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Knowledge of task‐irrelevant information influences judgments of forensic science evidence and thereby undermines their probative value (i.e., forensic confirmation bias). The current studies tested whether laypeople discount the opinion of a forensic examiner who had a priori knowledge of biasing information (i.e., a defendant's confession) that could have influenced his opinion. In three experiments, laypeople (N = 765) read and evaluated a trial summary which, for some, included testimony from a forensic examiner who was either unaware or aware of the defendant's confession, and either denied or admitted that it could have impacted his opinion. When the examiner admitted that the confession could have influenced his opinion, laypeople generally discounted his testimony, as evidenced by their verdicts and other ratings. However, when the examiner denied being vulnerable to bias, laypeople tended to believe him—and they weighted his testimony as strongly as that of the confession‐unaware examiner. In short, laypeople generally failed to recognize the superiority of forensic science judgments made by context‐blind examiners, and they instead trusted examiners who claimed to be impervious to bias. As such, our findings highlight the value of implementing context management procedures in forensic laboratories so as not to mislead fact‐finders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge of task‐irrelevant information influences judgments of forensic science evidence and thereby undermines their probative value (i.e., forensic confirmation bias). The current studies tested whether laypeople discount the opinion of a forensic examiner who had a priori knowledge of biasing information (i.e., a defendant's confession) that could have influenced his opinion. In three experiments, laypeople (N = 765) read and evaluated a trial summary which, for some, included testimony from a forensic examiner who was either unaware or aware of the defendant's confession, and either denied or admitted that it could have impacted his opinion. When the examiner admitted that the confession could have influenced his opinion, laypeople generally discounted his testimony, as evidenced by their verdicts and other ratings. However, when the examiner denied being vulnerable to bias, laypeople tended to believe him—and they weighted his testimony as strongly as that of the confession‐unaware examiner. In short, laypeople generally failed to recognize the superiority of forensic science judgments made by context‐blind examiners, and they instead trusted examiners who claimed to be impervious to bias. As such, our findings highlight the value of implementing context management procedures in forensic laboratories so as not to mislead fact‐finders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]