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This paper uses data on the near universe of job adverts posted online in the US to study the impact of the 2018 trade war on US job opportunities. It develops measures of labor market exposure to three key channels of impact from the trade war: import protection for US producers, the higher cost of imported inputs for US producers, and exposure of US exporters to retaliatory tariffs. It finds evidence that both tariffs on imported inputs and retaliatory tariffs led to a relative decline in online job postings in affected commuting zones. These effects were stronger for lower skilled postings than for higher skill postings. By contrast, it does not find any evidence of positive impacts of import protection on job openings. It estimates that the tariffs led to a combined effect of 175,000 fewer job postings in 2018, or 0.6 percent of the US total, with two thirds of this aggregate decline due to the imported input tariffs and one third due to retaliatory tariffs.

How high were import tariffs when GATT participants began negotiations to reduce them in 1947? Establishing this starting point is key to determining how successful the GATT has been in bringing down trade barriers. If the average tariff level was about 40 percent, as commonly reported, the implied early tariff reductions were substantial, but this number has never been verified. This paper examines the evidence on tariff levels in the late 1940s and early 1950s and finds that the average tariff level going into the first Geneva Round of 1947 was about 22 percent. It also find that tariffs fell by relatively more in the late 1940s and early 1950s for a core group of GATT participants (the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) than they did for many other important countries, including the set of other (non-core) GATT participants.

How do global supply chain linkages modify countries' incentives to impose import protection? Are these linkages empirically important determinants of trade policy? To address these questions, this paper introduces supply chain linkages into a workhorse terms-of-trade model of trade policy with political economy. Theory predicts that discretionary final goods tariffs will be decreasing in the domestic content of foreign-produced final goods. Provided foreign political interests are not too strong, final goods tariffs will also be decreasing in the foreign content of domestically-produced final goods. The paper tests these predictions using newly assembled data on bilateral applied tariffs, temporary trade barriers, and value-added contents for 14 major economies over the 1995-2009 period. There is strong support for the empirical predictions of the model. The results imply that global supply chains matter for trade policy, both in principle and in practice.

This paper analyzes how the exchange rate elasticity of exports has changed over time and across countries and sectors, and how the formation of global value chains has affected this relationship. The analysis uses a panel framework covering 46 countries over the period 1996-2012, and first finds evidence that the elasticity of manufacturing export volumes to the real effective exchange rate has decreased over time. The paper then examines whether the formation of supply chains has affected this elasticity using different measures of global value chain integration. Intuitively, as countries are more integrated in global production processes, a currency depreciation only improves the competitiveness of a fraction of the value of final goods exports. In line with this intuition, the analysis finds evidence that the rise of participation in global value chains explains on average 40 percent of the fall in the elasticity, and that corrections of the real effective exchange rate for participation in global value chains do not present the same decreasing pattern in elasticity.

This paper examines the implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, the paper models formal trade dispute negotiations as potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality problem that governments implement import protection above the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the policys costs to trading partners. The approach is to extend earlier theoretical models of trade agreement accession negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations in order to guide the empirical assessment. The paper uses instrumental variables to estimate the model on trade volume outcomes from World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes over 1995–2009. The evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions that larger import volume outcomes are associated with products that have smaller increases in foreign exporter-received prices (terms-of-trade losses for the importer) as a result of the dispute, larger pre-dispute import volumes, larger import demand elasticities, and smaller foreign export supply elasticities. Dispute settlement outcome differences are also explained by variation in institutionally-motivated measures of retaliation capacity and the severity of the free-rider problem associated with foreign exporter concentration.

What affects a country's decision of whether to formally engage in a trade dispute directly related to its exporting interests? This article empirically examines determinants of affected country participation decisions in formal trade litigation arising under the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1995 and 2000. It investigates determinants of nonparticipation and examines whether the incentives generated by the system's rules and procedures discourage active engagement in dispute settlement by developing country members in particular. Though the size of exports at stake is found to be an important economic determinant affecting the decision to participate in challenges to a WTO-inconsistent policy, the evidence also shows that measures of a country's retaliatory and legal capacity as well as its international political economy relationships matter. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of an implicit 'institutional bias' generated by the system's rules and incentives that particularly affects developing economy participation in dispute settlement.

This article is concerned with the interaction of regulated efficiency and World Trade Organization (WTO) accession and its impact on China's motor vehicle sector. The analysis is conducted using a 23 sector-25 region computable general equilibrium model. Regulatory reform and internal restructuring are found to be critical. Restructuring is represented by a cost reduction following from consolidation and rationalization that moves costs toward global norms. Without restructuring, WTO accession means a surge of final imports, though imports of parts could well fall as production moves offshore. However, with restructuring, the final assembly industry can be made competitive by world standards, with a strengthened position for the industry.

This paper focuses on the effect of import protection on the response of the real exchange rate to capital flows. The central hypothesis is that barriers to imports blunt the expenditure and production shifting effects of changes in relative prices, and hence the ability of the real exchange rate to equilibrate the economy in response to international capital flows. Employing a cross-section approach, the study focuses on three broadly similar countries but with very different levels of protection: Argentina, Australia, and Canada. The empirical results are consistent with the central hypothesis.

This paper analyzes the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty, using the global economy wide Linkage model, new estimates of agricultural price distortions for developing countries, and poverty elasticity's approach. It addresses two questions: to what extent are policies as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within developing countries (given that farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)? Results are presented for the key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a whole. They reveal that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries will be reduced at least slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries will come from agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries the majority of whom work on farms will benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries will rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day will drop 3 percent globally.

The Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations stalled in 2008 owing in no small degree to a lack of agreement on the terms of substantially reducing trade-distorting support for agricultural products and to what extent this will be beneficial to developing countries. Nicaragua presents an interesting case in point, being one of the poorest economies in Latin America with still a relatively large agricultural sector and high degrees of rural poverty. In 2005, the country signed a free trade agreement with the United States. This chapter provides a quantitative analysis addressing that question. It does so using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Nicaragua coupled with a micro-simulation methodology. The first section provides background information on trade reform policies and macroeconomic trends in Nicaragua, with special reference to the agricultural sector and rural poverty. The section that follows describes the main features of the CGE model and the micro-simulation methodology used to assess the impact on poverty and inequality. The author then lay out the model scenarios considered, which include liberalizations of agricultural and all merchandise goods trade by the rest of the world and by Nicaragua itself. That is followed by a summary analysis of results. This analysis includes tests for the sensitivity of the results with respect to assumptions regarding the responsiveness of trade to price liberalization, as identified through the relevant trade elasticities. The final section provides conclusions and possible policy implications.

In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important.

This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price incentives facing farmers in many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries' agricultural price and international trade policies. The authors summarize these and realted stylized facts that can be drawn from a new World Bank database that is worthy of the attention of political economy theorists, historians and econometricians. These indicators can be helpful in addressing such questions as the following: where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what extent has there been overshooting in the sense that some developing-country food producers are now being protected from import competition along the lines of the examples of earlier-industrializing Europe and Japan? What are the political economy forces behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful countries where major distortions in agricultural incentives remain? And what explains the pattern of distortions across not only countries but also industries and in the choice of support or tax instruments within the agricultural sector of each country?

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the long history of national distortions to agricultural markets. It then outlines the methodology used to generate annual indicators of the extent of government interventions in markets, details of which are provided in Anderson and appendix A. A description of the economies under study and their economic growth and structural changes over recent decades is then briefly presented as a preface to the main section of the chapter, in which the nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents (NRA and CTE) estimates are summarized across regions and over the decades since the 1950s. These estimates are discussed in far more detail in the regional chapters that follow. A summary is also provided of an additional set of indicators of agricultural price distortions presented in chapter eleven that are based on the trade restrictiveness index first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005). In chapter twelve the focus shifts from countries to commodities, and all the various distortion indicators are used to provide a sense of how distorted are each of the key farm commodity markets globally. Then chapter thirteen uses the study's NRA and CTE estimates to provide a new set of results from a global economy-wide model that attempts to quantify the impacts on global markets, net farm incomes and welfare of the reforms since the early 1980s and of the policies still in place as of 2004. The chapter concludes by drawing on the lessons learned to speculate on the prospects for further reducing the disarray in world agricultural markets.

Earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies as well as by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of policies, which reduce national and global economic welfare and contribute to global inequality and poverty, have been undergoing reform since the 1980s. Using the linkage model of the global economy and modifications to the pre-release of version 7 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) protection database for 2004, this paper seeks to compare the effect of those reforms to date with those that would come from removing remaining agricultural and trade policies. Two sets of results are thus presented: one showing the effects of policy reforms between 1980-84 and 2004, the other showing what the removal of remaining distortions as of 2004 could be. Both sets of results indicate improvements in the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes in most developing country regions despite the adverse effect on the international terms of trade for some developing countries that are net food importers or are enjoying preferential access to agricultural markets of high-income countries. Landowners in those high-income countries still offering their farmers price supports could readily afford to compensate them from the benefits of removing remaining agricultural protectionism.

This paper outlines the methodological issues associated with the task of measuring that actual delivered direct protection or taxation to individual agricultural industries, as well as the direct protection or anti-protection to non-agricultural sectors. It begins with a guide to what elements in principle could be measured. There are two key purposes of the distortion estimates being generated by this project are: 1) to provide a long annual time series of indicators showing the extent to which price incentives faced by farmers and food consumers have been distorted directly and indirectly by own-government policies in all major developing, transition and high-income countries, and hence for the world as a whole; and 2) to attribute the price distortion estimates for each farm product to specific border or domestic policy measures, so they can serve as inputs into various types of partial and general equilibrium economic models for estimating the effects of those various policies on such things as national and international agricultural markets, farm value added, income inequality, poverty, and national, regional and global welfare.

A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection.

This article presents estimates of the impact of China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). China is estimated to be the biggest beneficiary (US$31 billion a year from trade reforms in preparation for accession and additional gains of $10 billion a year from reforms after accession), followed by its major trading partners that also undertake liberalization, including the economies in North America, Western Europe, and Taiwan (China). Accession will boost manufacturing sectors in China, especially textiles and apparel, which will benefit directly from the removal of export quotas. Developing economies competing with China in third markets may suffer small losses. Accession will have important distributional consequences for China, with the wages of skilled and unskilled nonfarm workers rising in real terms and relative to those of farm workers. Possible policy changes, including reductions in barriers to labor mobility and improvements in rural education, could more than offset these negative impacts and facilitate the development of China's economy.

This paper focuses on the effect of import protection on the response of the real exchange rate to capital flows. The central hypothesis is that barriers to imports blunt the expenditure and production shifting effects of changes in relative prices, and hence the ability of the real exchange rate to equilibrate the economy in response to international capital flows. Employing a cross-section approach, the study focuses on three broadly similar countries but with very different levels of protection: Argentina, Australia, and Canada. The empirical results are consistent with the central hypothesis.

Now that import-substitution policies have failed and been discredited, there has been a shift in favor of interventions on behalf of export interests. The author argues that close scrutiny reveals these arguments to be as flawed as the old arguments for import substitution. Among other things, the author concludes that: 1) Under perfect competition, a country trying to retaliate against a trading partners export subsidies by instituting its own export subsidies, will only hurt itself. 2) The argument that export subsidies may be useful for neutralizing import tariffs, is spurious. In most practical situations, this is not possible. Removal of tariffs is a far superior policy. 3) In principle, a case can be made for protecting infant export industries in the presence of externalities. But the empirical relevance of externalities remains as illusory for export industries as it was for import-substituting industries. 4) Adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to the thinning of the market for credit insurance, but that is not a case for government intervention. 5) India's experience shows export subsidies to have little impact on exports. Brazil and Mexico's experience shows export subsidies to be a costly instrument of export diversification. 6) Those who argue that pro-export interventions were important in East Asia have not provided convincing evidence of a casual relationship between the interventions and growth.

We measure the effective assistance to 18 Norwegian private industries in 1989 caused by government budgetary subsidies, indirect commodity taxes, import protection through nominal tariffs and non-tariff-barriers, price discrimination of electricity and capital income taxation. The assistance effects are measured by the change in the net-of-tax value added price. Most industries were effectively assisted, but the effective assistance differs widely between industries indicating the overall distortive effect on the industry structure. Agriculture, Fishery and Building of Ships and Oil Platforms stand out as the most assisted industries. Budgetary subsidies and non-tariff barriers had the strongest effective assistance effect. Keywords: Effective Rates of Assistance, Industrial policy

The growing pressures for protection in industrialised countries against manufactured exports from developing countries appear to threaten the rapid rate of growth and market penetration of these countries' exports. An examination of the evidence suggests that whilst protection appears to have reduced the rate of growth of imports of manufactures from the Newly Industrialised Countries, the largest four appear to have successfully switched products and markets. A second group of medium middle income countries have done very well despite protection. A model consistent with this experience is provided, which describes the acquisition of exporting expertise by newcomers.