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By all accounts, Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) is virtually synonymous with process thought, including its more specific expressions as process philosophy and theology. This is most often assumed with little regard for the origins of modern process thought itself. Nicholas Rescher, reflecting on this fact, has called the pluralization of the field the "cardinal task" of all process proponents. This charge, given nearly thirty years ago, remains unfulfilled. Despite the fact that other candidates are available, the preeminence of this singular figure, and subordinately his later interpreter Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000), has led to what may be called "The Whitehead/Hartshorne Factor" in virtually all aspects of process thought. This has functioned as a limiting factor in the promotion of processual ideas, a phenomenon noted during the earliest years of modern process history. This historiographical review will outline the features of these limitations and suggest a broader process approach that works to the benefit of its theological branch in particular. This paper dares to ask the "heretical" question, what would process philosophy and theology look like without Whitehead? Ironically, with the most recent analysis of Whitehead scholarship, the answer is hidden in plain sight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the different interpretations of the distinction between closed and open societies put forward by Henri Bergson, Leo Strauss, Karl Popper, and Gilles Deleuze. These vary both in the features attributed to the two kinds of society, especially to openness, and in the authors' evaluations of what they describe. The similarities and differences between their views are documented in detail, and their significance considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens when a writer of the pre-photographic era is interpreted through the lens of photography? How does the newer medium influence the way one engages with the older medium? To explore these questions, this article takes as a point of departure Andrei Bitov's readings of Alexander Pushkin, which recast the canonical poet as a photographer. This anachronistic move—which puts Bitov in conversation with Jeff Wall, Walter Benjamin, and Henri Bergson—turns photography into a transhistorical instrument for exploring literature's relationship with extralinguistic world. By using photography as an interpretive lens, Bitov ascribes to literature new powers, such as the power to signify indexically and to develop upon contact with new realities. But he also underscores the limits of artistic representation. Focusing on Russia's most hallowed author, Bitov makes the claim that a text, no matter how great, can never surpass reality in expressive power. Like a photographer, a writer is perennially belated, unable to catch up with their fickle subject. Bitov ends up exposing the inadequacies of literature while simultaneously making a case for its value despite those inadequacies. He invites readers to consider writing as an experience that is simultaneously rewarding and humbling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores bells, and objects in general, from a philosophical perspective. More specifically, it explores the way objects orient our being, but only partially as aspects of things always remain withdrawn from access. Through an exploration of the elemental forms of bells, this article positions object exploration as a wholly spiritual and pleasurable undertaking. No matter how much we delve into something there will always be unknowable aspects to a thing. Our experience of things is an intensely metaphysical experience that only living in the world (through) time can elucidate. In this case, the long standing object bell, with all its historical and cultural uses and meanings, becomes our gateway to the metaphysical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly two decades ago, Neil Spiller and architect and teacher Derek Hales had a conversation about analogue computers. With its Surreal and 'pataphysical concerns, the conversation resonated with Spiller and inspired his design for the Chicken Computer, one of the centrepieces of his 'Communicating Vessels' series of drawings and writings. Hales reflects on the curious and extraordinary ideas that this chunking engine of pecking, haptic chance provokes in him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the machine is often seen as a powerful agent and enabler of extractive technologies, pollution and climate change, it can also be a necessary ally in resurrecting complex landscape rejuvenation projects that target potentially beneficial, catalytic natural hotspots. Daniela Atencio and Claudio Rossi, both architects and Associate Professors at the Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, show us how. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how Frances Lamont and Elizabeth Morison’s An Adventure (1913) disrupts temporal and spatial dichotomies through its supposed representations of time travel. An Adventure presents time as a shifting force that aligns with Bergsonian notions of temporality – specifically the concepts of objective and subjective time as defined in Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1911) and “Time and Free Will” (1913). This article also considers how Freudian notions of “condensation” further outline the subjective rendering of time in An Adventure’s surreal journeys back in time to the French Revolution and how the narrative’s subjective presentation of time aligns with Ford Madox Ford’s later theories of literary impressionism, particularly his idea that modernist narratives are composed of “various unordered pictures”. This article ultimately argues that Lamont and Morison’s book benefited from the temporally minded scientific and social climate of the time and used the theoretical groundwork of thinkers like Henri Bergson, Ford Madox Ford and Sigmund Freud as starting points from which they could tell their tale as truth. Specifically, their formal construction of the text as scientific research seeks to consciously obscure the differentiation between fact and fable, effectively positing their nonlinear time slip as truth. If that truth is humored, Lamont and Morison are proposing a more radical conception of time than Bergson – a nonlinear conception of time – a proposition that sits in tension with their use of scientific diction and discourse.

Çalışmamızın konusu ve amacı düşünce dünyasında çalışmalarıyla önemli bir yere sahip olan İbrahim Kalın’ın modernite eleştirilerini ortaya koymak ve bu eleştirileri Bergson’un felsefesiyle yorumlayarak yeniden değerlendirmek ayrıca Kalın ve Bergson’un birbirini tamamlayan benzer düşünceler ortaya koydukları göstermektir. Her iki düşünürün de çalışmalarında modern insanın akıl temelinde yarı tanrısal özne rolüne karşı, modern aklın ötesindeki gerçekliği ve aklı yapan öncesi ve sonu olmayan bir varlığı temel almaları çalışmamıza konu olmalarını sağlamıştır. Kalın’ın hayatın anlamının, ilerlemecilik anlayışı doğrultusunda her şeyin akıl temelinde belirlenmesine karşı bir modernite eleştirisi olarak Tanrı inancını koymasının nedenleri, Bergson’da modern düşüncenin ötesinde bir varoluşu ifade eden sezgi, süre, oluş, şuur ve tekâmül gibi kavramlar üzerinden yorumlanarak, Kalın’ın eleştirilerine farklı bir perspektiften anlamsal olarak katkı sağlanacaktır. Bu bağlamda Kalın’ın merkezinde modern insanın Tanrı’dan bağımsız bir şekilde aklını kullanmaya kalkması ve kendisini dünyanın geri kalanına karşı üstün gören bir varlık olarak düşünmesinin olduğu modernite eleştirilerinin, Bergson’un felsefesi üzerinden yeniden okunması mevcut literatürü zenginleştirmesi açısından önemlidir.

This article analyzes the artwork of two seemingly distant contemporary artists – Toomas Altnurme and Cao Jun – elucidating their creative processes through the theoretical frameworks of Martin Heidegger, Sigmund Freud, and Henri Bergson. In Section 1, I offer reasons for a side-by-side examination of Altnurme’s and Jun’s art. In my discussion of Altnurme’s art in Section 2, I argue that his process exemplifies Heidegger’s view that artists must abnegate themselves in order for their creations to come into being. In Section 3, I elucidate Jun’s painting in its power to decenter the usual, object-oriented, circumspection of the mind. I ground my analyses in Freud’s concept of dream logic. Freud’s work on dreams allows me to approach Jun’s creative process as a work of translation whereby the artist translates the preconscious elements into images that we – the audience – then see on canvas. In Section 4, where I offer a comparative examination of both artists, I rely on Bergson’s articulation of the importance of intuition in order to show that both Altnurme and Jun create artworks that disclose to us the non-objective dimension of life wherein action or process and possibility take precedence over objectively existing things.

In this essay, I examine the intersection between the concepts of freedom, the self, God, and creativity in the works of one of the most prominent twentieth-century Jewish thinkers, Rabbi Abraham Isaac HaCohen Kook (1865–1935), exploring his use of these concepts through the lens of the Lebensphilosophie of the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941). I first draw a historical and thematic parallel between Bergson's and Kook's philosophies that to date has not been considered extensively. I then argue that five different interpretative puzzles related to the topic of freedom in Kook's teachings can be explained against the background of Bergson's thought. This Bergsonian interpretation enables the reader to appreciate in what way different aspects of Kook's thought—the metaphysical, ethical, epistemological, and theological—are interconnected and can be understood as an organic whole. I thereby show that the Bergsonian philosophical and systematic models are an important, and yet unexplored, interpretative tool for the study of Kook's theological and philosophical thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the common elements between literature and cinema is the subject of time, for which two characteristic features are observed; quantitative time, which is objective and qualitative time, which has a mental existence. Henri Bergson based his philosophical views of the concept of time on subjective consciousness. Later, Gilles Deleuze extended Bergson's view of time to cinema. The current research, a descriptive-comparative study, aims to investigate the concept of qualitative time based on the opinions of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze in Sadeq Hedayat's novel, The Blind Owl (Būff Cūr) and its film adaptation, directed by Raúl Ruiz. According to this research, despite the difference in the written and visual media of literature and cinema, the concept of quality time is discerned as a common element in both works. To this end, the author and filmmaker have used a variety of internal time techniques, including diurnal cycles, intuition, reminiscences, time interferences, and time crystal components. Ruiz's film is a free adaptation, and its main plot and subplot are different from the novel. However, regarding the concept of time and the characteristics of mental time, it is consistent with Hedayat's effect. Among the findings of the present research, in addition to revealing the differences and similarities between the novel and the film from the perspective of qualitative time, it is possible to point out the common elements that can be adapted in literature and cinema based on the concept of time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have been invited to respond to Rethinking Existentialism's engagement with the work of Simone de Beauvoir, and I do so in three parts. First, I introduce Webber's Beauvoir, moral theorist, and raise some textual and conceptual objections to his argument for a 'categorical imperative for authenticity' in Chapter 10. Second, I turn to historical and conceptual challenges to Webber's definition of existentialism, including meta-philosophical questions about his use of literature in general and Beauvoir's novel She Came to Stay in particular. Finally, I conclude with a trio of broad questions relating to what I will call the 'missing materiality' in Webber's Beauvoir: Where's the ambiguity? Where's the tragedy? Where's the tension? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Ilahiyat Researches / Ilahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi is the property of Ataturk University Coordinatorship of Scientific Journals and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Le possible et le réel, Bergson says that there are two troubling problems in metaphysics: the first has produced theories of being, the second theories of knowledge. Both problems, however, have the same form: they ask why there is something instead of nothing. Using the example of some key moments in the history of Western metaphysics (and a fairytale written by Gianni Rodari), the aim is to show that the contingency of being, far from being an intuitive proof, is in fact the fruit of inference and the result of specific training. Thanks to this 'pedagogy', an 'adult' subject is in fact generated and one emerges from that 'mystical infancy' which, instead, for Bergson of the Deux Sources, constituted the model of the new philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Henri Bergson critiques the traditional view of time as a mere succession of states, arguing that it fails to capture the crucial aspect of time's speed or pace. The paper explores Bergson's concept of time's speed through the lens of modern scientific insights and analytic philosophy, addressing critiques from cognitive science and logical analysis. By introducing the concept of "time qualia," which distinguishes between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of temporal experience, the author defends Bergson's position and provides a new theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between external motion, its measurement, and conscious duree. The formulation of this concept not only sheds light on the intrinsic connections between various related texts but also contributes to the differentiation between two distinct types of time speed -- time-qualia-based and flow-qualia-based. The author concludes that the qualitative aspects of time experience have an irreducible reality that complements, rather than opposes, the quantitative aspects, arguing that Bergson's perspective offers a more comprehensive understanding of time's nature and our experience of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to consider Bergson's theory of language as a resource of his intuitive method. Although he never explicitly elaborated a philosophy of language, his reflections on how words intertwine with our thoughts and the way we know reality permeate various moments of his work, to the point where he defines the task of Metaphysics (i.e. Philosophy) as an attempt to go beyond symbols. Despite the exegetical effort to be developed here to present Bergson's conception of language and its centrality to the coherence of his philosophy, the pretension is above all systematic in its counterpoint with the theses of the so-called linguistic turn. Thus, by asking what Bergson's theory of language tells us about knowledge of reality and, consequently, about the nature of philosophy itself, I will also be questioning the status of the critique of language in contemporary philosophy. My aim is finally to show that the discussion about philosophy and the boundaries of language is less a theoretical question than a fundamental decision about the search for wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Film Quarterly / Kwartalnik Filmowy is the property of Kwartalnik Filmowy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Henri Bergson w pracy Materia i pamięć (1896) odróżnił dwa rodzaje pamięci: mózgową i czystą. Pamięć mózgowa należy do ciała i służy reagowaniu na bodźce, w związku z czym preferuje takie wspomnienia, które są najbardziej przydatne życiowo. Pamięć czysta rejestruje wszystko, co się zdarzyło, również wspomnienia bezużyteczne w prawdziwym życiu. Pierwszy rodzaj sytuuje nas po stronie ciała, a więc biologii. Hołubienie wspomnień bezużytecznych jest wyróżnikiem człowieczeństwa i warunkiem duchowości. Te konstatacje Bergsona, spopularyzowane w teorii Gilles’a Deleuze’a, okazują się niezwykle aktualne przy charakteryzowaniu filmowych przedstawień pamięci protetycznej, w których filmowi protagoniści mają wszczepione implanty pamięci lub też ich pamięć ulega eksternalizacji. Twierdzenia Bergsona o tym, że pamięć jest wyróżnikiem człowieczeństwa, że zachodzi związek między pamięcią a ciałem, a wreszcie, że istnieje podział na wspomnienia praktyczne i niepraktyczne, zachowują tu swoją ważność.

This paper seeks to highlight the importance of spatial cognition in Bergson's Données immédiates by engaging with Robert Watt's reconstruction of Bergson's argument that every idea of number involves the idea of space. We focus on the second stage of Watt's reconstruction, where Bergson argues that only space can provide the distinction required for our counting of otherwise identical items. Watt bases his reconstruction on a premise regarding the possibility that identical objects, in the absence of spatial distinction, might remain identical across different "temporal locations". Our paper raises the prospect that Bergson is committed to a stronger thesis, namely one implying that identical objects would necessarily remain indistinguishable without the intervention of space. The paper thus concludes by emphasizing the indispensability of space for knowledge according to Bergson. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens when intuition becomes algorithmic? This article explores how approaching intuition as recursively trained sheds light on what is at stake affectively, politically, and ethically in the entanglements of sensorial, cognitive, computational and corporate processes and (infra)structures that characterise algorithmic life. Bringing affect theory and speculative philosophies to bear on computational histories and cultures, I tease out the continuing implications of post-war efforts to make intuition a measurable and indexable mode of anticipatory knowledge. If digital computing pioneers tended to elide the more ambivalent implications of quantifying intuition, this article asks what computational myths are at play in current accounts of machine learning-enabled sensing, thinking, and speculating and what complexities or chaos are disavowed. I argue that an understanding of more-than-human intuition which grapples meaningfully with the indeterminacy central to digitally mediated social life must recognise that visceral response is recursively trained in multiple ways with diverse, and often contradictory, effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aldous Huxley's work The Doors of Perception introduced the phrase 'Mind at Large' to the lexicon of psychedelic experience in 1954. I argue that its original presentation requires re-evaluation. I present evidence that Huxley manipulates the construction of the discourse he uses to present this phrase as a philosophically legitimate term. His choice of a pivotal quotation implies support from the conclusions of philosophers C. D. Broad and Henri Bergson. A hermeneutic analysis of this discourse highlights problems with this implication and shows that a reinterpretation of Huxley's methods and intentions is warranted. An increase in references to Mind at Large and related terms in studies of the effects of psychedelics motivates this re-evaluation of its implied philosophical value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Muzika is the property of Musicological Society of Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Academy of Music in Sarajevo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I read the clash between predictive psychoanalytic theories and destabilizing queer theories on the subject of desire as a disagreement over probability. I point psychoanalysts and queer theorists towards four relevant episodes in the history of science: the debate on statistics and thermodynamics within the Victorian intelligentsia, the Einstein-Bergson feud, discussions within the cybernetics movement, and recent critiques of automated cars. Considering our sexual aims and objects as information, our desires would be due to the way we retrieve them. Psychoanalysis explains how such information is stored and queer theory how it is reorganized. In cases where repression is not accountable for lack of desire toward an external stimulus, such absence would be due to information not retrieved quick enough, rather than a genuine incapacity to desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, I propose a reading of Henri Bergson's Two Sources of Morality and Religion, centering on how mysticism transforms homo sapiens. For Bergson, the mystics are exemplars of social innovation, representatives of a "new species." The open society, far from being a distant utopian social ideal, is already immanent to static, closed society. Openness can be achieved now, in the moment of mystical experience, defined by Bergson as unity with the flow of life. Instead of a rigid dualism between closure and openness, Bergson proposes that social change is driven from the inside by new moral ideas. Moral heroes are those willing to break the mould of social obligation. A form of non-discriminatory love is possible, going beyond the inner/outer distinction. Far from being a passive or contemplative practice, mysticism for Bergson is an active change of the human condition, a passage to the more-than-human. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a comparative analysis of Charles and Ray Eames' Powers of Ten, and Eva Szasz and Robert Verrall's Cosmic Zoom, seen through the lenses of Bergsonian and Deleuzo-Guttarian philosophy. The author claims that, despite similarities with respect to their subject matter and modes of production, there are significant stylistic differences between these films that are suggestive of divergent ontological, epistemological and political commitments. Of particular importance is the foregrounding of objectivity in the case of Powers of Ten and subjectivity in the case of Cosmic Zoom – a distinction that is reflected in their respectively quasi-indexical and expressive modes of representation. This fundamental tension similarly conditions their differently inflected approaches to time, space and measure, drawing attention to the strange intertwining of representation, abstraction and affect that is characteristic of much animated film. Ultimately, it is proposed that, in the context of Powers of Ten and Cosmic Zoom, animation's capacities for abstraction and expression are differently distributed, resulting in a cosmopolitical opposition which can be aligned with the Deleuzo–Guattarian distinctions between major and minor language, and royal and nomadic science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent philosophy has witnessed a renewed interest in the works and ideas of Henri Bergson (1859–1941). But while contemporary scholarship has sought to rehabilitate Bergson's insights on time, memory, consciousness, and human freedom, comparatively little attention has been paid to Bergson's relationship to pantheism. By revisiting the 'pantheism' controversy surrounding Bergsonian philosophy during Bergson's lifetime, this article argues that the panentheistic notion of 'being-in-God' can serve as an illuminating framework for the interpretation of Bergson's philosophy. By examining the 'pantheist' readings of Bergson and comparing and contrasting Bergson's philosophy of life with Spinoza's panentheistic metaphysics, this paper shows that an account of 'being-in-Life' is key to Bergson's metaphysical outlook as well as his account of philosophy as a practice of 'intuitive' thinking. In so doing, this paper highlights some of the implicit religious motifs not only in Bergson's metaphysical outlook but also in his conception of the task of philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)