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In this paper, we propose a comprehensive Public Choice framework to identify and categorize barriers to efficient public climate adaptation. Specifically, we distinguish three dimensions of public adaptation: extent, structure (form and timing) and organisation (vertical and horizontal). Within each of these dimensions, we investigate how the self-interest of voters, pressure groups, bureaucrats and politicians may bias adaptation decisions. Thus, we indicate specific barriers to efficient public adaptation. Based on this framework, we illustrate how Germany’s response to major flood disasters reflects the incentive structure of concerned stakeholders and their political interaction. The ad-hoc character of some public adaptation measures implies a clear bias from the efficient benchmark. In conclusion, we argue that the propositions of Public Choice theory shed some light on how empirical public adaptation processes unfold.

It is well established that adaptation and technological investment in each case may serve as a commitment device in international climate politics. This paper for the first time analyzes the combined impact of these two strategic variables on global mitigation within a non-cooperative framework where countries either decide on mitigation before or after adaptation. By investment, which is assumed to be made in the first place due to its considerable lead time, countries commit to lower national contributions to the global public good of mitigation. We find that the sequencing of adaptation before mitigation reinforces this strategic effect of technological investments at least for sufficiently similar countries. As a consequence, the subgame-perfect equilibrium yields a globally lower level of mitigation, and higher global costs of climate change when adaptation is decided before mitigation. Besides this theoretical contribution, the paper proposes some strategies to combat the unfortunate rush to adaptation which can be currently observed in climate politics.

The strategy of adaptation to climate change has become a central topic within the UNFCCC negotiations in recent years. On the national level, adaptation plans are elaborated, and on the international level, the need for funding adaptation in developing countries is discussed. This tendency shows that adaptation is likely to be advanced relative to mitigation on the political agenda. Therefore, we analyze the economic consequences of the timing of mitigation and adaptation in a game-theoretic framework regarding as well the importance of technological investments for mitigation. Due to strategic behavior, the activity in mitigation deteriorates when adaptation is advanced. As a consequence, the resulting subgame-perfect equilibrium yields higher total costs. We demonstrate that this result is even reinforced when technological investments are regarded, i.e. the negative effects of advancing adaptation relative to the opposite timing are amplified.

Recent work has shown that Weitzman's policy rule for choosing price- versus quantity-based pollution control instruments under uncertainty is biased when the polluting firms possess market power (Heuson 2010). However, this study is restricted to emission standards and taxes, while tradable emission permits are ruled out since market power gives rise to strategic permit trading, which requires some separate effort in investigation. This paper aims at closing this gap and, in doing so, makes three main contributions. First, it provides the first-time full comparative analysis of the three most common pollution control instruments stated above which takes into account two features that are frequently given in actual regulation settings, namely market power of polluting firms and uncertain abatement costs from the regulator's perspective. Second, the paper reveals a new form of strategic permit trading that may arise even though the permit market is perfectly competitive. Finally, the rather pessimistic view concerning the impact of market power on the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits, which dominates in the literature so far, is put into context.

This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollu-tion problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less 'green' than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitigation efforts, which further increases the inefficiently high amount of global emis-sions. However, the present paper shows that the option of self-protection against environmen-tal damages, which has been invariably neglected in the relevant literature to date, alleviates or even completely offsets such strategic delegation and the related adverse effects.

Funding developing countries' climate policies after Cancun (COP16) has a dual goal: firstly, to support mitigation of developing countries in order to sustain the two-degree pathway of stabilising the global mean temperature; secondly, to empower the vulnerable countries in low-income regions to adapt to and recover from the most adverse impacts of climate change. So far, the political and scientific discussion has mainly concentrated on the appropriate level of funding. Referring to the newly emerging climate finance architecture under the post-Kyoto framework, this paper argues that a stronger focus must be put on the question: which mode of funding to choose? This is for the reason that the currently discussed funding instruments, such as earmarking of industrialised countries' transfer payments to developing countries for reducing loss and damages, mitigation, or adaptation costs, may cause fundamental changes in the countries' strategic behaviour concerning mitigation and adaptation efforts. Moreover, some of the instruments fall short of a minimum requirement for the donors to voluntarily provide means, and thus cannot guarantee sustained funding. We develop our results in a non-cooperative two-country framework in which donor and recipient decide on mitigation in the first, and on adaptation in the second stage of the game.

In view of the failure of international negotiations on climate protection and the improbability of a trend reversal in the climate changes that have already occurred, the option of climate change adaptation is becoming more and more important in climate change policy. A large number of countries have already initiated a process of adaptation by drafting strategies or catalogues of measures. Hence there is an urgent need to support this process at the scientific level. The discipline of economics has a key role to play in this context, especially with regard to the design, evaluation and selection of adaptation measures and instruments. The still relatively young field of research into the economics of adaptation is growing at a considerable pace and already exhibits a wide range of methodological approaches and research questions. Against this background, the present report aims to undertake a systematic structuring and synthesis of the individual research studies in order to provide political actors with an overview of the scientific recommendations and findings they must consider when making decisions. Another aim of the report is to identify open research questions and, based on this, to outline key pointers for the future direction of the research into the economics of climate adaptation.

Since numerous countries have already initiated a process of adaptation to climate change by drafting strategies or catalogues of measures, it is of particular importance to identify and overcome potential barriers to efficient public adap-tation from the beginning. A major source of barriers is given by self-interest driven behaviour of actors involved in the adaptation policy process. This is for the reason that several features of the adaptation option and the surrounding policy framework, such as the lacking of a clear-cut success-metric, are likely to boost such behaviour since they facilitate both the manipulation of the adaptation output and the exertion of influence through the various actor groups shaping the political system. Against this background, this paper provides a broad conceptual Public Choice theory framework serving both for raising the consciousness of potential barriers to efficient public adaptation and creating a sound basis for further in-depth research. Concerning the efficiency of public adaptation policies, we distinguish three dimensions, namely extent, structure (form and timing) and organisation (vertical and horizontal) of public adaptation. For either case, potential political biases are investigated taking into consideration the self-interests and influence of voters, pressure groups, bureaucrats and politi-cians in a representative democracy framework.

Angesichts erfolgloser internationaler Klimaschutzverhandlungen und einer kaum zu erwartenden Trendumkehr bereits eingetretener klimatischer Veränderungen gewinnt die Option der Anpassung an den Klimawandel immer mehr an klimapolitischer Bedeutung. Zahlreiche Länder haben durch die Konzeption von Strategien oder Maßnahmenkatalogen bereits einen Anpassungsprozess angestoßen. Daher besteht ein großer Bedarf, diesen Prozess von wissenschaftlicher Seite zu begleiten. Der ökonomischen Disziplin kommt in diesem Zusammenhang eine Schlüsselrolle zu, v. a. im Hinblick auf die Ausgestaltung, Bewertung und Auswahl von Anpassungsmaßnahmen und -instrumenten. Das noch recht junge Feld der ökonomischen Anpassungsforschung wächst mit beträchtlicher Geschwindigkeit und weist bereits eine enorme Bandbreite an methodischen Ansätzen und Forschungsfragen auf. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist der vorliegende Beitrag bestrebt, eine systematische Strukturierung und Synthese der einzelnen Forschungsarbeiten vorzunehmen, um den politischen Akteuren einen Überblick über die wissenschaftlichen Empfehlungen und Erkenntnisse zu verschaffen, die diese bei ihren Entscheidungen berücksichtigen müssen. Ferner sollen offene Forschungsfragen identifiziert und darauf aufbauend Eckpunkte für die zukünftige Ausrichtung der ökonomischen Klimaanpassungsforschung konturiert werden.

It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms’ costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in most actual regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultaneously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted to either of them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The article at hand takes a first step in closing this gap. It investigates the welfare effects of emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control costs and various degrees of the polluting firms’ market power.

It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms' costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in the most actual environmental regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultaneously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted itself to either of them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The article at hand accounts for closing this gap by investigating the welfare effects of emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control costs and a polluting asymmetric Cournot duopoly.