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This article looks at the impact of U.S. national security concerns on imports of goods and services to the United States from an international perspective regarding Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act. This international perspective involves elaborating on the impact of Section 232 concerning economic interests outside the United States. Much of the current focus on Section 232 has been in terms of its impact on U.S. concerns within the United States. Moreover, there is a need to bring to bear not just a World Trade Organization (WTO) analysis of Section 232 but also an analysis within the wider context of Public International Law and policy generally. In the analysis thus far, Section 232 has been the subject of much American "navelgazing" from a scholarly U.S. perspective. However, other than the growing focus on Section 232 from a WTO perspective, given the recent challenges in the WTO with reference to steel and aluminum, there is little if any analysis that brings to bear the wider set of principles and concepts that exist in public international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biden Administration's highest priorities well into the second half of 2021 will be domestic matters such as dealing effectively with the coronavirus pandemic and repairing the economic devastation caused for businesses and workers by the pandemic.1 Still, the Administration cannot safely ignore certain trade issues for American workers and businesses (including those who have been hit hard by both the recession and the China tariffs) even in these initial months of the Administration. A full "time out" on trade would be risky since U.S. adversaries such as China are energetically seeking to dominate the field, currently without effective pushback by the United States. Others, although important, are not as critical for the health of the nation. This paper divides the trade issues between the highest priorities (Part I) and those that probably can be safely addressed later (Part II). Part III is a short conclusion. I note that even the trade issues I consider to be lower priorities, including currency concerns with Vietnam and possible free trade agreements with Kenya are not being ignored by the Biden Administration's U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai and her colleagues. In all instances changing the tone of U.S. trade diplomacy may be almost as important as the substantive results. The Biden Administration's USTR Katherine Tai,2 and the rest of the administration's trade bureaucracy, recognize that effective trade policies for the United States require the support not only of members of Congress but also the public. Finally, considering trade policy as well as other Administration endeavors, it is important for the Biden Administration to encourage its allies and adversaries alike to understand that the United States is prepared to deal multilaterally as well as unilaterally when it makes sense to do so, and remains committed to the rule of law in trade matters as well as otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is no systematic link in America's international trade law to human rights. While the U.S. includes provisions in its free trade agreements on labor rights, it does not -- in contrast to the European Union -- include human rights clauses in them. Only episodically, and in an ad hoc fashion, does the U.S. respond through its trade laws to human rights issues. One such instance has been American measures taken after China, effective 1 July 2020, imposed its National Security Law on Hong Kong. In this instance, the U.S. has indelibly linked its liberal capitalist values to its import-export measures. This article explores Hong Kong as a case study in the linkage by the U.S. of its trade policy to human rights. It argues that Hong Kong is a useful precedent on which the U.S. should build, indeed, lead. That is true even after the infamous events at the U.S. Capitol of 6 January 2021, a day on which America lost more of its innocence as a young, hopeful nation, and undermined its exceptionalism as a shining light. The rationale for the argument is self-evident. No systematic defense of democracy specifically, or human rights generally, is offered -- or necessary. After all, plenty of such defenses have been made across the centuries. The tale of what happened in Hong Kong, both in fact and in law, provides all the rationale that should be necessary. Part II examines China's National Security Law and the essential legal developments that led up to it. Part III reviews the U.S. response to that Law, plus key developments in Hong Kong and Chinese views and counter-measures targeting America. Part IV suggests the U.S. response was correct, and a useful precedent on which to broaden and deepen the trade-human rights linkage, in what arguably is an Open Society War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The WTO has been going through an existential crisis, from which it is like that it will not exit unscathed. If it is to remain an organization of universal membership, it will have to content itself to shallow integration. Its continuing policy relevance, will largely depend on the choices it will make about the nature of its own integration process. The good news is that no one can simply walk away from globalization. The downside (for the WTO) is that globalization is being increasingly administered through bilateral contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to fill a vacuum in the international economic law literature about the legal tools mobilized by Chinese state-investments in middle-income economies. In order to develop this analysis, we scrutinize the largest operation of Chinese investments in Brazil: the acquisition of Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz ("CPFL") by State Grid in the electric energy sector. This analysis assesses the impact of such investments on three levels: the bilateral coordination macrolevel, the national regulatory framework mesolevel, and the corporate governance microlevel. The two main questions driving this exercise are: Which legal instruments support these economic interactions, and can they be qualified as disruptive of the international economic law order? We conclude that, in comparison to large and small economies, Chinese investments have been much less disruptive to middle-income economies such as Brazil, due to (i) the similar legal tools employed to manage the international economic legal order, (ii) an economic and legal environment previously exposed to foreign direct investments in strategic sectors; and (iii) the inexistence of reported direct interference, also known as "shadow administration," of the Chinese Communist Party in the daily operations of the corporation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on border control for non-nationals and refusal to entry in territory state allowed by the international law and mentions ancient custom of navigation embodied in treaty law. Topics discussed include embodiment of legal dimension in international economic law, occurrence of COVID-19 and its challenegs across the world and encompass of maritime legal issues.

This article analyzes the everyday interpretive practices of corporations and bureaucrats that shape the meaning and force of international economic law. To understand how common practices such as public consultation submissions, corporate threat letters, and external legal assistance influence regulators' understanding of their "legally available" policy space, we study the contested introduction of a pioneering nutrition labeling regulation in Chile. The transnational food industry powerfully challenged the regulation's legality under World Trade Organization law. But Chilean health bureaucrats, in coordination with segments of the country's legally highly competent economic bureaucracy, effectively defended the legality of their proposed regulatory measure. Drawing on data from freedom‐of‐information requests and in‐depth interviews, the article argues that the outcomes of such interpretive contests are substantially shaped by participants' knowledge of the entitlements created by international economic law and thus by the international legal expertise they have access to. This often but not always puts transnational corporations at an advantage over national regulators in the strategic interpretation of international economic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This inquiry explores the question of transnational companies’ criminal liability for international crimes, reviewing the current state of research in the field of international economic criminal law, a discipline that hitherto has received only scant analysis. Following some preliminary conceptual remarks (I.), the forms of corporate participation in such crimes (II.) and the supranational and national practice since Nuremberg are presented. This practice reveals a clear trend towards corporate liability, albeit represented by leading company staff. For this reason, and because legal persons (companies) ultimately act through natural persons (their staff), their liability (IV.) cannot be convincingly established on a purely collective basis - in the sense of a pure organisation model (IV. 4.1.) - but only on the basis of the attribution model, namely as a derivative corporate liability based upon supervisory or organisational culpability (IV.4.2.). The attribution model’s individual approach - or, to use procedural terms, the individualistic “trigger” for the prosecution of companies - finally brings us to the well-known forms of criminal participation (V.), with liability for complicity in particular coming into question. All in all, the essay concludes (VI.), we should not expect too much of (international) criminal corporate liability. Here, as in many other areas, criminal law can only have a (limited) preventive effect as part of a holistic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project is the first empirical examination of WTO filings to determine if a private party could bring an action for damages arising under the same core of operative facts pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty. This Article reviews all national treatment, most favored nation, quantitative restrictions, TBT, and SPS filings. After exploring the doctrinal and theoretical reasons for the trade/investment tension, it analyzes those trade filings under a model investment treaty applied in light of decided cases. This Article classifies the filings into "Positive," "Potentially Positive," and "Negative" categories. The findings show a near perfect correlation between trade and investment. These findings are highly significant not only because this is the first empirical study of its kind, but also because they suggest that private parties that relied on liberalized trade laws to invest across borders would have private causes of action for damages for protectionist measures that violate international economic law. Trade has traditionally been the domain of state-to-state dispute resolution, where states often operate based on rational choice, selective determinations of which matters to prosecute. Shifting trade litigation to the private party cause of action model would fundamentally alter sovereign immunity and the balance of power between private parties--in particular, large multinational corporations--and host jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although treaty abuse is an increasingly occurring element in international legal arguments, especially in the sphere of international economic law, the concept is still viewed by many lawyers as suspicious, for several reasons. First, lawyers have doubts about the legal status of the treaty abuse doctrine. Second, as many lawyers would seem to believe, the concept of treaty abuse is imprecise--it is the expression of some loose or unsettled idea about the function of international law that cannot be explained in a clear and coherent manner. Third, lawyers fear that by accepting the validity of a treaty abuse argument, a court or tribunal will import elements into a treaty that were not there originally, and by so doing, will encroach upon the sovereign right of the parties to define between themselves the precise terms of application of their treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Transnational trade rules endow authoritarians and armed groups with unaccountable power in states rich with natural resources. This structural flaw in international trade generates the ‘resource curse’ phenomena that have driven many of the world's most serious crises since the 1970s. Attempts to curtail this unaccountable power from outside resource‐rich states have not been successful, and crises caused by this structural flaw continue to plague the global community. The shipping sector provides a promising location for reforms to fight the resource curse, as it is a sector where extensive, unified and enforceable regulations have long been established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the sources, nature, and implications of an arbitrator’s duty to decide according to the governing law in investor-state arbitrations. It advances a contractarian conception of arbitral authority in investor-state arbitration, whereby the agreement of the states parties to the investment treaty is the source of both the arbitrator’s power to make decisions and the primary constraint on that power: the duty to apply the law. It argues that the choice of law provisions in investment treaties have a constitutional character for arbitral tribunals, such that a failure to apply the chosen law constitutes an excess of the tribunal’s powers which, if manifest, justifies annulment or non-enforcement of the award. The article concludes by considering the implications of this contractarian theory of arbitral powers and duties for arbitrators, disputing parties, and states seeking to reassert control over the investor-state dispute settlement system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews two critical “tipping point” moments in the evolution of international economic law, so-called given the overwhelming response by the international economic law community in each instance suggesting that the moment ought not be repeated as it called into question foundational tenets of the dispute resolution system. In each instance, an adjudicator was dismissed on the basis of his past decision-making, bringing into sharper focus questions about the mandate of the adjudicator and the checks and balances in relation to the adjudicatory role. This article surveys the availability of ethical or other doctrines to guide arbitrators in this respect and calls for change in the interest of preserving the legitimacy of the international economic law adjudicatory systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last twenty years, the United States government has put substantial resources behind the fight against foreign bribery by using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to prosecute unilaterally foreign and domestic companies who engage in corruption abroad. The United States is not entirely alone in this effort, but other countries have been far less vigorous in investing resources in investigations and prosecuting cases. Because of the unilateral and extraterritorial nature of FCPA prosecutions, these cases are sometimes controversial as foreign governments resist American influence in their commercial relations. In response to this international tension, as well as a desire for a more robust global anticorruption regime, commentators have called for a centralized international court to address corruption issues. This proposal, however, is legally fraught and highly politically infeasible, and, thus, quite unlikely to succeed. Nonetheless, the future trajectory of an international anti-bribery regime remains an important question, which could have significant effects on the future of U.S. extraterritorial enforcement. This Article provides an alternative and far more politically viable outline of the likely development of a multilateral approach to anticorruption enforcement. Drawing on the U.S.'s experience in international trade law, where the U.S. was also an early and unilateral enforcer, this Article discusses how a multilateral compromise that increases global enforcement can emerge. In doing so, it seeks to sketch out helpful parallels in conceptualizing the history and effect of the two approaches to combatting official and unofficial barriers to global markets. Rigorous, and sometimes controversial, U.S. enforcement of international trade law led to an institutional shift in the World Trade Organization from unilateral to multilateral enforcement. This Article contemplates the likely trajectory of the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention through the same lens. It argues that the global anti-bribery regime is poised to follow a similar but less formal path as developments in trade law, where continued U.S. FCPA prosecutions are likely to be leveraged into a flexible multilateral anti-bribery framework built on notions of complementarity. This multilateral framework involves more deference by U.S. prosecutors to foreign prosecutors but also leads to higher levels of global anti-corruption enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have observed, discussed, and debated Congressional interpretation of the Constitution. But few have considered Congress's power to interpret the Constitution in an increasingly important context: constitutional personal jurisdiction in transnational cases. The Supreme Court has, in the past few years, turned the United States into one of the most jurisdictionally stingy countries in the world. The Court has done this in the name of interpreting and applying the supposed commandments of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court has so narrowed constitutional personal jurisdiction that numerous federal statutes are now being rendered wholly or partly inoperative. For example, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act in 1987 to enable U.S. nationals to overcome jurisdictional hurdles in order to bring civil claims against foreign terrorist organizations in U.S. courts. Court-crafted jurisdictional rules now turn away all but a small subset of these cases from U.S. courts. In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Congress expressly stated that U.S. courts would have personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign entities for a variety of purposes, including recognizing arbitral awards. Many of these claims now too may be turned away. This article recognizes the recent and growing tension between federal statutory law and federal constitutional law. This tension can be resolved by recognition that Congressional interpretation of constitutional jurisdiction should be entitled to respect by the courts. Congressional interpretation of constitutional jurisdiction in transnational cases offends neither constitutional rights nor constitutional structure. Moreover, all of the Court's cases on personal jurisdiction to date have interpreted jurisdiction deriving from the Fourteenth Amendment--applicable in cases arising in state court or applying state law--whereas cases involving claims under federal law implicate the Fifth Amendment, which can and should be interpreted more broadly. Recognition of Congress's role in interpreting Fifth Amendment personal jurisdiction will drive a truly transnational approach to jurisdiction, enable important international treaties, and deemphasize the courts' trans-substantive approach to jurisdiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International law pervades the U.S. Code. This will come as a surprise to many Members of Congress, as well as to those who accept the common trope that Congress is ignorant about or hostile to international law. It also may be news to foreign affairs scholars who study those areas in which Congress necessarily must interact with international law, such as where the Senate provides advice and consent to treaty ratification or Congress enacts implementing legislation to further U.S. treaty commitments. Even those who have examined these high-profile congressional interactions with international law likely are not attuned to the breadth and depth of Congress' voluntary engagement with international law in a wide variety of situations in which it legislates. The little-discussed proliferation of international law throughout U.S. statutes--termed here "statutory international law"--is the launching point for this Article. Because limited attention is paid to congressional engagement with international law, current legal literature lacks a descriptive and theoretical account of when, why, and how Congress engages with these norms to advance its legislative goals. This Article is the first to systematically examine the phenomenon of statutory international law. Tracking how these norms find their way into statutes reveals the critical but often unseen influence of the Executive on the language of legislation. Further, the presence of statutory international law in the U.S. Code has important implications for the development of customary international law. It accelerates the amount of state practice that the Executive and courts produce and correspondingly empowers the United States to shape customary international law. Further, Congress' role in creating statutory international law reduces customary international law's notorious democracy deficit. In the domestic context, statutory international law introduces new factors to inform ongoing debates about the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation, while highlighting confounding effects on the separation of powers in foreign affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Law & Justice Review is the property of Justice Academy of Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Oil as a resource has always introduced a departure to the international structure. This is because the Northern developed nations are deficient in reserves and production of oil vis-à-vis the Southern developing nations. In essence, the North is dependent on the South, in a particular relationship between them, thus representing a totally new dimension in North-South relations. In view of the very important fact that the North was not particularly comfortable with the change in status-quo, there have been repeated efforts at reducing, if not totally eliminating, an oil dependency on the South. It has continued to be necessary that the extent at which the dependency is still in place be investigated and rigorously analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Signed in 2000 by President Bill Clinton, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) remains the cornerstone of US trade relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This Article suggests that recent economic and political realities clearly demonstrate that the original premise behind the AGOA—that trade preferences alone are sufficient to bolster economic and trade relationships between the United States and SSA—is deeply flawed. The AGOA has not been effective in significantly boosting US-SSA trade, partly because it does not include a coordinated mechanism for assisting SSA countries to address the genuine problems preventing them from improving their trade capacity. This Article suggests that the idea and goals behind the AGOA are still within reach and that the United States can still play a crucial role in shaping the evolving business and investment climate in SSA by building deeper trade relations with the region. The United States’ ability to do so, however, will require a broadening of its approach beyond mere trade preferences. This Article argues for a more coordinated US trade policy toward SSA that focuses not just on improving market access but also on assisting SSA countries in tackling the trade capacity and governance constraints that have limited their export competitiveness. By revamping its SSA trade policy, the United States would be better positioned to accomplish its goals of strengthening economic relations with the region and fostering the region’s economic and political development, thereby contributing to the realization of the region’s potential as an emerging frontier of economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In today’s global economy, a noticeable trend is that the traditional state-law-centred legal framework is increasingly challenged by self-regulatory private orders. Commercial norms, commercial arbitration and social sanctions at the international level have become important alternatives to national laws, national courts and legal sanctions at the national level. Consisting of transnational commercial norms, both codified and uncodified, and legal norms, both national and international, a plural regime for the governance of transnational commercial transactions has emerged and developed in the past few decades. This article explores the interaction between various kinds of norms in this regime, identifies the effects of this interaction on the governance of transnational commercial transactions and shows the challenges to this interaction at the current stage. The central argument of this article is that the interaction between social and legal norms, namely incorporation and internalisation, and the three effects derived from incorporation and internalisation, namely systematisation, harmonisation and compliance enhancement, are evident at both the national and international levels. In particular, the emergence of codified transnational commercial norms that are positioned in the middle of the continuum between national legal norms and uncodified transnational commercial norms has brought changes to the interaction within the international dimension. Although the development of codified transnational commercial norms faces several challenges at the moment, it can be expected that these norms will play an increasingly important role in the future governance of transnational commercial transactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to show that the tools being used to recalibrate the international investment regime, in particular proportionality and corporate social responsibility, constitute continuity rather than rupture with neoliberalism and neoliberal legality. Neoliberalism has been discredited, and few actors suggest a return to self-regulation after the 2008 global economic crisis. This call for regulation, however, finds international economic law scholarship divided between those who claim that standards of review and corporate social responsibility can solve the crisis of neoliberalism, and those who believe that the problem is more profound. In the case of the international investment regime, this article suggests that the current strategy to balance this regime consists only of adjustments to states' regulatory authority, leaving intact the legal techniques that foreign investors use to control local resources. The contractualization of foreign investment relations remains today as important as it was before the 2008 global economic crisis. In this way, this article concludes, the current balancing strategy marginally changes the means and does not change the purpose provided by neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article examines an unexplored issue arising at the intersection of international economic law and international environmental law: How might international economic law adapt to allow states in the Global South, which are disproportionately impacted by the sudden and unforeseen impacts of global climate change, to exit or modify economic relationships that render such states more vulnerable to these negative impacts This Article begins with an explication of the unique features of international economic law and international environmental law, and argues that the architecture of modern international economic law, which requires a certain degree of environmental stability in order to incentivize private investment, could limit a capital importing state's ability to respond to unforeseen environmental harm resulting from climate change. The limited solutions currently available to a capital importing state facing such circumstances, including breach, denunciation or withdrawal, could pose political, economic, and reputational costs that leave the developing state in the undesirable position of being untethered of the system of international economic law. This Article argues that climate change provides a unique opportunity to animate the moribund doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances, rebus sic stantibus, to assist states in managing the impacts of climate change within the realm of international economic law. The doctrine, rooted in equity, may provide a basis for exiting an agreement or, perhaps more desirably, renegotiating the agreement. The party invoking the doctrine must illustrate that the changes are unforeseen, the circumstances constitute an essential basis of consent to be bound by the underlying agreement, and the changed circumstances radically transform the party's ability to perform its obligations. Although the International Court of Justice has narrowly interpreted these doctrinal elements in the past, the climate change moment creates the imperative to broaden the scope of the doctrine and bring more flexibility to the current system of international economic law. The framework offered in this Article provides a roadmap for doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The establishment of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone immediately hit international and domestic headlines. On face value, the free trade zone is a variation to the long-established special economic zones set up by the Chinese government more than three decades ago in order to attract foreign direct investment and promote economic development in China. In substance, the free trade zone is used by China's new leadership as a more ambitious testing ground for more liberal economic reforms, especially in the financial industry. This article looks not only into these deepening economic reforms but also into the inherent political difficulties and significance of implementing these plans from a law and development perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era riddled with critiques of the relevance of classic international law, some have loudly given up on the subject, while others have placed their hopes in alternative mechanisms of global governance. One alternative is "soft law," and nowhere is soft law more successful than in international financial regulation (IFR). Today, almost every bank of any size across the world has to keep similar amounts of money in its emergency reserve, cannot stake its future on complex derivatives or other forbidden trades, and faces oversight that, no matter where the bank is located, will be conducted in roughly similar ways, with roughly similar tools. And yet the promulgators of these rules consistently disavow their status as binding law. These disavowals are disingenuous, and unpacking the reasons why has useful lessons for how international governance works, whether backed by treaty and custom or not. IFR works like traditional international law in three ways. It, like international law, depends on domestic institutions for implementation, although traditional international law has often sought to ignore the importance of any institution below the level of the state. IFR reminds us that the coordination of international interests comes with winners and losers, and therefore that the "mere coordination exercise" that international governance represents should not be dismissed, though traditional international law occasionally has been critiqued for that reason. And IFR emphasizes the necessarily messy way that fundamental legal principles are arrived at in international governance of any stripe—something I call the contestation principle. These features of both hard and soft law have been overlooked by both the traditionalists and critics of international law, but process-driven insights like them have much to tell us about both hard and soft law, which may not, in some ways, be so different after all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notwithstanding International Economic Law’s (IEL’s) inevitable distributional effects, IEL scholarship has had limited engagement with theoretical work on global distributive justice and fairness. In part this reflects the failure of global justice theorists to derive principles that can be readily applied to the concrete problems of IEL. This article bridges this gap, drawing on existing coercion-based accounts of global justice in political theory to propose a novel account of global distributive justice that both resolves problems within the existing theoretical literature and can be directly applied to both explain and critique concrete issues in IEL, including in particular WTO law. By complementing existing coercion-based accounts with a more nuanced typology of international coercion, it distinguishes two morally salient classes of economically relevant measures: External Trade Measures (ETMs), which pursue their goals specifically through the regulation of international economic activity; and Domestic Economic Measures (DEMs), which do not. The distinctive intentional relationship between ETMs and the outsiders they affect means such measures require more stringent justification, in terms of global equality or other goals those outsiders themselves share; whereas DEMs can be justified under the principle of self-determination. Non-Product Related Production Processes and Methods (NPRPPMs) provide a case study to show how this framework can illuminate recurring problems in IEL. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

International corruption law is a growing, if understudied, area of international economic law. This Article examines two aspects of governments' enforcement of the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention. The first aspect is the member state's efforts to enforce its own national legislation prohibiting foreign corruption within its territory and with regards to its nationals doing business abroad. The OECD Treaty's obligation concerning member states' enforcement of their own national legislation is somewhat ambiguous. While the obligation to pass particular national legislation is quite clear and specific, the treaty does not specify what resources that a state must dedicate to internally enforcing these laws. As a result, states may have robust anti-corruption laws on the books but fail to enforce them in a meaningful way. This is more than an abstract concern. As of 2013, less than half of the states party to the OECD Treaty had successfully prosecuted a private act or for foreign corruption. This Article also discusses a second aspect of enforcement: how these internal enforcement ambiguities hamper state-to-state efforts to enforce the agreement. States cannot easily identify whether other states are breaching the treaty's obligations when the internal enforcement obligations are opaque. This complicates international efforts to pressure other states to increase their compliance through retaliation or reciprocity. This Article concludes by discussing enforcement alternatives, namely the continued rigorous American enforcement of anti-corruption policies against private actors, even for activities having minimal territorial ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses international economic law and the reported impacts of compromises by the U.S. government on the facilitation of an agreement on the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Bali Package of issues which deal with efforts to improve trade efficiency and ensure food security in developing countries as of 2014. The WTO's Bali Ministerial Conference, which apparently concluded on December 7, 2013, is mentioned. Procedures aimed at reducing bureaucracy and corruption are examined.

Together with matters of multilateral and bilateral regulation, domestic regulation affects the law and policy of economic relations between the European Union (EU) and Australia. This article discusses the constitutional determinants of the Australian single market and the significance to its development of the free trade jurisprudence of the Court of justice of the European Union. When Australia was federated, free trade between the States and the removal of barriers at the borders were at the forefront of constitutional objectives. They find expression in Section 92 of the Australian Constitution. It took some time for the jurisprudence to develop by reference to principles of competition. Recent decisions of the High Court of Australia highlight the need to prove that a law or measure may have anti-competitive effects within a market to hold it invalid. Application of this (unacknowledged) test of proportionality invites comparison with EU law and opens to question the usefulness of protectionism as a criterion of constitutional invalidity for trade without borders in the 'new economy'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Privado (0123-4366) is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departmento de Derecho Civil and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Subsidy regulation is in a precarious state. While it has been so ever since the conception of the current subsidy regulation regime, the recent disputes between the United States and China over the "double counting" or "double remedies " of subsidies have threatened the mere functionality of the current regime. This Article argues that the double counting controversy reveals the self-contradictions of the current subsidy regulation regime as to the fundamental question of why subsidies need to be regulated. These selfcontradictions make it impossible to devise a coherent solution to the double counting problem within the framework of the current subsidy regulation regime and sharpen the need for fundamental reforms of the current regime. This Article puts forward a reform proposal that will solve the double counting problem and, more importantly, will help restore the intellectual foundation of the current subsidy regulation regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the authors' insights on several aspects of global legal regulation of the economic cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The authors discuss the certain progress achieved by the Organisation under the Kazakhstan's chairmanship. Several problems concerning SCO activity including the chaning relations between China and Russia, drug trafficking, and terrorism are discussed.

Increased globalization over the last twenty years has made effective global economic governance more important than ever. This period has witnessed the rise of a number of new international governance actors, such as the Group of Twenty and the Financial Stability Board. This Article proposes a five-part test to evaluate how the existing global governance actors serve the interests of all stakeholders in the global economy. The test is based on four fundamental indicators of good global governance. The Article uses the five-part test to evaluate the G20's performance at the G20 Summit at Los Cabos, Mexico. Finally, this Article concludes that the G20 is not fully satisfying any of the five parts of the test, and therefore fails to reach its full potential as a global economic governance actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the Asian century, the Asia-Pacific region has seen a proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The driving force behind the initial formation of these agreements since the 1990s, however, has moved away from focusing on economic incentives to more strategic geopolitical concerns. This article examines the employment of FTAs by the United States (US), China, and Australia to further their geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific region in the context of the strong trading relationship between China and Australia on the one hand, and the strong strategic relationship the US has had with Australia on the other. Australia's roadmap to the future as set out in its recently released White Paper provides valuable insights into this interlinked relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the strategies and legal framework regarding the enforcement of patents in the U.S. It states that the strategies have focused mainly on the cross-border trade disputes and the legal framework has addressed the characteristics of patentees, innovations and the value of patent. It highlights that patent portfolio management during legal process offers an important tool to business organizations during the development of business strategies.

The article discusses the challenge of institutional fragmentation in the international economic law. It mentions these challenges which include overlapping jurisdiction amongst the bodies and the relegation of diplomacy in favour of litigation. It reveals a continuing movement towards integration of the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of international economic adjudication. It further points out the key adjudicatory bodies such as judicial personnel, procedure for initiating the jurisdiction, and appellate functions that handle international economic issues.

Although liberal trade and development scholars disagree about the merits of the World Trade Organization (WTO), they both assume that WTO legal obligations restrict states' regulatory autonomy. This Article argues for relaxing this shared assumption by showing that, despite the restrictions imposed by international economic law obligations, states retain considerable flexibility to carve out policy autonomy. The Article makes three distinct contributions. First, it analyzes how active WTO members can, through litigation and lawyering, influence rule interpretation to advance their interests. Second, the Article redefines the concept of "legal capacity" in the WTO context and introduces the term "developmental legal capacity," which describes how states can use legal tools and institutions not only as a sword to open new markets but also as a shield for heterodox economic policies. Third, the Article offers a comparative analysis of two case studies, Brazil and Mexico, and shows that they have pursued different trade and litigation strategies. While subject to the same WTO obligations, these countries have made different use of their policy space according to their own economic objectives. The Article concludes that, despite the apparent rigidity of the WTO, countries following a deliberate strategy can expand their regulatory space to advance their own interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various topics including applied international economics, international trade, and commercial policy, also including the editorial board members like Mariam Camarero, Giovanni Facchini, and Romain Houssa.

Copyright of Scientific Journal of Chernihiv State Institute of Economics & Management. Series 1, Economics is the property of Chernihiv State Institute of Economics & Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)