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I examine the decades of fraught Iran–U.S. relations through a conceptual feminist IR lens, and I situate the relationship within the broader MENA region beset with rivalries, conflicts and crises. The spotlight is on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the unilateral U.S. withdrawal in 2018, the long sanctions regime imposed on Iran, and the gendered effects on women's welfare and security. I argue that Iran–U.S. mutual hostility has enhanced tensions in the Middle East, reinforced militarised masculinities and bolstered the patriarchal political forces in Iran – which became the target of the 2022 female-led protests. Building on feminist arguments about the connection between domestic and international affairs, the article elucidates the relationship of sanctions to 'the continuum of violence'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Islamic revolution, Iran has experienced deep identity changes in its foreign policy. The Islamic Republic redefined the way to interact with the world based on the Shi’ite ideas and the historical memory of Iranians. With the growing tensions between Iran and the West, conflicts can be seen between Iran’s defined identity and its foreign policy actions, to the extent that in cases such as Iran’s policy towards Russia and the path of Iran–China relations, the principles of Iran’s identity have been ignored. This article considers why there is a conflict between the positions and actions of Iran and the identity that this country represents, focusing on the period after the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Using the descriptive-explanatory method, this article tests the hypothesis that although the intensification of sanctions has strengthened the narrative of anti-Westernism in Iran, the transformation of anti-Westernism into a dominant identity discourse has caused other layers of identity to be marginalised and even ignored in some cases. This situation has created a disconnection between Iran’s actions and its biographical narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the signing of the JCPOA nuclear deal between Iran and the 5+1 countries in June 2015 and the subsequent lifting of international sanctions, many observers predicted that Chinese carmakers would be squeezed out of the Iranian market by European and South Korean manufacturers. In 2018 however, after the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the agreement and reinstated sanctions, the situation moved in favour of the Chinese car industry. China has now become the biggest overseas player in Iran's automobile market. This article argues that the abandonment of the JCPOA by Washington led to the 'China-ization' of the car industry in Iran and shows how Iranian carmakers played an instrumental role in this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear acquisition is a historically rare event driven by a broad range of factors, of which US nonproliferation policy is only one.[61] Nonetheless, the political benefits that nuclear weapons continue to offer the states that possess them, along with the broader geopolitical dynamics that may increase some states' incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, are likely to ensure that proliferation remains plausible.[62] Our argument suggests that the United States will likely become less central to the choices that states make about whether to seek and acquire nuclear weapons. Second, domestic political consensus within the United States has provided long-term credibility to the deals and commitments the United States makes, allowed policymakers to use the full set of nonproliferation tools in tandem, and ensured that nonproliferation policies endure across administrations of varying political stripes. First, US material power - military, economic, and within the civilian nuclear energy sector - has allowed the United States to shift the incentives of states contemplating a decision to pursue or acquire nuclear weapons, enabled the United States to build an international order that supports nonproliferation goals, and reinforced the US motivation to prevent proliferation. Third, US normative legitimacy has helped the United States achieve nonproliferation successes at lower costs, created an international order that states sought to enter even at the cost of eschewing their ability to acquire nuclear weapons, and allowed the United States to paper over some of the tensions within its portfolio of nonproliferation policies. [Extracted from the article]

And domestic politics need to be managed to break out of the polarization which left the US with lower COVID vaccination rates and higher death rates than most other large high-income countries.[55] The second is support for vaccine and other capacity building in low- and middle-income countries, such as the mRNA Vaccine Technology Transfer Hub which includes 15 countries in the Global South. But even if Iran violates non-weaponization understandings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the US were to resort to military force, claims of rule-enforcing against Iranian rule-breaking would be unlikely to carry the day given the US' highly mixed rule-abiding, rule-abusing record. It's hard to find a major Biden administration speech or policy document that doesn't invoke the "rules-based order." The United States for politics trumping science to such an extent that, as Francis Fukuyama put it, "its current highly polarized society and incompetent leader blocked the state from functioning effectively."[31] A bevy of countries for vaccine nationalism. [Extracted from the article]

The reformist‐moderate and the conservative discourses have co‐existed and contended for primacy in the Iranian foreign policy since the 1979 revolution. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, has been at the core of this discursive contest in recent years. This article investigates how Iranian conservative tweeters delegitimized the JCPOA and President Rouhani's nuclear diplomacy. We use Van Leeuwen's discursive construction of legitimacy (2008) to analyze three popular conservative Twitter accounts. Findings show that the Iranian conservatives used the strategies of authorization, moral evaluation, and rationalization for legal and political criticism of the JCPOA, offending Rouhani's administration and allies, and questioning their political competence. This research partly reveals the conservatives' anti‐negotiation and anti‐West logic and their refusal to offer a diplomatic alternative to the JCPOA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On July 14, 2015, under the leadership of the Obama administration, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal—was signed. After 35 years of diplomatic isolation, the agreement marked a watershed moment in the United States–Iran relations and achieved a key US national security objective regarding nuclear non-proliferation. However, the agreement faced significant domestic opposition grounded in concerns that Iran was untrustworthy. Yet, the prospect of withdrawal generated a sense of insecurity that the United States's status as a "responsible world leader" would be undermined, despite ongoing anxieties around Iran's compliance. What explains such a paradox in foreign policy preferences? By incorporating discursive institutionalist approaches with ontological security perspectives, I work to show how President Obama's entry into the agreement generated ontological insecurities as he struggled to displace existing narratives around Iran as a hostile, untrustworthy actor. Yet, Iran's compliance with the agreement made it equally difficult for Trump to justify withdrawal; instead, his efforts raised additional concerns that America's international standing would be undermined. Theoretically, this paper incorporates discursive institutionalist insights with ontological security to disaggregate how different conceptions of the "Self" are contested and activated in policy debates in ways that lead to instability and variation in US foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea has long been on the list of potential over-the-horizon proliferation challenges, but growing debates in Seoul about its nuclear options are quickly moving it toward the front of the US nonproliferation agenda. In particular, South Korea's emergence as a capable manufacturer and exporter of nuclear technology suggests the need for a substantively deeper relationship, to include closer cooperation in foreign markets.[55] South Korea may be the most prominent example, but it is not the only case of a US ally or partner that could contemplate nuclear weapons acquisition. Interestingly, when asked whether South Korea should develop nuclear weapons despite the possibility of economic sanctions, only 36 percent agreed, providing some evidence that majority public support for nuclear weapons acquisition is quite sensitive to potential consequences.[14] There appears to be wishful thinking about why the US might accept ROK proliferation. Some argue that South Korea's prominent international status would also deter such sanctions, or at least better enable Seoul to ride them out, presumably because countries would conclude that the risks of permanently ostracizing South Korea outweigh the benefits.[28] This "legal and transparent" strategy is notable because it stands in marked contrast with how most other proliferators have pursued nuclear weapons in the modern era; namely by trying to conceal both their intent and their capabilities from the outside world. [Extracted from the article]

Focusing on recent U.S. policy developments toward the Middle East, this commentary examines the potential influence of the Abraham Accords' agreements on politics in the region, the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the future of Israel as a democratic and Jewish state. It is based on a review of media coverage of the accords. It begins with a brief history of President Donald Trump's earlier Middle East policies involving Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" limiting Iran's access to nuclear weapons. I then examine the development of the Abraham Accords under the direction of Jared Kushner. This is followed by an analysis of the potential consequences of the Accords on relations between Israel and the Arab states including Saudi Arabia, on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and on the potential policy implications for the Palestinians. I close with a comment on the future sustainability of Israel as a Jewish and democratic political entity. Related Articles: Friedlander, Melvin A. 1988. "Jimmy Carter's Fascination with the Middle East." Politics & Policy (formerly, Southeastern Political Review) 16(1): 205–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.1988.tb00251.x. Jouini, Nizar, and Manel Ben Akal. 2022. "Political Consensus, Economic Reforms, and Democratic Transitions in the Middle East: Evidence from Voting on Tunisian Reform Bills." Politics & Policy 50(4): 851–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12489. Sarquís, David J. 2012. "Democratization after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt's Political Transition." Politics & Policy 40(5): 871–903. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00381.x. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the birth of Fordism and the expansion of the markets beyond the states' borders, national supply chains have evolved into international and global supply chains. Some countries fared much better than others in becoming an irreplaceable part of the said chain. For instance, one could mention Iran due to its rich oil reserves and geopolitical position on the globe, China with its cheap human capital and high-profit margins, and the US with its massive reach all around the world. This study examines the US's mediatory effect on Iran-China's relations. Consequently, a derivative of the gravity model has been devised to test the said hypothesis. The dependent variables to test this hypothesis are China's imports from Iran and China's exports to Iran. The model controls the two states' currency value, their inflation rate, and the price of crude oil. Furthermore, the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015 and the US's Maximum Pressure Policy in 2017 are the main variables of interest in the model in form of two dummy variables. The study employs a novel multidisciplinary approach both on the methodology front by introducing an abstract conception of distance and on the epistemology front by combining international economics literature with that of the international relations. According to the results, the US's foreign policy has a significant buffering effect on the trade between Iran and China. In other words, the United States acts as a distancing factor between the two states of Iran and China. This distancing effect, however, is stronger for China's imports from Iran in comparison to China's exports to Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In disputes over public policy, public debates often hinge on the argument involving policy knowledge. One approach for studying policy knowledge is the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which theorizes that advocacy coalitions form around coherent beliefs partly about policy knowledge and invest in policy knowledge by working with expert allies. This article examines the role of academics, a type of expert, in discourse about South Korea's adversarial nuclear energy policy debates. Using Discourse Network Analyzer, we collect and analyze text from 502 South Korean newspaper articles from 2016 through 2019. We find that academics align with distinctive discourse involving policy knowledge in coalitions. However, we also show that there exist weak or inconsistent associations between some academics' centrality and the intensity of policy conflict. The findings contribute to understanding policy knowledge, the distinctive discourse of experts, and a systematic study of controversial policy making in a non‐Western country. Related Articles: Heo, Inhye. 2022. "Energy Democratization Policy without Democratization of Policy Governance in South Korea: A Participatory Democracy Perspective." Politics & Policy 50(4): 834–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12480. Lantis, Jeffrey S. 2019. "'Winning' and 'Losing' the Iran Nuclear Deal: How Advocacy Coalitions and Competition Shape U.S. Foreign Policy." Politics & Policy 47(3): 464–505. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12299. Nowlin, Matthew C., Maren Trochmann, and Thomas M. Rabovsky. 2022. "Advocacy Coalitions and Political Control." Politics & Policy 50(2): 201–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12458. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenges in the Practice of Progressive Foreign Policy The second important question that Jackson's article raises is: Where is progressive foreign policy in practice? During the 2020 Democratic presidential primary, Democratic candidates such as Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren articulated visions for an "emerging left-wing foreign policy."[21] As Warren explained, "The United States can no longer maintain the comfortable assumption that its domestic and foreign policies are separate. Many important, complex foreign policy issues, such as discussions about the nature of future confrontation with China, Israeli-Palestinian relations, and US (re)entry into a nuclear agreement with Iran, have the potential to become "wedge" issues for the Democratic Party. [Extracted from the article]

It has been a year since Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the West's subsequent response with coordinated financial and economic sanctions. Moreover, while the United States may find general support for its sanctions regime against North Korea - a country with few economic ties and little, if any, global economic influence - China (and Russia) are another story. Victor Cha, professor of government at Georgetown and a Senior Vice President at the Center for Science and International Studies, recently called for "collective resilience" to counter China's use of "discriminatory sanctions."[33] That is, coalitions of regional allies and partners that, collectively, can withstand China's economic bullying. [Extracted from the article]

Since 2005, European and French foreign policy towards Iran have been caught between the change of Iran policy under Republican and Democrat administrations, on the one hand, and the Islamic Republic nuclear diplomacy on the other hand. To illustrate this argument, the article will provide a detailed history of Iranian-French relations, particularly pertaining to nuclear technology. The French discourse on a future nuclear Iranian threat reflects the dominant discourse within Western nuclear-weapon states on the nuclear 'other'. Therefore, this article aims to shed light on the growing gap between France's official nuclear ideology and the reality of internal and diplomatic developments of the Iranian nuclear program. I will deconstruct the official discourse produced in France on the Iranian quest for nuclear power to explore the complexity of the factors determining Iran's nuclear choices and the conclusion of the 2015 Nuclear Deal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates emotions conveyed in US presidential speeches and media coverage regarding the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal during 2003 and 2015. The researchers gathered and examined news stories about the two policies, all official speeches delivered by George W Bush and Barack Obama, and opinion polls conducted during the respective six-month period in those two years. Nine discrete emotions were coded to capture the valence and volume in the speeches and news media content. The study finds that emotions appear more frequently in the Iraq discourse than in the Iran counterpart. President Bush used more negative emotions while President Obama employed more positive emotions. Emotion in the media coverage is constant and stable across the two policy periods; yet negative emotions are more prevalent than positive counterparts in the media despite distinct foreign policies. The study also examines public opinion trends toward the two policies for inferring potential linkage. This article contributes to the conceptual nexus among emotional persuasion, journalism pattern, and foreign policy-making process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Raisi has repeatedly stated that he will not count on the negotiations to improve the economy and will instead focus on non-oil exports and improving ties with neighboring and near-by states. Simultaneous with overtures toward Saudi Arabia, reflecting Iran's broader security policy, Raisi has indicated that the country's missile program and its relationships with regional non-state actors in places such as Iraq, Yemen, and Syria are non-negotiable. 3 "President Raisi: Iran to develop economic ties with regional states", I Islamic Republic News Agency i , (September 17, 2021), https://bit.ly/3RWwZmF. In an orchestrated election with a low voter turnout, Ebrahim Raisi, an insider cleric and Ali Khamenei's trustee who had previously served as the head of the judiciary, was elected the eighth president of the Islamic Republic. [Extracted from the article]

See also "Strengthening ties with African countries to be pursued more seriously/ Iran backs independence, progress of African people", Official website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (January 24, 2022), https://bit.ly/3NSGBih. Reprioritizing Africa It was against the backdrop of the Islamic Republic's neglect of Africa and loss of longtime allies and top trading partners on the continent under Rouhani that Raisi likely aspired to reset Iran-Africa relations. Such transactional and non-aligned arrangements and approaches highlighted the agency of Ethiopia and other Africa countries in terms of their willingness and ability to leverage their relationship with Iran to balance against foreign powers and extract maximum concessions from them - as these countries had successfully done with the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. 12 "President Mahama to pay official visit to Iran", I News Ghana i , (February 13, 2016), https://bit.ly/3E1Y1FK; "President Jacob Zuma to Go on State Visit in Iran", I eNCA i , (April 22, 2016), https://bit.ly/3E51G5C; "President Mugabe arrives in Iran", I The Herald i , (August 5, 2017), https://bit.ly/3UuINys. [Extracted from the article]

A similar policy had been adopted as far back as 1992, when Russia, at the final stage of the agreement, viewed Iran as a potential competitor who was trying to mediate the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; they in turn thwarted Iran's political action through the occupation of Shusha by Russian-backed Armenian separatists. Furthermore, Iran's anti-US and anti-Israeli strategy, along with Turkey's and Russia's serious rivalry with Iran in dominating the region's energy export routes, presents a new set of challenges to Iran. Similarly, Iran strongly favors the swap agreement between Turkmenistan-Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan and the completion of the North-South Corridor that connects India through the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia-Europe route. In the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Iran's president, Ebrahim Raisi, has faced new geopolitical constraints in the South Caucasus. [Extracted from the article]

Unlike his predecessor President Obama, who sought to reduce tension with Iran and find common ground to establish trust, President Trump and his senior advisors saw Iran as the source of all evil in the Middle East and beyond. In retaliation, the US came within minutes of attacking military targets inside Iran, reportedly called off at the last minute by President Trump, who instead ordered the imposition of additional sanctions on the country, this time on Ayatollah Khamenei himself. Since 1980, diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been severed. The US Defense Intelligence Agency defined the drivers behind Iran's missile program as regime survival, making Iran a pre-eminent regional power and turning the country into an economic, scientific, and technological powerhouse. [Extracted from the article]

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement is a landmark accord that has deep implications for regional security and the global Non- Proliferation Regime. The revival of this agreement is a cumbersome challenge for the Biden administration, as the Trump withdrawal from this deal in 2018 caused a significant setback to its efficiency in blocking Iran's path to building nuclear weapons. With the JCPOA no longer effective to restrict Iran's nuclear ambitions, there is an urgent threat that the Middle East would be plunged into a nuclear arms race and strategic vulnerability. The Non-Proliferation Regime is facing a number of challenges which include a revival of the JCPOA nuclear deal, power imbalances, security dilemma, polarization among regional countries, continuing proliferation activities, regional security concerns, and domestic political pressures. The recent outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war has intensified Iranian insecurities in forgoing their nuclear program, as Iran feels threatened by its regional adversaries; Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iranian hardliners in empowered positions are steering Iran further away from the JCPOA owing to the security dilemma. A sustainable and comprehensive nuclear deal must be reached with Iran to avoid a nuclear arms race and further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This article aims to explore a) how the deal shall impact domestic and global security in terms of the Non-Proliferation Regime and, b) how the JCPOA is a decisive agreement for the fate of the Non- Proliferation regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After some two decades of growing partnership between Seoul and Tehran, South Korea's bilateral relationship with Iran reached a bottom of absolute gloom under the leadership of Moon Jae-in. Most of his presidency coincided with the administration of Donald Trump who followed a relatively contrasting approach toward the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues. Washington's Pyongyang and Tehran policies were naturally bound to create opportunities as well as troubles for the Moon-led Korean government's dealing with North Korea and Iran. Arguing from a perspective of strategic choice, this study asserts that Moon almost forfeited the ROK's commercial interests in Iran for the sake of advancing his North Korean agenda. As a corollary, the South Korean–Iranian ties sank to an all-time low, culminating in unprecedented diplomatic tensions between the two countries over the issue of Iran's oil incomes frozen in Seoul. The Mideast country's subsequent resort to gunboat diplomacy by seizing a Korean oil tanker in the Persian Gulf did also little to break the gridlock over the dilemma of blocked assets because any satisfactory and lasting solution regarding this intractable trouble largely hinged on resolving the fate of Iran's nuclear deal between Tehran and Washington. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) addressed the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program. The United States and the other P5+1 countries (the permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany) agreed to lift the nuclear‐related economic and financial sanctions they had imposed. This article discusses how the US administration successfully formulated a nonproliferation policy to convince Iran to engage in nuclear negotiations in the period before the 2015 agreement and how diplomacy and sanctions were used as integrated tools to achieve the goal of nonproliferation. The article also focuses on the administration's agitating for more sanctions and isolation of Tehran from the international community while employing the two diplomatic methods. In implementing the strategy, it faced major domestic and foreign challenges. Nevertheless, the US nonproliferation strategy toward Iran achieved its primary purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US Maximum Pressure campaign, a conglomeration of diplomatic, economic, and military sticks, was ostensibly designed to force Iran into renegotiating the 2015 nuclear deal; critics say the real aim is regime change. The auxiliary media efforts in support of the policy are part of an ongoing soft war. One dimension of these efforts is the export of a popular American media format, the outrage genre or cable news magazine, to Iran via Voice of America. Last Page (safhe-ye akhar) is an attempt, like much international propaganda, to reinforce rather than change opinions. This paper examines how the program attempts to reinforce anti-regime sentiment not by informing its audience but by providing a space of mediated belonging in which the host 'gets you,' feels the news with you, and feels for you. The paper concludes with a discussion about the potential uses and limitations of outrage media in international propaganda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In I New order in the Gulf i , Dina Esfandiary offers another angle on the UAE brand, focusing on its foreign policy and its cultivated assertiveness. Finally, chapter six analyses the implications of the UAE's foreign policy in the context of its broader relations with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has many distinctive features that are reflected in its national brand, captured as "seven emirates, seven beacons, one future". [Extracted from the article]

Yet while McKean and Szewczyk cheerfully hail Obama's attempts to fortify the liberal order, they shed light on how Donald Trump and his administration jeopardised its resilience. Adding to this detachment from Europe, Donald Trump's presidency led to an increasingly fractured and corroded transatlantic alliance as he challenged the European Union and NATO. I Partners of First Resort: America, Europe, and the Future of the West i endeavours not only to rebut these alternatives to the transatlantic alliance, but develop a set of policy options aimed at resurrecting the relationship. [Extracted from the article]

The article presents a generational analysis on the opinion of the American public on the relationship between the U.S. and Iran and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Also cited are the results of the 1989-2019 Gallup public opinion polls showing that only 12% of Americans have positive views of Iran, the percentage of Americans who disapproved the deal, the differing opinions among younger and older Americans on Iran, and how the 1979 hostage incident at the U.S. embassy in Iran caused the Americans' hostility, hatred, fear, and distrust of Iranians.

As new technologies change the face of war, whether and how to pursue arms-control and disarmament treaties is an urgent question. Our past treaties show us that codified commitments can have an influence on state conduct. The author reviews what we can learn from existing agreements on weapons of mass destruction, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Iran nuclear agreement, and the conventions on biological and chemical weapons. Though in some cases they have had more impact than others, these agreements have been effective in curbing the spread and use of our most devastating weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]