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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to discuss the case-based reasoning (CBR) approach to improve microcredit initiatives by means of providing a borrower risk rating system. Design/methodology/approach: The CBR approach has been used to consider the Kiva microcredit system, which provides a characterization (rating) of the risk associated with the field partner supporting the loan, but not of the specific borrower which would benefit from it. The authors discuss how the combination of available historical data on loans and their outcomes (structured as a case base) and available knowledge on how to evaluate the risk associated with a loan request can be used to provide the end users with an indication of the risk rating associated with a loan request based on similar past situations. Findings: The adopted approach is applied and evaluated employing a selection of cases from individual loans. From this perspective, the case base and the codified knowledge about how to evaluate risks associated with a loan represent two examples of knowledge IT artifacts. Originality/value: The originality of the work lies in borrower risk rating in online indirect peer-to-peer microcredit lending platforms. The case base and the codified knowledge are the two contributions in knowledge IT artifacts.

Long-run underperformance is a major a anomaly of the IPO market. But it is not as pervasive in nature as short run underpricing. The objective of this paper is to document empirically the long-run price performance of IPOs in Bangladesh. In addition to investigate whether this phenomena has any cross sectional or temporal pattern. We find a general pattern of underperformance in our market after five years of going public. The underperformance is 10.19% per year for investing in IPOs relative to the market. We observe some temporal variations and variations across different industries for long-run performance of IPOs. Keywords: long-run performance, initial return, short –run underpricing, wealth relatives.

This paper mainly focuses on two conjectures. Firstly the firm’s timing ability and secondly whether the firms are intentionally managing their pre-IPO discretionary accruals to overstate their earnings at the time of floatation to fetch higher price for their issues. In our study we do not find any evidence that supports the timing ability proposition of Ritter. But considering the cumulative abnormal return we find that in the long-run, IPOs have poor stock return when managers aggressively manage pre-IPO discretionary accruals of these firms than when they manage pre-IPO discretionary accruals conservatively. Keywords: Earning management, long-run underperformance, timing ability.