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International organizations promoting political liberalization and economic integration have become increasingly contested by some of their own members that do not abide by liberal norms. Yet our knowledge about whether these illiberal actors might change the decision-making process within international organizations remains limited. We argue that as more illiberal domestic parties emerge, liberal majority positions in democratic international organizations face increased contestation. We expect this development to be driven mainly by illiberal parties from liberal democracies. To provide evidence for our claims, we study roll call votes in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), one of the most powerful international parliaments to date and one committed to promoting liberal values. Leveraging an original dataset recording about 400,000 individual votes cast in PACE decisions, we find that illiberal parties are considerably more likely to cast dissenting votes than liberal parties. In contrast to our theoretical expectations, illiberal parties from illiberal (and not liberal) political systems challenge the majority most often. However, being in government mitigates illiberal parties’ challenging behavior. Our study has implications for the potential threat of emerging illiberal actors to international liberal institutions and organizations.

Anti‐pluralist parties have come to power in democracies around the world. However, only a subset of them have induced democratic backsliding while in government, raising the question of why some anti‐pluralist governments subvert democracy while others are more reluctant. I argue that anti‐pluralist incumbents undermine democratic institutions most severely during times of weak citizen support for democracy. In such settings, anti‐pluralist parties in power face a low risk of voter punishment and public backlash. By contrast, in democracies where citizens' commitment to democratic rule is strong, the cost of attacking democratic institutions for incumbents is considerably higher, making democratic backsliding less likely. I test this theory by combining data from public opinion surveys, party systems and democratic downturns in 100 democracies and implement dynamic time‐series cross‐section models covering the period from 1990 to 2019. Consistent with expectations, periods in which anti‐pluralist parties are in government during times of weak citizen support for democracy predict episodes of democratic decline. These findings have implications for the potential of citizens to constrain anti‐pluralist incumbents in pursuing undemocratic reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adequately financed branches contribute to the integration of regional interests into statewide parties. Yet, we have limited knowledge about the determinants of branches' varying income levels in federal contexts. To address this shortage, this article elucidates why branches receive donations from citizens and businesses to different degrees. I hypothesise that party competition at the state level, the difference in regional economic performance and parties' historical legacies can account for the level of branches' donation revenue. Analysing German statewide party branches' income from 2009 to 2017, this study finds support for the facilitating impact of state and federal electoral contests on donation levels. Regional economic disparities, by contrast, only marginally affect donation revenues. At the same time, parties' path-dependent developments help explain asymmetries in average revenue levels between western and eastern branches. The study's findings suggest that intense regional party competition contributes to branches' financial independence within the statewide party organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party finance allows elucidating parties' behaviour in differing political and institutional contexts, yet only a few studies investigate expenditure patterns. Given that campaign activities are central for parties to fulfil their core functions in representative democracy, this study seeks to explain why parties invest in electoral campaigns to different degrees. We argue that high party fragmentation reinforces parties' focus on electoral races in election years, a mechanism we refer to as the 'campaign concentration effect'. By contrast, in less fragmented systems, parties invest more in campaigning on a continuous basis. A subnational analysis of the German party system between 2009 and 2017 provides evidence for this effect. Our results imply that growing party fragmentation nurtures parties' efforts to succeed in elections, which is likely to intensify parties' orientation towards short yet capital-intensive campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]