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During the Big Bang enlargement (1997–2004) the European Commission was responsible for preparing 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe for membership of the European Union. To achieve this aim, the Commission had to explain the meaning of the Copenhagen political criteria, which required candidate countries to achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities." Academic analysis has delivered a negative verdict on whether the Commission succeeded in explaining to candidates what the political criteria meant. This received wisdom undermines the credibility of the Commission's current efforts to safeguard the values vis-à-vis Poland and Hungary. But was the Commission's work really so deficient? This article looks back at the Commission's view on the meaning of the Copenhagen political criteria during the pre-accession period. It concludes that while the Commission's work was far from flawless, it articulated a clear vision on the core meaning of the political accession criteria, and strongly criticized policies which have become the hallmark of Poland's and Hungary's current illiberal governments. The current policies of Hungary and Poland can and should be assessed in terms of the commitments made to the Copenhagen political criteria during pre-accession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article describes the evolution of political conditions for accession to the European Community from 1957 to 1973 on the basis of the responses of the Community and national parliaments to applications for association (Article 238 EC Treaty) and membership (Article 237 EC Treaty) and to a US foreign policy initiative. It challenges the thesis that the European Community was originally uninterested in the political nature of its members as long as they were non‐communist and that the Community made a volte face in 1962 in reaction to a request for an association agreement by Franco's Spain. It argues that the Copenhagen political criteria, except minority protection, were firmly established by 1973 after a series of pronouncements and decisions by the European Parliament, national parliaments (both 1962), the Commission (1967) and the Council (1973). The article aims to contribute to the early history of the constitutionalization of the Union and discusses how demands from outsiders prompted the Six to define the constitutional requirements for (candidate) members. It is partly based on new archival research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 7 years or so, the World Bank has expanded its rule of law agenda by moving into the area of criminal justice reform. This turn to criminal justice reform, however obvious it may be from a development perspective, was -- and still is -- a controversial step. This is because the World Bank, like most other multilateral devel-opment banks, is prohibited by its basic legal document, the Articles of Agreement, from interfering in the political affairs of its members. It must make its decisions on the basis of economic considerations only. Following the 2011 World Development Report, which made the case for World Bank involvement in criminal justice, in early 2012 the Bank's legal vice presidency released the Legal Note on Bank Involvement in the Criminal Justice Sector and a Staff Guidance Note: World Bank Support for Criminal Justice Activities. This paper shows how the Legal Note and the Guidance Note, by offering new interpretations of the World Bank's mandate and of the criminal justice sector, seek to incorporate criminal justice reform within the World Bank's governance agenda. It argues that the interpretation offered by these documents is unconvincing in addressing the two components of the political prohibition clause, being the injunc-tion to decide on the basis of economic considerations only and the prohibition on political interference. As a result, the Legal Note does not entirely succeed in its mission to provide '...a general legal framework for determining which interventions by the Bank in this sector would fall within the World Bank's mandate under its Articles of Agreement'. This paper concludes by suggesting that some of the loose ends in the Legal Note and the Guidance Note can be explained by the purpose of this new legal interpretation of the mandate, which is not so much to provide a consistent legal argument, but rather -- and above all -- to play [to] constituencies with different interests and maintain the myth of a common understanding of the World Bank's mandate and mission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]