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Russlands Überfall auf die Ukraine ist für Polen Zäsur und Bestätigung: Zäsur, weil gegen Polens wichtigsten östlichen Partner ein Angriffskrieg im großen Maßstab erfolgte; Bestätigung, weil sich Warschau in seiner pessimistischen Einschätzung hinsichtlich des russischen Aggressionspotentials bekräftigt sieht. Polens außen- und sicherheitspolitische Großziele haben sich durch den Krieg keineswegs verändert, aber sie stehen in einem neuen, dramatisch veränderten Kontext. Nach wie vor geht es darum, die Sicherheit Polens im transatlantischen Geflecht zu gewährleisten und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Landes im Gefüge der europäischen Integration voranzubringen. Weiterhin, wenn auch mit immenser Dringlichkeit, geht es darum, Russlands Ausgreifen zurückzudrängen sowie die Ukraine und andere östliche Nachbarn zu schützen. Und immer noch geht es darum, Polens Gewicht in der Europäischen Union und der NATO auszubauen, um beide Organisationen im Sinne Warschaus zu festigen und fortzuentwickeln. Ob dies gelingt, hängt davon ab, wie Polen sich in das Nordatlantische Bündnis, in die Ostpolitik des Westens und in die Europäische Union einfügt. Die seit 2015 in Polen regierende Partei Recht und Gerechtigkeit (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS) treibt in diesem Zusammenhang traditionelle Elemente polnischer Außenpolitik weiter, hat aber, gerade in der Europapolitik mit ihrem offensiven Kurs zur Wahrung nationaler Interessen, auch Neuausrichtungen vorgenommen.

Throughout its history, Finland’s relations with Russia have generally been determined by Russian attempts to secure control over the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region. In medieval times, it was mainly about the control of trade routes, especially between Novgorod, and Western Europe and Byzantium. After the founding of the new city of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great in 1703, the rulers of Russia were faced with the problem of ensuring security to that city. From a Russian point of view, it became vitally important to gain control over lands on the eastern side of the Baltic Sea. When Finland became a Russian province in 1809, it seemed that the Baltic security dilemmas of Russia had fi nally been resolved. However, the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917 changed that particular situation. Finland became independent, and Russia’s border moved east to the outskirts of St. Petersburg (renamed Petrograd during World War I). For the leaders of the Soviet Union, which had replaced the Romanov Empire, World War II provided an opportunity to try to regain lost Finnish territories. Although the Red Army did not manage to conquer Finland, during two wars (occurring between 1939–1940 and 1941–1944), the post war settlement saw the Soviet-Finnish border shift back westwards. Finland also had to reckon with the requirements of the USSR’s security policy and make it a priority of its own foreign policyAfter the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Finland modified its policy of neutrality and adopted a doctrine of non-alignment that has remained in place to this day. However, the increase of tensions in international relations in recent years, due to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy threatening its neighbours, has forced Finnish statesmen to rethink their country’s security policy. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Finland, together with Sweden, decided to apply for NATO membership. The ratification procedure is ongoing. The aim of this paper is to analyse, in a longer historical perspective, what Finland’s place was as regards the Russian and Soviet security policy, from Peter the Great to our times. The methodological approach refl ects the chronology of events which have occurred in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region in the last 300 years. They are described to provide readers with necessary facts, and create the background for conclusions on the reasons for the Russian/Soviet policy towards Finland and, in a broader sense, the northern coasts of the Gulf of Finland.

Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit den Machtverhältnissen im Kontext mehrerer Immobilienprojekte in einem als "Downtown" Colombo bezeichneten Gebiet. Solche Urbanisierungsprojekte versinnbildlichen die historisch gewachsenen postkolonialen Beziehungen in der sich globalisierenden Welt. Im Zentrum steht das von der chinesischen Regierung und Sri Lankas Ministerium für Megapolis und Westliche Entwicklung unterstützte "Colombo Port City"-Projekt, für das die Insel um 575 Hektar erweitert wurde. Es basiert auf einem 99-jährigen Pachtvertrag mit China für das "John Keels Cinnamon Life"-Projekt. Geplant sind ein großes Hotel, Wohnungen, Einkaufsmöglichkeiten, Restaurants und ein Casino. Durch das Projekt kam es zu Vertreibungen von Einzelpersonen oder Gemeinschaften aus dem Stadtteil "Slave Island", die entweder durch behördliche Eingriffe erzwungen wurden oder Folge steigender Preise waren. Die Autorinnen zeichnen die Politik der Urbanisierung Colombos unter dem Prinzip der "Rückgewinnung" nach. Dabei bezeichnet "Rückgewinnung" sowohl die physische Aufschüttung und Trockenlegung von Land (physical reclaimed land) als auch die Rückforderung von Land aus den Vertreibungen (land reclaimed from the Slave Island evictions) und die weiter bestehende Möglichkeit, außergewöhnliche Herrschaftsgewalt für das "öffentliche Wohl" auszuüben. Solche Investitionen und Partnerschaften deuten auf fortbestehende koloniale Machtverhältnisse ebenso hin wie auf den Versuch der sri-lankischen Regierung, eine Position als geostrategischer Partner in den internationalen Beziehungen erneut einzufordern. Nur eine von den makroökonomischen Ebene bis hin zur Mikroebene der Individuen reichende Sichtweise kann eine postkoloniale Kritik an der Globalisierung und der zeitgenössischen Geopolitik üben und alternative Modelle zu Fortschritt und südasiatischer Moderne bieten. This paper considers the geopolitical and geoeconomic power relations around several recent high rise, commercial, and tourism-based projects in what can be described as a future site of a "downtown" Colombo. These urbanisation projects also provide examples to critique and imagine the historically developed postcolonial relations of globalisation. The paper specifically discusses the Colombo Port City project - a reclaimed land project that is backed by the Chinese government and Sri Lanka's Ministry for Megapolis and Western Development, and includes a 99-year lease for the 575 acres added to the island for China - and John Keel's Cinnamon Life project - a project supported by both local investors and American hedge funds, that contributes not only another large hotel, but also apartments, shopping, restaurants, and a casino. Similar to other hotel developments, such as Shrangi-La, the evictions of Slave Island for the Cinnamon Life developments indicate a trend whereby individuals and/or communities are forced out either by government interference or rising prices. The authors suggest, first, that the politics of Colombo's urbanisation can be traced through the theme of "reclaiming", which includes not only the physical reclaimed land of the Colombo Port City project, but also the land reclaimed from the Slave Island evictions and the ongoing possibility to exercise eminent domain power for the "public good". In addition, this theme asks: do these different investments and partnerships indicate reclaimed or ongoing colonial power relations, or is Sri Lanka re-claiming their position as a geo-strategic partner within international relations? Second, and towards these questions, the authors argue that a dynamic and multi-scale lens - from the macro-economic and political international investments, to the micro-level of individuals - is necessary in order to engage a postcolonial critique of globalisation and contemporary geopolitics. Indeed, such a lens helps interrogate if these projects offer alternative models and relations to progress and South Asian modernity than what has come before in urban, postcolonial development narratives or not?

This research examined the effect of Jordan's humanitarian diplomacy strategy for Syrian refugees on its foreign policy and attempted to determine whether the strategy is financially sustainable. Humanitarian diplomacy is persuading decision-makers and leaders worldwide to act at all times and in all circumstances in the best interest of vulnerable populations by completely respecting fundamental humanitarian principles. Jordan has allowed many Syrian refugees to cross over and settle in Jordan. This study used a qualitative systematic literature review and quantitative data from the UNHCR to determine the effect of the strategy on Jordan’s foreign policy and whether the strategy could be sustained. The findings showed that Jordan’s stature in terms of its foreign policy has grown, leading to bilateral agreements and participation in international negotiations. However, its humanitarian strategy may not be sustainable with the current level of funding. The funding from foreign countries and international organizations has been insufficient to support the growing number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The literature on this topic is limited, and comprehensive quantitative research is recommended to determine the future effect of the strategy on health care and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan.

This article aimes to shed light on the rich, but rather enigmatic relationship between Finland and the Mediterranean world. These interactions have been approached since Antiquity, but this paper’s focus has been on 19th and 20th centuries and especially on the last three decades. About thirty years ago, when Finland was preparing itself to join the European Union, it also had to build up a real Mediterranean policy of its own. It was in the Corfu European Council in June 1994 when the then-president realised that the country needed such a policy. Thus, in 1995, when Finland joined the EU, it also participated in the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference and signed the Barcelona Declaration that established the Barcelona Process forming the structures for European Union cooperation with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The participation into this structural process was felt important for Finland mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the country wanted to be a full and active member of the EU and thus contribute to every fi eld of activity that are important for the union. Secondly, we Finns realised that if we wanted the southern European countries to understand and to cooperate with our own ambitions in the northern part of Europe, we needed to show solidarity towards the aims and needs of our southern partners in the Mediterranean. All this resulted in Finland being surprisingly active in all Euro-Mediterranean cooperation environments. This concerned not only offi cial state activities, but also other public sectors as well as civil society actors and NGOs. These EuroMediterranean activities became so many and so multiform that we can deal only with a few of them here as examples.

The role of the EU in sustainable development has been generally seen as influential so far. The EU has proven its commitment to promoting sustainability abroad, and the EU has embarked on a transition to a low-carbon society at home. The Middle East lags behind all regions regarding sustainability due to ravaging economic, security, and social challenges, particularly in Iraq and Syria. As the economic nature of the petro-states, the petroleum price influences the GDP and economic growth not only for Iraq and Syria but the majority of resource-based economies. This creates fragile economies that are less resistant to international financial crises. Moreover, petro-states have few economic characteristics, including; high capital intensity, centralization and control of revenues, and low demand for labor. At the same time, oil has special effects on domestic conditions like authoritarianism and the temptation for civil war. This study focuses on the role of the EU in sustainability policy towards Iraq and Syria. This study highlights how the European Green Deal (EGD) influences the path to sustainability in the Middle East, specifically in Iraq and Syria. In line with this, the analytical framework discusses the logic of social actions (consequentialism and appropriateness), which are at play in EU-Middle East relations. Thus, it contributes to the role of the EU as a leading actor in global sustainability governance, focusing on a region that has been largely neglected.

Southeast Asia is one of the places where fierce rivalry is taking place between the two leading powers in the world today - the US and China. The US-China rivalry in this region takes place in key fields, from politics - diplomacy, economy, security - defense to "soft power", the most prominent of which is the South China Sea issue. This article analyzes the strategic importance of the South China Sea in the policy of the US and China, the competition between the US and China in Southeast Asia in general, and the South China Sea in particular. To achieve this goal, the authors use research methods in international relations to analyze the main issues of the study. In addition to reviewing previous scholarly research and reviews, the authors use a comparative approach to assess the interactions between theory and data. The authors believe the data is important for accurately assessing the strategic competition between the US and China in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The rise of China in the early years of the XXI century strongly influenced the adjustment of the US policy in Southeast Asia and the powerful US-China rivalry in this region and the South China Sea. This rivalry is becoming increasingly complicated, and geopolitical conflicts between major powers are possible in the following years.

The goal of this article is to explore the role of mobilization in the foreign policies of populists in power. To do so, we focus on the main features and changes of Bolivia’s foreign Policy under its populist president Evo Morales (2006-2019) with regard to its two most prominent conflictive bilateral relations, with the US and Chile. In both domains, Morales departed from the foreign policy of previous governments. By ending cooperation with the US, the Morales government sought to establish a sovereign counternarcotics policy in line with its core constituency’s demands of legalizing coca crops. On the key issue of relations with Chile seeking to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the Morales government exhibited more continuity initially. However, by referring the stalemated conflict to the International Court of Justice, Morales eventually changed his country’s approach to finding a resolution. Tracing Morales’ discourse over time reveals an intensification of populist as well as hostile rhetoric in periods of domestic political instability. Thus, our findings support the theoretical expectation of a particularly close link between domestic politics and foreign policy under populists in power. Thereby, populism may lead to a more conflictive foreign policy in some cases. However, neither does populist mobilization over foreign policy matters necessarily drive foreign policy change, nor does it preclude genuine bilateral dialogue.