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This article examines the theoretical foundations upon which the rationale for mixed-income development as a strategy to confront urban poverty is built. The authors focus on four propositions that draw from theories on social networks, social control, culture and behavior, and the political economy of place. They assess available evidence about the relative importance of the four theoretical propositions. They conclude that the most compelling propositions are those that suggest that some low-income residents may benefit from a higher quality of life through greater informal social control and access to higher quality services. They find less evidence that socioeconomic outcomes for low-income residents may be improved through social interaction, network building, and role modeling. Keywords: urban poverty; urban development; mixed-income development; public housing

The homogeneity of retirees as a voting group and unflinching support from the low-income youth has been the secret of the popularity of the social security program.

The relation between private, inter-household income transfers to household resources is examined. The results from the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES) on income and expenditure patterns of the Philippines are presented.

All of the supposed pillars of income security are faltering: family, community, the state, and the market. Examples of how income maintenance programs resting on these pillars is inadequate for the future are provided, and a new unconditional benefit plan, 'participation income', is posited.

The implementation of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for the aged tend to have a negative effect on pre-retirement saving. Utilization of data obtained from the 1984 Survey of Income Program Participation revealed that SSI, which acts as a means-tested retirement income program, decreases the savings of men and women who are approaching the age of retirement. Support for such effect becomes robust when direct data on saving is employed instead of inference from cross-cohort differences in wealth.

Annual net fiscal incidence studies have generally been used to show that income redistribution through government taxes and expenditures is progressive as their net effect is the transfer of income from rich to poor. An analysis of lifetime taxation and expenditures shows that such studies have overstated the income redistribution effect. On the other hand, the premise that the lifetime redistribution is purely intra-personal rather than inter-personal redistribution is not supported. The tax-transfer system is progressive and results in some inter-personal distribution.

This article reviews research from the five income-maintenance experiments in Canada and the United States. After sketching the historical and political context of the experiments, we compare their designs and discuss some important analytic difficulties. Our primary focus is the work-incentive issue, both nonstructural estimates of the experimental effects and elasticity estimates of structural labor-supply functions. We provide initial estimates of nonstructural and structural models for the Canadian experiment. We discuss more briefly some non-work-response findings associated with a guaranteed annual income and offer some personal comments on social experimentation and the policy process.

This paper draws lessons from country studies of the effects of adjustment policies on the distribution of income in Chile, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Malaysia, Morocco, and Indonesia. Following an anlaytical discussion of the issues that must be confronted in the design of adjustment programs with a poverty focus, the paper synthesizes the main conclusions from the interpretative description in the country studies. Simulation exercises exploring the effects of the design of the adjustment packages in these countries on poverty and the sustainability of the measures undertaken show considerable diversity in the evolution of income distribution during adjustment. These exercises also expose the fatal flaws of narrowly designed adjustment programs. Adjustment programs, whether efficiency-focused or welfare-focused, will fail when they do not recognize the interdependence of the three criteria of efficiency, welfare, and political feasibility. Thus adjustment programs must be carefully packaged to fit country circumstances, taking into account both the political and economic environments.

This paper contrasts the use of means-tested and universal schemes in the alleviation of poverty. Using a class of poverty measures, we illustrate the trade-off from that the fact that means testing is costly to both the government and the claimant, while universal provision entails a leakage to the non-poor. The paper provides numerical as well as analytical results.

This note examines and describes the kinds of income protection that are available to workers during the first 6 months of illness or injury; it also provides estimates of benefits [...]

Byline: Jeremy Seekings In many 'developing' countries widespread poverty is linked to landlessness and unemployment. Two possible responses to such poverty are employment guarantee (or public works) programmes and cash transfers. In general, low-wage job creation is the preferred option of both elites and citizens, but in South Africa cash transfers through a minimum income programme might, perversely, be more viable politically and effective more broadly in terms of poverty alleviation. The relative viability and efficacy of employment guarantees and cash transfers depends primarily on prevailing wages in the 'market'. In a high-wage economy such as South Africa, the political power of organised labour is generally sufficient to prevent low-wage employment creation in public works programmes. In the South African context - in contrast to low-wage settings such as India or Ethiopia - the extension of public welfare might be more viable than an employment guarantee, although the political obstacles should not be under-estimated.

Family allowances in the present welfare program has not worked. The government's transfer of money to the poor has not changed personal sexual behavior. Illegitimacy coupled with poverty is still common. The failure of these government programs must be admitted and alternatives found.