1. On the Minimal Theory of Consciousness Implicit in Active Inference
- Author
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Whyte, Christopher J., Corcoran, Andrew W., Robinson, Jonathan, Smith, Ryan, Moran, Rosalyn J., Parr, Thomas, Friston, Karl J., Seth, Anil K., and Hohwy, Jakob
- Subjects
Quantitative Biology - Neurons and Cognition - Abstract
The multifaceted nature of experience poses a challenge to the study of consciousness. Traditional neuroscientific approaches often concentrate on isolated facets, such as perceptual awareness or the global state of consciousness and construct a theory around the relevant empirical paradigms and findings. Theories of consciousness are, therefore, often difficult to compare; indeed, there might be little overlap in the phenomena such theories aim to explain. Here, we take a different approach: starting with active inference, a first principles framework for modelling behaviour as (approximate) Bayesian inference, and building up to a minimal theory of consciousness, which emerges from the shared features of computational models derived under active inference. We review a body of work applying active inference models to the study of consciousness and argue that there is implicit in all these models a small set of theoretical commitments that point to a minimal (and testable) theory of consciousness.
- Published
- 2024