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Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1994 electoral reform in Japan has been accompanied with many blessings and speculations. It has been argued that the newly adopted electoral system, which mixes a single-member district plurality system wth a proportional representation system, will lead to a two-party system, issue-oriented politics, less expensive campaigns, and a less corrupt and more efficient government. The change was also expected to destroy Japan's bureaucratic regime and factional power. However, many of the above assertions have proven to be exaggerations. While the new electoral system will reduce the number of parties, it may not lead to an alternation of power between two large parties as exemplified by the Westminster model. Rather, coalition governments are likely to be the norm. Moreover, though party cues and issues will become more important in future campaigns, "personal vote strategy" remains politicians' only viable option. As a result, money politics and factional powers will continue to thrive. Nevertheless, the adoption of a new electoral system has created massive uncertainties for politicians, who will likely adjust some of their old practices. In this way, the 1994 electoral reform may set momentum for further transformations of Japanese politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]