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This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly recruits. Discriminatory behavior by the employer is isolated in a treatment where workers cannot send signals. We find that gender disparity among promoted workers is highest when workers can apply for promotion and employers recruit. Strikingly, the gender composition in competitive position is balanced in the absence of a signaling institution. When signaling is possible, we observe that female workers who do not request a promotion arediscriminated against.

En ligne sur http://cemapre.iseg.utl.pt/educonf/2e3/files/submissions_to_web/Branche-Seigeot%20Aline.doc; The development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and the important technological but also organizational innovations during the last decades have transformed the labor market and the jobs nature. One major consequence of this on employment has been the gradual rise in qualifications' structure sought and demanded by employers. However, the expansion of higher education contributed to depreciate diplomas proportionately more widespread in the labor market due to a greater skills' heterogeneity of their owners. Since high basic skills levels protect against unemployment, they are also essential to understand the individuals' allocation to a particular labor market position (employment, unemployment or inactivity). What is their role for : - dropouts, poorly signalled by their diploma level ? - old workers, who have a risk of cognitive skills depreciation ? - migrant people, often victims of discrimination ? - people living in critical urban areas (called ZUS in French), who have less social capital ?