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In the past few decades, there have been efforts to transform qualitative inquiry, drawing on resources from both imaginative literature and art. There have long been tensions within social science that have encouraged the use of these resources, but the recent "literary turn" is more radical. The assumptions underpinning it are examined, and it is argued that what is most important is the purpose for which modes of expression are employed and how well they serve this. The problem with the literary turn is that it frequently involves substitution of the purposes of art or politics for those of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically examines recent arguments by Andrew Abbott, Jensen Sass, and Tariq Modood proposing a normative sociology, one that not only adopts an evaluative stance towards the phenomena it investigates, but also makes explicit and seeks to justify the values on which its evaluations rely. I argue that, while these proposals are to be welcomed in some respects, they fail to address two key issues: On what reasonable basis can it be assumed that there are single correct answers to value questions?; and What distinctive intellectual authority can sociologists claim to be able to discover those answers? I also point out that these recent advocates for a normative sociology pay insufficient attention to the opposing position, a commitment to 'value-neutrality', as proposed most notably by Max Weber. I argue that, while this is frequently ignored or dismissed out of hand, it represents a much more coherent and cogent view, even if its advocates have rarely fully lived up to its demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper some fundamental criticisms of Max Weber's conception of the vocation of science are addressed. These well-known criticisms focus on his admission that science cannot demonstrate its own value, and his broader claim that there can be no rational basis for committing oneself to one set of ultimate values as against another. Instead, he insisted that the adoption of such values is necessarily a matter of individual decision. Influential critics have argued that this amounts to relativism, or even nihilism: that, if it were true, neither science nor anything else could have genuine value, all value-judgements would be arbitrary or entirely instrumental (e.g. a matter of self-interest). I will outline Weber's position, and then examine the arguments of some of his critics: focussing particularly on Midgley and Strauss. This provides the basis for a careful reassessment of Weber's position, and for some suggestions about how he could respond to these critics. It is argued that fundamental values operate in a dialectical relationship with specific evaluations, and that they arise naturally out of more or less universal features of human beings' life experience. While this does not provide a compelling rational basis for commitment to those values, even less for prioritising one over another, it tells us why we often feel a need to uphold them. Furthermore, despite the fact that it does not guarantee agreement, rational clarification of these values and their implications, as well as appraisal of their relative significance in particular cases, is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers what it could mean to say that epistemologies and methodologies are racially just or unjust. It has been argued that this has nothing to do with whether an individual researcher is racist: he or she could be anti-racist but still use an epistemology that is racially biased. To explore this issue, some pioneering research by Allison Davis, an influential African-American scholar in the 1940s and 1950s, is examined. This research dealt with the effects of social class cultures on academic achievement in the United States. While Davis was well-known at the time, his work in this field is now largely forgotten. Two senses of 'racially-just' are examined in this paper, relating: to the intrinsic character or origin of epistemologies and methodologies; or to the implications for and likely consequences of their use. Davis's investigations employed methods and assumptions that are rejected by many educational researchers today. I will address the question of whether these can be criticised as racially unjust; and, if so, on what basis. This evaluation will lead to a consideration of the broader question of the terms in which it is appropriate to assess educational research, and in particular the epistemologies and methodologies on which it depends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, titled "Dangerous Liaisons in the Wasteland? A Found Document," discusses the author's experience with reviewing research proposals related to waste reduction. The author expresses surprise and confusion at the unconventional and theoretical approaches proposed by researchers, such as examining capitalism as the root of waste, exploring structural racism in waste production, and investigating waste through artistic expressions. The author questions the value and practicality of these proposals and suggests that further research should be conducted on the issue of waste in social science. The article raises concerns about the potential wastefulness of research activities and the use of public funds. [Extracted from the article]

It is, perhaps, necessary to reiterate that the article was not primarily about ethnomethodology, or even about ethnomethodological work in Science and Technology Studies (STS), but about a particular line of argument - what can crudely be called radical constructionism - which has long been part of STS and continues to be influential in some quarters there, as Lynch acknowledges. Keywords: ethnomethodology; representation; science and technology studies; constructionism; Michael Lynch EN ethnomethodology representation science and technology studies constructionism Michael Lynch 268 271 4 07/07/22 20220701 NES 220701 I welcome Mike Lynch's response to my article and thank him for it. Reply to Michael Lynch's Comment on "Is Representation a "Folk" Term?". [Extracted from the article]

An influential strand within Science and Technology Studies (STS) rejects the idea that science produces representations referring to objects or processes that exist independently of it. This radical 'turn' has been framed as 'constructionist', 'nominalist', and more recently as 'ontological'. Its central argument is that science constructs or enacts rather than represents. Since most practitioners of science believe that it involves representation, an implication of the radical turn must be that 'representation' is a folk concept; perhaps even a myth or an ideology. This paper explores this anti-representationalism and its implications for the relationship between STS and mainstream social science, in part through drawing parallels with ethnomethodology. 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Karl Mannheim's work, particularly his book Ideology and Utopia, has considerable relevance to current concerns about the public role of sociology. However, this is not widely recognised, and key aspects of his thought have frequently been neglected or disparaged. In this article the background to Mannheim's work is outlined, and a summary provided of the central argument of Ideology and Utopia, comparing this with the positions taken by Max Weber and Georg Lukács, both of whom were important influences on Mannheim. The major criticisms of, and problems with, Mannheim's argument are then addressed. While he was by no means completely successful in putting forward a convincing conception of sociology's public role, there is a great deal to be learned from his work, and from the manner in which he pursued it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely assumed that researchers must normally secure informed consent from participants if research is to be ethical. But what exactly are people being asked to consent to? Most obviously, it is to supplying, or providing access to, data; but are they also agreeing that this data can be used in any way relevant to the research, or do they retain a right to control its use? A third question is: are they consenting to themselves being included within the focus of study, so that asking for consent amounts to assigning a rightnot to be researched? A further question concerns whether there can be group rights not to supply data, to control the use of data, and/or not to be researched? Such claims have been made by spokespersons for the disabled, indigenous groups, commercial organisations, governments, and religious cults. Justifications for these various rights usually appeal to the principle of autonomy, in one form or another. Yet this principle, being universal, must also apply to researchers themselves. So, does this imply that researchers have a right to carry out research? As this makes clear, there are conflicting rights-claims around research. This paper will examine these and their implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, titled "Is There Quality in Qualitative Research?" by Martyn Hammersley, explores the concept of quality in qualitative research. The author questions whether quality can be objectively measured in qualitative research and suggests that it may be subjective and dependent on individual perspectives. Hammersley, an Emeritus Professor of Educational and Social Research, has written extensively on methodological issues in social inquiry. The article raises important considerations about the nature of qualitative research and invites readers to reflect on their own beliefs and perspectives. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the character of a small but detailed observational study that focused on two teams of researchers, one engaged in qualitative sociological research, the other developing statistical models. The study was presented as investigating 'the social life of methods', an approach seen by some as displacing conventional research methodology. The study drew on ethnomethodology, and was offered as a direct parallel with ethnographic and ethnomethodological investigations of natural scientists' work by Science and Technology Studies scholars. In the articles deriving from this study, the authors show how even the statisticians relied on background qualitative knowledge about the social phenomena to which their data related. The articles also document routine practices employed by each set of researchers, some 'troubles' they encountered and how they dealt with these. Another theme addressed is whether the distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches accurately characterised differences between these researchers at the level of practical reasoning. While this research is presented as descriptive in orientation, concerned simply with documenting social science practices, it operates against a background of at least implicit critique. I examine its character and the closely associated criticism of social research methodology and conventional social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Alfred Schutz's concept of 'multiple realities', and in particular, his portrayal of science as one of these realities. It is noted that, while this concept has been widely cited, it has often been interpreted in ways that are at odds with key features of Schutz's original formulation. A careful assessment is made of the main article he wrote dealing with this topic, focusing on the respects in which the 'multiple realities' he discusses are held to differ. Particular attention is given to the relationship between science and what Schutz calls 'the paramount reality', that of 'daily life'. It is suggested that there are some serious problems with the distinctions he makes and that these relate to an ambiguity in his position: that he starts from within phenomenological psychology, drawing on the work of Husserl and James, but moves in a more naturalistic and sociological direction in his account of 'the world of daily life'. This raises some fundamental questions about the nature of phenomenology and its relationship to social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the "methodology," or philosophy of social science, developed by Felix Kaufmann in the second quarter of the 20th century, with the aim of determining its influence on the early work of the sociologist Harold Garfinkel. Kaufmann's two methodology books are discussed, one written before, the other after, his migration from Austria to the United States. It is argued that Garfinkel took over Kaufmann's conception of scientific practice: as a set of procedural rules or methods that determine whether or not new propositions will be accepted into the corpus of scientific knowledge, and whether previously accepted propositions should be retained or abandoned. However, Garfinkel deployed this methodology not so much as a model for sociological inquiry, but rather for the processes by which the lifeworld is constituted—an area of investigation that is epistemologically prior to the focus of most social science, and one which had been opened up in the writings of Edmund Husserl and (especially) Alfred Schutz. It is suggested that Kaufmann's "methodology" was an important complement to the work of these other two philosophers in their influence on Garfinkel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnomethodologists have made some fundamental criticisms of conventional forms of ethnography. For example, it has been argued that they fail to examine the processes through which the phenomena studied have been constituted, and that they lack rigour because they rely upon unexplicated common-sense knowledge. In my view, these criticisms have not been given sufficient attention. This article outlines them in detail and then goes on to provide an evaluation. It is concluded that they do not provide a sufficient basis for the radical-re-specification of the focus of inquiry that ethnomethodologists propose. However, they do raise issues to which ethnographers should give more attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to some recent discussions in the Journal about how interview data can be used. While recognising the value of detailed analysis of the discourse employed in interviews to identify its formal features, it is argued that such analysis is not essential for all the purposes for which interview data can be employed in social research; that informal understanding of everyday language use, built up through ordinary experience and during the course of inquiry, can often be relied upon. It is also argued that practical cautions against taking interview data at face value must not be conflated with philosophical doubts about whether interview data can serve as a source of evidence about anything beyond the interview context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this article is the character of ethnomethodology and its relation to mainstream sociology, specifically as regards assumptions about the nature of social phenomena and the attitude that ought to be adopted towards these. This issue is explored mainly through the example of suicide, which has been used by some ethnomethodologists to highlight the distinctiveness of their position. The viability of three interpretations of ethnomethodology is assessed: as being agnostic regarding the ontological status of suicide and other social phenomena, as insisting that such phenomena are entirely constituted in and through processes of social interaction on particular occasions, and as itself constituting the world as one in which social phenomena are occasioned products. It is argued that none of these is sustainable, but that the plausibility of the second varies somewhat across different types of phenomena, with money being even more evidently constituted through ongoing social interaction than is suicide or death. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of Alfred Schutz was an important early influence on Harold Garfinkel and therefore on the development of ethnomethodology. In this article, I try to clarify what Garfinkel drew from Schutz, as well as what he did not take from him, specifically as regards the task of social inquiry. This is done by focusing in detail on one of Schutz's key articles: 'Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences'. The aim is thereby to illuminate the relationship between Schutz's views on the character of social science and Garfinkel's radical proposal for a re-specified focus of investigation. This is further pursued by examining an important debate about the link between Schutz and ethnomethodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A major target of criticism for ethnomethodology has been cognitivism. In its broadest sense this term refers to any account of human behaviour that treats psychological features of agents – including beliefs, attitudes, and interpretations – as factors explaining their behaviour. While much criticism of cognitivism has been directed at neuroscientists and philosophical materialists, the range of targets has been wider than this, even including sociologists such as Herbert Blumer and symbolic interactionists. In this article I outline this criticism of Blumer and assess it. My conclusion is that, despite some misreading, his work does fall into the broad category of cognitivism. However, I question the grounds for the ethnomethodological critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A call to empiricists to rise up and reclaim reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A modest proposal of a sporting analogy is offered as methodological fiction about the democratization of research and the great mission such an ideal places upon qualitative inquiry. With apologies to Jonathan Swift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on what has been referred to as the 'radical critique' of interview data, to which Paul Atkinson has been an important contributor. This critique challenges the two main uses of such data in qualitative research, and in other forms of social science: to tap the knowledge of informants; and to draw inferences about the typical beliefs, attitudes, etc. of some group or category of actor to which the informant belongs. I argue that this radical critique relies upon a constructionist attitude towards the social world, and I examine one source of this: the influence of ethnomethodology. However, I suggest that a naturalistic stance can take account of the features of interviews to which the radical critique properly draws attention, without undercutting the normal uses of interview data. I emphasise that this does not obviate the need for careful consideration of how such data are produced, and particularly of the discourse practices involved. I illustrate my argument by briefly examining the opening section of an interview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article interrogates what are frequently taken to be central commitments of Childhood Studies: the idea that children are worthy of study ‘in their own right’, that childhood is a ‘social construction’, that children are and must be treated as active agents, and that participatory methods are the gold standard. It is argued that while these ideas have been fruitful in some respects, they involve fundamental problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued in this paper that a significant number of definitions of terms provided in currently available methodological texts are inadequate or positively misleading. Some do not cover the main meaning of the term but focus instead on a non-standard one. Others fail to pick out the distinctive features of what is being defined. There are also those that fail to indicate relationships to related terms or those with similar meanings. Finally, there are some definitions that are simply incorrect in significant respects. It is argued that defective definitions are worse than useless and are a disservice to students. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates the value of ethnographic re-studies, and some of the theoretical and methodological issues that carrying out a re-study can generate. It is argued that the disputes that arose around some classic examples in anthropology and community studies are particularly illuminating. For example, Mead’s work on Samoa and Redfield’s study of Tepoztlán, and the re-studies of these, generated considerable discussion, and this still offers lessons for today. Three key functions of re-studies are discussed: replication, mapping change, and producing a fuller portrait of a community or institution. Also explored is the role of the personal characteristics and the theoretical orientations of researchers. It is concluded that re-studies reveal threats to validity that are present in all social research. At the same time, there is a danger that the discrepancies in findings between study and re-study will be exaggerated, indeed that the methodological problems involved will be mistakenly treated as representing a logical impasse. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is concerned with a national dispute that took place in Britain in the second half of the 1970s, concerned with ‘Marxist bias’ in an Open University sociology of education course. The background to the dispute is outlined in terms of generational changes in political perspectives and the clashes produced. The events of the dispute are described, along with the arguments on both sides. The conclusion considers the broader implications of this dispute in the light of subsequent events. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is widely recognised that academic freedom is currently under threat. But there is also considerable dispute about the meaning of the term. In this paper I examine two recent and important accounts of the nature of academic freedom that seek to distinguish it clearly from free speech. Such a distinction is, in my view, essential. The aim of the paper is to clarify and resolve differences between these two accounts, and thereby to develop further the conceptualisation of academic freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the arguments that have been put forward about the implications of children's rights for the ethics of research involving children. It begins by exploring the concept of rights, and the different kinds of right that have been identified in the philosophical literature. From this, the discussion moves to the nature and legitimacy of children's rights. Finally, the implications of the debates about children's rights are examined for research ethics. It is argued that these implications are more limited and problematic than is generally recognised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some quarters today there are arguments to the effect that research ethics codes should be formulated in terms of principles, rather than specific prescriptions and proscriptions. This derives in part from what is probably the most influential approach to bioethics: principlism. What is provided here is an exploration of the nature of ethical principles as these relate to social research, and of the debates around them. It is argued that principles are useful, so long as they are treated as reminders of what ought to be taken into account, rather than as premises from which specific ethical judgments can be derived. At the same time, it is concluded that any move towards formulating codes in terms of principles is likely to make little difference in practice for researchers under the present regime of ethical regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to a previously published article on the ethics of interviewing for discourse analysis.

The focus is an ethical dilemma that arises, in an acute form, in interviews for studies using constructionist forms of discourse analysis. Informants typically assume that researchers are aiming to document their experiences, feelings, perspectives, etc., as features of a collectively shared world; an assumption that is probably reinforced by the rationales researchers provide, and by their behaviour. Yet, in such studies, the purpose of interviews is actually to generate displays of discursive practices, rather than to elicit information about the world or about people’s individual subjectivities. This discrepancy amounts to deception, but attempts to remedy it are likely to be counterproductive because of the gap between the natural attitude and a constructionist analytic orientation. From the perspective of some currently influential views about ethics, relating to informed consent and doing research ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ people, this would disqualify such research. However, these views are by no means beyond challenge. In these terms, discourse analysis poses important questions about currently accepted views of research ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper is a response to a recent article dealing with the concept of value-free sociology by Donald Black. It argues that while a defence of Weber's position on the role of values in sociological research is necessary and important, what is offered by Black is counter-productive in important respects. This is because it encourages some of the misunderstandings that it is aimed at remedying and, even more importantly, offers a simplistic discussion of what are complex issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the later writings of Foucault as a means of reflecting on research ethics, and in particular on the notion of researcher autonomy. It is suggested that such autonomy is a precondition for ethical practice, and also for sound research, and it is noted that it is under threat today, not least from creeping ethical regulation. Foucault’s philosophical position is outlined, noting the shift that took place in his later writings. There have been only a few attempts to use his ideas in thinking about research ethics, but we examine how they have been applied in relation to the ethics of anthropology. This is followed by a discussion of some widely recognized, and quite serious, problems with Foucault’s position. Finally, a number of positive and negative lessons that can be learned from his work are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents the author's comments in response to Sam Hillyard's recent article on the issue of theory development in interactionism, ethnography, and the sociology of education. According to the author, Hillyard's definition of "interactionism" is very lax, and not well-formulated. The author says that he does not agree with Hillyard's claim that there has been much more theory development in ethnographic studies in the sociology of education.

Analytic induction (AI) is an interpretation of scientific method that emerged in early twentieth-century sociology and still has some influence today. Among the studies often cited as examples are Becker’s articles on marijuana use. While these have been given less attention than the work of Lindesmith on opiate addiction and Cressey on financial trust violation, Becker’s work has distinctive features. Furthermore, it raises some important and interesting issues that relate not only to AI but to social scientific explanation more generally. These concern, for example, the presence and nature of causal systems in the social world, the relationship between historical and generalizing approaches, the character and role of social scientific theories, and how they are generated. In this article Becker’s research is examined in detail, and these issues explored through comparisons with the work of Lindesmith and Cressey. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article notes the increasing attention given to research ethics in recent years and focuses on two of the reasons for this: the growth in ethical regulation and the emergence of some kinds of qualitative research that foreground ethical ideals. It is argued that both involve forms of moralism or ethicism, in other words 'the vice of overdoing morality': they treat values that are external to the task of research as if they were central to it; and/or they require that researchers observe 'the highest ethical standards'. The misconceptions and dangers involved in each of these sorts of moralism are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its emergence in the first half of the twentieth century, there has been considerable discussion of the viability and value of analytic induction (AI) as a conceptualisation of social scientific method; one which challenges the correlational approach to causal analysis characteristic of much quantitative work. However, less attention has been given to the philosophical sources on which Znaniecki, Lindesmith, and other exponents of AI relied. This paper explores some of these, and focuses in particular upon the use made of Lewin's distinction between Aristotelian and Galileian forms of science. The status of AI is ambiguous in relation to this; and it is a distinction that raises some fundamental issues more generally about the methodology of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Herbert Blumer was a key figure in what came to be identified as the Chicago School of Sociology. He invented the term ‘symbolic interactionism’ as a label for a theoretical approach that derived primarily from the work of John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Charles Cooley. But his most influential work was methodological in character, and he is generally viewed today as a prominent critic of positivism, and of the growing dominance of quantitative method within US sociology. While this picture is broadly accurate, it neglects an important strand in his methodological thinking. He was committed to the goal of a science of social life, while at the same time he was uncertain whether such a science is possible. In his Appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish Peasant, he identified a serious dilemma facing this project: the problem of how a scientific approach can be made compatible with the distinctive nature of human social life. In the first chapter of his most influential book, Symbolic Interactionism, he advocates a naturalistic approach to case study, and seems to treat this as avoiding the dilemma. However, there is evidence to suggest that, even towards the end of his life, he regarded the problem as still unresolved. In this article, I examine both sides of Blumer’s dilemma, and whether his attitude towards it changed. However, my interest here is not only historiographical. I evaluate Blumer’s arguments and show that his intellectual struggle with this issue remains relevant today, despite the shifts that have taken place in social science methodology and the philosophy of science since his death. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Ethical regulation of social research has increased considerably in the UK in the past few years, not least as a result of the ESRC's Research Ethics Framework. This article questions whether ethics committees are capable of making sound judgments about the ethics of what is proposed and practised in particular research projects. In addition, the legitimacy of such regulation is questioned, on ethical grounds. Finally, it is argued that increased regulation will not raise the 'ethical standard' of social science and will probably worsen the quality of what it produces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article raises serious questions about the relativist approach to assessing qualitative research that has been championed by John K. Smith and various colleagues. They reject not just empiricism but also what they refer to as "neorealism." Against both these positions, they advance an antirealist, antiontological argument to the effect that we should not assume the reality of social phenomena as existing independently of our knowledge claims about them; insist that assessing the value of research findings is always a practical matter, rather than an issue of method; and claim that we must abandon epistemic in favor of moral criteria in assessing social research. On the basis of detailed scrutiny of their arguments, it is shown that neither the critique of neorealism they present nor the alternative approach they recommend is coherent or convincing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A response by Martyn Hammersley about his article"Challenging Relativism," in the Volume 15 of "Qualitative Inquiry" journal is presented.

Furlong and Oancea's influential framework for assessing the products of applied and practice-based educational inquiry raises some important issues about the criteria by which research should be judged. They begin by outlining the current significance of the issue, and some of the uncertainties surrounding the definition of applied and practice-based inquiry. They then present four sets of criteria by which such research can be assessed, covering, in shorthand terms, epistemic, technical, practical and economic dimensions. The issue of assessment criteria has recently been highlighted by public criticism of the quality of educational research, by attempts to incorporate qualitative work into systematic reviews, as well as by the continuing disputes generated by major methodological divisions among qualitative researchers. In this article, several aspects of the framework offered by Furlong and Oancea are examined. To start with, there is a discussion of the mode of argument they employ, and of how they define 'applied and practice-based educational research'. It is argued that explicit justification is not presented for some key, and controversial, elements of the argument. One of these is the idea that a new social contract is required between educational researchers and the funders and non-academic users of their work. The nature of the proposed contract is examined, through a discussion of to whom educational researchers should be accountable, how, and for what. It is argued that the typology of research offered by Furlong and Oancea is inadequate, and an alternative is proposed. The ways that the authors formulate the four sets of criteria by which research should be judged are also examined in some detail. It is suggested that there are potentially serious conflicts amongst these criteria, and that by no means all of them are appropriate standards in terms of which educational researchers, of any kind, should be held accountable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a reply to Gewirtz and Cribb's argument for ethical reflexivity, presented in a previous issue of this journal. These authors compared their views with mine, suggesting a way in which the differences between our positions could be overcome. I argue that, while there is certainly substantial agreement, there are also some fundamental differences between us, notably about the goal of research. Indeed, in my view, what they recommend involves a greatly increased danger of bias and a version of scientism. At issue here is, in large part, the kind of ethical reflexivity that is appropriate in sociological work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]