Search

One of the most replicated findings in political science is links individuals' perceptions of past economic performance with the vote. Yet there are a number of reasons to expect that self-reported evaluations of the economy are endogenous to vote choice. Indeed, if endogeneity is present, then existing models cannot be viewed as providing a valid test of the causal claim derived from retrospective theories of voting. In this paper, we show that objective local economic conditions help to frame individuals' perceptions of the national economic situation and are a useful instrument for retrospective sociotropic evaluations. We use an instrumental variables probit model to assess the causal effect of these evaluations on the decision to vote for the incumbent president or his party's presidential candidate in the 1980 to 1996 U.S. presidential elections. We find that, while there is much greater uncertainty regarding the IV estimate for sociotropic evaluations, it is quite similar to the estimate obtained by a traditional probit model in which any potential endogeneity is ignored. Our results suggest that existing models of retrospective sociotropic voting may be robust against claims of endogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concepts, tools of social network analysis to understand the legal advocacy network. It is discussed that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the U.S. have been prominent over the 54 court terms. it is concluded that changes in a policy venue does not affect the organization of the interest community at the local level but it does affect when micro-level clusters assemble into larger structures.

The article explores variation in the levels of organized interest activity at the U.S. Supreme Court over time. It argues that aggregate levels of organized interest involvement at the Court will be the function of shifts in the ideological orientation and agenda space allocations of the court. The argument has been tested on the amicus curiae briefs filed at the Court from 1950 to 2005. The implications of the analysis for the understanding of the court as an institution and the nature of organized interest lobbying behavior are also explained.

The article examines variation in the volume of organized interest activity at the U.S. Supreme Court over time. The heavy involvement of organized interests with the Supreme Court is shown by the filing of amicus curiae briefs, which aims to influence the legal policy established by the institution. The analysis of trends in amicus curiae brief filings shows the dynamics of organized interest mobilization and lobbying efforts that may be difficult to determine in the context of other political institutions.

This paper examines the electoral consequences of voter turnout in the U.S. Existing scholarship on the subject focuses primarily on the claim that high turnout benefits Democrats, but evidence supporting this conjecture is highly variable and controversial. Moreover, previous work does not account for endogeneity between turnout and electoral choice, and thus causal claims may be invalid. Using an instrumental variables approach, we reexamine the Partisan Effects and Two-Effects Hypotheses—standard explanations for how turnout affects partisan outcomes. We also provide an empirical test of an Anti-Incumbency Hypothesis and propose a Volatility Hypothesis, which argues that high turnout produces electoral consequences that are systematically less predictable. Using county-level data from the 1948-2000 U.S. presidential elections, we find support for each of these hypotheses. Our results show that prior work has may have underestimated the magnitude and range of implications of variation in voter turnout. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the more important decisions that a federal judge can make is the decision to retire from his or her appointed court. Given the political opportunities created by judicial retirements, prior studies suggest that judges may strategically time their retirements to allow a like-minded president to select their replacements. In this research note, we examine the careers of virtually all federal district court judges appointed from 1946 to 1995 and test an alternative conception of strategic retirements. We suggest that judges may be more concerned with their own prospects of being elevated to an appeals court seat than with their possible replacements. Our analysis supports this hypothesis, as we find that judges are significantly less likely to retire as their chances for elevation increases. In contrast, factors related to policy-oriented behavior do not appear to have an effect on the decision to retire. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking It to the Next Level: the Elevation of District Judges to the US Courts of Appeals Much of the study of public law is dedicated to the investigation of judicial selection to the federal courts. In the US, as in many common law countries, a large number of appellate court vacancies are filled by elevating a judge from the court below. Therefore, an interesting question arises: how can we predict the likelihood that any given judge will be elevated when such a vacancy occurs? In other words, are there systematic patterns associated in elevating federal judges to a higher court? Our paper explores this compelling and important question. In his extensive evaluation of nominations and appointments to the lower federal courts, Goldman (1997) shows us that presidents are most often committed to agendas steered by policy, partisan, and/or personal interests. Most interesting is Goldman’s articulation of policy-influenced goals in nominating and appointing persons to the federal courts. Moreover, partisan and personal interests are also apparent in judicial selection events, as presidents blatantly choose close friends and political party allies for judicial posts in the hopes of paying off debts or bolstering support for his party. Elevation of sitting judges may be an attractive alternative to presidents seeking to further their policy agenda as the prior judicial record of a nominee may provide useful cues of their legal policy orientation. Recent work by Kaheny and Songer provides tentative support for this hypothesis. Their analysis provides preliminary evidence that when presidents choose to elevate judges associated with their own party they select judges whose district court records are consistent with the president’s preferences. Also, they find evidence that when choosing to elevate a judge from the opposite party, these judges are deviant from their party’s policy goals (ex. Democratic presidents elevate the more liberal Republicans). Goldman’s theory of judicial selection and the findings of Kaheny and Songer pave the way for this study of judicial elevation by invoking all three agendas, policy, partisan and personal, into the politics of elevation. In this paper, we examine judicial selection in elevating judges from district courts to the courts of appeals. We will examine patterns in selection strategies shaped by policy, partisan, and personal concerns. Does a judge’s opinion writing record influence his chances of elevation, especially in civil rights and criminal cases? Does the possibility of elevation decrease once a new president takes office? Do party considerations carry over into elevation events? Does the ABA’s evaluation of a judge help or hurt a judge’s chance for elevation? Are former US Attorneys more likely to be the judges chosen for elevation? Do race and gender increase a judge’s likelihood for elevation? Finally, how much of an effect do the policy preferences of home state senators have in the elevation choice? We will attempt to answer these questions by examining all elevations of district court judges since 1960. Construction of two logit models, accounting for elevation by same party presidents in the first model and elevation by opposite party presidents in the second model, will assist in providing answers to the above questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an organized interest chooses to "lobby" the U.S. Supreme Court by filing an amicus curiae brief, it can submit such a brief on its own or it can submit one with other organized interests as cosigners of the brief. I argue that whether an organized interest lobbies the Court with a coalition depends on the trade-off between controlling the content of the amicus brief and the potential policy and financial benefits associated with coalition participation. I also contend that membership-based interests will have a greater propensity for joining coalition briefs than institutional interests due to differences in the cost-benefit calculus resulting from the need to appeal for membership support. Using data on a sample of organized interests and their amicus curiae brief filings at the U.S. Supreme Court from the 1991 to 1995 terms, I estimate a probit model (accounting for selection) in which the dependent variable is whether an organized interest submitted a brief with a coalition of interests or on their own. The results suggest that organized interests respond to the number of amicus briefs being filed in support of their position on the merits of a case and also base their decisions according to the amount of experience they have in lobbying the Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]