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The Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) became the focus of intense competition between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1930s, when it was more commonly known as Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union viewed the MPR as an ideological and strategic ally, and was determined to defend that state against the increasingly adventurist actions of the Japanese military based in northern China. Japanese ambitions to solve the so-called 'Manmo' (Manchuria-Mongolia) problem led the Soviets to initiate ever-closer links with the MPR, culminating in the 1936 pact of mutual assistance which was intended to constrain Japanese pressure. Using unpublished Japanese materials as well as Russian and Mongolian sources, this article demonstrates how the Soviet leadership increasingly viewed the MPR as strategically crucial to the defence of the Soviet Far East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between Russia and Japan follow two unequal tracks, a network of cooperation slowly expanding in various fields, and a territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands. In 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union signed the ceasefire agreement. Japan binds the conclusion of the peace treaty between the two countries, with the return of Russia to the four Kuril Islands that the Soviet Union annexed to its lands in the framework of the results of the Second World War, while Russia is adhering to its right to own the Kuril Islands and considers it part of its security and sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union used a wedge strategy aimed at weaning Japan away from the United States. While the effort failed, this was far from an inevitable outcome. At the time, the Japanese government publicly expressed its intention to improve relations with the communist bloc. Moreover, Moscow offered Tokyo attractive carrots, mainly in the form of a favorable resolution of outstanding territorial disputes. I argue that the failure stemmed from how the United States deployed binding strategies--policies aimed at maintaining or enhancing an ally's loyalty--to counter Moscow's overtures. In doing so, I seek to expand our understanding of binding strategies and the dynamic interplay between binding and wedge strategies. To this end, I present a typology of binding strategies and develop a theory that encompasses dynamic interactions between binding and wedge strategies. I then test the theory with the case of the Soviet-Japanese-US triangular diplomacy and demonstrate that the two strategies are deeply intertwined and should be analyzed as such. I conclude by discussing broader theoretical implications, such as the possibility of developing a dynamic theory of alliance politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the life and career of Korean author and spy Roman Nikolaevich Kim. He mentions Kim's education in Japan, his career as a spy for the Soviet Union secret police (NKVD) against Japan, and his subsequent arrest and later career.

This article deals with the Sino–Soviet conflict of 1925–26 over the Chinese Eastern Railway, with special attention given to its background and consequences. In 1924, the Chinese Eastern Railway became a joint venture between the Soviet Union and China, creating fresh friction between the joint Soviet and Chinese managers which culminated in general manager A.N. Ivanov's prohibition on transporting military cargoes and troops, and Ivanov's arrest by Manchurian warlord-general Zhang Zuolin. Some scholars and diplomatists have viewed Ivanov's prohibition and the simultaneous rebellion by Chinese general Guo Songling against Zhang as a Soviet attempt to replace Zhang with a more manageable warlord. But this article argues that although the prohibition—a typical instance of back-and-forth Soviet diplomacy—was a coincidence, it was primarily the result of Soviet ambassador Lev M. Karakhan's tough stance and his rash decision-making, undertaken without seeking advice from Moscow. Zhang's victory in the 1926 clash convinced the Chinese that they had the power to take repressive measures against the Soviet Union's citizens and institutions, which led to the Sino–Soviet conflict of 1929 and exacerbated Japanese alarm over the Soviet's increasing strength in the region. This was to be a factor in the takeover of Manchuria in 1931 by Japan's Guandong Army, which eventually led to global war. This article, therefore, deals with the origins of world-changing events and thus is interesting to Modern Asian Studies’ wider readership. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article looks at the contribution of diplomat Chiune Sugihara, described by the author as "Japan's Wallenberg" for transferring World War II jewish refugees across the Soviet Union. Special attention is paid to Sugihara's relations with the Soviet Union during his service at the Japanese mission in Finland. Russian-Japanese relations during the Jewish refugees' transfer to Central and South America are also discussed.

The article discusses 1989-1990 back-channel negotiations between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Japanese politician Ozawa Ichiro of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Topics include the role of a dispute over the Kurile island chain in stalling a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty after World War II, the role of Russian politician Boris Yeltsin in nationalist opinion regarding the Kurile Islands, and the impact of Soviet economic problems on negotiations. It is said that Ozawa wished to exchange economic aid for territory in the same way that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had done with regard to East Germany.

The article discusses the role of Soviet Union military threats in promoting a U.S. military alliance with Japan between 1978 and 1985. It is said that U.S. officials encouraged Japan to engage in a sea-lane defense mission, especially under Japanese Prime Ministers Suzuki Zenkō and Nakasone Yasuhiro. Other topics include a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union regarding Japan's purported Northern Territories, the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Japanese military policy, and the influence of Japan's 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (PFT) with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The article discusses the foreign policy of Soviet Union (USSR) political leader Iosif Stalin toward Japan after World War II in the context of Soviet relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Korea. The impact of the U.S.-Soviet relations and the U.S. occupation of Japan on Stalin's Northeast Asia foreign policy is noted. It is said that Chinese leader Mao Zedong was concerned about Japan during negotiations on a Sino-Soviet Treaty. Reports by Soviet interpreter N. B. Adyrkhaev and Japanese diplomat Hakamada Satomi on 1951 meetings between Stalin and representatives of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) are presented.

The article discusses the role of the detention of Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) by the Soviet Union (USSR) after World War II as a factor in Japan's experience of the Cold War. It is said that the POWs were used for forced labor and not repatriated for several years. Other topics include the operation of Japanese diplomacy during the U.S. occupation, the roles of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in attempts at repatriation, and the implications of the POWs for U.S.-Soviet relations.

This article examines Japan's relations with the Soviet Union/Russian Federation during the sixteen-year period between Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985 and Putin's completion of his first year as president in the spring of 2001. It identifies five lost windows of opportunity for solving the Northern Territories dispute between these two nations, which might have significantly improved the bilateral relationship. At the time of the first missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1986-1988, the Cold War rigidity in relations still deeply affected how Japan and the Soviet Union dealt with one another. The second missed opportunity under Gorbachev in 1989 saw structural rigidity on the part of Japanese policy-makers hampering the faster development of the relationship. The third missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1992 was the consequence of a failure in policy choices on the Japanese side and of policy-makers not fulfilling their responsibility. At the fourth missed opportunity under Yeltsin in 1997-1998, the Japanese side learned lessons from past mistakes and did not hesitate to propose a courageous proposal to break the impasse. President Yeltsin was impressed by this proposal, but the Russian side as a whole did not accept it as a basis for negotiations. Before the fifth missed opportunity, awareness of past failures was very much at the forefront of Japanese and Russian negotiators' mind. The negotiations proceeded unexpectedly fast and effectively in 2000-2001, and then were suddenly crushed because of domestic issues in Japan. Individual responsibility was fulfilled in negotiating with the Russians, but the negotiators were unable to overcome domestic constraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the outbreak of the September 18th Incident, the Japanese, who had provoked the incident, Ahang Zuolin, who headed the Fengtian warlord clique, and the Nanjing authorities paid close attention to Moscow's diplomatic stance. Although the Central Eastern Railway faced a serious threat from the Japanese army, the Soviet Union still adopted a "non-intervention plicy," sitting by and watching as the Japanese occupied the whole of Northeast China. After 1932, the Soviet Union took the first opportunity to recognize "Manchukuo" and began negotiations with Japan about the sale of the railway. The foreign policy decisions taken by Stalin and the top Soviet authorities were related to the gradual emergence of the Soviet diplomatic model as well as to the international background. In addition, they were also influenced by such historical details as lack of information and failure to correctly judge the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]