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Avian A/H7 influenza viruses are a global threat to animal and human health. These viruses continue to cause outbreaks in poultry and have caused the highest number of reported zoonotic infections to date, highlighting their pandemic threat. Evidence for antigenic diversification of avian A/H7 influenza viruses exists; however, knowledge of the drivers and molecular basis of antigenic evolution of these viruses is limited. Here, antigenic cartography was used to analyze the global antigenic diversity of A/H7 influenza viruses and to determine the molecular basis of antigenic change in A/H7N9 viruses. A phylogenetic tree based on all available A/H7 HA sequences was generated, from which 52 representative, genetically diverse, antigens were selected for antigenic characterization using hemagglutination inhibition assays. The resulting data were used to compute an antigenic map using multidimensional scaling algorithms. High antigenic relatedness was observed between antigens and sera belonging to genetically divergent A/H7 (sub)lineages. The most striking antigenic change relative to the timespan of virus isolation was observed for the A/H7N9 viruses isolated between 2013 and 2019 in China. Amino acid changes at positions 116, 118, 125, 130, 151, and 217 in the hemagglutinin globular head were found to be the main determinants of antigenic evolution between A/H7N9 influenza virus prototypes. The A/H7 antigenic map and knowledge of the molecular determinants of their antigenic evolution will aid pandemic preparedness against A/H7 influenza viruses, specifically regarding the design of novel vaccines and vaccination strategies. IMPORTANCE A/H7 avian influenza viruses cause outbreaks in poultry globally, resulting in outbreaks with significant socio-economical impact and zoonotic risks. Occasionally, poultry vaccination programs have been implemented to reduce the burden of these viruses, which might result in an increased immune pressure accelerating antigenic evolut

Past pandemic influenza viruses with sustained human-to-human transmissibility have emerged from animal influenza viruses. Employment of experimental models to assess the pandemic risk of emerging zoonotic influenza viruses provides critical information supporting public health efforts. Ferret transmission experiments have been utilized to predict the human-to-human transmission potential of novel influenza viruses. However, small sample sizes and a lack of standardized protocols can introduce interlaboratory variability, complicating interpretation of transmission experimental data. To assess the range of variation in ferret transmission experiments, a global exercise was conducted by 11 laboratories using two common stock H1N1 influenza viruses with different transmission characteristics in ferrets. Parameters known to affect transmission were standardized, including the inoculation route, dose, and volume, as well as a strict 1:1 donor/contact ratio for respiratory droplet transmission. Additional host and environmental parameters likely to affect influenza transmission kinetics were monitored and analyzed. The overall transmission outcomes for both viruses across 11 laboratories were concordant, suggesting the robustness of the ferret model for zoonotic influenza risk assessment. Among environmental parameters that varied across laboratories, donor-to-contact airflow directionality was associated with increased transmissibility. To attain high confidence in identifying viruses with moderate to high transmissibility or low transmissibility under a smaller number of participating laboratories, our analyses support the notion that as few as three but as many as five laboratories, respectively, would need to independently perform viral transmission experiments with concordant results. This exercise facilitates the development of a more homogenous protocol for ferret transmission experiments that are employed for the purposes of risk assessment. IMPORTANCE Following

SARS-CoV-2, a coronavirus that emerged in late 2019, has spread rapidly worldwide, and information about the modes of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among humans is critical to apply appropriate infection control measures and to slow its spread. Here we show that SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted efficiently via direct contact and via the air (via respiratory droplets and/or aerosols) between ferrets, 1 to 3 days and 3 to 7 days after exposure respectively. The pattern of virus shedding in the direct contact and indirect recipient ferrets is similar to that of the inoculated ferrets and infectious virus is isolated from all positive animals, showing that ferrets are productively infected via either route. This study provides experimental evidence of robust transmission of SARS-CoV-2 via the air, supporting the implementation of community-level social distancing measures currently applied in many countries in the world and informing decisions on infection control measures in healthcare settings.

Human influenza A viruses are known to be transmitted via the air from person to person. It is unknown from which anatomical site of the respiratory tract influenza A virus transmission occurs. Here, pairs of genetically tagged and untagged influenza A/H1N1, A/H3N2 and A/H5N1 viruses that are transmissible via the air are used to co-infect donor ferrets via the intranasal and intratracheal routes to cause an upper and lower respiratory tract infection, respectively. In all transmission cases, we observe that the viruses in the recipient ferrets are of the same genotype as the viruses inoculated intranasally, demonstrating that they are expelled from the upper respiratory tract of ferrets rather than from trachea or the lower airways. Moreover, influenza A viruses that are transmissible via the air preferentially infect ferret and human nasal respiratory epithelium. These results indicate that virus replication in the upper respiratory tract, the nasal respiratory epithelium in particular, of donors is a driver for transmission of influenza A viruses via the air.

Contains fulltext : 225123.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access), Recently, a petition was offered to the European Commission calling for an immediate ban on animal testing. Although a Europe-wide moratorium on the use of animals in science is not yet possible, there has been a push by the non-scientific community and politicians for a rapid transition to animal-free innovations. Although there are benefits for both animal welfare and researchers, advances on alternative methods have not progressed enough to be able to replace animal research in the foreseeable future. This trend has led first and foremost to a substantial increase in the administrative burden and hurdles required to make timely advances in research and treatments for human and animal diseases. The current COVID-19 pandemic clearly highlights how much we actually rely on animal research. COVID-19 affects several organs and systems, and the various animal-free alternatives currently available do not come close to this complexity. In this Essay, we therefore argue that the use of animals is essential for the advancement of human and veterinary health.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) transmission from dromedaries to humans has resulted in major outbreaks in the Middle East. Although some other livestock animal species have been shown to be susceptible to MERS-CoV, it is not fully understood why the spread of the virus in these animal species has not been observed in the field. In this study, we used rabbits to further characterize the transmission potential of MERS-CoV. In line with the presence of MERS-CoV receptor in the rabbit nasal epithelium, high levels of viral RNA were shed from the nose following virus inoculation. However, unlike MERS-CoV-infected dromedaries, these rabbits did not develop clinical manifestations including nasal discharge and did shed only limited amounts of infectious virus from the nose. Consistently, no transmission by contact or airborne routes was observed in rabbits. Our data indicate that despite relatively high viral RNA levels produced, low levels of infectious virus are excreted in the upper respiratory tract of rabbits as compared to dromedary came

Influenza A viruses can infect a wide range of hosts, creating opportunities for zoonotic transmission, i.e., transmission from animals to humans, and placing the human population at constant risk of potential pandemics. In the last hundred years, four influenza A virus pandemics have had a devastating effect, especially the 1918 influenza pandemic that took the lives of at least 40 million people. There is a constant risk that currently circulating avian influenza A viruses (e.g., H5N1, H7N9) will cause a new pandemic. Vaccines are the cornerstone in preparing for and combating potential pandemics. Despite exceptional advances in the design and development of (pre-)pandemic vaccines, there are still serious challenges to overcome, mainly caused by intrinsic characteristics of influenza A viruses: Rapid evolution and a broad host range combined with maintenance in animal reservoirs, making it near impossible to predict the nature and source of the next pandemic virus. Here, recent advances in the development of vaccination strategies to prepare against a pandemic virus coming from the avian reservoir will be discussed. Furthermore, remaining challenges will be addressed, setting the agenda for future research in the development of new vaccination strategies against potentially pandemic influenza A viruses.

Since their emergence in 1997, A/H5N1 influenza viruses of the A/goose/ Guangdong/1/96 lineage have diversified in multiple genetic and antigenic clades upon continued circulation in poultry in several countries in Eurasia and Africa. Since 2009, reassortant viruses carrying clade 2.3.4.4 hemagglutinin (HA) and internal and neuraminidase (NA) genes of influenza A viruses of different avian origin have been detected, yielding various HA-NA combinations, such as A/H5N1, A/H5N2, A/H5N3, A/H5N5, A/H5N6, and A/H5N8. Previous studies reported on the low pathogenicity and lack of airborne transmission of A/H5N2 and A/H5N8 viruses in the ferret model. However, although A/H5N6 viruses are the only clade 2.3.4.4 viruses that crossed the species barrier and infected humans, the risk they pose for human health remains poorly characterized. Here, the characterization of A/H5N6 A/Guangzhou/39715/2014 virus in vitro and in ferrets is described. This A/H5N6 virus possessed high polymerase activity, mediated by the E627K substitution in the PB2 protein, which corresponds to only one biological trait out of the three that were previously shown to confer airborne transmissibility to A/H5N1 viruses between ferrets. This might explain its lack of airborne transmission between ferrets. After intranasal inoculation, A/H5N6 virus replicated to high titers in the respiratory tracts of ferrets and was excreted for at least 6 days. Moreover, A/H5N6 virus caused severe pneumonia in ferrets upon intratracheal inoculation. Thus, A/H5N6 virus causes a more severe disease in ferrets than previously investigated clade 2.3.4.4 viruses, but our results demonstrate that the risk from airborne spread is currently low.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is essentially a poultry disease. Wild birds have traditionally not been involved in its spread, but the epidemiology of HPAI has changed in recent years. After its emergence in southeastern Asia in 1996, H5 HPAI virus of the Goose/Guangdong lineage has evolved into several sub-lineages, some of which have spread over thousands of kilometers via long-distance migration of wild waterbirds. In order to determine whether the virus is adapting to wild waterbirds, we experimentally inoculated the HPAI H5N8 virus clade 2.3.4.4 group A from 2014 into four key waterbird species-Eurasian wigeon (Anas penelope), common teal (Anas crecca), mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), and common pochard (Aythya ferina)-and compared virus excretion and disease severity with historical data of the HPAI H5N1 virus infection from 2005 in the same four species. Our results showed that excretion was highest in Eurasian wigeons for the 2014 virus, whereas excretion was highest in common pochards and mallards for the 2005 virus. The 2014 virus infection was subclinical in all four waterbird species, while the 2005 virus caused clinical disease and pathological changes in over 50% of the common pochards. In chickens, the 2014 virus infection caused systemic disease and high mortality, similar to the 2005 virus. In conclusion, the evidence was strongest for Eurasian wigeons as long-distance vectors for HPAI H5N8 virus from 2014. The implications of the switch in species-specific virus excretion and decreased disease severity may be that the HPAI H5 virus more easily spreads in the wild-waterbird population.

Respiratory tract infections can be caused by a wide variety of viruses. Airborne transmission via droplets and aerosols enables some of these viruses to spread efficiently among humans, causing outbreaks that are difficult to control. Many outbreaks have been investigated retrospectively to study the possible routes of inter-human virus transmission. The results of these studies are often inconclusive and at the same time data from controlled experiments is sparse. Therefore, fundamental knowledge on transmission routes that could be used to improve intervention strategies is still missing. We here present an overview of the available data from experimental and observational studies on the transmission routes of respiratory viruses between humans, identify knowledge gaps, and discuss how the available knowledge is currently implemented in isolation guidelines in health care settings.

Airborne pathogens — either transmitted via aerosol or droplets — include a wide variety of highly infectious and dangerous microbes such as variola virus, measles virus, influenza A viruses, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and Bordetella pertussis. Emerging zoonotic pathogens, for example, MERS coronavirus, avian influenza viruses, Coxiella, and Francisella, would have pandemic potential were they to acquire efficient human-to-human transmissibility. Here, we synthesize insights from microbiological, medical, social, and economic sciences to provide known mechanisms of aerosolized transmissibility and identify knowledge gaps that limit emergenc

A/H5N1 influenza viruses pose a threat to human and animal health. A fully avian A/H5N1 influenza virus was previously shown to acquire airborne transmissibility between ferrets upon accumulation of five or six substitutions that affected three traits: polymerase activity, hemagglutinin stability and receptor binding. Here, the impact of these traits on A/H5N1 virus replication, tissue tropism, pathogenesis and transmission was investigated in chickens. The virus containing all substitutions associated with transmission in mammals was highly attenuated in chickens. However, single substitutions that affect polymerase activity, hemagglutinin stability and receptor binding generally had a small or negligible impact on virus replication, morbidity and mortality. A virus carrying two substitutions in the receptor-binding site was attenuated, although its tissue tropism in chickens was not affected. This data indicate that an A/H5N1 virus that is airborne-transmissible between mammals is unlikely to emerge in chickens, although individual mammalian adaptive substitutions have limited impact on viral fitness in chickens.

Influenza A viruses are major pathogens for humans, domestic animals, and wildlife, and these viruses occasionally cross the species barrier. In spring 2014, increased mortality of harbor seals (Phoca vitulina), associated with infection with an influenza A(H10N7) virus, was reported in Sweden and Denmark. Within a few months, this virus spread to seals of the coastal waters of Germany and the Netherlands, causing the death of thousands of animals. Genetic analysis of the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes of this seal influenza A(H10N7) virus revealed that it was most closely related to various avian influenza A(H10N7) viruses. The collection of samples from infected seals during the course of the outbreak provided a unique opportunity to follow the adaptation of the avian virus to its new seal host. Sequence data for samples collected from 41 different seals from four different countries between April 2014 and January 2015 were obtained by Sanger sequencing and next-generation sequencing to describe the molecular epidemiology of the seal influenza A(H10N7) virus. The majority of sequence variation occurred in the HA gene, and some mutations corresponded to amino acid changes not found in H10 viruses isolated from Eurasian birds. Also, sequence variation in the HA gene was greater at the beginning than at the end of the epidemic, when a number of the mutations observed earlier had been fixed. These results imply that when an avian influenza virus jumps the species barrier from birds to seals, amino acid changes in HA may occur rapidly and are important for virus adaptation to its new mammalian host.

Influenza A viruses are amongst the most challenging viruses that threaten both human and animal health. Influenza A viruses are unique in many ways. Firstly, they are unique in the diversity of host species that they infect. This includes waterfowl (the original reservoir), terrestrial and aquatic poultry, swine, humans, horses, dog, cats, whales, seals and several other mammalian species. Secondly, they are unique in their capacity to evolve and adapt, following crossing the species barrier, in order to replicate and spread to other individuals within the new species. Finally, they are unique in the frequency of inter-species transmission events that occur. Indeed, the consequences of novel influenza virus strain in an immunologically naïve population can be devastating. The problems that influenza A viruses present for human and animal health are numerous. For example, influenza A viruses in humans represent a major economic and disease burden, whilst the poultry industry has suffered colossal damage due to repeated outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. This review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of influenza A viruses by shedding light on interspecies virus transmission and summarising the current knowledge regarding how influenza viruses can adapt to a new host.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 viruses that emerged in poultry in East Asia spread to Europe and North America by late 2014. Here we show that the European HPAI H5N8 viruses differ from the Korean and Japanese HPAI H5N8 viruses by several amino acids and that a Dutch HPAI H5N8 virus had low virulence and was not transmitted via the airborne route in ferrets. The virus did not cross-react with sera raised against pre-pandemic H5 vaccine strains. This data is useful for public health risk assessments.

Bioluminescent and fluorescent influenza A viruses offer new opportunities to study influenza virus replication, tropism and pathogenesis. To date, several influenza A reporter viruses have been described. These strategies typically focused on a single reporter gene (either bioluminescent or fluorescent) in a single virus backbone. However, whilst bioluminescence is suited to in vivo imaging, fluorescent viruses are more appropriate for microscopy. Therefore, the idea l reporter virus varies depending on the experiment in question, and it is important that any reporter virus strategy can be adapted accordingly. Herein, a strategy was developed to create five different reporter viruses in a single virus backbone. Specifically, enhanced green fluorescent protein (eGFP), far-red fluorescent protein (fRFP), near-infrared fluorescent protein (iRFP), Gaussia luciferase (gLUC) and firefly luciferase (fLUC) were inserted into the PA gene segment of A/PR/8/34 (H1N1). This study provides a comprehensive characterisation of the effects of different reporter genes on influenza virus replication and reporter activity. In vivo reporter gene expression, in lung tissues, was only detected for eGFP, fRFP and gLUC expressing viruses. In vitro, the eGFP-expressing virus displayed the best reporter stability and could be used for correlative light electron microscopy (CLEM). This strategy was then used to create eGFP-expressing viruses consisting entirely of pandemic H1N1, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and H7N9. The HPAI H5N1 eGFP-expressing virus infected mice and reporter gene expression was detected, in lung tissues, in vivo. Thus, this study provides new tools and insights for the creation of bioluminescent and fluorescent influenza A reporter viruses. Copyright

Zoonotic influenza A viruses originating from the animal reservoir pose a threat for humans, as they have the ability to trigger pandemics upon adaptation to and invasion of an immunologically naive population. Of particular concern are the H5N1 viruses that continue to circulate in poultry in numerous countries in Europe, Asia and Africa, and the recently emerged H7N9 viruses in China, due to their relatively high number of human fatalities and pandemic potential. To start a pandemic, zoonotic influenza A viruses should not only acquire the ability to attach to, enter and replicate in the critical target cells in the respiratory tract of the new host, but also efficiently spread between humans by aerosol or respiratory droplet transmission. Here, we discuss the latest advances on the genetic and phenotypic determinants required for avian influenza A viruses to adapt to and transmit between mammals.

In September 2013, leptospirosis was diagnosed in two Spanish travellers returning from Thailand. The first case walked in floodwater in the Phi Phi Islands in pouring rain: 20 days later he presented with fever and acute hepatitis. The second presented with fever and renal failure 17 days after visiting the islands. These cases remind clinicians to consider leptospirosis in febrile patients with a history of contact with flood or fresh water while travelling to tropical countries.

Wild waterfowl form the main reservoir of influenza A viruses, from which transmission occurs directly or indirectly to various secondary hosts, including humans. Direct avian-to-human transmission has been observed for viruses of subtypes A(H5N1), A(H7N2), A(H7N3), A(H7N7), A(H9N2) and A(H10N7) upon human exposure to poultry, but a lack of sustained human-to-human transmission has prevented these viruses from causing new pandemics. Recently, avian A(H7N9) viruses were transmitted to humans, causing severe respiratory disease and deaths in China. Because transmission via respiratory droplets and aerosols (hereafter referred to as airborne transmission) is the main route for efficient transmission between humans, it is important to gain an insight into airborne transmission of the A(H7N9) virus. Here we show that although the A/Anhui/1/2013 A(H7N9) virus harbours determinants associated with human adaptation and transmissibility between mammals, its airborne transmissibility in ferrets is limited, and it is intermediate between that of typical human and avian influenza viruses. Multiple A(H7N9) virus genetic variants were transmitted. Upon ferret passage, variants with higher avian receptor binding, higher pH of fusion, and lower thermostability were selected, potentially resulting in reduced transmissibility. This A(H7N9) virus outbreak highlights the need for increased understanding of the determinants of efficient airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between mammals.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses have devastated the poultry industry in many countries of the eastern hemisphere. Occasionally H5N1 viruses cross the species barrier and infect humans, sometimes with a severe clinical outcome. When this happens, there is a chance of reassortment between H5N1 and human influenza viruses. To assess the potential of H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses (H1N1, H3N2 and pandemic H1N1), we used an in vitro selection method to generate reassortant viruses, that contained the H5 hemagglutinin gene, and that have a replication advantage in vitro. We found that the neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses were preferentially selected by H5 viruses. However, these H5 reassortant viruses did not show a marked increase in replication in MDCK cells and human bronchial epithelial cells. In ferrets, inoculation with a mixture of H5N1-pandemic H1N1 reassortant viruses resulted in outgrowth of reassortant H5 viruses that had incorporated the neuraminidase and matrix gene segment of pandemic 2009 H1N1. This virus was not transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets to naïve recipient ferrets. Altogether, these data emphasize the potential of avian H5N1 viruses to reassort with contemporary human influenza viruses. The neuraminidase and matrix gene segments of human influenza viruses showed the highest genetic compatibility with HPAI H5N1 virus.

Recently, we and others obtained experimental evidence that highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5 can acquire the ability to transmit via aerosols between ferrets. Upon submission of manuscripts describing the results of these studies, the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was consulted and recommended that the main Conclusions of the work be published but without the experimental details and mutation data that would enable replication of the experiments. Over the past few months, these events have led to intense discussions. Should this type of experiment be conducted? If so, under what conditions? Do the scientific and public health benefits of the work and its publication outweigh the potential risks? In February 2012, public health and influenza experts discussed these issues during a World Health Organization-organized technical consultation. This perspective article reviews the current state of the field and the recommendations made during the meeting.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus can cause morbidity and mortality in humans but thus far has not acquired the ability to be transmitted by aerosol or respiratory droplet ("airborne transmission") between humans. To address the concern that the virus could acquire this ability under natural conditions, we genetically modified A/H5N1 virus by site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent serial passage in ferrets. The genetically modified A/H5N1 virus acquired mutations during passage in ferrets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible in ferrets. None of the recipient ferrets died after airborne infection with the mutant A/H5N1 viruses. Four amino acid substitutions in the host receptor-binding protein hemagglutinin, and one in the polymerase complex protein basic polymerase 2, were consistently present in airborne-transmitted viruses. The transmissible viruses were sensitive to the antiviral drug oseltamivir and reacted well with antisera raised against H5 influenza vaccine strains. Thus, avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses can acquire the capacity for airborne transmission between mammals without recombination in an intermediate host and therefore constitute a risk for human pandemic influenza.

Family-wide molecular diagnostic assays are valuable tools for initial identification of viruses during outbreaks and to limit costs of surveillance studies. Recent discoveries of paramyxoviruses have called for such assay that is able to detect all known and unknown paramyxoviruses in one round of PCR amplification. We have developed a RT-PCR assay consisting of a single degenerate primer set, able to detect all members of the Paramyxoviridae family including all virus genera within the subfamilies Paramyxovirinae and Pneumovirinae. Primers anneal to domain III of the polymerase gene, with the 3′ end of the reverse primer annealing to the conserved motif GDNQ, which is proposed to be the active site for nucleotide polymerization. The assay was fully optimized and was shown to indeed detect all available paramyxoviruses tested. Clinical specimens from hospitalized patients that tested positive for known paramyxoviruses in conventional assays were also detected with the novel family-wide test. A high-throughput fluorescence-based RT-PCR version of the assay was developed for screening large numbers of specimens. A large number of samples collected from wild birds was tested, resulting in the detection of avian paramyxoviruses type 1 in both barnacle and white-fronted geese, and type 8 in barnacle geese. Avian metapneumovirus type C was found for the first time in Europe in mallards, greylag geese and common gulls. The single round family-wide RT-PCR assay described here is a useful tool for the detection of known and unknown paramyxoviruses, and screening of large sample collections from humans and animals.

The route by which highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus spreads systemically, including the central nervous system (CNS), is largely unknown in mammals. Especially, the olfactory route, which could be a route of entry into the CNS, has not been studied in detail. Although the multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) in the hemagglutinin (HA) of HPAI H5N1 viruses is a major determinant of systemic spread in poultry, the association between the MBCS and systemic spread in mammals is less clear. Here we determined the virus distribution of HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets in time and space-including along the olfactory route-and the role of the MBCS in systemic replication. Intranasal inoculation with wild-type H5N1 virus revealed extensive replication in the olfactory mucosa, from which it spread to the olfactory bulb and the rest of the CNS, including the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Virus spread to the heart, liver, pancreas, and colon was also detected, indicating hematogenous spread. Ferrets inoculated intranasally with H5N1 virus lacking an MBCS demonstrated respiratory tract infection only. In c

Since emergence of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in April 2009, three influenza A viruses-seasonal (H3N2), seasonal (H1N1), and pandemic (H1N1) 2009-have circulated in humans. Genetic reassortment between these viruses could result in enhanced pathogenicity. We compared 4 reassortant viruses with favorable in vitro replication properties with the wild-type pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus with respect to replication kinetics in vitro and pathogenicity and transmission in ferrets. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses containing basic polymerase 2 alone or in combination with acidic polymerase of seasonal (H1N1) virus were attenuated in ferrets. In contrast, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 with neuraminidase of seasonal (H3N2) virus resulted in increased virus replication and more severe pulmonary lesions. The data show that pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus has the potential to reassort with seasonal influenza viruses, which may result in increased pathogenicity while it maintains the capacity of transmission through aerosols or respiratory droplets.

A multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) in the haemagglutinin (HA) protein of influenza A virus is a key determinant of pathogenicity in chickens, and distinguishes highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses from low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAI). An MBCS has only been detected in viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes. Here we investigated the phenotype of a human H3N2 virus with an MBCS in HA. Insertion of an MBCS in the H3N2 virus resulted in cleavage of HA and efficient replication in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells in the absence of exogenous trypsin in vitro, similar to HPAI H5N1 virus. However, studies in ferrets demonstrated that insertion of the MBCS into HA did not result in increased virus shedding, cellular host range, systemic replication or pathogenicity, as compared with wild-type virus. This study indicates that acquisition of an MBCS alone is insufficient to increase pathogenicity of a prototypical seasonal human H3N2 virus.

Repeated transmission of animal influenza viruses to humans has prompted investigation of the viral, host, and environmental factors responsible for transmission via aerosols or respiratory droplets. How do we determine - out of thousands of influenza virus isolates collected in animal surveillance studies each year - which viruses have the potential to become 'airborne', and hence pose a pandemic threat? Here, using knowledge from pandemic, zoonotic and epidemic viruses, we postulate that the minimal requirements for efficient transmission of an animal influenza virus between humans are: efficient virus attachment to (upper) respiratory tissues, replication to high titers in these tissues, and release and aerosolization of single virus particles. Investigating 'airborne' transmission of influenza viruses is key to understand - and predict - influenza pandemics.

Only two classes of antiviral drugs, neuraminidase inhibitors and adamantanes, are approved for prophylaxis and therapy against influenza virus infections. A major concern is that influenza virus becomes resistant to these antiviral drugs and spreads in the human population. The 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza virus is naturally resistant to adamantanes. Recently a novel neuraminidase I223R mutation was identified in an A/H1N1 virus showing cross-resistance to the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir, zanamivir and peramivir. However, the ability of this virus to cause disease and spread in the human population is unknown. Therefore, this clinical isolate (NL/2631-R223) was compared with a well-characterized reference virus (NL/602). In vitro experiments showed that NL/2631-I223R replicated as well as NL/602 in MDCK cells. In a ferret pathogenesis model, body weight loss was similar in animals inoculated with NL/2631-R223 or NL/602. In addition, pulmonary lesions were similar at day 4 post inoculation. However, at day 7 post inoculation, NL/2631-R223 caused milder pulmonary lesions and degree of alveolitis than NL/602. This indicated that the mutant virus was less pathogenic. Both NL/2631-R223 and a recombinant virus with a single I223R change (recNL/602-I223R), transmitted among ferrets by aerosols, despite observed attenuation of recNL/602-I223R in vitro. In conclusion, the I223R mutated virus isolate has comparable replicative ability and transmissibility, but lower pathogenicity than the reference virus based on these in vivo studies. This implies that the 2009 pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus subtype with an isoleucine to arginine change at position 223 in the neuraminidase has the potential to spread in the human population. It is important to be vigilant for this mutation in influenza surveillance and to continue efforts to increase the arsenal of antiviral drugs to combat influenza.

The paramyxovirus F protein promotes fusion of the viral and cell membranes for virus entry, as well as cell-cell fusion for syncytium formation. Most paramyxovirus F proteins are triggered at neutral pH to initiate membrane fusion. Previous studies, however, demonstrated that human metapneumovirus (hMPV) F proteins are triggered at neutral or acidic pH in transfected cells, depending on the strain origin of the F sequences (S. Herfst et al., J. Virol. 82:8891-8895, 2008). We now report an extensive mutational analysis which identifies four variable residues (294, 296, 396, and 404) as the main determinants of the different syncytial phenotypes found among hMPV F proteins. These residues lie near two conserved histidines (H368 and H435) in a three-dimensional (3D) model of the pretriggered hMPV F trimer. Mutagenesis of H368 and H435 indicates that protonation of these histidines (particularly His435) is a key event to destabilize the hMPV F proteins that require low pH for cell-cell fusion. The syncytial phenotypes were reproduced in cells infected with the corresponding hMPV strains. However, the low-pH dependency for syncytium formation could not be related with a virus entry pathway dependent on an acidic environment. It is postulated that low pH may be acting for some hMPV strains as certain destabilizing mutations found in unusual strains of other paramyxoviruses. In any case, the results presented here and those reported by Schowalter et al. (J. Virol. 83:1511-1522, 2009) highlight the relevance of certain residues in the linker region and domain II of the pretriggered hMPV F protein for the process of membrane fusion.

The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus phenotype is restricted to influenza A viruses of the H5 and H7 hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes. To obtain more information on the apparent subtype-specific nature of the HPAI virus phenotype, a low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H6N1 virus was generated, containing an HPAI H5 RRRKKR↓G multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) motif in HA (the downward arrow indicates the site of cleavage). This insertion converted the LPAI virus phenotype into an HPAI virus phenotype in vitro and in vivo. The H6N1 virus with an MBCS displayed in vitro characteristics similar to those of HPAI H5 viruses, such as cleavage of HA0(the HA protein of influenza A virus initially synthesized as a single polypeptide precursor) and virus replication in the absence of exogenous trypsin. Studies of chickens confirmed the HPAI phenotype of the H6N1 virus with an MBCS, with an intravenous pathogenicity index of 1.4 and systemic virus replication upon intranasal inoculation, the hallmarks of HPAI viruses. This study provides evidence that the subtypespecific nature of the emergence of HPAI viruses is not at the molecular, structural, or functional level, since the introduction of an MBCS resulted in a fully functional virus with an HPAI virus genotype and phenotype. Copyright

In the first 6 months of the H1N1 swine-origin influenza virus (S-OIV) pandemic, the vast majority of infections were relatively mild. It has been postulated that mutations in the viral genome could result in more virulent viruses, leading to a more severe pandemic. Mutations E627K and D701N in the PB2 protein have previously been identified as determinants of avian and pandemic influenza virus virulence in mammals. These mutations were absent in S-OIVs detected early in the 2009 pandemic. Here, using reverse genetics, mutations E627K, D701N, and E677G were introduced into the prototype S-OIV A/Netherlands/602/2009, and their effects on virus replication, virulence, and transmission were investigated. Mutations E627K and D701N caused increased reporter gene expression driven by the S-OIV polymerase complex. None of the three mutations affected virus replication in vitro. The mutations had no major impact on virus replication in the respiratory tracts of mice and ferrets or on pathogenesis. All three mutant viruses were transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets in ferrets. Thus, the impact of key known virulence markers in PB2 in the context of current S-OIVs was surprisingly small. This study does not exclude the possibility of emergence of S-OIVs with other virulence-associated mutations in the future. We conclude that surveillance studies aimed at detecting S-OIVs with increased virulence or transmission should not rely solely on virulence markers identified in the past but should include detailed characterization of virus phenotypes, guided by genetic signatures of viruses detected in severe cases of disease in humans. Copyright

The swine-origin A(H1N1) influenza virus that has emerged in humans in early 2009 has raised concerns about pandemic developments. In a ferret pathogenesis and transmission model, the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus was found to be more pathogenic than a seasonal A(H1N1) virus, with more extensive virus replication occurring in the respiratory tract. Replication of seasonal A(H1N1) virus was confined to the nasal cavity of ferrets, but the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus also replicated in the trachea, bronchi, and bronchioles. Virus shedding was more abundant from the upper respiratory tract for 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus as compared with seasonal virus, and transmission via aerosol or respiratory droplets was equally efficient. These data suggest that the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza virus has the ability to persist in the human population, potentially with more severe clinical consequences.