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O conceito de democracia pode ser analisado sob duas abordagens principais: o constitucionalismo e o igualitarismo. No enfoque do constitucionalismo, a democracia é entendida como um sistema em que o poder é exercido por governantes eleitos, com base em um conjunto de regras e estruturas estabelecidas por uma constituição. A ênfase recai sobre as instituições e os mecanismos formais que regulam o poder, garantindo que as ações dos governantes estejam restritas pelos limites da lei fundamental. O modelo de democracia constitucional valoriza a legalidade e a organização das instituições políticas, assegurando a distribuição equilibrada do poder, de forma que ele seja exercido de maneira previsível e estruturada. Por outro lado, o igualitarismo propõe uma visão da democracia centrada na igualdade de direitos e oportunidades para todos os indivíduos. Nesse modelo, a democracia não se resume a quem detém o poder, mas também envolve a garantia de que todos os cidadãos tenham acesso igualitário aos recursos, oportunidades e que suas necessidades e direitos sejam igualmente atendidos. O igualitarismo coloca em destaque a justiça social e a equidade, buscando construir uma sociedade onde as diferenças de status, riqueza e poder não gerem discriminação ou tratamento desigual. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo principal analisar o conceito de democracia à luz das ideias do filósofo Richard Rorty. Rorty oferece uma perspectiva singular ao destacar a importância da contingência e da flexibilidade dentro de uma sociedade liberal. Ele argumenta que a democracia não é apenas uma questão de estruturas formais ou distribuição de recursos, mas também envolve a capacidade de uma sociedade se adaptar às mudanças e rever continuamente suas práticas e instituições. A escolha do tema se justifica pela relevância das ideias de Rorty para a compreensão contemporânea da democracia. A pesquisa busca realizar uma análise detalhada da obra de Richard Rorty, bem como de outros pensadores que discutem o conceito de democracia, a fim de avaliar como suas concepções podem contribuir para o debate atual. O método empregado envolve uma leitura crítica das obras de Rorty, com ênfase em suas reflexões sobre a relação entre poder, justiça e igualdade. Dessa forma, o estudo pretende explorar como sua visão pragmática pode fornecer novas maneiras de interpretar as dinâmicas democráticas na sociedade contemporânea.

Egalitarianism can be defined as the view which holds that a situation improves on at least one aspect if the value contained in this situation is distributed more equally among individuals. Despite having more followers, part of the theory was ignored by them: egalitarianism takes into consideration all sentient beings, but the non-human animals, which are the majority of them, were not included in the texts on the subject, making this literature incomplete and inaccurate. Because of this, it is necessary to study the consequences that this view has for non-human animals. Among the few who discuss, are Horta, Faria, Holtug, Lippert-Rasmussen, Person and Vallentyne, who are my bibliographical references to show six consequences of egalitarianism for non-human animals: (1) to reject speciesism, (2) do not harm non-human animals for self-benefit, (3) to engage yourself in ativism in favor of non-human animals, (4) actively assist non-human animals regardless of where these animals live, which includes animals who lives in the nature, (5) to give priority to attend non-human animals needs and (6) these five consequences above are independent of the kind of egalitarianism that is assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article inquires into the practices and the egalitarian discourse of the artiguist experience during the first decade of the revolution. We seek to examine the different dimensions of the notion of equality addressed by artiguismo as well as the network of concepts, images and metaphors linked to this notion and its changes throughout the period. We also wonder about what kind of equality could be proposed, practiced and imagined in a stamental society in war and revolution, where popular mobilization was based on novel political principles and the questioning of the structures and practices of the colonial order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines morality in taste judgements. In response to Bourdieu's analysis of France in the 1960s, sociologists note that repertoires of moral evaluation vary across contexts. They typically highlight national variations, like Nordic egalitarianism weakens cultural boundaries, and temporal variations, with transformed values having made cultural hierarchies less defensible. The article investigates a neglected type of moral variation: contrasting cultural areas. In a study of class and culture in Stavanger, Norway, the authors combined oral interviews on taste with photo elicitation in the visual arts, literature and housing/architecture. While interviewees were often careful not to appear disdainful of other people's tastes, and expressed ambivalence about cultural boundaries, their thoughts on housing/architecture diverged. Here, people did not hesitate to criticise other people's taste, even to the point of ridiculing their houses. The authors discuss the implications for Lamont's symbolic boundary perspective, which is predicated on a separation of three types of symbolic boundaries (cultural, socioeconomic, moral). Morality can both weaken and reinforce cultural boundaries, depending on the areas under investigation. In conclusion, the authors suggest ways cultural sociology may conceive of different moral modalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En este trabajo se estudian los bienes patrimoniales de las familias de negocios de la ciudad de Burgos a finales del Antiguo Régimen (1700-1850) y su transmisión hereditaria. Utilizando abundantes fuentes documentales, donde destacan los testamentos y las partijas de bienes o cuentas de testamentaria, hemos apreciado las diferencias de comportamientos de estas familias burguesas respecto a las de la ciudad leonesa. Así, partiendo de unos patrimonios solventes en el siglo XVIII y sobre todo en la segunda mitad, predominan las transmisiones igualitarias a los hijos/as, lo cual se aprecia en el análisis cuantitativo de las partijas o cuentas de bienes, favoreciendo el igualitarismo de los descendientes frente a los intereses económicos de la familia. En menor medida, existen mejoras, mandas y legados, pero en general no se concentran en los hijos varones elegidos para la continuación del negocio, que suelen ser los primogénitos, sino que vuelven a ser determinantes los afectos y los sentimientos hacia hijos/as ya religiosos, menores de edad o más desprotegidos, sin olvidar a los esposos viudos/as. Finalmente, el escaso recurso a la preherencia y las transmisiones de bienes de tíos/as sin hijos refuerzan las ideas ya señaladas.

This research focuses on the patrimonial assets of the business families of the city of Burgos at the end of the Ancient Regime (1700-1850) and their hereditary transmission. We have used abundant documentary sources, especially wills and testamentary accounts, whose analyses shows the differences in behaviour between these bourgeois families and their counterparts in the city of León. It can be observed that in the eighteenth century, and more particularly in the second half of that century, families that had a sound financial situation favoured partible inheritance, as proved by the quantitative analysis of the testamentary accounts. They thus privileged equity among heirs over the economic interests of the family. Similarly, improvements and legacies did not only benefit the descendants that were expected to take over the business -- who were usually the first-born males. They were rather distributed on the basis of the affections felt for religious sons and daughters, underage children and the most unprotected, including also widowed spouses. Finally, pre-inheritance was hardly ever used and the transfer of properties from uncles/aunts without progeny was also rare, which reinforces the previous ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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En este trabajo reconstruyo la estructura argumentativa del asociacionismo coercionista defendido por Michael Blake, que consta de dos premisas, una normativa y otra empírica. Sostengo que ambas premisas pueden ser rechazadas, de manera indirecta (en el caso de la premisa empírica) o directa (en el caso de la premisa normativa). La conclusión es que el asociacionismo coercionista no prueba la existencia de una discontinuidad normativa entre el plano doméstico y el plano global.

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Las réplicas del autor a los comentarios críticos se ordenan en tres secciones: (1) retrato (la fisonomía del retratado mismo, que incluye consideraciones metodológicas sobre cómo está hecho el retrato); (2) fuego amigo (es decir, proveniente de autores que profesan el discurso republicano); y (3) fuego enemigo o en todo caso indiferente (autores que, al menos en esta ocasión, no hacen profesión de fe republicana).

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RESUMO Neste artigo, são rejeitadas duas teses relativamente aceitas a respeito do projeto filosófico tardio desenvolvido por John Rawls. A primeira tese afirma que o objetivo de obras como "O Liberalismo Político" (1993; 1996) e "Justiça como Equidade: Uma Reformulação" (2001) seria o de revisar a natureza do argumento contratualista de Rawls. A segunda, por sua vez, afirma que a principal consequência dessa revisão teria sido certo recuo das implicações igualitárias de sua teoria da justiça original. Procurar-se-á rejeitar ambas as proposições mostrando que (i) "O Liberalismo Político" deve ser entendido como uma teoria acerca do uso legítimo do poder em uma sociedade democrática (e não como uma nova teoria da justiça), e (ii) que essa teoria da legitimidade possui consequências distributivas próprias, incompatíveis com teorias liberais convencionais.

The article has two goals. Firstly, it tries to discern the meanings in which the word “market” is employed, sometimes as the lack of legal impediments to the freedom of contract, sometimes as relationships susceptible to supply and demand variations, sometimes as lack of coordination and sometimes, finally, as a “place” to the fulfillment of preferences. The second goal is to show how a disregard of these several meanings may truncate normative arguments about markets. To this end, the paper assesses Dworkin’s argument on the inescapability of markets for attaining equality of resources. It is argued that this argument is problematic in that, although drawing on the market being understood as a “place” for preferences satisfaction, it assumes, in a general way, that such desideratum could be achieved simply through the abolition of legal constraints to transactional freedom.

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John Rawls (1921-2002) was a liberal philosopher whose theory was, in the mid-twentieth century, the default mainstream political philosophy. His main theoretical construct is called justice as fairness. This study departs from the perception that there is an unexplored internal ethical tension within Rawls' justice as fairness. We argue that Rawls' deontological compass jeopardizes his reconciliation of liberalism and egalitarianism. Our objective is, accordingly, to elucidate the demandingness problem related to deontological ethics and how this affects Rawls' ideal endeavors. This so-called demandingness problem was originally conceived in reference to consequentialist ethics. Accordingly, the alleged tension within Rawls' system will be briefly contrasted with the controversy regarding John Stuart Mill's (1806- 1873) system of political economy usually noticed by the literature, in which the demandingness beams from the necessarily consequentialist nature of utilitarianism. Our conclusion is that, whereas utilitarianism is necessarily consequentialist, and, therefore, demanding, Rawls' system does not integrate inevitably demanding rules of behavior. It is Rawls' deontological background that promotes the tension between liberalism and egalitarianism in his reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I shall approach, from the luck egalitarianism perspective, to the problem of distributive justice in the health care. For that purpose I will follow an argumentative strategy based in some of the statements argued by Ronald Dworkin and Shlomi Segall on which the origin of luck egalitarianism relays. Even though it is truth that Rawls at the time of proposing the principle of fair equality of opportunities, he intended to mitigate the social inequalities originated by luck; for some egalitarian philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin, Rawls' argument resulted inequitable since it did not consider the binomial liberty-responsibility. The consideration of responsibility as a criterion of distribution of healthcare resources will be tested and studied in three points. First of all I will expose the general aspects of luck egalitarianism and I will define the position of Daniels and Segall regarding healthcare assistance. In second term, I will go back to the distinction made by Dworkin between "brute luck" and "option luck" and I will expose his proposal about the resources equality and the healthcare model based on the ground of the liberty-responsibility binomial that he defends. In third place, I will analyze the relationship between liberty and responsibility in healthcare. This way I shall intend to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages that may arise from taking individual responsibility as a criterion for the distribution of resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rousseau's political philosophy suggests that there is an intimate connection between the guarantee of freedom (as non-domination, as defined in the republican tradition) and a radically democratic constitution, especially as regards the process of collective decision-making. This text seeks to explore some aspects of this link between egalitarianism and freedom as non-domination, from the perspective of the theory of democracy proposed by Rousseau in his Social Contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El igualitarismo liberal de John Rawls constituye un punto de referencia insoslayable en los debates contemporáneos sobre la justicia social. En este artículo nos proponemos mostrar los alcances y límites de la justicia como equidad y analizar, en particular, algunos aspectos de la controversia suscitada en torno al Principio de Diferencia. En primer término, examinamos con cierto detalle el principio en cuestión, destacando sus rasgos más radicales. Posteriormente, nos detenemos a observar las dos interpretaciones del Principio de Diferencia propuestas por G.A. Cohen: la interpretación laxa, según la cual los incentivos materiales no igualitarios están permitidos por razones de justicia; y la interpretación estricta, según la cual la justicia rawlsiana, bien entendida, no permite incentivos a los más aventajados. En la siguiente sección presentamos los argumentos de Cohen para preferir la lectura estricta del Principio de Diferencia, la cual requiere, para su realización, la existencia de un ethos igualitario a escala social y mecanismos específicos de justificación interpersonal. En el último acápite mostramos cómo la interpretación de Cohen puede ser respaldada por la visión de Jacques Bidet, quien sostiene que los principios rawlsianos pierden impacto al no estar formulados estrictamente como imperativos categóricos.

En este artículo sostengo que ciertos principios igualitaristas de justicia distributiva tienen alcance solo local y no también global. Me baso en la teoría de Michael Blake, quien afirma que el contenido y alcance de los principios de justicia dependen del tipo de coerción que se ejerce en determinado ámbito. A esa teoría se le critica que no es capaz de identificar un tipo de coerción que solo exista en el ámbito local y no también en el global. Me propongo responder a esa objeción mediante una analogía que muestra que solo en el ámbito local el control coercitivo es continuo, mientras que el control coercitivo que existe en el ámbito global es intermitente.

In this paper, I will show that strict versions of Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Egalitarianism are implausible since both claim that the object of egalitarian justice should single out one and only one value. On the contrary, weak versions are acceptable since they allow a plural composition of the egalitarian justice object.This plural understanding of the object of egalitarian justice demands the justification of normative priorities since each conception would justify conflictive demands. In this article I will make three arguments to justify the normative priority of Democratic Egalitarianism over Luck Egalitarianism: a purely instrumentalone, another concerning expressive meaning of public policies and one last argument will show why we need a division of egalitarian moral work.

Desde el renacimiento y en adelante, en la cultura española se desarrollaron dos estilos de danza muy distintos, que reflejaban contextos sociales también completamente opuestos—el baile reflejaba al campesino, al hombre de la calle, al jaque, mientras la danza representaba la realeza, la nobleza, la alta sociedad. Pero durante el siglo XVIII ilustrado, surgieron géneros que representaban al individuo como ser que vale por sí solo, independientemente de su rango, raza, género, o clase social. Ningún baile encarnaba la filosofía igualitaria de esta época mejor que el fandango. Este género nuevo era una especie de “fotografía sonora” de derecho natural—una representación musical de las “filosofías naturales” descubiertas por Newton y Leibniz en la física, y por Adam Smith, Jefferson y Voltaire en el gobierno. Al igual que Jefferson, quien proclamó que “sostenemos como evidentes estas verdades: que todos los hombres son creados iguales,” el fandango proclamó este sentimiento en la pista de baile. En Las bodas de Figaro, el libretista Lorenzo da Ponte y el compositor Wolfgang A. Mozart utilizaron el fandango y sus connotaciones culturales para reflejar a la perfección los conflictos entre personajes sobre los cuales se edificaba la estructura dramática. Basado en la obra del mismo título de Beaumarchais, la ópera presenta el enfrentamiento entre sirviente y amo, que se expresa a través de la división entre baile y danza. A partir del análisis riguroso de las estructuras simétricas en Figaro, propongo que en la narratividad de la obra los autores dieron un papel protagonista al fandango, utilizándolo en momentos claves para proclamar el triunfo del intelecto y de un sirviente claramente valioso, sobre el “valor” artificial de un conde malvado (o sea, la esencia de la Ilustración). Tanto Susanna como Figaro cantan mensajes igualitarios, y es un hecho significativo que los dos utilicen el fandango en estos momentos claves como vehículo musical.

In terms of distributive justice, one of the most important problems is that which relates to the question about which is the fairest distribution criterion. In this sense, three alternatives have been proposed: sufficiency, priority and egalitarianism. For sufficiency, justice lies in providing a sufficient or adequate level of wellbeing for all. In turn, for prioritarism, the State must prioritize only those who are worse off. Finally, for egalitarianism, justice consists in distributing the same or equal portion to everyone. In this paper, we are going to propose that this last criterion constitutes the most appropriate distribution standard, treating the right to education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Priority View, benefiting the worse off matters more than benefiting the better off, this being the case simply because the worse off are worse than how they could otherwise have been, not because they worse than others are or could have been. In recent literature, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve have argued that the Priority View fails to capture a shift in the moral considerations that underpin our decisions on moral distribution in intra-personal and inter-personal cases, and that it fails to do so for neglecting the relational but morally significant fact known as the separateness of persons. The present piece will target this line of criticism. It is far from clear that the aforementioned shift actually exists. And even if it does, the Priority View could still accommodate the moral importance of the separateness of persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In A Matter of Principle (1985), Ronald Dworkin discusses the role a political morality should play in decisions about when the law should be obeyed and enforced, and even what law is. Noticing that liberalism was once a quasi-consensus theory in Great Britain and the United States - and, therefore, a natural candidate to that role in those countries - Dworkin argues that the loss of that status is due to an alleged failure of liberal political theorists to identify a kind of egalitarianism as the constitutive principle on which liberalism is based. My aim in this paper is to advance arguments against such an influential claim that a certain egalitarianism would be the constitutive principle of political liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is, on the one hand, to describe what I call “tightrope walker love” –the contemporary model of love in Western societies−; on the other, I aim to examine critically its contradictions. This new style of love, which has transcended, but not totally overcome, traditional romanticism, and which is near A. Giddens’ “confluent love” and “pure relation”, has the following features: in relation to its predecessors, it is more democratic; more individualistic; more intimate; more sophisticated from the point of view of emotional intelligence and pliable sexuality; more egalitarian; more utilitarian; and more legalist. However, two kinds of contradictions may be raised: external and internal. External contradictions involve, firstly, the flexibility of the labor market and the economy, in contrast with the psychological assumption of couples and families; and secondly, gender inequality, which denies the whole project. The internal contradictions –those that affect its self-description− may be summed up in the antinomy “liquidity” versus “attachment”. I will conclude arguing in favor of this new style of love, which is morally superior to the other models available, and contend that is contradictions, even if not completely solved, may be softened to a great extent.

La mayoría de los movimientos de reforma política radical propugna un orden justo, que estaría determinado, entre otros factores, por la igualdad fundamental de los ciudadanos y la eliminación de las elites privilegiadas. Estos postulados están presentes en casi todos los proyectos utópicos. Las tendencias populistas y socialistas en América Latina son también partidarias del igualitarismo. Pero ya en las grandes utopías clásicas aparece un fenómeno recurrente: el surgimiento de clases dirigentes que están muy alejadas del pueblo llano, que concentran el poder efectivo y los privilegios, y que utilizan el igualitarismo como mero instrumento ideológico.

O texto é uma defesa, inspirada em Hume, da naturalização de valores morais, especificamente da universalidade e da igualdade. Tomo a posição de Tugendhat a respeito da relação entre afetos e julgamentos morais como o ponto de partida para explicitar o problema central da naturalização na moralidade, que é a naturalização dos valores. Mostro, então, que a assunção de uma assimetria entre afetos e razão, em favor desta última, é a nota característica da tradição kantiana, cujo núcleo é uma teoria antinaturalista de valor. Discuto, em seguida, em favor de naturalismo moral de Hume, mas indico suas limitações em esclarecer distinções morais a respeito das virtudes artificiais. Por fim, concluo apresentando uma análise naturalizada do universalismo e do igualitarismo baseada na assimetria entre a culpa e a indignação.

Una de las cuestiones que debería preocupar más a la teoría de la justicia global es la enorme desigualdad de salud que hay en el mundo. En este artículo, se repasan las causas de la desigualdad global de salud y los argumentos éticos a favor y en contra de la necesidad de tratar dicha desigualdad desde la perspectiva de la justicia global. Tras rechazar los argumentos en contra tanto del libertarismo de derechas como del estatalismo, y tras exponer las críticas tanto al lenguaje de los derechos humanos como a la propuesta poggeana de reducir los deberes de la justicia global a deberes morales negativos, defiendo la necesidad de partir de un criterio de justicia global suficientista y basado en los deberes morales positivos para afrontar la gravedad y la urgencia moral que suponen las desigualdades globales de salud.

El igualitarismo axiológico defiende que una situación mejora al menos en algún respecto si el valor que contiene es distribuido más igualitariamente. En este artículo defiendo esta forma de igualitarismo y apunto algunos de sus corolarios. Tras considerar y rechazar la objeción de la igualación a la baja, sostengo que del igualitarismo se sigue un cuestionamiento de la consideración meramente maximizadota del valor de la vida. Argumento, asimismo, que esta posición objeta a la concepciones antropocéntricas del valor.

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This article discusses the best way to distribute economic resources in order to guarantee the effectiveness of social rights. The main concepts and foundations of egalitarian and prioritarian theories are explained, as well as their inner tensions and their relations to social rights theories. The main conclusion of this work states that the best theory for an optimal guarantee of social rights requires adopting a teleological and pluralist 'prioritarianism' and 'egalitarianism', taking into account that this theory does not deny the universality features of social rights. Public policies focused on disadvantaged groups should be adopted in order to effectively protect their social rights in conditions of fair equality of opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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En este escrito me propongo examinar la filosofía política republicana como una concepción en diálogo con el liberalismo. Según intentaré mostrar -a través del recurso a ejemplos históricos provenientes de los orígenes del constitucionalismo- ambas filosofías se encuentran unidas por sus comunes aspiraciones igualitarias, pero al mismo tiempo muestran entendimientos diferentes acerca del significado y los alcances de la idea de igualdad. El republicanismo, según diré, viene a «reparar» los (que reconoce como) déficits del liberalismo en tanto postura igualitaria. Sin embargo -sostendré también-, el éxito del republicanismo en esta empresa resulta, en todo caso, sólo parcial. Para proceder en este análisis, primero haré referencia a algunos rasgos salientes del liberalismo; luego mostraré las respuestas del republicanismo frente a los mismos; y finalmente mencionaré algunos de los límites propios de la respuesta republicana. Desde ya, me interesa dejar en claro que siendo tantas y tan disímiles las posibles caracterizaciones de las dos teorías aquí en juego -el liberalismo y el republicanismo- mi presentación sólo resultará de algún interés para quienes acepten las descripciones que aquí propongo sobre las mismas.

Este artículo expone algunos elementos de la discusión actual en la filosofía política entre el liberalismo igualitarista y el anti-igualitarismo. En la primera parte se discute la tesis libertariana que afirma que la justicia social no puede ser el fundamento de justificación del Estado. En la segunda parte se argumenta en favor de un modelo de justicia social en el que se propone la prioridad de los imperativos de equidad social sobre la libertad

This article aims to shed light on the ambiguous notion of equality. It comments on and criticizes the major claims regarding equality maintained by certain prominent authors belonging to the liberal/libertarian tradition. Political equality, as distinguished from substantive equality, is the object of the analysis. Since the liberal/libertarian tradition has targeted various egalitarianisms starting from utopian socialism, the most representative contemporary egalitarian doctrines--equality of outcome and arithmetical equality-- are also assessed here. The investigation eventually allows us to build a theoretical framework for politics that rests upon three kinds of equality: formal equality, ideological equalities, and normative equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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