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In much of the world, public transportation infrastructure is sorely needed. Political economy models suggest that provision lags because uneven access and use of public transit fragments political coalitions. Yet, traditional survey techniques tell us little about who supports valence issues, such as mass transit. I instead adopt a novel survey approach from economics designed to elicit preference intensity. I then sample households at different distances from a subway project in Bogotá, Colombia. Contra conventional expectations, I find little evidence that local geography shapes preferences. Those who use public transit the least and pay the most for its construction—the upper class—are its strongest supporters. An experiment and focus groups suggest that middle- and upper-class groups want others to take public transportation to reduce congestion and shorten their commutes. One implication is that a growing middle class might help to strengthen urban public goods provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economy models view property rights as the linchpin to economic development. But strong property rights—defined as rules that provide greater compensation to a larger set of claimants—encourage opportunistic behaviors that undermine infrastructure investments. Strong rights lead to (1) holdout problems among existing property owners, (2) infrastructure trolls who occupy needed land, and (3) scope expansions in which communities demand unrelated local public goods. I draw on original qualitative research around highway projects in Colombia to illustrate how communities leverage their property rights to secure greater compensation and collective goods. A survey experiment supports the microfoundations of the theory: making salient strong property rights increases compensation demands and legal claims. State audit reports reveal that opportunistic behavior occurs on two‐thirds of highway projects. These findings bolster a neglected view of strong property rights as a check on state‐led economic development projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative political economists often divide Latin American labor markets into those with secure employment (insiders) and those without it (outsiders). Yet this division misses an increasingly important class of contract workers, who hold formal labor contracts but often lack labor stability, welfare benefits, and organizing rights. When do unionized and contract workers share preferences and engage in joint organizing? And when do their efforts result in policy change? Drawing on case studies of Chile and Peru, I argue that unionized workers mobilize contract workers when they see their own membership under threat and when they share physical workplaces with contractors. Labor coalitions succeed in policy reform when they leverage divisions within the business community and upcoming elections to build support. This article thus pushes scholars to move beyond dichotomies of formal versus informal workers and study how contract workers matter for collective action and labor policy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

So a worker might be a subcontractor for a large firm but not have access to that firm's pension or health policy (and might be too well off to qualify for means-tested noncontributory pension or health programs, even if these were on offer from the government. The COVID-19 pandemic yet again exposed the vast divide in working conditions across Latin America. Melina Altamirano, Sarah Berens, and Franziska Deeg's study of social policy preferences in Mexico closes the issue with a counterintuitive finding: informal workers support social assistance policy at lower rates than formal workers. Many governments struggled to provide social assistance and employment relief to workers and businesses without formal documents (Blofield et al. 2020; Filgueira and Blofield 2020; Hummel et al. 2021). First, as governments extend noncontributory social policies, many workers without formal labor arrangements have access to social programs. [Extracted from the article]

Why do some citizens remove the same politicians that they elected from office? This article examines the use of recall referenda, an increasingly prevalent process in which citizens organize a vote to remove politicians from office before they complete their terms. Although celebrated as a tool to improve electoral accountability, we argue that recall referenda are organized to pursue political vendettas. We test this claim using an original data set on the different stages leading to subnational recalls in Peru. Recalls are initiated more often when politicians lose by narrow vote margins and when women hold office. Once put to a vote, citizens do use office performance to decide whether to retain their politicians. Losing politicians organized fewer recall referenda following an institutional reform that allowed politicians to name their successors. The implication is that recall referenda create weak incentives to improve office performance, but careful institutional design can improve their functioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cities are complex regulatory environments. Attempts to regulate urban behavior create opportunities for politicians to manipulate enforcement to win votes and reward supporters. While some politicians choose not to enforce regulations, or forbearance, others undercut their intent, or dilution. Empirical research on enforcement has lagged behind due to the identification challenges in distinguishing weak state capacity from political manipulations. We develop a structured approach to process tracing that follows enforcement decisions sequentially across bureaucracies and specifies statistical distributions as counterfactuals to identify the causes of limited enforcement. We illustrate these strategies through original data on enforcement against squatters in urban Colombia and the provision of building permits in urban Turkey. Enforcement process tracing helps to document a form of distributive politics that is common to cities in the developing world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Particularly in developing countries, there is a gap between written law and behavior. Comparative research emphasizes that laws go unenforced due to resource constraints or inadequate control of the bureaucracy. I instead introduce the concept of forbearance, or the intentional and revocable nonenforcement of law, and argue that politicians often withhold sanctions to maximize votes as well as rents. Drawing on tools from price theory and distributive politics, I present several methods to separate situations when politicians are unable versus unwilling to enforce the law. I demonstrate the identification strategies with original data on the enforcement of laws against street vending and squatting in urban Latin America. In contexts of inadequate social policy, politicians use forbearance to mobilize voters and signal their distributive commitments. These illustrations thus suggest the rich, and largely neglected, distributive politics behind apparent institutional weakness. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Organizational membership is one of the strongest, yet overlooked, predictors of vote buying across Latin America. We argue that this relationship is driven by the fact that politicians outsource some of their vote-buying efforts to interest associations. In contrast to the existing literature that focuses on party brokers, who are loyal to a single political machine, we introduce the concepts of organizational brokers, who represent interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles, and hybrid brokers, who split their loyalties between an interest association and a single political party. We illustrate the operation of these alternative broker types through case studies of street-vending organizations in an uninstitutionalized party system, Colombia, and peasant organizations in an institutionalized party system, Mexico. Attention to the role of brokers and the organizations that they represent has implications for political accountability, collective action, and the persistence of clientelism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some politicians tolerate the violation of the law? In contexts where the poor are the primary violators of property laws, I argue that the answer lies in the electoral costs of enforcement: Enforcement can decrease support from poor voters even while it generates support among nonpoor voters. Using an original data set on unlicensed street vending and enforcement operations at the subcity district level in three Latin American capital cities, I show that the combination of voter demographics and electoral rules explains enforcement. Supported by qualitative interviews, these findings suggest how the intentional nonenforcement of law, or forbearance, can be an electoral strategy. Dominant theories based on state capacity poorly explain the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some politicians tolerate the violation of the law? In contexts where the poor are the primary violators of property laws, I argue that the answer lies in the electoral costs of enforcement: Enforcement can decrease support from poor voters even while it generates support among nonpoor voters. Using an original data set on unlicensed street vending and enforcement operations at the subcity district level in three Latin American capital cities, I show that the combination of voter demographics and electoral rules explains enforcement. Supported by qualitative interviews, these findings suggest how the intentional nonenforcement of law, or forbearance, can be an electoral strategy. Dominant theories based on state capacity poorly explain the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Episodic memory retrieval can be influenced by individuals' current goals, including those that are emotional in nature. Participants underwent an fMRI scan while reappraising, or changing the way they thought about aversive images they had previously encoded, to down-regulate (i.e., decrease), up-regulate (i.e., increase), or maintain the emotional intensity associated with their recall. A conjunction analysis between down- and up-regulation during the entire 12-s recall period revealed that both commonly activated reappraisal-related regions, particularly in the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex (PFC). However, when we analyzed a reappraisal instruction phase prior to recall and then divided the recall phase into the time when individuals were first searching for their memories and later elaborating on their details, we found that down- and up-regulation engaged greater neural activity at different time points. Up-regulation engaged greater PFC activity than down-regulation or maintenance during the reappraisal instruction phase. In contrast, down-regulation engaged greater lateral PFC activity as images were being searched for and retrieved. Maintaining the emotional intensity associated with the aversive images engaged similar regions to a greater extent than either reappraisal condition as participants elaborated on the details of the images they were holding in mind. Our findings suggest that down- and up-regulation engage similar neural regions during memory retrieval, but differ in the timing of this engagement. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Despite a growing literature on the left in Latin America, few studies have considered the fate of the right. This article examines a highly successful conservative party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), which held power for close to two decades in El Salvador. The ARENA party used mano dura policies--defined by the introduction of discretionary crimes, diluted due process guarantees, and military participation in policing--to boost its support among constituencies plagued by crime. Two key factors prompted ARENA party strategists to emphasize security. First, a credible electoral threat existed from a leftist party hesitant to resort to harsh security measures. Second, factional divisions drove party strategy. Business elites who formed the core of the ARENA party refused to abandon unpopular economic reforms. Mano dura policies allowed the party to maintain support from traditional elites and their rural bases without reversals to its economic program. Party centralization facilitated the programmatic shift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We used fMRI to investigate the neural processes engaged as individuals down- and up-regulated the emotions associated with negative autobiographical memories (AMs) using cognitive reappraisal strategies. Our analyses examined neural activity during three separate phases, as participants (a) viewed a reappraisal instruction (i.e., Decrease, Increase, Maintain), (b) searched for an AM referenced by a self-generated cue, and (c) elaborated upon the details of the AM being held in mind. Decreasing emotional intensity primarily engaged activity in regions previously implicated in cognitive control (e.g., dorsal and ventral lateral pFC), emotion generation and processing (e.g., amygdala, insula), and visual imagery (e.g., precuneus) as participants searched for and retrieved events. In contrast, increasing emotional intensity engaged similar regions during the instruction phase (i.e., before a memory cue was presented) and again as individuals later elaborated upon the details of the events they had recalled. These findings confirm that reappraisal can modulate neural activity during the recall of personally relevant events, although the time course of this modulation appears to depend on whether individuals are attempting to down- or up-regulate their emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We examined the neural correlates of specific (i.e., unique to time and place) and general (i.e., extended in or repeated over time) autobiographical memories (AMs) during their initial construction and later elaboration phases. The construction and elaboration of specific and general events engaged a widely distributed set of regions previously associated with AM recall. Specific (vs. general) event construction preferentially engaged prefrontal and medial temporal lobe regions known to be critical for memory search and retrieval processes. General event elaboration was differentiated from specific event elaboration by extensive right-lateralized prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity. Interaction analyses confirmed that PFC activity was disproportionately engaged by specific AMs during construction, and general AMs during elaboration; a similar pattern was evident in regions of the left lateral temporal lobe. These neural differences between specific and general AM construction and elaboration were largely unrelated to reported differences in the level of detail recalled about each type of event. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]