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Given the costs of political violence, scholars have long sought to identify its causes. We examined individual differences related to participation in political violence, emphasizing the central role of political orientations. We hypothesized that individuals with dominance-driven autocratic political orientations are prone to political violence. Multilevel analysis of survey data from 34 African countries ( N = 51,587) indicated that autocracy-oriented individuals, compared with democracy-oriented individuals, are considerably more likely to participate in political violence. As a predictor of violence (indexed with attitudinal, intentional, and behavioral measures), autocratic orientation outperformed other variables highlighted in existing research, including socioeconomic status and group-based injustice. Additional analyses of original data from South Africa ( N = 2,170), Denmark ( N = 1,012), and the United States ( N = 1,539) indicated that the link between autocratic orientations and political violence reflects individual differences in the use of dominance to achieve status and that the findings generalize to societies extensively socialized to democratic values.

What are the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for people’s political attitudes and behavior? We tested, specifically, whether the psychological burden of the COVID-19 pandemic relates to antisystemic attitudes (dissatisfaction with the fundamental social and political order), peaceful political activism, and political violence. Nationally representative two-wave panel data were collected via online surveys of adults in the United States, Denmark, Italy, and Hungary ( ns = 6,131 and 4,568 in Waves 1 and 2, respectively). Overall, levels of antisystemic attitudes were low, and only a small share of interviewees reported behavioral intentions to participate in and actual participation in political violence. However, preregistered analyses indicated that perceived COVID-19 burden was associated with antisystemic attitudes and intentions to engage in political violence. In the United States, the burden of COVID-19 was also associated with self-reported engagement in violence surrounding the Black Lives Matter protests and counterprotests. We found less robust evidence that perceived COVID-19 burden was associated with peaceful activism.

Research has revealed an association between individual physical strength and attitudinal support for modern war. Physical strength of one individual has an infinitesimal effect on the outcomes of state-level aggression involving large-scale armies and complex military technology. The fact that stronger individuals do support such aggression hints at an evolved psychology specialized for small-scale coalitional aggression, where strength of coalition members non-negligibly contribute to the net coalition strength. Here, I examined whether strength also accounts for participation in modern political aggression, as contrasted to mere support. Given that contemporary political aggression primarily occurs within—not between—states, I focused on intra-state forms of political violence, specifically violent antigovernment protests. To enhance external and ecological validity, I relied on large probability samples from both non-WEIRD and WEIRD countries experiencing political violence (N = 6283; interviewees were quota-sampled from YouGov online panels to generate representative samples of online adult populations). Multinational analyses revealed that self-perceived strength significantly predicts intentions to participate in political violence and self-reported participation, and that this association is stronger among young interviewees, but not among men (compared to women). The predictive power of strength was modest but comparable to that of gender, an established predictor of aggression. I discuss why the fact that strength—a physiological variable—relates to political violence—a complex modern phenomenon—is remarkable. Subsequently, I suggest a new research agenda that draws on insights from evolutionary research to study modern political violence.

Political repression is a ubiquitous phenomenon; yet how it affects human psychology is not well understood. We examined whether repression deters citizens from engaging in antigovernment behavior (its intended goal), or in fact motivates it. Analyses of 101 nationally representative samples from three continents (N = 139,266) revealed a positive association between perceived levels of repression and intentions to engage in antigovernment violence. Additional analyses of fine-grained data from three countries characterized by widespread repression and antigovernment violence (N = 2,960) identified a positive association between personal experience with repression and intentions to engage in antigovernment violence. Randomized experiments revealed that memories about repression also motivate participation in antigovernment violence. These results suggest that political repression, aside from being normatively abhorrent, creates psychological conditions for political violence.

We present a two-stage approach to civil conflict analysis. Unlike conventional approaches that focus only on armed conflict and treat all other cases as “at peace,” we first distinguish cases with and without contested incompatibilities (Stage 1) and then whether or not contested incompatibilities escalate to armed conflict (Stage 2). This allows us to analyze factors that relate to conflict origination (onset of incompatibilities) and factors that predict conflict militarization (onset of armed violence). Using new data on incompatibilities and armed conflict, we replicate and extend three prior studies of violent civil conflict, reformulated as a two-stage process, considering different estimation procedures and potential selection problems. We find that the group-based horizontal political inequalities highlighted in research on violent civil conflict clearly relate to conflict origination but have no clear association with militarization, whereas other features emphasized as shaping the risk of civil war, such as refugee flows and soft state power, predict militarization but not incompatibilities. A two-stage approach to conflict analysis can help advance theories of civil conflict, assess alternative mechanisms through which explanatory variables are thought to influence conflict, and guide new data-collection efforts.

The relationship between inequality and civil conflict has attracted considerable interest in conflict research. Recent large -N studies have shown that inequalities significantly contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict and have proposed a number of causal pathways to account for this. These pathways, however, have rarely been assessed in systematic case-based research. This study implements a “middle -N” qualitative congruence analysis of 16 conflicts, focusing on the observable implications of the pathways through which inequalities are typically theorized to influence conflict. The study finds evidence to support some of the main pathways proposed in the quantitative literature. Furthermore, the analysis finds that different types of inequalities relate to different conflict categories. Specifically, vertical inequalities relate to non-ethnic governmental conflicts (via an “individual deprivation pathway”), regional inequalities to non-ethnic territorial conflicts (via a “separatist pathway”), and horizontal inequalities to ethnic conflicts (via a “group deprivation pathway”).

Given the costs of political violence, scholars have long sought to identify its causes. We examined individual differences related to participation in political violence, emphasizing the central role of political orientations. We hypothesized, specifically, that individuals with dominance-driven autocratic political orientations are prone to political violence. Multilevel analysis of survey data from 34 African countries (N = 51,587) indicated that autocracy-oriented individuals, compared to democracy-oriented individuals, are considerably more likely to participate in political violence. As a predictor of violence (indexed with attitudinal, action intent, and behavioral measures), autocratic orientation outperformed other variables highlighted in existing research, including socioeconomic status and group-based injustice. Additional analyses of original data from South Africa (N = 2,170), Denmark (N = 1,012), and the United States (N = 1,539) indicated that the autocratic orientation-political violence link reflects individual differences in dominance orientations, and that the findings generalize to societies extensively socialized to democratic values.

Conflict researchers have increasingly stressed the importance of distinguishing between different categories of civil conflict, such as ethnic vs non-ethnic. However, the data on conflict categories has remained limited. This paper introduces the Categorically Disaggregated Conflict (CDC) dataset, which categorizes conflicts based on the two most commonly used distinctions, ethnic-vs-non-ethnic and governmental-vs-territorial, resulting in four conflict categories: ethnic governmental, ethnic territorial, non-ethnic governmental and non-ethnic territorial. While not the first of its kind, the CDC contains a number of novel features. Aside from its unique conceptualization of ethnic conflict, the CDC provides coding of the key component variables (language, religion and “race”), allowing users to re-code ethnic/non-ethnic conflicts into several alternative lists (e.g. religious/non-religious). Furthermore, the CDC provides detailed descriptions documenting coding choices for every single conflict, allowing users to track individual coding decisions. To demonstrate the value of the CDC, this paper replicates a recent study by Cederman, Gelditsch and Buhaug, based on the ACD2EPR—the only extant alternative to the CDC. The findings of the replication analysis challenge some of the key conclusions of the original study, substantiating the need for alternative categorically disaggregated datasets.

The debate on democratic civil peace has centered on three general claims: democracies have a low risk of civil conflict, autocracies have the same low risk of conflict as democracies, and hybrid regimes have the highest conflict risk. We re-evaluate these claims, emphasizing that previous studies have focused on the aggregate categories of regimes, neglecting the role of particular institutional features. We propose focusing on the electoral qualities of regimes, which constitute the core of democracy, and argue that constraints on electoral contestation generate incentives for opposition to use force. Building on this framework, we distinguish between five regime types according to their electoral features – non-electoral autocracies, single-party autocracies, multi-party autocracies, minimalist democracies, and polyarchies – and specify hypotheses regarding the probability of conflict onset in each. In a global statistical analysis spanning 1817–2006 and employing the new Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED), we find that polyarchies, characterized by unconstrained contestation, have a lower probability of conflict than any other regime type (although minimalist democracies are only slightly more prone to conflict). Subsequently, we find that single- and multi-party autocracies, characterized by non-competitive elections, are more peaceful than non-electoral autocracies. Our analysis also reveals two factors that are particularly associated with civil peace: the presence of (any form of) elections and minimal electoral competition. Overall, our study underscores the importance of focusing on the central attributes of democracy and sheds new light on the relationship between particular regime features (or types) and civil conflict, thereby contributing to the growing efforts in conflict research to disaggregate political regimes.

The democratic civil peace hypothesis has generated considerable debate in conflict research. This debate has centered on three general claims: democracies have lower risk of civil conflict; autocracies have as low a risk of civil conflict as democracies; and hybrid regimes have the highest risk of civil conflict. This study reassesses the relationship between regime type and civil conflict by employing the newly constructed Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED). This measure enables us both to distinguish between levels of electoral democracy and distinct regime types. In contrasts to previous studies, our global statistical analysis shows that hybrid regimes do not have the highest risk of civil conflict. Rather, full autocracies are the most conflict prone, while full electoral democracies are least likely to experience civil conflict.

Recent years have seen an efflorescence of work focused on the definition and operationalization of democracy. One debate concerns whether democracy is best measured by binary or graded scales. Critics of binary indices point out at that they are overly reductionist, while defenders counter that the different levels of graded measures are not associated with a specific set of conditions. Against this backdrop, we propose to operationalize electoral democracy as a series of necessary and sufficient conditions arrayed in an ordinal scale. The resulting “lexical” index of electoral democracy, based partly on new data, covers all independent countries of the world from 1800 to 2013. It incorporates binary coding of its subcomponents, which are aggregated into an ordinal scale using a cumulative logic. In this fashion, we arrive at an index that performs a classificatory function—each level identifies a unique and theoretically meaningful regime-type—as well as a discriminating function.

The impact of inequality on the outbreak of intrastate armed conflicts or civil wars has recently attracted considerable interest in conflict research. In contrast to previous studies that have focused on inequality in the total population (vertical inequality), recent studies have analysed inequality between certain groups of people (horizontal inequality), and found that inequality significantly increases the likelihood of conflict onset. However, most of the recent studies on the inequality–conflict nexus have focused on conflicts fought between ethnic groups. The relation between inequality and other (non-ethnic) categories of conflicts has attracted less attention. The present study aims to address this gap: it implements a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relation between inequality and popular rebellions, a subset of conflicts where mobilization transcends ethnic boundaries and hostilities involve popular participation. Based on a sample of 77 popular rebellions and new global data on vertical inequality in income and education, this study shows that inequality significantly increases the likelihood of popular rebellion onset. In addition, the study reveals that inequality proxies (income and education Gini indices) outperform proxies of the absolute level of income (GDP per capita) in the model of popular rebellion onset, suggesting that it is relative, not absolute, well-being that ultimately motivates people to rise up in arms.