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Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

In three studies, we examined whether beliefs in repressed memory and dissociative amnesia could be changed. Participants provided agreement ratings to statements related to repressed memory and dissociative amnesia. Then, they received a university course which included education on the science of memory. Following this, participants had to re-rate the statements. In Study 3, at Times 1 and 2, participants also received a case vignette on a therapy-induced recovered memory and rated several statements related to this case. Participants who received education on the science of memory were less likely to agree with statements endorsing repressed memory and dissociative amnesia-and participants were more likely to state that the case vignette involved a false memory. Providing education on the science of memory can help people (e.g., legal professionals, people from the general population) to use critical thinking on the topic of repressed memory and dissociative amnesia.

In order to prevent future child abuse, it is important to implement appropriate treatment according to risk factors present within a family. These principles are described in the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model. We investigated 192 case files from Dutch child protective services on reported risk factors. We hypothesised that important risk factors (relating to parents and parent-child interaction) would often be absent from the case files. This expectation was confirmed, indicating that the RNR model cannot be used as intended. We provide recommendations to incorporate more evidence-based methods in child protective services.Risk assessment is an essential aspect of child abuse investigations in order to estimate the risk of future abuse and to develop a risk management and intervention plan. According to the risk-need-responsivity model, intervention and risk monitoring needs to target dynamic risk factors to prevent future child maltreatment. In the current study, we examined whether child protection workers in the Netherlands focus on evidence-based risk factors for child maltreatment. We investigated 192 case files retrospectively for risk factors included in the Child Abuse Risk Evaluation-NL, a structured risk assessment instrument. We expected to find limited information concerning parental risk factors and risk factors related to parent-child interaction, but more information on family and child factors. These hypotheses were confirmed. Because parental and parent-child interaction factors are the most important and proximal risk factors for child abuse, our findings point to a large gap between science and child protection practice. We recommend the use of a structured risk assessment instrument and a risk-focused approach to intervention planning.

In various countries, forensic scientists have begun to express their expert opinion in terms of the likelihood of observing the evidence under the primary and under an alternative hypothesis (i.e. the likelihood-ratio approach). This development is often confined to technical domains such as fingerprint analyses. In forensic psychological expertise, likelihood ratios are largely absent. In this contribution, we explain how forensic psychologists can employ likelihood ratios, and we describe two illustrating cases. We also present two studies in which we examined how (Dutch) professional judges appreciate psychological expertise framed in likelihood ratios. Findings suggest that judges ( N = 39) appreciate a fictitious expert witness report framed in likelihood-ratios similarly to an opinion framed one-dimensionally. Judges’ ( N = 79) understanding of a psychological expert opinion framed in likelihood ratios was satisfactory as measured by self-report and an actual test We conclude that, as is custom in forensic technical domains, psychological expert opinion can be expressed in likelihoods. Two of the hypothesised flipsides, namely, lawyers’ dislike of likelihoods, and their lack of proper understanding, may be surmountable.

Faulty eyewitness testimony can be a notorious source of mistakes in the legal system potentially leading to wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice. The current study examined the knowledge of a sample of police officers (n = 270) and psychologists (n = 63) in Indonesia regarding factors known to influence the validity of eyewitness testimony given by adults and children. Previous studies have documented that police and psychologists in Western countries have less-than-optimal knowledge about the psychology of eyewitness testimony. Similarly, our non-Western sample also demonstrated a lack of knowledge that may be damaging in the legal context such as the belief that recall of minor details indicates accuracy of memory. For both adult and child eyewitnesses, the psychologists performed significantly better than the police but at the item level these differences were small in size. Intriguingly, we also found that psychologists were more likely than the police officers to endorse the item about repression of memories. The findings show the need for teaching on the psychology of eyewitness testimony for professional groups involved in the legal arena.

The proposed experiment will examine the effect of deceptive behavior on memory. Participants will be assigned to a “strong-incentive to cheat” or “weak-incentive to cheat” condition and play the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm. Specifically, Player A (computer; participants think it is another participant) throws a die and reports it to Player B (participant). Then Player B throws his/her die, remembers the outcome, and reports it to Player A. Participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition are monetarily punished if their die roll outcome differs from Player A's die roll outcome. Participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition are not punished if the die roll outcomes differ. Two-days later, memory for the die-rolling event will be assessed. We predict that participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition will have lower belief and recollection for the die-rolling event and will report more errors than participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition.

Legal psychologists’ assessments can have a major impact on the fact finder’s evaluation of evidence and, consequently, perceptions of guilt. Yet, in the few studies about legal psychologists’ assessments and reports, great variability was found. As is the case with other forensic expert domains, legal psychologists are prone to cognitive biases, such as being adversely affected by irrelevant contextual information, confirmation bias, and allegiance bias. Based on the scientific literature, we propose several ways in which legal psychologists can minimize cognitive biases in their assessments, most notably the alternative scenario method. Furthermore, we propose guidelines for expert witnesses in the legal psychological domain, designed to make reports as scientifically grounded, applicable, readable, transparent, and bias-free as possible. We hope that the guidelines will enhance the quality of expert witness testimony provided by legal psychologists around the world.

False denials are sometimes used to cope with traumatic experiences. We examined whether false denials can affect true and false memory production for a traumatic event and conversations surrounding the trauma. One hundred and twenty-six participants watched a trauma analogue video of a car crash before being randomly asked in a discussion with the experimenter to (1) respond honestly or (2) falsely deny that certain details happened in the video. After one week, all participants received misinformation about the discussion with the experimenter and the car crash. Finally, all participants were instructed to respond truthfully in a source memory task. Participants who falsely denied information during the first session were statistically significantly more prone than honest participants to omit details they denied and to report misinformation about what was discussed in the first session. Our work suggests that false denials of a traumatic experience might lead to both forgetting and increased false memory levels for earlier conversations about the event. ispartof: Memory vol:30 issue:9 pages:1158-1171 ispartof: location:England status: Published online

This special issue honours James Ost's (1973-2019) contributions to our understanding of false and distorted remembering. In our editorial, we introduce some of James' distinctive research themes including the experiences of people who retract "recovered" memories, social (e.g., co-witness and interviewer influence) and personality influences on false remembering, the nature of false remembering itself (e.g., different types of false memories; false memories vs. false beliefs), public understanding of (false) memory, and a historical link to the work of Frederic Bartlett. We illustrate these themes through a number of key publications. The unifying thread behind James' work is his core interest in false/distorted remembering in real-life (typically high-stake) situations, in line with his engagement with the British False Memory Society and his role as an expert witness in court trials. The articles included in this special issue elaborate on the research themes to which James devoted his career and his curiosity.

A suspect of a crime can avoid legal repercussions by creating a false alibi. We examined whether creating such a false alibi can have adverse effects on memory. To do so, participants watched a mock crime video and were either instructed to create a false alibi or to provide an honest account for what they actually saw in the video. After a 2-day and 1-month delay, all participants were instructed to come forward with the truth using a free recall task. Participants who initially created a false alibi had more commission errors after a 2-day and 1-month delay (vs. truth telling participants). Moreover, participants who created a false alibi reported fewer correct details after a 2-day and 1-month delay (vs. truth telling participants). Our study suggests that like other types of deception, creating a false alibi can elicit memory undermining effects in the form of commission and omission errors.

During police investigations, interviewees are sometimes forced to confabulate a response to questions for which they don't know the answer. In this registered report, we conducted a three-level meta-analysis to examine whether forcing people to confabulate an answer to these questions can lead to false memories for the confabulated details and/or events (i.e., forced confabulation effect). Results showed that forced confabulation indeed led to the production of false memories. Qualitative reviews of studies suggested that the forced confabulation effect is enhanced after receiving confirmatory feedback. Moreover, we found evidence that longer delays between the forced confabulation phase and the final memory task are necessary to observe the forced confabulation effect for entire events. However, caution is needed when interpreting the forced confabulation effect. Specifically, our moderator analyses revealed that voluntarily produced confabulation led to more false memories than forced confabulation. Also, our exploratory analysis indicated that the forced confabulation effect was mainly observed in within-subject designs. Taken together, our meta-analysis supports the notion that forcing participants to confabulate can lead them to later report such confabulations as part of the truth. Nonetheless, caution is warranted because this effect might be due to the introduction of misinformation through asking unanswerable questions. ispartof: MEMORY vol:31 issue:5 pages:635-651 ispartof: location:England status: published

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is one of the most serious and incapacitating mental diseases that can result from trauma exposure. However, despite its relevance, there is still considerable confusion and debate surrounding its diagnosis. The aim of this umbrella review is to clarify the overall prevalence of PTSD. Furthermore, the study examined whether the diagnostic methodology applied (self-reported vs structured interviews) and the nature of the traumatic event (interpersonal vs not interpersonal) impact on PTSD prevalence. A systematic search of major databases and additional sources was conducted. Fifty-nine reviews met the criteria of this umbrella review. Overall PTSD prevalence was 23.95% (95% CI 20.74 - 27.15), with no publication bias or significant small-study effects, but a high level of heterogeneity between meta-analyses. Findings suggest that using structured clinical interviews results in a lower PTSD prevalence than using of self-report instruments, while no difference was found in the disorder prevalence when confronting interpersonal and non-interpersonal events. This analysis gives a solid foundation for future research and PTSD assessment.

In this commentary, we argue that besides focusing on generalization, sufficient attention must be invested in the practical relevance of psychological and applied memory research. That is, memory research is frequently used to address real life questions. In the area of psychology and law, memory scientists are sometimes asked by court to provide expert opinion about, for example, the validity of witness testimony. When doing so, they refer to applied memory research to support their conclusion on whether or not a statement is valid. But when can applied memory research meaningfully inform legal cases? Memory scientists can best know the practical relevance of research by considering the smallest effect size of interest in a given domain. Applied memory research has generally failed to consider the importance of the smallest effect size of interest and instead relies uncritically on benchmarks of effect sizes (e.g., small, medium, large). We demonstrate how memory scientists can set the smallest effect size of interest, and we provide an example in the area of false memory. We argue that psychological science can best contribute to law when memory scientists make use of the smallest effect size of interest.

Pretending to suffer from amnesia for a mock crime has been shown to lead to memory impairments. Specifically, when people are asked to give up their role of simulators, they typically recall fewer crime-relevant details than those who initially confess to a crime. In the current review, we amassed all experimental work on this subject and assessed the characteristics of the memory-undermining effect of simulated amnesia for a crime procedure (i.e., crime stimuli, simulating amnesia instructions, memory tests, and memory outcomes). We specifically focused on the effect that crime-related amnesia claims may have on offenders’ final memory reports. Our review showed that simulators who initially claimed amnesia might paradoxically experience some sort of forgetting pertaining to crime-related information. This issue could likely lead to legal complications that need be taken into account in crime-related amnesia cases.

The entactogen 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) is increasingly being recognized for its therapeutic potential but is also widespread in nightlife settings where it may co-occur with crime. Since previous research detected impaired verbal memory during acute MDMA intoxication, understanding the drug's ramifications in an applied legal context becomes crucial. We conducted a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial to examine acute and delayed effects of MDMA (75 mg) on false memory in 60 healthy volunteers with a history of MDMA use, using three well-established false memory methods: a basic, associative word list (Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM)) paradigm and two applied misinformation tasks using a virtual reality crime. Memory was tested immediately (encoding and retrieval under drug influence) and 1 week later (retrieval when sober). Small MDMA-induced impairments of true memory in the word list task were detected at both time points. MDMA increased false memory for related but non-critical lures during the immediate test, and decreased false memory for critical lures after a delay. Episodic memory assessed in the misinformation tasks was not consistently affected. Findings indicate a complex memory profile but no heightened vulnerability to external suggestion in response to MDMA intoxication. Recommendations for future applied legal psychological research include adding measures of recall on top of recognition, using study designs that separate the different memory phases, and potentially testing higher doses. Further research on false memories and suggestibility using imagination procedures can also be relevant for the clinical context. ispartof: EUROPEAN NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY vol:57 pages:59-68 ispartof: location:Netherlands status: published

People lie on a frequent basis. However, when a victim of maltreatment lies by denying the abuse, lies can become forensically relevant. We have reviewed the relevant literature on the prevalence and memory consequences of such false denials. The way forensic interviewers proceed in the face of denying children will be shaped by their beliefs about the frequency with which truly abused children deny abuse. We discuss that estimates of the prevalence of false denials among abused children vary but that such false denials do happen. When falsely denying children eventually come forward with their experiences, a second issue lingers: how valid are maltreated children's statements after a false denial? We review the literature indicating that false denials can negatively affect memory for the investigative interview during which the lie was told. Yet, memory for the denied experience itself seems to be mostly preserved, and some research even found potential protective effects of false denials. We conclude that denials should always be handled with care in the court room, since the ground truth usually is not known, but that statements should not be dismissed based solely on previous denials.

Are personality traits related to symptom overreporting and/or symptom underreporting? With this question in mind, we evaluated studies from 1979 to 2020 (k = 55), in which personality traits were linked to scores on stand-alone validity tests, including symptom validity tests (SVTs) and measures of socially desirable responding (SDR) and/or supernormality. As to symptom overreporting (k = 14), associations with depression, alexithymia, apathy, dissociation, and fantasy proneness varied widely from weak to strong (rs .27 to .79). For underreporting (k = 41), inconsistent links (rs − .43 to .63) were found with narcissism, whereas alexithymia and dissociation were often associated with lower SDR tendencies, although effect sizes were small. Taken together, the extant literature mainly consists of cross-sectional studies on single traits and contexts, mostly offering weak correlations that do not necessarily reflect causation. What this field lacks is an overarching theory relating traits to symptom reporting. Longitudinal studies involving a broad range of traits, samples, and incentives would be informative. Until such studies have been done, traits are best viewed as modest concomitants of symptom distortion.

We reviewed articles that appeared between 2000 and 2018 and that addressed fantasy proneness as measured by the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ) or the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI). We searched Google Scholar to identify relevant articles and used the Hunter-Schmidt method to meta-analyze the correlates of fantasy proneness. We identified 132 articles describing 139 samples that together included 24,007 research participants. Effect sizes were large (rs > .50) for hallucinatory experiences, magical ideation, perceptual aberration, dissociation, and excessive daydreaming. Contrary to the popular idea that childhood trauma is a prominent precursor of fantasy proneness, we found that the effect sizes for self-reported trauma were small, as was also the case for depression, anxiety, and memory illusions (rs < .30). Strides in this research area can be made when future studies move beyond the fantasy proneness-trauma link to test causal models regarding the antecedents of maladaptive fantasizing.

Dissociative amnesia, defined as an inability to remember important autobiographical experiences, usually of a stressful nature, is a controversial phenomenon. We systematically reviewed 128 case studies of dissociative amnesia reported in 60 articles that appeared in peer-reviewed journals in English over the past 20 years (2000–2020). Our aim was to examine to what extent these cases met core features of dissociative amnesia. All cases were about reports of autobiographical memory loss, but the evidence offered in support of a dissociative amnesia interpretation was often weak and plagued by an ambiguous heterogeneity with respect to nature, etiology, and differential diagnoses of alleged memory loss. Most case studies failed to rule out plausible alternative explanations of dissociative amnesia, such as ordinary forgetting and malingering. We encourage clinicians and researchers to more critically investigate alleged cases of dissociative amnesia and provide criteria for how a dissociative amnesia case ideally would look like.

The current study examined the effects of different delivery modes of misinformation on false memory creation in adolescents and adults. Forty adolescents (14-15 year olds) and fifty-three adults (over 18) were instructed to watch a video. Following this, half of the participants were given direct-with interaction misinformation, in which misinformation was delivered by the experimenter and participants (co-witnesses) were able to interact before their memory was tested. The other half of the participants were given direct-without interaction misinformation, in which they listened to a narrative read aloud by the experimenter, without interacting. Lastly, all participants completed a memory test. We found that participants in the direct-without interaction group were more likely to report false memories compared to the direct-with interaction group. Furthermore, adolescents endorsed more misinformation details than adults. Our results provide a new perspective about the role of social factors in the occurrence of false memories. ispartof: Journal Of Cognitive Psychology vol:33 issue:2 pages:1-9 status: Published online

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice. ispartof: MEMORY vol:30 issue:1 pages:16-21 ispartof: location:England status: published

In the present study, we used a new approach to establish the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI) for false memory research by asking memory researchers what they considered to be the SESOI in false memory research. They were presented with three hypothetical and three influential paper scenarios. These scenarios depicted studies examining the effects of certain manipulations (e.g., therapy) on false memory formation using well-known false memory paradigms: Deese/Roediger-McDermott, misinformation, and forced fabrication. Subsequently, they were asked for each scenario what they would consider to be the SESOI for practical and theoretical purposes and justify their decisions. We found that there was no clear consensus for the SESOI. However, memory researchers tended to accept smaller SESOIs or "any difference that leads to a p < .05," especially for theoretical ends. We argue that the lack of a general consensus is acceptable as long as proper justification is used. We discuss such rationales and provide recommendations for setting the SESOI.

In the Netherlands, there is currently no quality standard for conducting child forensic interviews in Child Protective Services (CPS) . The lack of such standard causes concern regarding the quality of these interviews, which are used to determine the child's safety and implementing treatment. In the current study, we implemented the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) protocol at Safe Home, the Dutch national reporting agency for child abuse and domestic violence. Professionals at Safe Home received a three-day training in the NICHD protocol with regular follow-up feedback sessions. We compared 38 NICHD interviews with 30 control interviews on variables such as the type of questions asked, number of reported words, and children's mood state. NICHD interviews contained more invitations and fewer suggestive questions compared to non-standardized interviews. Furthermore, children reported more information related to the reported incident when they were interviewed with the NICHD protocol compared to control interviews. After being interviewed, children reported a more positive mood state independent of how they were interviewed (NICHD or control interview). Finally, children interviewed with the NICHD protocol were less likely to succumb to suggestive probes provided after the interview than children in the control group. We argue that child protection professionals need training in an evidence-based interview protocol to improve fact-finding in CPS.