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Since some solutions are unsound, the Rio Conventions explore nature-based solutions to tackle environmental issues. The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) promotes nature-based approaches, while Egypt has been invited to integrate water into the Conference of the Parties (COP 27) negotiations. However, despite the benefits of water for human and environmental systems highlighted by the scholarship, gaps exist in the knowledge concerning the status of water within the international climate regime. This paper analyses policies, legal resources, and literature on individual rights and global warming to investigate water's current state and potential future roles within the Paris Agreement. This study first reviews the existing scholarship to explore water-related complexities and challenges, the specific gaps and weaknesses in the current international climate change regime that water status might address, and why and how water is an unexploited potential. It then examines the concept of water within the Paris Agreement regime and its value within the Anthropocene. It then explores the potential role of water in achieving the Paris Accord objective. The paper suggests that water could be a grundnorm of the jus cogens type for the global warming regime. In conclusion, water is an unexploited potential under the Paris Agreement. Findings from this study can inform the efforts of the International Law Commission (ILC) to amend the jus cogens principles that underpin international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the traditions of constitutionalism to develop the building blocks of a doctrine of transitional constitutional norms. After arguing that existing doctrines of implicit constitutional unamendability, such as the basic structure and constitutional replacement doctrines, are derivative, the article provides an account of the underlying primary doctrine: transnational constitutional norms. From the perspective of the form of government, constitutional norms are divided into peremptory and voluntary norms. Unearthing an old, but now largely forgotten, tradition of political thought, it defines peremptory norms as norms that derive from or constitute the form of government. These constitutional norms have a complex nature: domestic and transnational. The transnational dimension immunizes the people's choice in favor of the democratic form of government by protecting peremptory norms from deselection, defined as the impermissible alteration or replacement of that form of government through piecemeal derogation from peremptory norms. Only the people as pouvoir constituant , but not their representatives, may chose the form of government and only through a full-scale process of constitution-making. The article uses judicial independence to illustrate the idea of peremptory constitutional norms. The doctrine of transnational constitutional norms helps to resist attempts at undermining judicial independence and to protect the integrity of the democratic form of government against impermissible deselection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations, aiming to eradicate enforced disappearance, introduced the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPAPED), mandating signatory States to take preventive actions. Enforced disappearance is also deemed a crime against humanity under other international treaties. However, Pakistan has not ratified the ICPAPED, and its national laws lack specific provisions criminalizing enforced disappearance. Additionally, Pakistan is involved in various international treaties that uphold jus cogens, a fundamental principle of international law considered non-derogable. Given this context, the article highlights the misalignment of Pakistan's national laws with the principles of jus cogens and underscores the urgent need for Pakistan to enact specific legislation that criminalizes enforced disappearances in line with international standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the concept of jus cogens in light of the past and present impact of Russia's veto power. It mentions permanent member of the Security Council violating the core norm against the aggressive use of force and violating international law, and causing the Security Council to be unable to carry out its core mandate. It also mentions limitations to veto use in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

An introduction is presented in which editor discusses various articles within the issue on topics including implications of a new tribunal to prosecute crimes of aggression in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine; traditional notions of jus ad bellum and concept of jus cogens in Russia.

Ever since the infamous Port Arthur massacre, Australia has not only lacked mass shootings, but has seen a dramatic decline in firearm-related homicides nationwide following a significant overhaul in its gun laws. As a result, legal commentators, political pundits, and scholars from around the globe have consistently argued that the United States is missing out on crucial gun law reforms that Australia implemented without any noticeable recourse. These reforms included, among other things, gun ownership licensure, a national firearm registry, and a ban on "military-style" weapons, such as assault rifles. Nevertheless, the contention that the United States ought to either adopt or substantially mirror the radically imposed firearm laws of Australia is based on a precarious misunderstanding of American constitutionalism and a blatant example of "jumping the gun on policy reform as a whole. Moreover, as this article will defend, the right to keep and bear firearms should evidently be viewed as a fundamental predicate of international jus cogens norms, including the individual right to self-defense and the imperative that citizens ought to have the unfettered ability to rebel against a tyrannical government. Therefore, not only should the United States be the nation that sets the global standard for firearm policy, but the argument that it should change its ways in comparison to Australia must suitably be put to rest, once and for all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UNSC has under Chapter VII of the UN Charter broad powers to maintain international peace and security. The "primary responsibility" of the UNSC for this "maintenance" was expresiss verbiss embodied in the UN Charter (Art. 24). The only explicit limitation on the UNSC powers is in Art. 24(2), which states that the UNSC shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. There is often raised a legitime question of judicial review of the Council's decisions. Frankly to say this possibility was rejected already during negotations on the UN Charter. This study is dealing with contentions jurisdiction of the ICJ and its advisory opinions as well. The UNSC cannot act contrary to jus cogens. But the UN Charter does not explicitly authorize the ICJ to review the legality or validity of acts of the UNSC and other bodies of the UN. There is opinion that UNSC resolutions which are ultra vires or violate jus cogens norms are void and not legally binding. However, another opinion insists that the UNSC sole bears responsibility for determination of legality of its own acts. The members of the UN agree to acceps and carry out the decisions of the UNSC in "accordance with the present Charter". This brief study endeavours to discuss the question of judicial control of acts adopted by the UNSC. The issue of judicial review has received extensive scale of discussion in the last years. But there are problems with the scope and implementation of judicial review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rule of law binds humankind together, or at least, is expected to do so. In an attempt to keep the sanctity of the UN Charter, the San Francisco conference and the vision which made way for the modern contemporary world, rule of law is the quintessential word. But, has there been any realization on the importance of the principle, with regard to the international legal regime is the question that propels thought. Ever since the conception of the term 'rule of law', there have been enormous scholarly explorations on its nuances. Through this paper, the author tries to understand in depth, how the practical implications of the same are felt across different sectors of the mechanisms of law. Be it in the international setting or the domestic set-up with the UN framework, the author outlines the significance of rule of law at work. The paper also attempts to answer some basic questions with respect to the administrators of rule of law from an international legal platform, the instruments that propel rule of law and explores the human rights dimensions to this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a book "Existing Legal Limits to the Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes" argues that , when considered within the context and veto use by the permanent members of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council. It mentions face of ongoing, or the serious risk of, genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes is of questionable legality. It also mentions veto power when considering jus cogens.

Jus cogens are a species of supernorm in international law. They are universally binding and trump all contrary rules-such as treaties and customary international law. They are typically framed in terms of substantive prohibitions: no genocide, no slavery, no crimes against humanity, etc. This Article seeks to identify a procedural jus cogens; namely, the right to due process of law made up of notice, a hearing, and an impartial and independent decisionmaker. To do so, it draws from what are called "general principles of international law"; that is, principles common to legal systems around the world, which make up a source of international law. It argues that a comparative approach to these principles can reveal an empirically supported, objective underlying natural law right. In particular, by looking to the rights that states deem most important, hierarchically superior, and foundational to their legal systems as contained in their constitutions, this approach solves major seemingly intractable jurisprudential and practical dilemmas for the international law of jus cogens by providing an alternative to horizontal, consent-based positivistic law of treaties and custom. To make its argument, this Article examines the 193 member states of the United Nations as well as Kosovo, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the Vatican City (Holy See). Diligent research has revealed that virtually all states in the world secure the most basic requirements of due process: notice, a hearing, and an impartial and independent decisionmaker. More specifically, 189 states provide notice to the accused, 196 states provide for the right to a hearing, and 196 states provide for an impartial and independent decisionmaker. Moreover, the vast majority of these protections are constitutional. The right to notice is protected in 179 constitutions, the right to a hearing is protected in 193 constitutions, and the right to an impartial and independent decisionmaker is protected in 193 constitutions. This analysis easily satisfies the recent International Law Commission criteria that for a norm to qualify as jus cogens it must be accepted by "a very large majority of states . . . across regions, legal systems and cultures". Discovering a procedural jus cogens would be revolutionary in some respects. A procedural jus cogens norm would expand the concept of jus cogens because such a norm would qualitatively differ from a substantive one, given that it is not merely a negative obligation on a state but imposes a positive duty to provide a right. Further, the Article's argument holds powerful implications not just for international law but for domestic U.S. law as well. The Supreme Court long ago held that international law is part of our law, including the law of jus cogens, and mechanisms exist to enforce that law in U.S. courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kratochwil criticizes two important teleological global narratives of universal progress – Luhmannian systems theory and jus cogens – and defends the need for a non-ideal and situated approach to law and politics. Despite the cogency of Kratochwil's analysis, why should we place our hope in his pragmatic program given the complexity of actual decision-making? This paper shows that more needs to be said about the role of hope grounding Kratochwil's account. Which hopes are hopeless, and which warranted? Why should we care and 'go on', choosing to be prudential and political rather than focusing on one's inner development or pleasure? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the judicialization of mega-political issues to international law by examining the issue of jus cogens in international courts. Other topics include the transposition of themes in constitutional law to international law, the study on the original historical promise of jus cogens based on a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), and the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT).

The Caribbean Court of Justice was established in 2005 to have a determinative role in the further development of Caribbean jurisprudence, and, during its sixteen years of existence, the CCJ has made many important pronouncements on the rule of law. A recent study of these pronouncements suggests that the Court appears to be headed towards the acceptance of a substantive conception of the rule of law which is hierarchically superior to the Constitution and which limits the legislative power to amend the Constitution. But any such court-determined rule of law may be difficult to reconcile with orthodox principles of Caribbean constitutionalism and the orderly development of Caribbean Constitutional democracies. This paper identifies an alternative method of disciplining legislative action in the norms of jus cogens and explores the conceptual methodologies and precedents for making these norms applicable in domestic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As COVID-19 has spread around the world, many states have suspended their compliance with a core requirement of international refugee law: the duty to refrain from returning refugees to territories where they face a serious risk of persecution (the duty of nonrefoulement). These measures have prompted some observers to question whether non-refoulement will survive the pandemic as a nonderogable legal duty. This Article explains why the international community should embrace non-refoulement as a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) that applies even during public emergencies, such as the coronavirus pandemic. Viewed from a global justice perspective, the authority that international law entrusts to states--including the sovereign power to regulate migration across national borders--can be legitimate only if states refrain from refoulement. For the international legal order to claim to possess legitimate authority over exiled outsiders, it must treat non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm. A failure to regard nonrefoulement as a peremptory norm would thus strip the international legal system of its claim to legality vis-à-vis asylum seekers, supplanting the rule of international law in this context with mere coercive force. To test this account of the authority of international refugee law, the Article surveys closed-border policies that states have adopted in response to COVID-19 and explains why the associated restrictions on non-refoulement are unjustifiable and incompatible with the rule of law. Even during a genuine national emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving states cannot return refugees to persecution without subverting their own claims to legal authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than a decade, U.S. courts have struggled to develop a common law immunity regime to govern suits brought against foreign government officials, and they are now divided on a number of issues, including the extent to which they should defer to the executive branch and whether to recognize a jus cogens exception. This Editorial Comment considers a more conceptual division in the courts, between an "effect-of-judgment" approach that would confer immunity only when the judgment that the plaintiff is seeking would be directly enforceable against the foreign state, and a broader "nature-of-act" approach that would confer immunity whenever the plaintiff's case is challenging conduct carried out on behalf of the state. The Comment argues in favor of the nature-of-act approach and explains why analogies in this context to domestic civil rights litigation are misplaced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the legality of the land closure imposed upon the Gaza Strip by Israel. After having considered the area under occupation, the paper argues that the legality of the closure must be determined under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. In the light of these rules, the arbitrary closure of the Gaza Strip should be considered illegal because it breaches the unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and because it violates the freedom of movement of the local population. Moreover, the closure breaches the relevant rules pertaining to the transit of goods in occupied territory. The paper concludes that most of the violations caused by the closure affect peremptory rules which produce obligations erga omnes, so that any state in the international community is entitled to react under the law of state responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to assess the military operation started on 24 February 2022 by Russia against Ukraine in light of the law on use of force, having in mind all the justifications officially expressed by Russian authorities and in light of international humanitarian law. The author claims that there is no justification for the Russian military action and thus it must be qualified as aggression. This, due to the serious violation of the peremptory norm, implies obligations on the part of states and international organizations (i.e. the international community). In addition, the current conduct of hostilities clearly shows that it is mainly Russian forces which neglect international humanitarian law principles, which might amount to war crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights' jurisdiction should outlive the purpose of any state to denounce the American Convention on Human Rights in order to avoid disadvantageous international rules and circumvent the international adjudicative authority to protect victims of human rights violations. I begin by outlining the Human Rights jus cogens nature integrated into the universal international human rights law. Following that, I review leading international court cases approaching the jurisdictional paradigm on treaty defections. Furthermore, I propose two conjunctive new elements modifying the mechanical jurisdictional paradigm: the constitutional internationalized human rights treaties and the substantial reviewability of a treaty's defection. I conclude by examining the interface concerning the American Convention on Human Rights and Latin American constitutions. In approaching the Latin American constitutions, I will demonstrate how what I refer to as the "jus cogens complementary jurisdictional model" would operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with an important question of legal justification: What reasons serve to justify a claim that a norm has the status of jus cogens. This question can be approached from two fundamentally different perspectives – in this article referred to as legal positivism and legal idealism. As earlier research has demonstrated, legal positivists have great difficulty justifying their jus cogens claims. What this article argues is that legal idealists face a no less difficult task, and that this prompts an entirely new understanding of the jus cogens discourse. If there is no way for a lawyer to justify a jus cogens claim, then neither is there any way for him or her to refute propositions put forth by others. Jus cogens discourse becomes a safe haven for all kinds of arguments, of which, legally speaking, no one can ever be regarded as any more acceptable than any other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of the Manhattan Project, a secret nuclear weapons program in 1946, the United States became the first nation in the world to secure a nuclear weapon. Although the United States' nuclear weapon resulted in an international desire to attain similar capabilities, the leading scientists of the Manhattan Project released a somber statement that first reflected the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. The Manhattan Project scientists warned that a "grave danger lies ahead" if the issues associated with the weapon were not "carefully analyzed and discussed with competent authorities.". The statement released by the Manhattan Project scientists was the first express statement made about the dangers that accompany nuclear weapons and, incidentally, nuclear proliferation. The scientists' grave prediction came to fruition one month later, when two nuclear bombs killed over 250,000 Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. After the World War II nuclear bombings, the Soviet Union secured a nuclear weapon followed by the United Kingdom, France, and China. Fearing further proliferation and possible catastrophic results if the nuclear bomb fell into the wrong hands, the international community began to heed to the Manhattan Project scientists' warnings by carefully analyzing and discussing nuclear non-proliferation. International discussions led to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. Currently, the NPT is the largest binding arms and limitation agreement as 191 out of 193 States are party to the treaty. This Comment will argue that nuclear non-proliferation has attained jus cogens status because of both its shared fundamental importance in the international community as well as its universal acceptance and adherence. Ultimately, this Comment will analyze the opinio juris that surrounds the norm, relevant treaties and resolutions, and ad hoc investigations that contribute to the jus cogens status of the norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International legal responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors have been many but often inconsistent, inadequate, and legally unsound. This Article argues in favor of resorting to successfully-implemented methods of dealing with similar crimes. International law has already expanded from its original statist conceptions and scope to include individuals, such as in international human rights norms and international humanitarian laws. In the latter, in particular, the law has expanded in the context of both international and non-international armed conflict. This Article argues that the advancement of law in these areas can lend much to efforts to bring nuclear terrorism within the scope of International Criminal Court, from whose jurisdiction this crime is currently excluded. This Article also recommends purposefully elevating the prohibition against possession and use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors to jus cogens, making such acts international crimes of the type that do not necessarily require state consent for prosecution by an international tribunal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the European Union (EU) intervention in Cyprus and concrens regarding right to self-determination is a jus cogens right for the EU and the Council of Europe. Topics discussed include EU could argue that United Nations Security Council Resolution 550 justifies the isolation of Northern Cyprus, 1960 Settlement which did not permit the economic or political unification of the island partially and interventions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

International environmental law (IEL) seems unable to comprehensively and effectively respond to the Anthropocene's deepening socio‐ecological crisis. While there are several reasons for this state of affairs, one in particular relates to the argument that IEL lacks higher‐order global constitutional‐type norms that could constrain State sovereignty and the free will of States in their relations with the environment. As a contribution to the debate on the effectiveness of IEL in the Anthropocene, we seek here for such higher‐order constitutional norms in the areas of customary international law and jus cogens. We conduct the ensuing analysis through the lens of the 'normative hierarchy' and 'global constitutionalism' theories of international law and critically reflect on the extent to which these norms could play a meaningful role to mediate the human–environment interface in the Anthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines claims filed by Ukrainian investors against Russia under the Ukraine–Russia BIT alleging violations committed in Crimea after its annexation by Russia in 2014. Six tribunals have recently rendered awards concluding that they have jurisdiction over these disputes. I will argue that the only logical way for them to come to this conclusion is to consider that Crimea is now part of Russia for the application of the BIT. Yet, Crimea is still part of Ukraine under international because the annexation was in violation of the jus cogens prohibition of the use of force. Tribunals should therefore have declined their jurisdiction over these claims. Their decisions have certainly been influenced by the unprecedented context of these proceedings, including Ukraine’s intervention recognizing the effectiveness of the occupation. Yet, such decisions are giving legal effect to Crimea’s change of status contrary to the non-recognition obligation under international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state on 16th August in 1960 after being declared formally as a Crown Colony on 10th March in 1925 by the United Kingdom. The Constitution of the Republic, which came into effect on the day of independence, had its roots in agreements reached between the heads of government of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on 11th February in 1959. These were incorporated in agreements reached between those governments and the United Kingdom in London on 19th February. On the same day, the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities accepted the documents concerned, and accompanying declarations by the three governments, as "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus". The agreements were embodied in treaties - the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and the Treaty of Alliance, signed by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey - and in the constitution, signed in Nicosia on 16th August in 1960. Republic of Cyprus was founded as a bi-communal state based on partnership between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots proposed amendments to the Constitution, known as the Thirteen Points that entailed usurping the rights of Turkish Cypriots and degrading their equal co-founder status to that of a minority on the Island. Turkish Cypriots refused the Thirteen Points as an obligation to protect their treaty rights and do not recognize the situation created by the abuse of rights as legal. International community has an obligation not to recognize as lawful within the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur based on the peremptory norm of self-determination of peoples under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, the situation created by the Greek Cypriots with the amendments to the Constitutional Treaty of 16 August 1960. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario's self-determination of the population of Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. The legal status of Western Sahara was given by the International Court of Justice, and the UN General Assembly recognizing Front Polisario as the representative of the Sahrawi people.

The article considers the apparent disjunction between the Court's effective limitation of liability for the U.S. corporation and expansive liability for the natural person for similar crimes. Topics include Jus Cogens claims against corporations; court cases Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. on the same; and Alien Tort Statute on the same.

This Article uses social systems theory to examine the increased reliance on a distinction between substantive and procedural international law to resolve cases involving a conflict between jus cogens and state immunity. This presents the problem of an evolutionary relationship between international law and the complex differentiation of world society. International law is shown to be structurally related to the segmentary differentiation of states that underwrites modern society's functional differentiation. At the same time, it is shown to be structurally related to the increasing formulation of global norms that result from advanced functional differentiation. The Article then turns to examining the substantive/procedural law distinction as a solution to this dual functional reference problem. The distinction is shown to not only maintain the autopoiesis of law under these difficult conditions, but to also secure law's continued functional relevance in globalized society. This functionalist perspective is used to expose differences in the self-description and operation of international law, to point out how law has been blind to its own coding, and to highlight opportunities for programming law to respond in a more constructive manner to the challenges of globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]