoring solvency.

This paper provides an overview of the initial crisis responses to the coronavirus pandemic and asks whether and how both the nature of the COVID-19 crisis and the national responses to this differ from those witnessed during the Great Recession. We argue that the speed and scale of the crisis are indeed distinctive, but that claims of symmetry — a crisis affecting all equally — are misplaced. We suggest that stimulus packages have, in broad terms, reflected the scale of the threat and that the wage subsidies and employment supports that were introduced or adjusted are novel in scope and scale, with innovative developments. There has been a greater emphasis on housing than was apparent in responses to the Great Recession and, while a focus on taxation in response packages has been a focus in both crises, its form differs, with a greater reliance on deferrals rather than tax reductions in the stimulus plans announced to date. Our account stresses the agility of crisis responses and this agility must be regarded as welcome, mitigating a great deal of social harm during the initial phase of the pandemic. Whether these short-run responses create pressures for wider-ranging change is much debated, but highly uncertain.

Between 1940 and 1965, state-level officials changed the relationship between two pillars of the postwar social contract: secure retirement and modern public schools. In the early twentieth century, state pension managers, following an investment regime we call “fiscal mutualism,” funneled the savings of government workers into government securities. Through direct participation in municipal bond markets, pension officials lowered the borrowing costs for local governments. Yet by the 1960s, pensions had completely abandoned this investment regime. We document this transformation through a close examination of New York State’s pension fund. Throughout the 1950s, the comptrollers who managed the New York State Employee Retirement System (NYSERS), the nation’s largest state pension, underwrote the boom in suburban school construction by purchasing the municipal bonds of local school districts. However, in response to changes in national political economy, along with shifts in the ideology guiding pension stewardship, New York Comptroller Arthur Levitt Sr. sought to deregulate the pension’s investment powers. Following the regulatory changes, Levitt disinvested from municipal bond holdings in favor of higher-yielding corporate securities. Pension deregulation secured higher returns for state retirees, but it also forced local school districts to enter bond markets without the backstop of fiscal mutualism. As school budgets, and the property taxes supporting them, soared to repay the interest costs, tax revolts became a permanent response to the fiscal volatility. These transformations, we argue, stemmed from postwar liberalism’s dependence on financial markets to deliver retirement security, public education, and other social benefits. This public dependence on private capital foreclosed more ambitious policy alternatives and ceded power to private actors—particularly investment bankers and bond investors—who prioritized their own profits over social welfare provision.

This article explores the inter-relationship of gender, sexuality, race and class among cabin crew, members of trade union BASSA, in the British Airways dispute of 2009–2011. It evaluates the utility of intersectional analysis in the context of industrial action, investigating the ways crew mobilised intersectional identities and class interests. In their narratives, crew evoked the 1984–1985 miners’ strike, but rejected a version of class and militancy based on a perceived historical legacy of class as white, heterosexual and male. Engaging with debates in Sociology on class, the article restores work as the key site of class formation and identifies BASSA as providing the organisational and ideological resources to legitimate an inclusive worker interest that transcended sectional identities and generated a reimagined and reconfigured class identity.

This article examines the ways in which ‘Chinese walls’ – that is, information barriers within financial institutions – are constituted and subverted by acts of trespass within large investment banking firms in New York. While Chinese walls positively serve to prevent corruption and fraud, they simultaneously attract legal, semi-legal and illegal forms of trespassing. My analysis shows that some trespassing is based on non-verbalized and embodied exchanges of information that are not in and of themselves illegal. Referred to as playing ‘the game’, the result of these forms of trespass is that the Chinese wall becomes an ‘effect’ or fiction. At other times, trespassing can cause inconvenient suspicion, encouraging those who operate amid these walls to participate strategically in various aspects of wilful blindness. Together, these examples reveal the conceptual and material relationships between ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’, thereby highlighting the complexity of information flows in financial institutions and demonstrating how the critical regulation of financial capitalism is sometimes weakened.

In this paper, we provide an up‐to‐date empirical assessment of the relationship between economic globalisation and government spending for the ‘hyper‐globalisation’ period of the 1990s and 2000s. We use data on government consumption spending and more disaggregated spending components (e.g., social welfare). We also use a range of globalisation measures, including the most recent version of the KOF globalisation index, and a combination of econometric methods, including fixed‐effects and instrumental variable (IV) estimation. The results suggest that hyper‐globalisation has had divergent and conflicting effects on consumption spending: while de jure trade globalisation has tended to raise spending, de jure financial globalisation has tended to reduce it. We also find evidence that the positive effect of de facto trade globalisation on spending weakened significantly during the 1990s and 2000s, in comparison with earlier decades. These effects could have contributed to the growing political backlash witnessed against globalisation since the early 2000s.\ud \ud

Authors acknowledge funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under Grant 642018 (GREEN‐WIN project) and funding from the project INSeaPTION as part of ERA4CS, an ERA‐NET initiated by JPI Climate, and funded by BMBF (DE), MINECO (ES), NWO (NL), and ANR (FR) with co-funding by the European Union (Grant 690462). Coastal flood risk reduction (CFRR) presents a significant public funding challenge, due to its high upfront costs and long-term benefits, and this challenge will increase with future sea-level rise. The funding challenge necessarily involves multiple levels of government, due to the regional nature of CFRR public goods involved. Yet there has been little research comparing such multilevel arrangements across countries, and in particular exploring the performance of public funding arrangements for providing coastal flood risk reduction. We address this gap, applying fiscal federalism to develop a multilevel governance analysis of public decision-making and fiscal authorities for CFRR in the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Australia. For each country, we locate key decision-making and fiscal authorities in multilevel governance arrangements, and analyse their alignment with the benefits of CFRR measures (spillovers). We find diverse coastal flood risk governance arrangements ranging from highly centralised (NL), mixed arrangements, involving regional centralisation (Germany) or partial devolvement (UK), to full decentralisation (AUS). Further, we find that in accordance with fiscal federalism, multilevel coastal flood risk governance arrangements are generally reflective of the distribution of the benefits across different levels of government, with some exceptions (Germany and UK). Finally, exploring the outlook of current arrangements under sea-level rise, we find that major fiscal redistributions may be put under pressure by rising costs likely under SLR and future coastal development. This is particularly the case for those systems which operate under hazard-based, as opposed to risk-based, coastal protection policies. Further, we find that both fully and moderately decentralised arrangements may require greater central support for alternative measures, such as retreat, in light of growing financial burdens on local governments. Postprint

Can e-governance reforms improve government policy? By making information available on a real-time basis, information technologies may reduce the theft of public funds. We analyze a large field experiment and the nationwide scale-up of a reform to India’s workfare program. Advance payments were replaced by “ just-in-time” payments, triggered by e-invoicing, making it easier to detect misreporting. Leakages went down: program expenditures dropped by 24 percent, while employment slightly increased; there were fewer fake households in the official database; and program officials’ personal wealth fell by 10 percent. However, payment delays increased. The nationwide scale-up resulted in a persistent 19 percent reduction in program expenditure. (JEL C93, D72, I38, O15, O17)

The UK population is predicted to grow from 65 m in 2015 to 71 m in 2030 and 75 m in 2040, with the number aged 65-plus rising to 18 m. Successive governments have been reluctant to increase taxes but this looks increasingly unsustainable, if the increasing demand for health and social care is to be met. Increasing state pension age is the customary response for keeping pension contributions and benefits in balance in Pay As You Go (PAYG systems). However, this policy raises concerns about the capability of people to work to ever higher pension ages. Using newly available labour market data on health and disability, the paper finds limits to how far pension age can be increased without necessary health improvements. If improvements were forthcoming, planned pension age rises could be postponed. However, inequalities in healthy life expectancy across the UK are a major barrier to its achievement.

We examine how the regulation of financial reporting frequency affects corporate innovation. We use a difference-in-differences approach based on a sample of treatment firms that experience a change in their reporting frequency and matched industry peers and control firms whose reporting frequency remains unchanged. We find that higher reporting frequency significantly reduces treatment firms’ innovation output, but find no evidence that the net externality effect on industry peers is statistically significant. Together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that frequent reporting induces managerial myopia and impedes corporate innovation.

Corporate tax avoidance is both widespread and diverse in its practical mechanics. The scope of the phenomenon often leads economists to conclude that in the jungle of economic competition, tax planning (or optimisation) is among the necessary tools to ensure the survival of the fittest. This theory is increasingly associated with a Darwinian theory of economic evolution. In this paper, I develop a contrasting framework of the evolutionary political economy of corporate tax avoidance. Analysing core concepts of Old Institutionalist Economics (OIE), I examine the core drivers of corporate tax avoidance in a globalised system of states. The major contrast, I find, is between that of the corporate and legal personality and the institutional environment in which it operates. Historically, each corporate entity has been considered a separate legal person, yet a series of ‘mutations’ of incorporations laws created a widening gap between theory and reality, and these, in turn, give rise to tax arbitrage. Narrowing this gap, however, impinges on another venerable historical institution, the institution of sovereignty and sovereign inequality.

We assess conditions that explain plural forms of public and private action using a comparative study of 24 public initiatives in Brazil, India, and South Africa. Measuring performance as evidence of positive outcomes to their target populations, we compare cases of high and low performance. Our configurational approach examines combinations of conditions leading to positive outcomes: public operational capacity, diverse collaborations nurtured by public units (with for-profit firms, with nonprofit organizations, and with other units in the public bureaucracy), and stakeholder orientation (permeability to multiple sources of input to design and adjust the project). We apply fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to unveil configurations consistent with high performance. Our configurational analysis reveals two distinct paths to high performance. A path with higher private engagement involves concurrent collaborations with for-profit and nonprofit actors, whereas an alternative path with higher internal (public) engagement relies on collaborations within the public bureaucracy complemented by high permeability to inputs from multiple stakeholders. Our results also confirm that strong public capacity is necessary in all high-performance configurations. An important implication is that externalization and multiple forms of collaboration are not substitutes for weak governments. Furthermore, our configurational perspective contributes to the literature by operationalizing a multiple-actor, multiple-logic perspective describing alternative paths to high performance.

Credit ratings aim to reduce information asymmetries and to increase transparency and competition in the financial markets. However, during the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis, credit ratings contributed significantly to risk mispricing that led to the build-up of systemic risk, up until the collapse of “too big to fail” institutions. In this paper, we examine if changes in issuer credit ratings by the three main providers are associated with changes in systemic risk. Our empirical findings suggest that rating downgrades result in an increase in bank systemic risk, whereas upgrades do not proportionally reduce systemic risk. We also document that the positive relationship between rating downgrades and systemic risk can be mitigated by accounting-based stability factors such as profitability and capital. Finally, we find that the beginning of the COVID19 crisis that included unprecedented government support towards the banking system globally also mitigated the contribution of rating downgrades to systemic risk. We argue that credit rating agencies have a pivotal role in financial stability and policymakers should adopt a formal assessment to deal with the inherent systemic importance of these agencies that regulate the market.

A simple statistical method is used to identify what domestic and external variables the monetary authorities in different countries have succeeded in stabilising, in each year over the period 1974–2017. The findings emphasise the shift over time from exchange rate to domestic variable (mainly price) stabilisations, and from cases where no variable is stabilised on the criteria used and inflation is 5% or higher, to cases where no variable is stabilised but inflation is constrained to be below 5%. The stabilisations identified are also compared with a recent classification of countries’ monetary policy frameworks, which has a different approach and different sources: the overlaps are considerable but incomplete. The association between the different stabilisations and economic performance in terms of inflation and growth is then examined, through both unconditional and conditional analyses. The clearest finding is that constrained no overall stabilisation is associated with better performance than unconstrained no overall stabilisation, and typically with as good performance as price stabilisation. It is suggested that good macroeconomic outcomes can be obtained in the context of a variety of stabilisations, provided the monetary authorities are ‘serious about inflation’. Postprint

This paper uses an instrumental variable approach based on close elections to evaluate the effect of political parties on local fiscal policy in England and Wales over the period 1998-2016. Our main finding is that political control of the council (by Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat parties) has no effect on total expenditure, the composition of expenditure, the property tax rate (council tax per band D property) or total council tax revenue. Thus, our results confirm the widely expressed belief that centrally imposed constraints on local government fiscal policy (rate-capping, and more recently, compulsory referenda) hold local government fiscal policy in a tight grip

On 23 March 2022, the Chancellor delivered his annual Spring Statement address to parliament. Though the event had been trailed as a relatively low-key, “policy-light” affair, the looming squeeze in living standards compelled the Chancellor to adjust his plans once again. This briefing note assesses the main implications for Wales.

PurposeTax evasion is an economic crime that nearly all world countries suffer from. Its consequences are countless, including poor public spending on infrastructure projects and social welfare programs, low economic growth and development, institutional mistrust and fiscal deficits. For developing countries in particular, targeting development programs and infrastructural investments requires an efficient tax collection policy to generate sufficient funds for such purposes. This makes the tax evasion problem a critical one and countering it extremely policy relevant. Based on evidence that shows how the understanding of taxpayers' behavior is an essential factor in fighting evasion, this paper aims to test different factors that might incentivize citizens using a behavioral and experimental approach, in non-Western educated industrialized rich democracies (non-WEIRD) countries, to comply more.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses a survey experiment to examine the impact of different behavioral primes on tax compliance behavior. Specifically, it observes subjects' compliance behavior in two contexts: voice and empathy. A total of 273 students from a big public university in Egypt were randomly selected to participate in this study.FindingsIn the “Voice” treatment, the explanatory variable (VOICE) was found statistically significant, thus confirming the hypothesis that democracy, through having a voice in the decision-making process, affects compliance positively. As for the “Empathy” treatment, the explanatory variable (EMPATHY) was also found significant. This confirms the second hypothesis that triggering feelings of empathy, through highlighting the good cause behind public spending that uses taxpayers' money, affects compliance behavior positively.Research limitations/implicationsDespite the fact that the experimental methodology is a methodology with high internal validity, examining the impact of a specific intervention on behavior, a replication of the experiment in other contexts might be useful in increasing the external validity of the findings. Specifically, conducting this experiment on a nonstudent sample might lead to even more powerful results by increasing the ecological validity of the results.Practical implicationsThis study advocates a more behaviorally informed public policy. Specifically, Egyptian policymakers are recommended to adopt behavioral nudges as a complement to existing policies. The authors believe the findings, if confirmed by repeated experiments (lab, lab-in-the-field and rational choice theories on both student and non-student samples) in a number of Arab countries, might also help in offering cost-effective nudges for the Arab world policymakers, where culture and the political context are to a great extent similar.Social implicationsThe findings of the study have a number of social implications. Higher tax compliance will enable higher levels of public spending on a number of social targets such as education, health and welfare programs.Originality/valueWhile the study builds on recent research examining how to incentivize tax compliance, it simultaneously seeks to make three contributions. First, the study design aims to apply recent advances in behavioral sciences (impact of voice and empathy) in a policy area that has not seen much use of such interventions in the Egyptian context (i.e. tax compliance). Second, the study is policy relevant in the sense that it aims to increase the effectiveness of existing government policies by complementing them with behavioral primes. Third, there is nearly no literature found applying this topic in a non-WEIRD country such as Egypt.

A combination of price increases, tax rises, and trailing income growth threatens to squeeze living standards on a scale not seen in the UK for decades. This briefing note sets out the factors driving the latest cost-of-living squeeze, analyses the distributional impact of policies announced by the Welsh and UK governments, and examines the likely effectiveness of these measures in mitigating the impact on household finances in Wales.

This exploration of UK fiscal rules and the establishment of an independent UK fiscal watchdog focuses on the practical enactment of rules-based fiscal policy to analyse the politics of technocratic economic governance. Analysing UK macroeconomic policy rules and their operation unearths numerous dimensions of the politics of technocratic fiscal policy-making. Firstly, policy rules are marshalled for partisan purposes. Secondly, a politics of economic ideas surrounds the invention, revision and interpretation of fiscal rules. Thirdly, technocratic economic governance entails a ‘politics of method’, selecting methodological approaches necessarily built on particular political economic assumptions. Finally, a ‘politics of numbers’ sees politicians cooking the books to present their economic record favourably against fiscal yardsticks. Successive governments have altered UK fiscal rules, informed by different political economic principles. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) see themselves as a technocratic and apolitical institution, yet their operational work entails contrasting accounts of the economy and policy. The scale of discretion and judgement inherent in operating fiscal rules is under-appreciated. This article finds technocratic economic governance to be a much more social and political process than many advocates of economic rules-based policy acknowledge. It engenders new forms of distinctive fiscal politics within elite statecraft and expert technocracy.

We use administrative tax data from audits of self‐assessment tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely to be non‐compliant. Non‐compliance is common, with one‐third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate under‐reporting is done by just 2% of taxpayers. Third party reporting reduces non‐compliance, while working in a cash‐prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non‐compliance is higher for men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources.

Local state and third sector actors routinely provide support to help people navigate their right to social security and mediate their chequered relationship to it. COVID-19 has not only underlined the significance of these actors in the claims-making process, but also just how vulnerable those working within ‘local ecosystems of support’ are to external shocks and their own internal pressures. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork with organisations providing support to\ud benefit claimants and those financially struggling during COVID-19, this paper examines the increasingly situated nature of the claims-making process across four local areas in the United Kingdom. We do so to consider what bearing ‘local ecosystems of support’ have on income adequacy, access and universality across social security systems. Our analysis demonstrates how local state and third sector actors risk amplifying inequalities that at best disadvantage, and at\ud worst altogether exclude, particular social groups from adequate (financial) assistance. Rather than conceiving of social security as a unitary collection of social transfers, we argue that its operation needs to be understood as much more fragmented and contingent. Practitioners exhibit considerable professional autonomy and moral agency in their discretionary practice, arbitrating between competing organisational priorities, local disinvestment, and changing community needs. Our findings offer broader lessons for understanding the contemporary governance of social security across welfare states seeking to responsibilise low income households through the modernisation of public services, localism, and welfare reforms.

Executive summary\ud This report was commissioned to inform the future work of the EPSU Social Services Committee. The research objectives were:\ud 1. To develop an overview of the extent of privatisation of social services across Europe on the basis of available studies at national and European level;\ud 2. To review existing studies that compare public and private provision in relation quality accessibility and affordability of services and;\ud 3. To provide an overview of existing reports and surveys that reveal the impact of privatisation of social services on the pay and conditions of workers.\ud \ud Social services have evolved in different ways in each European country partly determined by existing social welfare systems. This has influenced the role that the public, for-profit and not-for-profit sectors play in social services provision. Although there have been different legislative changes, in European countries the responsibility for delivery of social services is now shared by public, private for-profit and private not-for-profit sectors. In Germany and the Netherlands almost all long-term care services are provided by the for-profit and not-for-profit sector. In the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Norway, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden less than 20% of residential care places are provided by the private, for-profit sector. Norway, Sweden and Slovenia have less than 20% of domiciliary care provided by the private, for-profit sector (Eurofound, 2017). \ud \ud Although there are signs of a growing consensus on the need for governments to play a key role in funding or facilitating the funding of long-term care, which is often decentralised to local government, this is usually to a range of different providers (public, for-profit and not-for-profit and occasionally cooperatives). However, this rarely includes an expansion of provision by the public sector. The not-for-profit sector has a long history of providing social services in many countries, especially home and residential services. This is continuing, with not-for-profit organisations often contracted directly by government to provide social services. The implications of not-for-profit organisations entering contractual relationships to deliver care are that the same pressure to measure the care being delivered can result in the loss of a more holistic approach to care provision. \ud The term privatisation is defined as the change of ownership from public to private but during the last twenty years of extensive public management reforms the complexity of the privatisation process has become clearer. Mercille and Murphy (2017) define privatisation as a multi-dimensional process which takes place through changes in:\ud (1) Ownership: when public assets (including public companies, buildings, services, land) are\ud sold or transferred to private interests;\ud (2) Financing: when funding sources of public assets and service providers become private,\ud for example, raising private capital instead of relying on public funding;\ud (3) Management: when private companies/ entities become responsible for managing and operating public assets and service providers;\ud (4) Production and provision: when private firms become responsible for the production or\ud provision of a good or service, often via outsourcing by the public sector.\ud During the last twenty years there has been an expansion of multinational care companies in some countries, which are the result of for-profit companies expanding outside their domestic market. Although this has, until recently, been limited to regional groups of countries, for example, the Nordic region and continental Europe, but there are signs that this is expanding either through multinational company expansion or through increased investments by private equity companies in companies working in the social services sector (Lethbridge, 2019). \ud Existing multi-national companies (MNC) have become involved in social services in several ways. Many multinational social care companies own a mix of care homes as well as some clinical services, usually mental health services. Facilities management MNCs have become involved in the delivery of homecare services, for example, ISS, Sodexho. Some companies, not always involved directly in care, provide luxury retirement apartments with a range of services. The services may cover care but also include recreational activities for people on higher incomes (ESN, 2019). \ud Even through there is a wide variation between countries in terms of public and private for-profit provision, most countries are experiencing an expansion of for-profit care homes. A Eurofound (2017) report found that private care homes were less likely to provide specialist medical access although this can also be influenced by legislation. For childcare and early childhood education and care (ECEC) there is a much stronger public provision with over 50% provided directly by the public sector (EC, 2011).\ud The introduction of care allowance schemes can be seen as part of a privatisation of care provision to the household level which has been met either by members of the household being paid an allowance for care work or the recruitment of low paid, precarious workers who are often migrant workers. The majority of paid and informal carers are women. The introduction of care allowances has formalised a system of informal household care, although informal care is still predominantly the main form of long-term care in many countries.\ud One of the results of corporatisation and marketisation is a loss of control by social services workers over the labour process. The pressure to reduce costs is felt most intensively by social services workers, resulting in reduced pay, longer working hours and increased occupational safety and health risks. This can be seen in the way in which work is organised in care homes and in the use of electronic monitoring in home care.\ud One impact of privatisation has been an increased use of migrant labour. Workers leave their own countries, which then experience a loss of care workers, creating further problems of recruitment and retention. The increase in personal care workers, paid for by care allowances has facilitated low paid and insecure care work in households (Spasova et al, 2018).\ud The impact of privatisation on collective bargaining and social dialogue has been a reduction in national, sectoral level collective bargaining and an increase in company/firm level bargaining, for example, in Central and Eastern Europe, Spain, England (Lethbridge, 2019). Privatisation tends to fragment collective bargaining systems down to individual companies. The drive to increase profits is driven through a reduction in labour costs.\ud Poor quality of social services provided by companies has led to several municipalities returning to in-house management of social services. Norlandia Care was involved in nursing overtime and staffing issues in Norwegian care homes in 2011. In Sweden, scandals about understaffing and poor care provided by Ambea in 2011 led to the company being rebranded as Vardaga (eldercare) and Nytida (disability services). In 2015, the city governments of Oslo and Bergen decided not to renew management contracts with these for-profit companies. \ud In almost every European country, the social services sector has problems in recruiting and retaining workers because of the growing demand for services, the lack of status of care work pay and poor terms and conditions as well as lack of training and continuous professional development.\ud Social services are a labour-intensive sector with care homes as the main form of infrastructure. Many social services are delivered in the home or household. Marketization and the corporatisation of the health and social services sector have played a key role in preparing social services for privatisation. The decentralisation of services to municipalities and the rhetoric of choice in social services prepared countries for a new way of delivering social services. The impact of these changes is still being felt in many countries. In addition, there is a growing demand for social services which places pressure on existing budgets in a time of austerity.\ud As a labour-intensive sector, the main source of profit is generated by reducing labour costs. This has been done through the commodification of care services and their transformation into a series of tasks without any relational exchanges. This takes away what is important in the quality delivery of social services, the relationship between client and care worker. The use of digital technology has given the employer or commissioner more control over the worker by timing the delivery of care. \ud The introduction of care allowances to clients or households has created a demand for low paid care workers, based in households with little control over their work or the wider labour process. Although the demand for personal, home care workers has been met in many countries by migrant workers, working on short term or commuting arrangements, migrant workers are also employed by public sector agencies and private companies. \ud There is a need for more research into what public and private provision in relation to quality accessibility and affordability of social services. There is growing evidence that the claims of privatisation and ability of the private sector to be more efficient have not been met. Instead, there are a growing number of indicators, for example, worker-client/resident ratios, sickness rates and turnover rates that are better in the public sector and contribute to quality services. The effects of austerity are being felt by service users who find it increasingly difficult to access services because they are either unable to pay for user fees or are excluded from the services.\ud The labour-intensive nature of social services dictates that if private companies are to generate regular dividends and high returns for investors then this can only take place with reduced labour costs. As the quality of social services depends on workers who are well-paid, trained, supported and able to work in a safe environment, the profit motive undermines the basis of high-quality social services.

This cross-sectional study estimates the costs incurred by the National Health Service (NHS) in England as a consequence of the unnecessary prescribing (i.e. non-indicated or dispensable) of dependency-forming medicines (antidepressants, opioids, gabapentinoids, benzodiazepines, Z-drugs). It assesses prescribing in primary care from April 2015-March 2018. Analyses were based upon the following data sets: the number of adults continuously prescribed dependency forming medications and the duration of prescriptions (obtained from Public Health England); the Net Ingredient Cost (NIC) and the dispensing costs for each medicine (obtained from the NHS Business Service Authority [NHSBSA]). Consultation costs were calculated based on guideline recommendations and the number of consultations evidenced in prior research for long-term medication monitoring. Across opioids, gabapentinoids, benzodiazepines, Z-drugs the total estimated unnecessary cost over three years (April 2015-March 2018) was £1,367,661,104 to £1,555,234,627. For antidepressants the total estimated unnecessary cost for one year was £37,321,783 to £45,765,504. The data indicate that the NHS in England may incur a significant estimated mean annual loss of £455,887,035 to £518,411,542 for opioids, gabapentinoids, benzodiazepines, Z-drugs and an estimated annual loss of £37,321,783 to £45,765,504 for antidepressants. Combined, this gives an estimated annual loss of £493,208,818 to £564,177,046 as a result of non-indicated or dispensable prescribing of dependency-forming medicines. Estimates are conservative and figures could be higher.

Tax revenue elasticities are an important parameter in the management of the revenue side of the government budget as they provide information about the impact of economic growth on tax revenues and fiscal sustainability. A growing number of empirical studies have estimated such elasticities or buoyancies for different countries using various methods. This paper follows a novel approach of deriving tax revenue elasticities that are consistent with a balanced budget for six Central and Eastern European countries using data over the period 1995-2019. These derived elasticities were then compared to actual estimates reported in other studies. The main conclusion from this comparison is that, for most cases considered, tax revenues were responsive enough to economic growth to support fiscal sustainability.

This paper studies costly conflict over private and public goods. Oil is an example of the former, political and civil rights an example of the latter. Our theory predicts that groups in conflict are likely to be small when the prize is private, and large when the prize is public. We examine these implications empirically using a global dataset of conflict at the ethnic group level. Our theoretical predictions find significant confirmation in this setting, and the analysis sheds new light on group size and collective action in the context of violent conflict.

This is the accepted manuscript version of the work published in its final form as Harris, Jamelia; Development in Practice;https://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09614524.2021.2009772 Deposited byshareyourpaper.organdopenaccessbutton.org. We've taken reasonable steps to ensure this content doesn't violate copyright. However, if you think it does you can request a takedown by emailinghelp@openaccessbutton.org.

Through a correspondence study, this paper investigates whether employers discriminate job applicants based on their living conditions. Exploiting the natural setting provided by a Rapid Re-housing Program, we sent 1347 job applications for low-qualified front-desk jobs in Brno, Czech Republic. The resumes exogenously differed in only one main aspect represented by the address of the applicants, signaling both the quality of the neighborhood and the quality of the housing conditions in which they were living. We found that while the higher quality of the district has a strong effect in increasing the hiring chances (+20%) the actual improvement of the living conditions standards, per se, does not generate any significant positive effect.

PurposeThis paper investigates stakeholders' perspectives of share buybacks in the context of time-horizons of investment decisions and strategy.Design/methodology/approachWe use in-depth interviews with stakeholders from eight listed UK firms as well as examine their publicly available data.FindingsFindings suggest that share buybacks involve a wide range of stakeholders' rational interests and long-term management perspectives as they enable firms to strategise operational plans towards their long-term corporate goals.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings are based on interviews with a small number of share buyback firms and the findings, therefore, may not be generalised to all firms.Practical implicationsThe results show that share buybacks may be part of the long-term interests of firms and not necessarily used as part of short-term EPS increases as suggested in the extant literature.Originality/valueThe findings contribute to the literature on corporate pay-out policies in the context of short-term financial objectives vs long-term strategic objectives of stakeholders. They show that share buybacks can be an important part of firms' long-term strategic considerations.

This comprehensive report sets out the outlook for devolved and local spending, analyses spending pressures, examines the budgetary impact of devolved and local taxes, and explores policy options over coming years.