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In this article I recuperate a structure-oriented account of a politics of becoming from the work of Iris Young, one that rejects identity politics to focus instead on redressing structural injustice. Young offers a theorization of democracy that at once acknowledges our inner multiplicity and our individual capacity to shape our identity, and views equality and inclusion as important political goals that require eliminating structural injustice. For Young, fully embracing the multiplicity and fluidity of groups entails a shift away from conceptualizing groups in terms of identity, toward viewing groups as structural positions. Emancipation thus cannot be achieved through including marginalized identities (e.g., through group-based representation) but only through attention to how particular social positions become the site of structural advantage or disadvantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role played by consumers in producing what Iris Marion Young calls structural injustice. Through their consumption of a commodity, consumers can contribute to injustice, often as a result of their ignorance toward the ethical footprint of the commodity in question. After establishing that consumers are routinely implicated in structural injustice (Section I), I defend Young's scepticism towards attributing blame to those who contribute to injustice through acts of consumption, whether their contribution to injustice result from a state of moral or factual ignorance (Sections II-IV). I then examine the action-guiding implications of Young's work and introduce the concept of conspicuousness to narrow the vast range of possibilities for action (Section V). I also suggest a revision to Young's derivation of the responsibility she ascribes to people for ameliorating injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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O artigo desafia certa interpretação da teoria da justiça rawlsiana que a concebe como um paradigma distributivo-alocativo concentrado na “distribuição de coisas” para pessoas entendidas como “portadoras de coisas”, como objeta Iris Young na sua obra magna. Dada a influência da objeção da filósofa nos debates em teorias da justiça, na primeira seção é reconstruída sua crítica do paradigma distributivo-alocativo dos trabalhos de Rawls. Na segunda seção, com base no artigo divisor de águas de Elisabeth Anderson, é argumentado em que sentido a intuição original de Young acerta no diagnóstico das desventuras dos debates distributivos da época, momento no qual se disputava o sentido do “igualitarismo social” da justiça rawlsiana. Em congruência com o diagnóstico descrito pelas autoras, Rainer Forst condensa suas intuições na célebre distinção das duas “imagens da justiça”: a distributiva-alocativa e a relacional. Ao passo que Forst concorda que no cenário contemporâneo concorre uma imagem da justiça – e do igualitarismo rawlsiano – como uma teoria distributiva-alocativa focada estritamente em distribuir recursos e bens pelas instituições; todavia, Forst argumenta que a justiça rawlsiana melhor se encaixa com a imagem relacional. Para mostrar seus aspectos relacionais, na quarta seção, são reconstruídas três ideias fundamentais de “justiça como equidade”: sociedade, pessoa e sociedade bem-ordenada.

A structural harm results from countless apparently innocuous interactions between a great many individuals in a social system, and not from any agent's intentionally producing the harm. Iris Young has influentially articulated a model of individual moral responsibility for such harms, and several other philosophers have taken it as their starting point for dealing with the phenomenon of structural injustice. In this paper, I argue that this social connection model is far less realistic and socially effective than it aims to be. This is because the model systematically neglects the key role played by the emotions in human moral life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neste artigo exploro a crítica de Iris Young a algumas das teses de Judith Butler em Problemas de Gênero: Feminismo e Subversão da Identidade (1990). A autora considera que a proposta política de Butler é muito fraca para dar conta das tarefas que o feminismo, enquanto movimento político emancipatório, busca realizar. Todavia, é a partir das críticas de Butler e de outras feministas, que Young busca reformular o conceito de gênero, desvinculando-o da noção de identidade. O gênero entendido em termos de serialidade promove simultaneamente tanto uma crítica da injustiça estrutural, quanto um reconhecimento da diferença entre mulheres. Essa elaboração acaba exigindo da autora uma revisão de seus trabalhos anteriores, mas permite uma resposta inovadora ao problema do essencialismo.

In her recent work, Joan Tronto, (2018, 22), explains that one of the reasons why care is an issue of power and inequality is because, among other things, it has not been revealed as 'already shaped' in existing social norms and institutions. In particular, she emphasises the fact that the injustice of such social norms and institutions has been tolerated or largely overlooked from the perspective of the privileged. This paper aims to reveal the power and inequality of care that is 'already shaped' in existing norms and institutions, as Tronto puts it. For this purpose, Iris Young's concept of oppression is employed to show that 'care status' is one of the important axes of oppression in society, and to clarify the various aspects of structural oppression associated with care. Ultimately, this paper aims to strengthen the possibility of care ethics becoming a normative political theory that challenges and criticises the structural injustice in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with the current developments in planning theory literature, with regard to its extensive focus on flexibility and process. When emphasizing the open-endedness and procedural validity of planning, planning theorists do not seem to consider ethical considerations about the results of planning outcomes. This is understandable given that postmodernism and its ardent defense of "open-endedness" is often considered to contradict any prescriptive nuances. However, I argue that normativity of planning is possible within the postmodern paradigm and that postmodern concepts and theoretical standpoints can propose a basis for normativity. To demonstrate this, I adopt the works of political theorists who have addressed normativity and political solidarity within the postmodern paradigm (anti-essentialist, anti-Cartesian), most of whom are inspired by the future paths of feminism. To be clear, what I refer as "feminism" is about not only defending the status of women as a legal category, but also how to construct political solidarity against inequalities—without essentialist categorizations or a priori conceptualizations. Using the ideas of Young (second-/third-wave feminism), Laclau and Mouffe (post-Marxism), Mouffe (post-Marxism/third-wave feminism), and Butler (third-wave feminism/body politics), I outline what could be considered "anti-essentialist norms." Based on these norms, a planner can judge which people and whose voices—which social groups or "serial collectives"—should be prioritized and heard first, in order to promote a more inclusive and just urban space. The three anti-essentialist norms that I propose are (1) taking into account the historicity of social relations, (2) having a modest attitude toward what we claim as the representation of "the public," and (3) recognizing a human interdependency that leads to pursuing future-orientedness in a political project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Catherine Lu’s important book argues that global justice must be conceived in structural terms, paying special attention to the way this approach applies to colonialism and its legacies. Lu shows how our states system perpetuates colonial injustice, and how deconstructing or disaggregating nation states reveal the ways that colonial legacies continue to permeate contemporary problems of justice. In this essay, I apply these arguments to key issues and institutions of global gender justice, that is, issues of ‘equality and autonomy for people of all sex groups and gender identities,’ focusing especially on problems of women’s rights and problems with global dimensions, which can be thought of as a subcategory of gender justice (Htun and Weldon 2018). Drawing on recent feminist analyses of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), I show how Lu’s approach illuminates our thinking about the justice of these institutions. Considering the problem of missing and murdered indigenous women (violence against Native American and Indigenous women more generally) further highlights the limitations of these institutions and the strength of the structural approach to global justice. Conversely, I also use these examples to assess the adequacy of Lu’s approach for guiding action, especially for those grappling with questions of institutional design and policy development. In each case, understanding gender justice initiatives as attempts to address structural injustice helps to understand the advantages and limits of various strategies of institutional design and reform.

Iris Marion Young's social connection model of responsibility faces one difficulty when dealing with a non-ideal case where actors, especially victims, lack what I call "capability for responsibility". Without taking this problem into consideration, Young's model could be criticized for blaming the victim for not taking their responsibility for political Justice. In this paper, I address this question by examining a case study taken from Japan where society is deeply structured in a mode that oppresses women. The first sections point out that Young's model overlooks the importance of agents for political justice while trying not to blame anyone. In the second sections I will introduce the idea of the "capability for responsibility" to connect the analytical part and the prescriptive part of her model as a theory of justice, arguing that actors' engagement in self-examination through collective action is necessary for the enhancement of their capability for responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that Iris Marion Young's concept of political responsibility is well suited for transnational feminism analyses. Young's work reveals the intersections of ethical, social, and political theory; her model of political responsibility articulates a view of shared social and political responsibility for the structural conditions of exploitation and domination. Young's theory of political responsibility provides an account that views responsibility for social injustice as both deeply personal, and shared. She argues that we can only discharge our political responsibility by engaging with others in collective actions that seek to change unjust situation and institutions. I argue that Young's model of political responsibility, because of its focus on structural injustice, provides a more nuanced account of global justice than either a human rights framework, or a cosmopolitan framework. Because Young's theory of political responsibility focuses on structural injustice we can use it to analyze inequalities and asymmetries of power with respect to gender and in terms of structural injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Catherine Lu’s important book argues that global justice must be conceived in structural terms, paying special attention to the way this approach applies to colonialism and its legacies. Lu shows how our states system perpetuates colonial injustice, and how deconstructing or disaggregating nation states reveal the ways that colonial legacies continue to permeate contemporary problems of justice. In this essay, I apply these arguments to key issues and institutions of global gender justice, that is, issues of ‘equality and autonomy for people of all sex groups and gender identities,’ focusing especially on problems of women’s rights and problems with global dimensions, which can be thought of as a subcategory of gender justice (Htun and Weldon 2018). Drawing on recent feminist analyses of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), I show how Lu’s approach illuminates our thinking about the justice of these institutions. Considering the problem of missing and murdered indigenous women (violence against Native American and Indigenous women more generally) further highlights the limitations of these institutions and the strength of the structural approach to global justice. Conversely, I also use these examples to assess the adequacy of Lu’s approach for guiding action, especially for those grappling with questions of institutional design and policy development. In each case, understanding gender justice initiatives as attempts to address structural injustice helps to understand the advantages and limits of various strategies of institutional design and reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iris Young, em trabalho publicado postumamente, trouxe importante contribuição para a teoria da justiça social a partir do conceito de responsabilidade e do que chamou de "modelo de conexão social", onde recupera o indivíduo e sua responsabilidade diante da injustiça ao analisar as diversas formas de relação do indivíduo com a estrutura social. O artigo em questão examinará os principais construtos teóricos de Iris Young, analisará as relações que a autora propõe entre sujeito e estrutura, o valor heurístico de suas teses e os limites por ela apresentados. Em seu decorrer, o artigo mostrará a distinção entre culpa e responsabilidade, discutirá a noção de responsabilidade vis-à-vis a estrutura social e descreverá o modelo de conexão social proposto por Iris Young.

Governments have been slow to address climate change. If non-governmental agents share a responsibility in light of the slow pace of government action then it is a collective responsibility. I examine three models of collective responsibility, especially Iris Young's social connection model, and assess their value for identifying a collective, among all emitters, that can share responsibility. These models can help us better understand both the growth of the movement to divest from fossil fuels and the nature of responsibility for collective action problems. Universities and colleges share a responsibility because they occupy similar positions of, among other things, power and privilege. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The vast majority of the urban poor in Mumbai live in dehumanizing physical and political conditions, living in public but only reluctantly recognized as being a part of ‘the public’. The difficulties that the urban poor experience in accessing public facilities such as sanitation and water for example, reproduces and amplifies their marginality. Being compelled to take care of their bodily functions in degrading and public ways, they come to be seen as sub-human and consequently reproduced as targets of violence. Drawing on Iris Young's discussion of insurgent expressions of citizenship, this article examines the struggle waged by an alliance of pavement and slum dwellers to transform the way in which the state relates to its most impoverished urban citizens, and in so doing, to demonstrate an alternative conception of ‘the public’. The Alliance's practice helps reveal the politics through which the subject of public policy is constructed in neoliberal India, as well as provide us an opportunity to consider how it might be transformed to create a more just society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to make a contribution to the debate concerning the moral obligations which follow from the facts of the pervasiveness of acute poverty and the extent of global wealth and income inequality. I suggest that in order to make progress in this debate we need to move beyond two dominant ways of thinking about when the demands of distributive justice apply. The first approach focuses solely on the global distribution of resources, regardless of background social relations and institutions. This approach, exemplified by Simon Caney, identifies positive 'humanity based' obligations to promote or support institutions that fulfil the socio-economic rights of other humans. The second approach concentrates on the justice of the coercively enforced institutional arrangements governing access to resources. This approach, shared by theorists like Thomas Pogge, focuses on negative obligations not to harm other humans by imposing upon them resource regimes which avoidably fail to secure socio-economic human rights. I use Iris Young's concept of structural injustice to suggest that vulnerability to deprivation can be understood as a social structural position which results from the cumulative effect of a variety of global and national actions, norms and institutions. I draw on the concepts of social responsibility and civic duty to outline an account of social obligation. This obligation requires that individuals critically assess their social structures for any systematic injustice, and make efforts to work with others to establish and maintain legitimate means for avoiding or mitigating any structural injustice. I use this analysis to suggest that individuals who contribute to global social structures must make efforts to work with others who are similarly connected to global poverty towards preventing the continuation of extreme poverty and growing inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore a confrontation between Husserl’s ethical position of vocation and its absolute ought with a feminist ethical position. I argue that Husserl’s ethics has a great deal to offer a feminist ethics by providing for the possibility of an ethics that is particular rather than universal, that recognizes the role of the social through tradition in establishing values and norms without conceding the ethical responsibility of the individual, and that acknowledges the role of both reason and desire in establishing moral values that has the consequence of breaking down the public/private distinction that has reigned in so many ethical theories. In order to make this case, I proceed with a review of Husserl’s position of the absolute ought, some typical criticisms that might be leveled at his position, and finally, responses to those criticisms that show ways in which Husserl’s position can be beneficial to the formulation of a feminist ethics that is inclusive of the emotional aspect of moral valuation, and the particularity of ethical commitments, while providing for a different way of evaluating thinking that accommodates what are usually understood to be “feminine” concerns. In addition to describing Husserl’s position, I show how that position meets some of the expectations for a feminist ethics as put forth by Iris Marion Young and Sara Ruddick. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Young proposes an extremely important definition of social groups, which champions the flexible nature of the concept over attempts to freeze and fix the content of groups' identity on a cultural basis. Young shows an increasing disaffection with claims for groups' legislative presence that results in the abandoning of an essential definition of groups and the promotion of an analytical one. This entails that social groups remain the instruments to acknowledge and reproduce patterns of injustices, yet mechanisms to enhance effective inclusion of marginalized groups do not depend on political mobilization around groups' shared backgrounds. This increasing rejection of social groups as privileged instruments of political mobilizations leads me to elaborate an Arendtian `inessential coalition', viewed as the development of Young's reworking of the concept of social groups. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Jürgen Habermas' response to the European Union democratic deficit calls for a minimal threshold of democratic legislation through an explicit constitutional founding. He defends a model of freedom as autonomous self-determination by proposing to tie basic rights in the EU to a univocal form of European-wide popular sovereignty. Instead of constructing a common European political identity, I appeal to the novel democratic potential of institutions in the EU such as the Open Method of Coordination for mediating overlapping sovereignties in accord with freedom as non-domination. The concluding example of basic rights to effective participation for immigrants and permanent minorities illustrates the strengths of Iris Young's and James Bohman's republican views of non-domination over Habermas' call for a European-wide collective willing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on Iris Young's work to argue that social justice in education has to be understood in relation to particular contexts of enactment. More specifically, the author argues that it is not possible to make cross-national or other comparative assessments of social justice without consideration of the ways in which justice is enacted in practice. The contextualized approach to justice that the author is advocating involves: first a recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of justice and the potential for conflict between different facets of justice; second, attention to the ways in which concerns of justice are mediated by the other norms and constraints that motivate actors; and third, a consideration of the way in which contradictions between different facets of justice and these other norms and between justice concerns and the constraints that compete with justice are differentially shaped by the levels and settings in which the actors are operating. This contextualized approach is illustrated using an interview with one mother's encounters with the English education system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]