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Popular depictions of the largest single procurement project in Canadian history--the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project--characterize it as a bureaucratic failure. What began in 2008 as a $26.2B project has expanded to at least $77,313, and $2B has already been spent without having produced a single vessel. Unlike other major Canadian aircraft, helicopter, and submarine contracts over the past four decades, however, participants in the CSC have lauded the technical merits of the procurement process. This article argues that successful procurement in this area requires: (a) clear (naval) doctrine supporting why a specific (weapons) platform or system is needed; and (b) government acceptance of that doctrine. When these two imperatives are aligned, procurement should proceed relatively smoothly. However, such smooth procurement is highly unlikely when major systems purchases involve long time periods and shifts in elected governments, policy goals, or (naval) doctrine undermine previous understandings and agreements. Le plus grand projet d'approvisionnement de l'histoire du Canada--le projet de Navires de combat canadiens (NCC)--est decrit comme un echec bureaucratique par les representations populaires. Ce qui a commence en 2008 comme un projet de 26,2 milliards $ s'est etendu a au moins 77,3 milliards $, et 2 milliards $ ont deja ete depenses sans avoir encore produit un seul navire. Contrairement a d'autres gros contrats canadiens d'avions, d'helicopteres et de sous-marins au cours des quatre dernieres decennies, les participants au NCC ont neanmoins fait l'eloge des avantages techniques du processus d'acquisition. Cet article soutient qu'un approvisionnement reussi dans ce domaine exige : (a) une doctrine (navale) claire expliquant pourquoi une plate-forme ou un systeme (d'armes) specifique est requis; et (b) l'acceptation de cette doctrine par le gouvernement. Lorsque ces deux imperatifs sont alignes, la passation des marches publics devrait se derouler de maniere relativement fluide. Cependant, un telle fluidite d'approvisionnement est hautement improbable lorsque les achats de systemes majeurs impliquent de longues durees et lorsque les reorientations des gouvernements elus, des objectifs strategiques ou de la doctrine (navale) discreditent les ententes et accords anterieurs., Introduction: the politics of (military) procurement and the Canadian Surface Combatant project In recent years, Canadian plans to secure new submarines, fighters, helicopters and naval vessels all resulted in serious [...]

The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large-scale military platform procurement is an essential but understudied component of the policy studies of megaprojects. Procurement decisions in this area, from ships to aircraft, are examples of a specific type of often very expensive purchases which feature complex multi-actor and multiyear processes characterized by high degrees of conflict between actors over purchases and planning horizons. This study of military procurement efforts of this type demonstrates the importance of maintaining policy 'alignment' between governments and service providers for successful megaproject procurement to occur and suggests several strategies for accomplishing this that can be applied to similar large-scale but nondefense-related projects, ranging from hydroelectric dams to high-speed railway development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]