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Today's international political environment is not favorable for establishing new arms control agreements, but history demonstrates that arms control opportunities can arise quickly. When opportunities arise, however, they will be accompanied by verification challenges for which nuclear and non-nuclear states alike must prepare now. In particular, new approaches must be developed to verify the dismantlement of nuclear warheads -- a task never before undertaken. In order to identify technical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification, as well as procedures and technologies that might address those challenges, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the US State Department -- through a project known as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) --- are engaging collaboratively with more than 25 countries to build global verification expertise. The IPNDV has completed a first phase of work, which focused on monitoring and verification objectives, on-site inspections, and technical challenges and solutions. It has now embarked on a second phase of work, which will seek to deepen understanding of the verification options identified in the first phase, begin to test some of those options, and extend the partnership's work beyond the core of nuclear weapon dismantlement. At a highly contentious moment for global security, the IPNDV stands out as a model of effective international collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNAtional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, reported to the board of governors on September 1, 2004, that Iran intended to convert 37 metric tons [...]

IRAN HAS ADMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it made secret efforts to procure the wherewithal to make sophisticated gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, But few believe [...]

IRAN HAS BEEN SECRETLY DEVELOPING the capability to make nuclear weapons--in particular, developing the wherewithal to produce separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Since they first learned of Iran's [...]

A MID SUSPICIONS THAT IT WAS developing secret nuclear weapons facilities, Iran revealed earlier this year that its nuclear capabilities were more advanced than thought--that it was nearly ready to [...]

There are approximately 1,440 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the world today. Because this material might be stolen by terrorists seeking to build a nuclear weapon, efforts are underway to reduce, secure, and consolidate stocks of HEU. But simply minimizing the use of HEU is no longer sufficient to the risk nuclear terrorism poses. Low-enriched uranium (LEU) has proved acceptable for virtually all civilian applications, and LEU has been substituted for HEU in 63 reactors and facilities to date. There are few remaining technical impediments to the elimination of HEU use in civil and military naval nuclear facilities. The process of HEU elimination must begin with enhanced transparency and stronger international standards for HEU inventory declarations. The international community must also find ways to incentivize conversion from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium and continue to fund research and development for HEU alternatives. Ultimately, however, eliminating HEU use will require that all stakeholders reach a consensus and commit to an irreversible policy in favor of low-enriched uranium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on several issues concerning the decision of Iran to abandon its deal with the European Union (EU) on the suspension of its uranium enrichment program, as of November 2004. Concerns of the EU and the U.S. over the decision; Terms of the agreement, including the recognition of the right of Iran to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Information on an investigation initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify the nuclear program of Iran.

Focuses on the statement submitted by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency which revealed its secret efforts to acquire gas centrifuges to enrich its uranium technology. Initial stages of the centrifuge program; Role of Pakistanis in the procurement; Description of the procurement system developed by Iran for the centrifuge program.

Focuses on the confirmation made by the Iranian government concerning its nuclear capabilities as of April 2003. Misconception on the military capabilities of Iran; Commitment of the nation to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Doubts of the U.S. government on the nuclear capabilities of Iran.

Focuses on several issues surrounding Algeria's hidden nuclear site near the city of Ain Oussera. Speculation on the potential production of plutonium at the site; Suspicions on Algeria's motive for acquiring nuclear weapons from China; Details on the visit of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors at the site.