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International audience; This article shows how the increase of information availability due to new technologies positively affects aggregate entrepreneurship in national economies. We relyon an “occupational choice” model of managerial production, extended to include the managerial use of information, to explain variations in the number of entrepreneurs, and thus of firms, as measured by the aggregate new business creation data.We present evidence that supports such a theory of industrial organization dynamics for a sample of 78 economies over the period 2004–2012 using panel data instrumental variable regressions.; This article shows how the increase of information availability due to new technologies positively affects aggregate entrepreneurship in national economies. We relyon an “occupational choice” model of managerial production, extended to include the managerial use of information, to explain variations in the number of entrepreneurs, and thus of firms, as measured by the aggregate new business creation data.We present evidence that supports such a theory of industrial organization dynamics for a sample of 78 economies over the period 2004–2012 using panel data instrumental variable regressions.

International audience; With the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the fourth-largest population in theworld, Indonesia has tremendous entrepreneurial potential. The recent fast developmentof Internet-based businesses there brings opportunities for startups to flourish.Some have already achieved remarkable success, despite a lack of institutional supportto provide the necessary networks, material resources, and other elements ofan entrepreneurial culture. Increasingly, these factors for success are being providedby entrepreneurial ecosystems in which entrepreneurial networks play a major role.The experiences of #StartupLokal illustrate how an entrepreneurial network cansprout from the field, relying on the passion and drive of successful serial entrepreneurs.They also reveal how the entrepreneurial community can inspire potentialand new startup leaders, strengthen the entrepreneurial culture, and facilitate accessto resources.; With the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the fourth-largest population in theworld, Indonesia has tremendous entrepreneurial potential. The recent fast developmentof Internet-based businesses there brings opportunities for startups to flourish.Some have already achieved remarkable success, despite a lack of institutional supportto provide the necessary networks, material resources, and other elements ofan entrepreneurial culture. Increasingly, these factors for success are being providedby entrepreneurial ecosystems in which entrepreneurial networks play a major role.The experiences of #StartupLokal illustrate how an entrepreneurial network cansprout from the field, relying on the passion and drive of successful serial entrepreneurs.They also reveal how the entrepreneurial community can inspire potentialand new startup leaders, strengthen the entrepreneurial culture, and facilitate accessto resources.

This paper analyzes the setting of sustainability standards, such as those recently implemented in Europe and in the United States, as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of competing industries and under the indirect influence of ecologists. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we extend Yandle's theory of `Bootleggersand Baptists' of interdependence between interest groups.Paradoxically, the indirect and information-based influence of ecologists can lead to a less constraining standard. We show, in a context of trade liberalization, that this influence leads nonetheless to a tightening of standards in large countries.

The Asian paradox suggests a net grease-the-wheel effect of corruption. Under the assumption of diminishing returns to bribes, going beyond the single-representative-firm assumption, we argue that the grease and sand-the-wheel effects are likely to co-exist among a large population of firms, and that the industrial effect of corruption depends on the productivity drivers that fuel firm dynamics. We decompose Indonesian manufacturing labor productivity growth while contrasting and comparing the contributions of no-, low- and high-bribing firms over the period 1975-94. We confirm the coexistence of grease- and sand-the-wheel effects. Industrial productivity gains stem first from the net entry of non-corrupted firms, evidencing a sand-the-wheel effect. Market share reallocation from low to high productivity growth incumbents paying low bribes is the second source of productivity growth, pointing at a grease-the-wheel effect. Intra-plant productivity growth is overall negative and largely attributable to high-corruption plants, suggesting a sand-the-wheel effect.

Membres du jury :Olivier Cadot, Per Fredriksson, Olivier Godard (président), Gilles Rotillon; This thesis is a positive analysis of emissions trading systems' implementation. We explain why allowances are generally granted for free even though normative economic analysis recommends their sale. We show empirically that free tradable permits, source of windfall profit, motivate rent seeking behaviours. The study focuses on the US market for SO2 emissions allowances. The initial allocation rule resulted from parliamentary discussions that looked like a zero sum game. We formalize it as an endogenous sharing rule, function of lobbying effort, and we test it using political (money) contributions.We analyse theoretically the behaviour of an influenced regulator that has chosen to organize a market for permits and that must still decide on two policy variables: the whole quantity of permits and the way to allocate them initially. We formalize this decisions making process with the common agency model of politics.We show that the choice of an initial allocation rule is not neutral in presence of political market failures (lobbying). The decision to sell the permits or to grant them for free modifies the shareholders' incentive, in a polluting industry, to pressure for or against the reduction of legal emissions.Then, we analyse the public arbitrage between the two policy variables when several industrial lobbies play a partially cooperative game for the free permits. The regulator chooses in priority to grant the rights for free rather than to manipulate their quantity, and this constitutes an efficient answer to the political influence.; Cette thèse est une analyse positive de la mise en œuvre des marchés de permis d'émission. Nous expliquons pourquoi les droits sont généralement offerts quand l'analyse économique normative recommande de les vendre.Nous montrons empiriquement que les permis négociables gratuits, source de profit exceptionnel, motivent des comportements de recherche de la rente. L'étude porte sur le marché américain de droits d'émission de SO2. La règle d'allocation initiale a été établie à l'issue de discussions parlementaires similaires à un jeu à somme nulle. Nous la formalisons comme une règle endogène de partage, fonction de l'effort de lobbying et nous la testons à l'aide des contributions politiques (monétaires).Nous analysons théoriquement le comportement d'un régulateur influencé ayant choisi d'organiser un marché de permis et qui doit encore décider sur deux variables politiques : la quantité globale de droits et la manière de les allouer au départ. Nous formalisons ce processus de décisions à l'aide du modèle d'agence commune.Nous montrons que le choix d'un mode d'allocation initiale n'est pas neutre en présence de défaillances du marché politique (lobbying). La décision de vendre les permis ou de les offrir gratuitement modifie l'incitation d'actionnaires d'une industrie polluante à faire pression pour ou contre la réduction des émissions.Nous analysons ensuite l'arbitrage public entre les deux variables lorsque plusieurs lobbies industriels jouent un jeu partiellement coopératif pour obtenir des permis gratuits. Le régulateur choisit en priorité d'offrir gratuitement les droits avant d'en manipuler la quantité totale, répondant ainsi efficacement à l'influence politique.