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At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multinational data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar results were found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, and collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-neglible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic., PNAS Nexus, 1 (3), ISSN:2752-6542

This paper proposes a qualitative study exploring anomalous self and world-experiences in individuals with high levels of depersonalization traits. Depersonalization (DP) is a condition characterized by distressing feelings of being a detached, neutral and disembodied onlooker of one’s mental and bodily processes or even of reality itself (‘derealization’). Feelings of depersonalization are extremely common in the general population, yet under-acknowledged and under-examined. Our findings indicate the presence of a wide range of anomalous experiences traditionally understood to be core features of depersonalization, such as disembodiment and disrupted self-awareness. However, our results also indicate experiential features that are less highlighted in previous work, such as faster time perception and blurriness of the self/other boundaries which may play a key role in altering one’s sense of self and sense of presence in the world. Our qualitative study provides an in-depth examination of self-reported disturbances of one’s relatedness to one’s self and the world, thereby shedding further light on the nature of altered subjective experiences in DP. In doing so, this paper draws attention to key aspects yet overlooked that may prove valuable for potential diagnosis and therapy. We conclude by highlighting limitations of this study and a number of open questions that further work needs to address in the future, in order to better understand this condition and to improve the quality of life of those experiencing depersonalization.

There has recently been a resurgence of philosophical and scientific interest in the foundations of self-consciousness, with particular focus on its altered, anomalous forms. This paper looks at the altered forms of self-awareness in Depersonalization Disorder (DPD), a condition in which people feel detached from their self, their body and the world (Derealisation). Building upon the phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, we argue that DPD may alter thetransparencyof basic embodied forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness, as well as the capacity to flexibly modulate and switch between the reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. Empirical evidence will be invoked in support of the idea that impaired processing of bodily signals is characteristic of the condition. We provide first-hand subjective reports describing the experience of self-detachment or fracture between an observing and an observed self. This split is compared with similar self-detachment phenomena reported in certain Buddhist-derived meditative practices. We suggest that these alterations and changes may reveal the underlying and tacit transparency that characterises the embodied and basic pre-reflective forms of self-consciousness, in the same way that a crack in a transparent glass may indicate the presence of an unnoticed window.

In this study, we investigated the effect of intergroup contact on processing of own- and other-race faces using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Previous studies have shown a neural own-race effect with greater BOLD response to own race compared to other race faces. In our study, white participants completed a social-categorization task and an individuation task while viewing the faces of both black and white strangers after having answered questions about their previous experiences with black people. We found that positive contact modulated BOLD activity in the right fusiform gyrus (rFG) and left inferior occipital gyrus (lIOC), regions associated with face processing. Within these regions, higher positive contact was associated with higher activity when processing black, compared to white faces during the social categorisation task. We also found that in both regions a greater amount of individuating experience with black people was associated with greater activation for black vs. white faces in the individuation task. Quantity of contact, implicit racial bias and negatively valenced contact showed no effects. Our findings suggest that positive contact and individuating experience directly modulate processing of out-group faces in the visual cortex, and illustrate that contact quality rather than mere familiarity is an important factor in reducing the own race face effect.

The sense of self lies at the heart of conscious experience, anchoring our disparate perceptions, emotions, thoughts and actions into a unitary whole. There is a growing consensus that sensory information about the body plays a central role in structuring this basic sense of self. Depersonalisation (DP) is an intriguing form of altered subjective experience in which people report feelings of unreality and detachment from their sense of self. Previous studies in healthy adults have showed a self-bias effect, namely a greater enhancement of accuracy in detecting touch applied to one’s own face when viewing touch on the self versus other’s face. The current study used the Visual Remapping of Touch (VRT) paradigm to explore self-bias in visual tactile integration in non-clinical participants reporting high and low levels of depersonalisation experiences. Participants observed images of their own face, the face of another person or a ball being touched or not touched either unilaterally or bilaterally while being asked to detect unilateral or bilateral tactile stimulation on their own cheeks. The current study revealed that participants high in DP showed an increased overall VRT effect but a no self-face bias, instead showing a greater VRT effect when observing the face of another person. In addition, across all participants, self-bias was negatively predicted by the occurrence of anomalous body experiences suggesting that this effect was specifically linked to disruptions in the perception of the bodily self. These results provide evidence for disrupted integration of tactile and visual representations of the bodily self in those experiencing high DP and provide greater understanding of how disruptions in multisensory perception of the self may underlie the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

This study examined whether the high level of immersion provided by HMDs encourages participants to synchronise their attention during viewing. 39 participants watched the 360° documentary “Clouds Over Sidra” using either a HMD or via a flat screen tablet display. We found that the HMD group showed significantly greater overall ISC did the tablet group and that this effect was strongest during transition between scenes.

Whether pointing at a menu item or rifling through a clothes rack, when we choose we often move. We investigated whether people’s tendency to copy the movements of others could influence their choices. Participants saw pairs of pictures in private and indicated which one they preferred. They then entered a virtual art gallery and saw the same picture pairs in the presence of a virtual character. Having observed the virtual character point to indicate her preference with either a high or low movement trajectory, participants indicated their preference. There was either an anatomical (same movement, same choice) or spatial correspondence (same movement, different choice) between the participant’s pictures and those of the virtual character. We found that participants copied the movement made by the virtual character rather than her action goal (i.e., her choice of picture). This resulted in a shift towards the virtual character’s preferences in the anatomical condition but away from her preferences in the spatial condition. This effect was driven by the observation of the virtual character’s high pointing movements. In a further experiment, we did not find any significant differences in imitation behaviour in autism, although autistic participants were less consistent in their choices. Our findings demonstrate that we are not only influenced by other’s choices but also the types of movements others make to indicate those choices.

During our daily lives, we often learn about the similarity of the traits and preferences of others to our own and use that information during our social interactions. However, it is unclear how the brain represents similarity between the self and others. One possible mechanism is to track similarity to oneself regardless of the identity of the other (Similarity account); an alternative is to track each other person in terms of consistency of their choice similarity with respect to the choices they have made before (consistency account). Our study combined functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and computational modelling of reinforcement learning (RL) to investigate the neural processes that underlie learning about preference similarity. Participants chose which of two pieces of artwork they preferred and saw the choices of one agent who usually shared their preference and another agent who usually did not. We modelled neural activation with RL models based on the similarity and consistency accounts. Our results showed that activity in brain areas linked to reward and social cognition followed the consistency account. Our findings suggest that impressions of other people can be calculated in a person-specific manner, which assumes that each individual behaves consistently with their past choices.

According to the Justified True Belief account of knowledge (JTB), a person can only truly know something if they have a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is justified true belief). This account was challenged by Gettier (1963), who argued that JTB does not explain knowledge attributions in certain situations, later called Gettier-type cases, wherein a protagonist is justified in believing something to be true but their belief was only correct due to luck. Lay people may not attribute knowledge to protagonists with justified but only luckily true beliefs. While some research has found evidence for these so-called Gettier intuitions (e.g., Machery et al., 2017a), Turri et al. (2015) found that participants attributed knowledge in Gettier-type cases at rates similar to cases of justified true belief. In a large-scale, cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri and colleagues’ (2015) Experiment 1 (N = 4724), we failed to replicate this null result using a within-subjects design and three vignettes across 19 geopolitical regions. Instead, participants demonstrated Gettier intuitions; they were 1.86 times more likely to attribute knowledge to protagonists in standard cases of justified true belief than to protagonists in Gettier-type cases. These results suggest that Gettier intuitions may be common across different scenarios and cultural contexts. When assessing the knowledge of others, lay people may rely on a shared set of epistemic intuitions (i.e., a core folk epistemology) that requires more than simply justification, belief, and truth. However, the size of the Gettier intuition effect did vary by vignette, and the Turri et al. (2015) vignette produced the smallest effect. Thus, epistemic intuitions may also depend on contextual factors unrelated to the criteria of knowledge, such as the characteristics of the protagonist being evaluated.

This article focuses on the question of the function of imitation and whether current accounts of imitative function are consistent with our knowledge about imitation's origins. We first review theories of imitative origin concluding that empirical evidence suggests that imitation arises from domain-general learning mechanisms. Next, we lay out a selective account of function that allows normative functions to be ascribed to learned behaviours. We then describe and review four accounts of the function of imitation before evaluating the relationship between the claim that imitation arises out of domain-general learning mechanisms and theories of the function of imitation.

Psychology distinguishes between a bodily and a narrative self. Within neuroscience, models of the bodily self are based on exteroceptive sensorimotor processes or on the integration of interoceptive sensations. Recent research has revealed interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive processing of self-related information, for example that mirror self-observation can improve interoceptive awareness. Using heartbeat perception, we measured the effect on interoceptive awareness of two experimental manipulations, designed to heighten attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self. Participants gazed at a photograph of their own face or at self-relevant words. In both experimental conditions interoceptive awareness was significantly increased, compared to baseline. Results show that attention to narrative aspects of self, previously regarded as relying on higher-order processes, has an effect similar to self-face stimuli in improving interoceptive awareness. Our findings extend the previously observed interaction between the bodily self and interoception to more abstract amodal representations of the self.

Actions of others automatically prime similar responses in an agent’s behavioural repertoire. As a consequence, perceived or anticipated imitation facilitates own action control and, at the same time, imitation boosts social affiliation and rapport with others. It has previously been suggested that basic mechanisms of associative learning can account for behavioural effects of imitation, whereas a possible role of associative learning for affiliative processes is poorly understood at present. Therefore, this study examined whether contingency and contiguity, the principles of associative learning, affect also the social effects of imitation. Two experiments yielded evidence in favour of this hypothesis by showing more social affiliation in conditions with high contingency (as compared to low contingency) and in conditions of high contiguity (compared to low contiguity).

The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its potential for explaining aspects of social cognition is explored. The minimal requirements for a BSS are considered, before reviewing empirical evidence regarding the development of the BSS over the first year of life. Finally, evidence on the involvement of the body in social distinctions between self and other is reviewed to illustrate how the BSS is affected by both the bottom up effects of multisensory stimulation and the top down effects of social identification.

Viewing another person's hand actions enhances excitability in an observer's left and right primary motor (M1) cortex. We aimed to determine whether viewing communicative hand actions alters this bilateral sensorimotor resonance. Using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we measured excitability in the left and right M1 while right-handed non-signing participants observed bimanual communicative hand actions, i.e., meaningful signs in British Sign Language. TMS-induced motor evoked potentials were recorded from hand muscles during sign observation before and after teaching the participants to associate meanings with half of the signs. Before this teaching, when participants did not know that the presented hand actions were signs, excitability of left and right M1 was modulated equally. After learning the meanings of half the signs, excitability of the left, but not right, M1 was significantly enhanced. This left-lateralized enhancement of M1 excitability occurred during observation of signs with known and unknown meanings. The findings suggest that awareness of the communicative nature of another person's hand actions strengthens sensorimotor resonance in the left M1 cortex and alters hemispheric balance during action observation.

People can communicate by using hand actions, e.g., signs. Understanding communicative actions requires that the observer knows that the actor has an intention to communicate and the meanings of the actions. Here, we investigated how this prior knowledge affects processing of observed actions. We used functional MRI to determine changes in action processing when non-signers were told that the observed actions are communicative (i.e., signs) and learned the meanings of half of the actions. Processing of hand actions activated the left and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, BA 44 and 45) when the communicative intention of the actor was known, even when the meanings of the actions remained unknown. These regions were not active when the observers did not know about the communicative nature of the hand actions. These findings suggest that the left and right IFG play a role in understanding the intention of the actor, but do not process visuospatial features of the communicative actions. Knowing the meanings of the hand actions further enhanced activity in the anterior part of the IFG (BA 45), the inferior parietal lobule and posterior inferior and middle temporal gyri in the left hemisphere. These left-hemisphere language regions could provide a link between meanings and observed actions. In sum, the findings provide evidence for the segregation of the networks involved in the neural processing of visuospatial features of communicative hand actions and those involved in understanding the actor’s intention and the meanings of the actions., Highlights • Participants observed hand actions before and after learning that they are signs. • Learning-induced changes in brain activity measured using fMRI. • No activity in mirror neuron system when actions were not known to be communicative. • Knowing the actor’s intention to communicate activated IFG and IPL. • Knowing meanings of the actions increased activity in left IFG (BA 45), IPL and MTG.

Humphreys and Sui provide a powerful theoretical framework to explain processing biases toward self-related information. However, the framework is primarily applied to information relevant to a conceptual self-representation. Here, we show a similar processing bias for information related to the bodily self, grounded in sensorimotor representations. Furthermore, we can use bodily illusions to explore the ways in which embodied self-associations can affect our perceptual and attentional processing. It is possible to extend the current framework to take into account these effects, and we argue that this will yield considerable benefits for our understanding of self-relevance.

The effect of multisensory-induced changes on body-ownership and self-awareness using bodily illusions has been well established. More recently, experimental manipulation of bodily illusions have been combined with social cognition tasks to investigate whether changes in body-ownership can in turn change the way we perceive others. For example, experiencing ownership over a dark-skin rubber hand reduces implicit bias against dark-skin groups. Several studies have also shown that processing of skin colour and facial features play an important role in judgements of racial typicality and racial categorization independently and in an additive manner. The present study aimed at examining whether using multisensory stimulation to induce feelings of body ownership over a dark-skin rubber hand would lead to an increase in positive attitudes towards black faces. We here show, that the induced ownership of a body-part of different skin colour affected the participants’ implicit attitudes when processing facial features, in addition to the processing of skin colour as shown previously. Furthermore, when the levels of pre-existing attitudes towards black people were taken into account, the effect of the rubber hand illusion on the post-stimulation implicit attitudes was only significant for those participants who had a negative initial attitude towards black people, with no significant effects found for those who had positive initial attitudes towards black people. Taken together, our findings corroborate the hypothesis that the representation of the self and its relation to others, as given to us by body-related multisensory processing, is critical in maintaining but also in changing social attitudes.

Multisensory stimulation has been shown to alter the sense of body-ownership. Given that perceived similarity between one’s own body and those of others is crucial for social cognition, we investigated whether multisensory stimulation can lead participants to experience ownership over a hand of different skin colour. Results from two studies using introspective, behavioural and physiological methods show that, following synchronous visuotactile (VT) stimulation, participants can experience body-ownership over hands that seem to belong to a different racial group. Interestingly, a baseline measure of implicit racial bias did not predict whether participants would experience the RHI, but the overall strength of experienced body-ownership seemed to predict the participants’ post-illusion implicit racial bias with those who experienced a stronger RHI showing a lower bias. These findings suggest that multisensory experiences can override strict ingroup/outgroup distinctions based on skin colour and point to a key role for sensory processing in social cognition.

The self is one the most important concepts in social cognition and plays a crucial role in determining questions such as which social groups we view ourselves as belonging to and how we relate to others. In the past decade, the self has also become an important topic within cognitive neuroscience with an explosion in the number of studies seeking to understand how different aspects of the self are represented within the brain. In this paper, we first outline the recent research on the neurocognitive basis of the self and highlight a key distinction between two forms of self-representation. The first is the “bodily” self, which is thought to be the basis of subjective experience and is grounded in the processing of sensorimotor signals. The second is the “conceptual” self, which develops through our interactions of other and is formed of a rich network of associative and semantic information. We then investigate how both the bodily and conceptual self are related to social cognition with an emphasis on how self-representations are involved in the processing and creation of prejudice. We then highlight new research demonstrating that the bodily and conceptual self are both malleable and that this malleability can be harnessed in order to achieve a reduction in social prejudice. In particular, we will outline strong evidence that modulating people’s perceptions of the bodily self can lead to changes in attitudes at the conceptual level. We will highlight a series of studies demonstrating that social attitudes towards various social out-groups (e.g. racial groups) can lead to a reduction in prejudice towards that group. Finally, we seek to place these findings in a broader social context by considering how innovations in virtual reality technology can allow experiences of taking on another’s identity are likely to become both more commonplace and more convincing in the future and the various opportunities and risks associated with using such technology to reduce prejudice.

Advances in head mounted displays (HMDs) have increased the interest in cinematic virtual reality as an art form. However, the freedom of a viewer in 360 video presents challenges in ensuring that audiences do not inadvertently miss important events and locations. We examined whether the high level of immersion provided by HMDs encourages participants to synchronize their attention during viewing. Sixty-four participants watched the 360° documentary Clouds Over Sidra (VRSE.works, 2015) using either an HMD or via a flat screen tablet display. We used intersubject correlation (ISC) analysis to measure attentional synchrony over the course of the video and to examine whether spatial and temporal factors led to different amounts of correlation both within and between groups. We found significantly greater ISC for the HMD compared to the tablet group. This effect was greatest for scenes with a unidirectional focus and at the start of scenes. We discuss our results in terms of the visual properties and the motor affordances of HMDs versus tablets. Our results show the value of HMDs in increasing attentional synchrony and may provide producers of 360° content insight in how to encourage or discourage synchronization of viewing direction. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).