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This paper grapples with Bernard Williams's prima vista enigmatic assertion that '[w]hether it is a matter of good philosophical sense to treat a practice as a violation of human rights, and whether it is politically good sense, cannot ultimately constitute two separate questions'. Though Williams's approach to thinking about human rights has a number of affinities with other 'political' and 'minimalist' understandings, we highlight its distinctive features and argue that it has significant implications for our understanding of human rights along a number of key dimensions. We then proceed to explain how Williams's way of thinking about human rights coheres with certain aspects of the reasoning of one of the most important international human rights courts, to wit, the European Court of Human Rights. This lends further plausibility to the view that a politically realistic understanding of human rights, of the kind urged by Williams, should be taken seriously, since it is a plausible candidate for the explanation of important aspects of human rights practices. We close by examining the suggestion that thinking in these terms is worryingly conservative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper views Bernard Williams through the lens of the pragmatist tradition. The central insight of pragmatism is that philosophy must start with human practice, in contrast to high theory or metaphysics. Williams was one of the twentieth century's most able proponents of this insight, especially when considering the topics of ethics and the law. Williams never saw himself as a pragmatist, because he took Richard Rorty's radical relativism to be the exemplar of the position. But I shall suggest that had Williams seen himself as a more objective pragmatist, along the lines of C. S. Peirce, C. I. Lewis, or Frank Ramsey, he might have had the resources to settle vital issues on which he wavered, issues having to do with whether there is anything objective underpinning our deliberations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategies for promoting social justice include both individualistic approaches, rooted in the universalistic philosophy of human rights, and collectivist approaches, such as group- or issue-specific rights advocated by various social movements. The expansion of human rights education is well documented, but less attention has been given to education for or about other social movements. Drawing on a content analysis of 556 secondary school textbooks from 80 countries between 1950 and 2011, we compare and contrast the rise of emphases on social movements and human rights. Our analyses reveal a marginalized emphasis on social movements in secondary school civics and social studies curricula, while history books are more likely to include discussions of social movements. An implication of these findings is that in formal structures of education, such as textbooks, emphases on social movements may be relegated to matters of historical record, rather than treated as part of contemporary, active citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers his response to Robert Louden's criticism of his book "Kant's Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress." He explains Louden's concern about his Kantian foundation of human rights stained by the wrong assumption that human beings are the sole entities capable of moral behavior. He says that his discussion of the moral politician mean the obedience of the moral law. which for Kant is known with perfect clarity in the soul of all rational beings.

This article explores an alternative to the established dichotomy between philosophical (natural law) accounts of human rights, characterized by a foundationalist tendency, and political (practice-based) accounts of human rights, which aspire to be non-foundationalist. I argue that in order to justify human rights practice, political accounts of human rights cannot do without the support of theoretical foundations, although not necessarily of the natural-law variety. As an alternative to natural-law metaphysics, a deflationary theory of human rights, based on a deflationary account of truth, is put forward. Starting from a distinction between 'extreme' and 'moderate' forms of deflationism, this article defends a constructivist theory of human rights grounded on the Humean notion of conventionalism. This innovative approach to human rights provides political conceptions of human rights with the foundations (or quasi-foundations) they need, but are currently lacking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some foundations have been provided for the social validity of human rights in Western philosophical literature. Some African scholars have also sought to ground the notion of human rights within the traditional African cultural beliefs and practices. There is, however, a dearth in literature on the Yoruba notion of human rights. Perhaps this may be due to scholars' attitude that any talk about human rights is incompatible with the communalistic social structure of the Yoruba. The present paper challenges this prevalent attitude by providing some philosophical foundations for human rights within the limits permitted by the Yoruba world-view. The paper attempts a theoretical reconciliation between the Yoruba claim to communitarianism and the possibility of human rights. The paper concludes that, in spite of the seemingly antinomic relation they bear to each other, the idea of human rights is neither practically meaningless/unintelligible in a communitarian society, nor is it conceptually incompatible with the communitarian ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Filozofija i Drustvo is the property of University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy & Social Theory and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers information on the work of theorists Allen Buchanan on philosophy of human rights. Topics discussed include his views in the symposium related to international human rights practice and the international legal human rights (‘ILHR') system; social welfare function of human rights; and equality function of human rights. Also mentions objections to ethical pluralism.

Contemporary politics is often said to lack utopias. For prevailing understandings of the practical force of political theory, this looks like cause for celebration. As blueprints to apply to political practice, utopias invariably seem too strong or too weak. Through an immanent critique of political realism, I argue that utopian thought, and political theory generally, is better conceived as supplying an orientation to politics. Realists including Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss explain how utopian programs like universal human rights poorly orient their adherents to politics, but the realists wrongly conclude that utopias and other ideal theories necessarily disorient us. As I show through an analysis of utopian claims made by Michel Foucault, Malcolm X, and John Rawls, utopias today can effectively disrupt entrenched forms of legitimation, foster new forms of political identity, and reveal new possibilities within existing institutions. Utopias are needed to understand the political choices we face today. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Roger Scruton and Pierre Manent provide us much to admire, as authors and as men, and much to ponder. They can be seen as collaborators in the defense of the nation-state against the empty universalism of “human rights,” and, more generally, in exposing the boundless arrogance and blindness of modern rationalism insofar as it denies its inheritance from premodern sources. This defense of the nation-state and critique of secular rationalism are of vital interest to moral and political conservatives, and Scruton, for his part, has explicitly taken on the cause and the label of conservatism. But conservatives face an imposing and, I propose here, critically instructive obstacle in appropriating the teachings of these two contemporary giants. For, as soon as we begin to examine the foundations of their respective projects, Scruton's and Manent's approaches appear to be, not only quite different (and therefore, one might hope, complementary) but in an important sense directly opposed to one another. This opposition appears most directly in their respective estimates of the realm of politics: one would exaggerate little in saying that, for Manent, politics is everything, whereas Scruton wishes to constrict the reach of politics to the minimum. Thus, Scruton embraces the title “conservative” but understands it apolitically, whereas Manent declines to identify himself as conservative but fully embraces a political task essential to conservatism. Conservatives must confront this disconcerting opposition and see what can be learned from it. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is a critical philosophical assessment of John Searle’s theory of human rights as it is articulated both in his earlier book,The Construction of Social Realityand especially in his more recent book,Making the Social World. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Human rights are rights held “simply in virtue of humanity.” In unpacking this claim, we find that theories of human rights disclose (1) something about what we understand a minimally decent human life to be and (2) who we consider to belong within a community of rights-bearers. In this article, I address two interrelated questions: When and why do future persons have standing as rights-bearing members of a shared moral community? Are the rights held by future generations best expressed in the “greening” of existing rights or in a new distinctly environmental right? I argue that human rights theorists miss an important element of the humanquahuman if they take ecological embeddedness to be contingently rather than necessarily relevant to human rights. I therefore argue that there are reasons to favor a new distinctly environmental human right. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay on philosopher Rainer Forst's morality of justification is presented. It explores his fictive account of an impoverished worker who seeks promotion, but was faced with skepticism. It concludes that Forst's political theory risks conflating the context-transcending independence of morality, struggles to demonstrate the link between the legitimation of human rights and the reasonableness of justice, and inability to avoid charges of elitism and metaphysical foundationalism.

Critics charge that Kantian conceptions of human dignity and normative agency, which some suggest underwrite the modern doctrine of human rights, are parochial, unable to account for the dynamism and context-dependence of human rights, aloof from human rights practice, and incapable of distinguishing human rights from the vast array of other political rights constitutional democracies generally recognize as demands of justice. I argue here that whatever force these charges might have against human rights theories inspired by Kant’s work, they do not impugn Kant’s own conception of human rights. By tying human rights to official attitudes toward justice rather than, as familiar approaches do, to concrete conformity with ‘minimum prerequisites’ of justice, Kant’s approach fits core features of human rights practice while providing a dynamic, context-sensitive guideline for auditing the conduct of states and public officials. Just as Kant’s critical writings argue that agents must be able to assume that the natural world of efficient causes is purposive for morality’s ultimate ends, we can profitably understand Kant’s political philosophy as claiming, analogously, that agents must also be able to assume that the juridical world of state action is purposive for justice. Kant’s conception of human rights, I suggest, identifies the conditions under which that assumption is warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deontology and consequentialism are two prominent, disparate tenets of normative ethics concerned with prescribing norms for ethical action in order to advance human flourishing. While consequentialism in its purest form is practical and realistic, its precepts do not intrinsically consider justice and human rights, which are salient canons of deontology. Contrariwise, though plenary deontology categorically focuses on duty or rule-based ethics, its prescripts overlook the consequences of moral action, which results in indeterminate and conceivably dramatic implications for societal eudemonia and human flourishing. Traditionally, consequentialists have sought to quantify the moral value of action by formulating creative expressions. Attempts have also been made to combine ideologies in order to resolve moral conflicts that arise in both normative ethical positions. This article fuses these approaches, creating a single formulation to measure the moral value of action. Used as a guideline in the moral decision-making process, this formulation enjoins individuals to consider the consequences of action beyond the self, to ruminate beyond the immediacy of an act under consideration, and to regard unqualified societal and global norms for justice and human rights as a baseline for all moral action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses articles in the issue on topics including African philosophy of rights according to philosophers Kwasi Wiredu, Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye.

In this article I discuss the conditions under which sovereign debts are not morally binding for a state. Following an old legal doctrine, I call non-binding debts ‘odious'. I proceed as follows. First, I argue that alternative accounts on the morality of debts are unsatisfactory. The problem these accounts have are that they do not clearly identify the philosophical issues that underlie the notion of odious debts, or that they fail to specify what exactly the immorality of odious debts consists in. Second, I defend the view that a debt is odious when two conditions are satisfied: (i) borrowed funds were used by public officials for purposes for which they were not authorised (ii) lenders knew, or should have known, about possible unauthorised uses of those funds. If these two conditions are both satisfied, debts should not be considered debts of the state, but rather personal debts of rulers. Third, I discuss the feasibility of my approach by exploring how it would work in the current world. Finally, I discuss the implications of my account and a possible reply to it. One of the remarkable upshots of this analysis is that it will show that the problem of odious debts is widespread and pervasive. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores the ideas of permissive natural law and the philosophy of property rights in the work of philosopher Jean Barbeyrac. Emphasis is given to topics such as comparisons with the work of philosophers Samuel Pufendorf and John Locke, moral indifference, and the confirmation of individual rights under civil law.

Copyright of Inter-American Journal of Philosophy is the property of Inter-American Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In some libertarian's opinion, social rights are inexistent as 'rights'. In this paper, I will first identify some of the main libertarian's approaches to then show Locke's positions. This will allow tracing the conditions for the potential foundations of the economic and social rights back to the beginnings of the liberal thought. I argue that there is a contradiction between Locke's theoretical principles and the libertarian's radical approaches. Finally, I show how the need for an economic redistribution looking toward a greater political equality can be supported based on Locke. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to show the compatibility between Confucianism and human rights, first by revisiting the moral philosophy of Mencius, a key founder of the Confucian tradition, then by reconstructing the Mencian- Confucian idea of human rights from the perspective of his moral philosophy. One of my central claims is that not only did Mencius acknowledge core human rights-socioeconomic as well as civil-political-justified by his foundational faith in universal moral equality and human dignity, but he further understood the right to subsistence as an essential part of Confucian-constitutional rights. Contrary to the widely received notion that in Mencian- Confucianism the right to subsistence has an overriding value vis-a-vis civil-political rights, I argue that Mencius (and Confucians in general for that matter) never stipulated such a lexical ranking among rights. I conclude by discussing how the type of Confucian moral reasoning that Mencius employs in justifying the moral value of human rights can be re-appropriated to produce Confucian rights suitable for today. ... ... ... ... ... ... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented to this special issue dedicated to the history of philosophical and religious principles that support notions of natural philosophy and the 1948 United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights arising from Libertarian, Roman Catholic, Islamic, and Confucian philosophies.

This essay examines the evolutionary development of the "rights" concept. It argues that the concept is both relatively recent and fundamentally economic rather than abstractly philosophical. The essay is unique, not only in its explication of the concept, but also in the use of ngram data (i.e., the changing relative frequency of published words and phrases) to visualize the correspondence between the evolving rights concept and growing aggregate prosperity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers political agency and space as found in Cavarero's For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression in order to take a critical philosophical approach to human rights education (HRE) and the political implications of its increasingly legal discourse. Like Arendt, Cavarero is concerned with a radical rethinking of political space, as not limited to place or legal borders, but bound by our human condition of plurality and relationality. Both Arendt and Cavarero want politics to be coupled with justice, nevertheless, Cavarero provides a notion of politics that lets us think beyond territorial terms of a polis, which opens for exploring an expanded conceptualization of human rights politics, as not bound by national legislative measures, but as concerning political action in-between human beings. In contrast to the dominant discourse on 'human rights experts' who frame the content for HRE, the notion of 'absolute local space' questions the dichotomy of universal/particular in raising the importance of a plurality of unique voices who create a spectrum for the universality of rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many East and West debates on human rights. One of them is whether all civil and political rights are human rights. On one hand, scholars generally agree that rights to physical security are human rights. On the other hand, some scholars argue that rights to political liberty are only Western rights but not human rights because political liberty conflicts with some East Asian cultural factors, especially the Confucian tradition. I argue that physical security also conflicts with some parts of the Confucian tradition, but rights to physical security are still human rights because physical security is a minimal value. I then argue that political liberty, similar to physical security, is also a minimal value. Therefore, similar to rights to physical security, rights to political liberty are also human rights, even though political liberty also conflicts with some parts of the Confucian tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Informed Consent required for all research involving human subjects, especially in biotechnology research, is actually a process that requires the sharing of information, activities and decisions on the basis of unpredictable events, review of medical procedures, involvement of families, research institutions, support groups and businesses, it is necessary to examine it in the light of human rights, especially under the auspices of the principle of human dignity, to be able to effectively evaluate its manifestation and influence, and so that all fundamental rights of the subjects of research are respected and preserved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the concept of Menschenwürde (universal human dignity) has served as the foundation for human rights, it is absent in the Confucian tradition. However, this does not mean that Confucianism has no resources for a broadly construed notion of human dignity. Beginning with two underlying dilemmas in the notion of Menschenwürde and explaining how Confucianism is able to avoid them, this essay articulates numerous unique features of a Confucian account of human dignity, and shows that the Confucian account goes beyond the limitations of Menschenwürde. It is arguably richer and more sophisticated in content, and more constructive for protecting and cultivating human dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines three different "images" of the social contract. The first image concerns the reasons for our accepting the existence of some form of political authority which has the power and the legitimacy to create laws and impose sanctions upon its citizens. The second image of the contract concerns reasons for our accepting the requirements of morality and the acquisition of a sense of justice. The third image concerns the reasons for the establishment of limits for the interference of state power in our lives. These limits are characterized in terms of human rights. The third image of the social contract elucidates in which sense human rights are universal rights, but it denies that there are any innate or natural rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dialectic, analogical and iconic hermeneutics of the Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot are not only a consistent and rigorous method for addressing the problems at hand, they are also a philosophical instrument for reflecting on the world and life, existence and the human condition in its temporality, on the hollowness of existence and on life in a world in constant crisis and to date, without improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between law and morality, and has even been tempted by natural law arguments in developing his theory of jurisprudence (see Part IV), Kelsen is more receptive to arguments drawn from legal and political realism. Yet Habermas is hardly oblivious to these arguments, as can be seen from his recent acknowledgment that human rights that secure subsistence and development depend on ‘global domestic policy’ for their full enjoyment. This acknowledgment, I submit, brings Habermas’ legal philosophy closer to Kelsen’s monistic view that a supranational human rights regime must regulate political as well as purely legal matters (Part III). Given this stronger analogy between domestic and global institutions of governance, I argue (Part IV) that a global human rights regime must also incorporate features of constitutional review. Conceding this point, however, raises further questions about the insulation of international law from so-called extra-legal (political) influences. I conclude that not only do multicultural differences in understanding human rights (conflicts between legal paradigms) generate political problems for international courts but so do competing subsystems of international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay considers philosophical arguments for states' rights to limit immigration, focusing on an analysis of philosopher Michael Blake's arguments in his article "Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion." The authors address the relationship between an immigrant's human rights and the freedom of the state to which he/she seeks to immigrate, and several hypothetical examples are analyzed.

The claimability objection rejects the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights because the duties thought to correlate with this right are undirected, and thus it is not claimable. This objection is open to two replies: One denies that claimability is an existence condition on rights. The second suggests that the human right to subsistence actually is claimable. I argue that although neither reply succeeds on the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence, an alternative ‘practical’ interpretation provides a viable approach to vindicating this right. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article I examine Onora O’Neill’s philosophical critique of human rights in the context of her appointment to the Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the recent political turn against human rights in the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his essays and speeches, Harold Pinter addressed issues that are central in political and philosophical debates: national identity and the other, the ethics of responsibility, the relational nature of human rights, the politics of death. Discussing his treatment of these issues, Maria Germanou sees Pinter as a Foucauldian intellectual engaged in the politics of truth, and argues that in these texts the postmodern writer enables the political activist. Pinter subjects to scrutiny naturalized political rhetoric, discloses the affinity between meaning and power, and challenges the legitimacy of established hierarchies and their practices. His ultimate purpose is to restore ethics to politics. To this end, he places responsibility for the other at the core of his problematic in ways similar to Emmanuel Levinas, and invites western democracies to redefine ‘humanity’ and the ‘international’ community by taking into consideration accountability for those allowed to die in the name of an alleged justice. Maria Germanou is Professor in English Drama at the University of Athens. She has published in Modern Drama, Comparative Drama, Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Gramma, and elsewhere. Since 2008 she has been co-editor of Synthesis, an e-journal of comparative literature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article deals with a philosophical and partly theological basis of human rights. Human rights are certain moral guarantees that have a long historical heritage. There are basically two different approaches to philosophical foundations of the notion of human rights: either they are inherently present as objective moral obligations of the natural law which should be respected by the state, or they are subjectively and arbitrarily imposed by the state who determines the legal obligations in the society. Both approaches have been criticized or justified, and the main criticism comes from Marxists who claim that traditional definitions of human rights should be rejected as the „safe distance“ play is always presupposed. Genuine Christian world-view defines human rights on the basis of universal concept of human dignity and sacredness of every individual that transcends 'safe distance' approach and avoids any kind of segregation and distrustful approach of any formal religion or the state. This calls for sincere conversion to Christ whose openness to all human beings represents the only sure way of respect of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article looks at the role of human dignity in the justification of human rights, focusing on references to dignity within discourse concerning human rights as well as the political aspects. Information is provided on the international human rights movement prior to World War II as well as in the postwar era, as the author notes the importance of political philosophy in a historical context. In addition, several interpretations of dignity are covered, including as social rank, value, and conduct.

El artículo presenta información acerca del V Coloquio Internacional de Filosofía Política, el cual tuvo lugar el 6 al 8 de noviembre de 2013 en la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina. Se describen algunos de los temas centrales de la conferencia, incluyendo presentaciones sobre los aspectos filosóficos del populismo, la democracia, los derechos humanos y la globalización.

Copyright of Sociologia del Diritto is the property of FrancoAngeli srl and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article presents the author's rebuttal of critiques of her article “Relativismus und Menschenrechte," published in this issue of the journal. She addresses several issues, including the philosophy of human rights from the perspectives of cultural relativism and universalism, individualism, and the influence of Western civilization on the concept of human rights.

A critical response to the article “Relativismus und Menschenrechte” by Marie-Luisa Frick, published in this issue of the journal, is presented. The author addresses several issues, including the history and philosophy of human rights from the perspectives of cultural relativism and universalism, the history of humankind from prehistory onwards, and the origins and history of the state.

A critical response to the article “Relativismus und Menschenrechte” by Marie-Luisa Frick, published in this issue of the journal, is presented. The author addresses several issues, including the philosophy of human rights from the perspectives of cultural relativism and universalism, ethical relativism, and female circumcision.

A critical response to the article “Relativismus und Menschenrechte” by Marie-Luisa Frick, published in this issue of the journal, is presented. The author addresses several issues, including the philosophy of human rights from the perspectives of cultural relativism and universalism, regionalism and particularism in international politics, and human rights and international law.

A critical response to the article “Relativismus und Menschenrechte” by Marie-Luisa Frick, published in this issue of the journal, is presented. The author addresses several issues, including the philosophy of human rights from the perspectives of cultural relativism and universalism, human rights and international law, and power and civil society.