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This paper characterizes the trade-off between the income gains and the inequality costs of trade using survey data for 54 developing countries. Tariff data on agricultural and manufacturing goods are combined with household survey data on detailed income and expenditure patterns to estimate the first order effects of the elimination of tariffs on household welfare. We assess how these welfare effects vary across the distribution by estimating impacts on the consumption of traded goods, wage income, farm and non-farm family enterprise income, and government transfers. For each country, the income gains and the inequality costs of trade liberalization are quantified and the trade-offs between them are assessed using an Atkinson social welfare index. We find average income gains from liberalization in 44 countries and average income losses in 10 countries. Across countries in our sample, the gains from trade are 1.8 percent of real household expenditure on average. We find overwhelming evidence of a trade-off between the income gains (losses) and the inequality costs (gains), which arise because trade tends to exacerbate income inequality: 46 countries face a trade-off, while only 8 do not. These trade-offs are typically resolved in favor of lower tariffs. In the majority of developing countries, the prevailing tariff structure thus induces sizeable welfare losses., Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS)

The rural economy in Bangladesh has been a powerful source of economic growth and has substantially reduced poverty, especially since 2000, but the remarkable transformation and unprecedented dynamism in rural Bangladesh are an underexplored, underappreciated, and largely untold story. The analysis identifies the key changes occurring in the rural economy, the principal drivers of rural incomes, the implications for policy, and related actions to foster future growth, further reduce poverty, and improve food security and nutrition. A substantial strength of this study is its empirical foundation, consisting of three sets of detailed data on rural households. Two of the datasets are unique in tracking the same set of households for more than two decades. These data make it possible to examine how change is occurring within and among rural households; they shed considerable light on trends that tend to be obscured at more aggregate levels of analysis. Nationally representative surveys and aggregate secondary data provide complementary and contextually rich insights into the household data.

Iraq was plunged into two simultaneous crises in the second half of 2014, one driven by a sharp decline in oil prices, the other, by the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The severity and recurrent nature of these crises demand a fast understanding and quantification of their welfare impact, which is critical for policy makers. This paper employs an innovative extension of the micro-simulation methodology to provide an ex ante estimate and analysis of the complex and dynamic poverty and distributional impact of the twin crises. The results show an almost complete erosion of the welfare gains of the past, with poverty falling back to 2007 levels and a 20 percent increase in the number of the poor. While the incidence of poverty is higher among internally displaced persons than the rest of the population (except in the Islamic State–affected governorates, where poverty is higher), internally displaced persons make up only a small proportion of Iraq's eight million poor in 2014. The rest comprise of households who already lived below the poverty line, or those who have fallen below the poverty line in the face of the massive economic disruptions the country is facing. The welfare impact of the crises varies widely across space, with the largest increases in poverty headcount rates in Kurdistan and the Islamic State–affected governorates. Yet, the poorest regions in the 2014 crisis scenario are the same as in 2012, the currently Islamic State–affected, and the South, with poverty rates of 40 and 30 percent, respectively. Although the simulated results are not strictly comparable to ex post micro data estimates, because of survey coverage constraints, overall the results are very much in line, particularly in Kurdistan and the South.

Climate risk is an important driver of long-term poverty dynamics, especially in rural regions. This paper builds a dynamic, multi-generation household model of consumption, accumulation, and risk management to draw out the full consequences of exposure to climate risk. The model incorporates the long-term impacts of consumption shortfalls, induced by the optimal “asset smoothing” coping behavior of the vulnerable, on the human capital and long-term wellbeing of families. The analysis shows that the long-term level and depth of poverty can be improved by incorporating elements of “vulnerability-targeted social protection” into a conventional system of social protection. The paper also explores the degree to which vulnerability-targeted social protection can be implemented through a subsidized insurance mechanism. The analysis shows that insurance-based vulnerability-targeted social protection dominates (in economic growth and poverty reduction measures) both in-kind transfer mechanisms and vulnerability-targeted protection paid for using a public budget. The relative gains brought about by this scheme of insurance-augmented social protection increase—at least for a while—under climate change scenarios. However, if climate change becomes too severe, then even this novel form of social protection loses its ability to stabilize the extent and depth of poverty.

Since the early 2000s, Tanzania has seen remarkable economic growth and strong resilience to external shocks. Yet these achievements were overshadowed by the slow response of poverty to the growing economy. Until 2007, the poverty rate in Tanzania remained stagnant at around 34 percent despite a robust growth at an annualized rate of approximately 7 percent. This apparent disconnect between growth and poverty reduction has raised concerns among policy makers and researchers, leading to a consensus that this mismatch needed to be addressed with a sense of urgency. Over the past few years, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) in Tanzania has given high priority to eradicating extreme poverty and promoting broad-based growth. Achieving pro-poor growth has also been widely recognized by the World Bank as a critical strategy for accelerating progress toward its twin goals of eliminating extreme poverty at the global level by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity by fostering income growth among the bottom 40 percent in every country. The official poverty figures announced by the government in November 2013 have revealed that the national strategy against poverty has begun to facilitate reductions. The basic needs poverty rate has declined from around 34 percent to 28.2 percent between 2007 and 2012, the first significant decline in the last 20 years. Identifying the policy mechanisms that have helped to increase the participation of the poor in the growth process and to speed pro-poor growth is therefore important for present and future decision-making in Tanzania on how best to eradicate poverty. Such task requires a rigorous analysis of the evolution of poverty and of the linkages between poverty, inequality, and economic growth. This report uses the availability of the new Tanzanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2011 and 2012, as well as the new rebased GDP figures released in December 2014, as an opportunity to address these issues. More specifically, the report examines the recent trends in poverty and inequality and their determinants and explores how responsive poverty reduction was to economic growth and the obstacles to achieving it.

Since the early 2000s, Tanzania has seen remarkable economic growth and strong resilience to external shocks. Yet these achievements were overshadowed by the slow response of poverty to the growing economy. Until 2007, the poverty rate in Tanzania remained stagnant at around 34 percent despite a robust growth at an annualized rate of approximately 7 percent. This apparent disconnect between growth and poverty reduction has raised concerns among policy makers and researchers, leading to a consensus that this mismatch needed to be addressed with a sense of urgency. Over the past few years, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) in Tanzania has given high priority to eradicating extreme poverty and promoting broad-based growth. Achieving pro-poor growth has also been widely recognized by the World Bank as a critical strategy for accelerating progress toward its twin goals of eliminating extreme poverty at the global level by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity by fostering income growth among the bottom 40 percent in every country. The official poverty figures announced by the government in November 2013 have revealed that the national strategy against poverty has begun to facilitate reductions. The basic needs poverty rate has declined from around 34 percent to 28.2 percent between 2007 and 2012, the first significant decline in the last 20 years. Identifying the policy mechanisms that have helped to increase the participation of the poor in the growth process and to speed pro-poor growth is therefore important for present and future decision-making in Tanzania on how best to eradicate poverty. Such task requires a rigorous analysis of the evolution of poverty and of the linkages between poverty, inequality, and economic growth. This report uses the availability of the new Tanzanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2011 and 2012, as well as the new rebased GDP figures released in December 2014, as an opportunity to address these issues. More specifically, the report examines the recent trends in poverty and inequality and their determinants and explores how responsive poverty reduction was to economic growth and the obstacles to achieving it.

Together with reductions in indirect taxes on food imports, cash for work programs were one of the main responses implemented by African governments following the food, fuel, and financial crisis of recent years. The main objective of those programs was to help the poor cope with the various shocks by increasing their net earnings through community-level work paid for under the programs. Yet it is unclear whether these cash for work programs indeed reached their intended beneficiaries and to what degree they generated other, potentially long-term beneficial impacts. This paper explores these issues in the context of Liberia and the performance of the Cash for Work Temporary Employment Program (CfWTEP) funded by the World Bank through an emergency crisis facility in response to the 2007/2008 food crisis. Both quantitative and qualitative data are presented, focusing on the operational and policy experiences emerging from program implementation. This paper analyzes the context that led to the creation and implementation of the CfWTEP in Liberia, the nature and administrative arrangements for the program, and its operational performance. The objective is to share the lessons learned from evaluation findings so that they can be useful for implementing similar programs in the future in Liberia itself or in other countries. Findings from the analysis highlight the possibilities of implementing public works program in low capacity, post conflict setting and the scope for using the program as a springboard towards a broader and more comprehensive social safety net.

The financial crisis of 2008-09 has considerably slowed the pace of economic growth in Mongolia. When combined with the Dzud (severe winter storm) of 2009-10, which occurred just as the economy was beginning to recover and killed over one million heads of livestock, the slowdown is likely to have significant impacts on poverty as well as the distribution of income and consumption among the poor and non-poor. In this paper we examine the poverty and distributional impacts of the crisis in Mongolia, relying on predictions from a simulation model based on pre-crisis data, given that household data to measure impacts during and after the crisis is unavailable. It is difficult to predict the distributional impacts of the financial crisis with a high degree of confidence. Evidence from previous crises suggests that relative inequality falls about as often as it rises during aggregate contractions (Paci et al, 2008). Furthermore, as the crisis spreads within a country (through adjustments in domestic credit and labor markets and fiscal policies), its impacts across different groups, sectors or areas became all the more difficult to track. The paper is structured as follows. Section two outlines the basic methodological approach used to create the simulation results used here. Section three discusses the macroeconomic projections that are used as inputs into the model. Sections four and five examine the model's projections for poverty and distributional impacts respectively, section six discusses the impact of Dzud (severe winter) and section seven concludes.

Contrary to conventional economic theories, the relationship between income growth and agricultural employment is extremely diverse, even among regions starting from similar levels of development, such as Asia and Africa. Due to its labor-intensive Green Revolution and strong farm–nonfarm linkages, Asia's development path is mostly characterized by fast growth with relatively slow agricultural exits. In contrast to Asia, urban biased policies, low rural population density, and high rates of population growth have led a number of African countries down a path of slow economic growth with surprisingly rapid agricultural exits. Despite this divergence both continents now face daunting employment problems. Asia appears to be increasingly vulnerable to rising inequality, slower job creation, and shrinking farm sizes, suggesting that Asian governments need to refocus on integrating smallholders and lagging regions into increasingly commercialized rural and urban economies. Africa, in contrast, has yet to achieve its own Green Revolution, which would still be a highly effective tool for job creation and poverty reduction. However, the diversity of its endowments and its tighter budget constraints mean that agricultural development strategies in Africa need to be highly context specific, financially sustainable, and more evidence-based.

This paper assesses the potential impacts of the removal of agricultural and other trade distortions using a newly developed dataset and methodological approach for evaluating the global poverty and inequality effects of policy reforms. It finds that liberalization of agriculture will increase global extreme poverty (US$1 a day) slightly and by almost 1 percent if other goods trade is also liberalized; but the number of people living on less than $2 a day will fall by almost 1 percent. Beneath these small aggregate changes, most countries witness a substantial reduction in poverty while South Asia where half of the world's poor reside will experience an increase in extreme (but not moderate) poverty incidence due to high rates of protection afforded to its unskilled labor-intensive agricultural sectors. The distributional changes also are projected to be mild, but again exhibit a strong regional pattern: inequality falls in Latin America, which is characterized by high initial inequality, and rises in South Asia, has relatively low income inequality.

Cet article etudie le lien entre liberalisation commerciale et specialisation des agriculteurs dans l’exportation de cultures commerciales. Il estime dans quelle mesure, au debut des annees 2000, les tarifs plus favorables octroyes aux exportations du Vietnam ont contribue a une hausse de la production de ces cultures. Afin d’etablir une correlation entre le comportement des agriculteurs et les tarifs pratiques sur les exportations vietnamiennes, on construit, au niveau de la province, un indicateur du commerce agricole. Cet indicateur mesure les tarifs moyens appliques aux exportations vietnamiennes par ses partenaires commerciaux, et prend en compte les dotations en ressources naturelles de chaque province et controle des problemes d’endogeneite. On estime l’effet sur la production agricole d’une variation de l’indicateur, en utilisant des donnees de panel issues des enquetes sur les menages realisees en 2002 et 2004. Les resultats montrent que les effets de la liberalisation des exportations n’engendrent pas des gains pour l’ensemble des agriculteurs et dependent de la specialisation.Classification JEL : Q17 ; Q12 ; F16.

In the last two decades, across a range of countries high growth rates have reduced poverty but have been accompanied by rising inequality. This paper is motivated by this stylized fact, and by the strong distributional concerns that persist among populations and policy makers alike, despite the poverty reduction observed in official statistics where growth has been sufficiently high. This seeming disconnects frames the questions posed in this paper. Why the disconnect, and what to do about it? It is argued that official poverty statistics may be missing key elements of the ground level reality of distributional evolution, of which rising inequality may be an indirect indicator. Heterogeneity of population means that there may be significant numbers of poor losers from technical change, economic reform and global integration, even when overall measured poverty falls. In terms of actions, attention is drawn to the role of safety nets as generalized compensation mechanisms, to address the ethical and political economy dimensions of such a pattern of distributional evolution. Addressing structural inequalities is also a long term answer with payoffs in terms of equitable growth. In terms of future analysis, diminishing returns have set in to the inequality-growth cross-country regressions literature. Further work to help policy makers should focus on: (i) new information to illuminate the disconnect; (ii) analysis and assessment of safety nets as generalized compensation mechanisms; and (iii) addressing specific forms of structural inequality related to assets, gender, and social groupings like caste or ethnicity.

Quite often, migrants appear to exert little effort to absorb the mainstream culture and to learn the language of their host society, even though the economic returns (increased productivity and enhanced earnings) to assimilation are high. We show that when interpersonal comparisons affect individuals’ wellbeing and when a more intensive assimilation results in migrants’ comparing themselves more with the richer natives and less with fellow migrants, then the effort extended to assimilate will be muted.

When the World Bank dreams of 'a world free of poverty,' what should it be dreaming? In measuring global income or consumption expenditure poverty, the World Bank has widely adopted the $1 a day standard as a lower bound. Because this standard is based on poverty lines in the poorest countries, anyone with income or expenditures below this line will truly be poor. But there is no consensus standard for the upper bound of the global poverty line: above what level of income or expenditures is someone truly not poor? This article proposes that the World Bank compute its lower and upper bounds in a methodologically equivalent way, using the poverty lines of the poorest countries for the lower bound and the poverty lines of the richest countries for the upper bound. The resulting upper bound global poverty line will be 10 times higher than the current lower bound and at least 5 times higher than the currently used alternative lower bound of $2 a day. And in tracking progress toward a world free of poverty, the World Bank should compute measures of global poverty using a variety of weights on the depth and intensity of poverty for a range of poverty lines between the global lower and upper bounds. For instance, rather than trying to artificially force the global population of 6.2 billion (a billion is 1,000 million) into just two categories 'poor' and 'not poor,' with the new range of poverty lines the estimates would be that 1.3 billion people are 'destitute' (below $1 a day), another 1.6 billion are in 'extreme poverty' (above $1 a day but below $2 dollar a day), and another 2.5 billion are in 'global poverty' (above extreme poverty but below the upper bound poverty line).

Quite often, migrants appear to exert little effort to absorb the mainstream culture and to learn the language of their host society, even though the economic returns (increased productivity and enhanced earnings) to assimilation are high. We show that when interpersonal comparisons affect individuals' wellbeing and when a more intensive assimilation results in migrants' comparing themselves more with the richer natives and less with fellow migrants, then the effort extended to assimilate will be muted. Migranten scheinen recht häufig nur geringe Anstrengungen zu unternehmen, die Kultur und die Sprache ihres Gastlandes anzunehmen bzw. zu erlernen, obwohl die ökonomischen Gewinne der Assimilation (gesteigerte Produktivität und höhere Einkommen) hoch sind. Wir zeigen, dass die erhöhte Anstrengung sich zu assimilieren, dadurch gedämpft wird, dass Migranten es im Hinblick auf zwischenmenschliche Vergleiche, die das Wohlergehen von Individuen beeinflussen, vorziehen, sich stärker mit den anderen Migranten und weniger mit den wohlhabeneren Einheimischen zu vergleichen.

The literature on the economics of happiness in developed economies finds discrepancies between reported measures of well-being and income measures. One is the so-called Easterlin paradox: that average happiness levels do not increase as countries grow wealthier. This article explores how that paradox and survey research on reported wellbeing in general can provide insights into the gaps between standard measures of economic development and individual assessments of welfare. Analysis of research on reported wellbeing in Latin America and Russia finds notable discrepancies between respondent assessments of their own wellbeing and income or expenditure based measures. Accepting a wide margin for error in both types of measures, the article posits that taking such discrepancies into account may improve the understanding of development outcomes by providing a broader view on wellbeing than do income or expenditure based measures alone. It suggests particular areas where research on reported well-being has the most potential to contribute. Yet the article also notes that some interpretations of happiness research psychologist set point theory, in particular may be quite limited in their application to development questions and cautions against the direct translation of results of happiness surveys into policy recommendations.

This article assesses the impact of the East Asian financial crisis on farm households in two of the region’s most affected countries, Indonesia and Thailand, using detailed householdlevel survey data collected before and after the crisis began. Although the nature of the shocks in the two countries were similar, the impact on farmers’ income (particularly on distribution) was quite different. In Thailand, poor farmers bore the brunt of the crisis, in part because of their greater reliance on the urban economy, than did poor farmers in Indonesia. Urban-rural links are much weaker in Indonesia. Farmers in both countries, particularly those specializing in export crops, benefited from the currency devaluation. Although there is some evidence that the productivity of the smallest landholders declined over the period in question, it is difficult to attribute this directly to the financial crisis. At least in Thailand, a rural credit crunch does not seem to have materialized. Now that the East Asian financial crisis has waned, its impact on two of the region’s most affected countries, Indonesia and Thailand, can be more readily assessed. Agriculture is the major employer in these economies, yet little is known about how farm households weathered the crisis. Hyperbolic news reports notwithstanding, many farmers surely benefited from the exchange rate depreciation. Other effects of the crisis, however, may not have been so sanguine. Overall, one would expect considerable variation in the impact of the crisis within the rural sector. Of particular interest to policymakers, given the implications for the design of safety net programs and balanced rural development, is how the rural poor fared relative to better-off households. This article uses detailed household survey data from Indonesia and Thailand collected before and after the onset of the 1997 financial crisis to explore its effect on farm production and income, especially its differential impact on the poor.