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Cooperation among divisions is usually thought to explain the performance of diversification strategies. However, such divisions are also in competition. Through the in-depth analysis of an intraindustry diversified firm operating in the global semiconductor industry, this paper identifies the sources of coopetition and the treatment of coopetitive tensions among divisions in the production allocation process. We find a multipoint origin of cooperation within a competitive setting. Then, we extend a previous study that considers uniquely two substitute views: (a) corporate-centric; and (b) division-centric. Additionally, by employing formal organizational mechanisms, we show that corporate headquarters guides divisional interaction to form a circular coopetition process. Thus, it is feasible to consider that intrafirm competition and cooperation phases form in a dynamic loop.

In the advancing coopetition strategy literature, firms are often seen as organizations making coopetitive arrangements in an intentional fashion. Drawing on the received distinction between deliberate and emergent strategies, this paper innovatively analyzes the formation of coopetition as an unintended and therefore emergent strategy. More specifically, an in-depth case study on a renowned consortium of Italian opera houses is proposed to illustrate the role played by the external environment (e.g., the institutional one) in triggering coopetitive strategies through the imposition of cooperation. Accordingly, the specific strategic learning processes that actually intervene in the formation of coopetition are identified, and the two related brand-new concepts of imposed cooperation and induced coopetition are introduced and discussed.