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Fernbach et al. (2013) found that political extremism and partisan in-group favoritism can be reduced by asking people to provide mechanistic explanations for complex policies, thus making their lack of procedural-policy knowledge salient. Given the practical importance of these findings, we conducted two preregistered close replications of Fernbach et al.’s Experiment 2 (Replication 1a: N = 306; Replication 1b: N = 405) and preregistered close and conceptual replications of Fernbach et al.’s Experiment 3 (Replication 2: N = 343). None of the key effects were statistically significant, and only one survived a small-telescopes analysis. Although participants reported less policy understanding after providing mechanistic policy explanations, policy-position extremity and in-group favoritism were unaffected. That said, well-established findings that providing justifications for prior beliefs strengthens those beliefs, and well-established findings of in-group favoritism, were replicated. These findings suggest that providing mechanistic explanations increases people’s recognition of their ignorance but is unlikely to increase their political moderation, at least under these conditions.

In his target article, Lewis argues that the goal of reaching consensus on what “equality” means should not impede progress toward the goal of equality. He identifies several justifications for thi...

In an adversarial collaboration, we examined associations among factors that could link ideological conflict—perceiving that members of a group do not share one’s ideology—to prejudice and affiliation interest. We also examined whether these factors would possess similar (“symmetrical”) or different (“asymmetrical”) associative strength among liberals and conservatives. Across three samples (666 undergraduate students, 347 Mechanical Turk workers), ideological conflict was associated with perceived dissimilarity on political and nonpolitical topics, as well as negative emotions. Perceived political and nonpolitical dissimilarity were also associated with negative emotions, prejudice, and lower affiliative intentions among both liberals and conservatives. Importantly, however, perceived political dissimilarity was associated with negative emotions, prejudice, and lower affiliative intentions more strongly among liberals. Some inconsistent evidence also suggested that perceived nonpolitical dissimilarity was associated with prejudice and lower affiliative intentions more strongly among conservatives. These findings document nuance in relationships that could link ideological conflict to prejudice.

Previous theory and research has suggested that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is a unitary construct related to attitudes regarding obedience to authority. Recently, scholars have suggested that RWA is multidimensional. To adjudicate these competing notions, we test whether the associations between RWA components and moral attitudes regarding obedience differ depending on the ideology of the authority. Across three studies and an integrative data analysis, we found that the RWA component capturing obedience to and respect for authorities (i.e., submission) related to judgments that it is moral to obey all authorities, and perhaps also nonauthorities, regardless of the targets’ political ideologies. In contrast, the RWA component capturing socially conservative beliefs (i.e., traditionalism) related to judgments that it is moral to obey conservative authorities and immoral to obey liberal authorities. These results suggest that RWA is not a unitary construct and that its components differentially relate to moral judgments regarding obedience to authorities.

Prejudice can be expressed toward a wide array of target groups, but it is often operationalized as being expressed toward a narrower array of groups. By studying a heterogeneous array of target groups, we can draw broader conclusions about prejudice writ large. Here, we describe our research, in which we seek to understand constructs that consistently predict prejudice across a wide array of groups (consistent predictors), as well as constructs that predict prejudice for only some types of groups (inconsistent predictors). For inconsistent predictors, we can also identify the perceived characteristics of the target groups (e.g., status, ideology) that are associated with expressed prejudice. Studying a heterogeneous array of target groups opens up new questions related to morality, cognitive processing, and perceived discrimination but also suggests that prejudice, depending on the group, can be a motivating force preserving the status quo or prompting social change.

Meta-analyses show that low levels of Openness and Agreeableness correlate with generalized prejudice. However, previous studies narrowly assessed prejudice toward low-status, disadvantaged groups. Using a broad operationalization of generalized prejudice toward a heterogeneous array of targets, we sought to answer two questions: (a) Are some types of people prejudiced against most types of groups? and (b) Are some types of people prejudiced against certain types of groups? Across four samples ( N = 7,543), Openness was very weakly related to broad generalized prejudice, r = −.03, 95% confidence interval (CI) [−.07, −.001], whereas low Agreeableness was reliably associated with broad generalized prejudice, r = −.23, 95% CI [−.31, −.16]. When target characteristics moderated relationships between Big Five traits and prejudice, they implied that perceiver–target dissimilarity on personality traits explains prejudice. Importantly, the relationship between Agreeableness and prejudice remained robust across target groups, suggesting it is the personality trait orienting people toward (dis)liking of others.

Social science researchers are predominantly liberal, and critics have argued this representation may reduce the robustness of research by embedding liberal values into the research process. In an adversarial collaboration, we examined whether the political slant of research findings in psychology is associated with lower rates of scientific replicability. We analyzed 194 original psychology articles reporting studies that had been subject to a later replication attempt ( N = 1,331,413 participants across replications) by having psychology doctoral students (Study 1) and an online sample of U.S. residents (Study 2) from across the political spectrum code the political slant (liberal vs. conservative) of the original research abstracts. The methods and analyses were preregistered. In both studies, the liberal or conservative slant of the original research was not associated with whether the results were successfully replicated. The results remained consistent regardless of the ideology of the coder. Political slant was unrelated to both subsequent citation patterns and the original study’s effect size and not consistently related to the original study’s sample size. However, we found modest evidence that research with greater political slant—whether liberal or conservative—was less replicable, whereas statistical robustness consistently predicted replication success. We discuss the implications for social science, politics, and replicability.

Contains fulltext : 214941.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) We present a consensus-based checklist to improve and document the transparency of research reports in social and behavioural research. An accompanying online application allows users to complete the form and generate a report that they can submit with their manuscript or post to a public repository. 3 p.

Author(s): Aczel, Balazs; Szaszi, Barnabas; Sarafoglou, Alexandra; Kekecs, Zoltan; Kucharský, Simon; Benjamin, Daniel; Chambers, Christopher D; Fisher, Agneta; Gelman, Andrew; Gernsbacher, Morton A; Ioannidis, John P; Johnson, Eric; Jonas, Kai; Kousta, Stavroula; Lilienfeld, Scott O; Lindsay, D Stephen; Morey, Candice C; Munafo, Marcus; Newell, Benjamin R; Pashler, Harold; Shanks, David R; Simons, Daniel J; Wicherts, Jelte M; Albarracin, Dolores; Anderson, Nicole D; Antonakis, John; Arkes, Hal R; Back, Mitja D; Banks, George C; Beevers, Christopher; Bennett, Andrew A; Bleidorn, Wiebke; Boyer, Ty W; Cacciari, Cristina; Carter, Alice S; Cesario, Joseph; Clifton, Charles; Conroy, Ronan M; Cortese, Mike; Cosci, Fiammetta; Cowan, Nelson; Crawford, Jarret; Crone, Eveline A; Curtin, John; Engle, Randall; Farrell, Simon; Fearon, Pasco; Fichman, Mark; Frankenhuis, Willem; Freund, Alexandra M; Gaskell, M Gareth; Giner-Sorolla, Roger; Green, Don P; Greene, Robert L; Harlow, Lisa L; de la Guardia, Fernando Hoces; Isaacowitz, Derek; Kolodner, Janet; Lieberman, Debra; Logan, Gordon D; Mendes, Wendy B; Moersdorf, Lea; Nyhan, Brendan; Pollack, Jeffrey; Sullivan, Christopher; Vazire, Simine; Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan | Abstract: An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via a link at the top of the paper.

The traditional perspective on the political ideology and prejudice relationship holds that political conservatism is associated with prejudice, and that the types of dispositional characteristics associated with conservatism (e.g. low cognitive ability, low Openness) explain this relationship. This conclusion is limited by the limited number and types of groups studied. When researchers use a more heterogeneous array of targets, people across the political spectrum express prejudice against groups with dissimilar values and beliefs. Evidence for this worldview conflict perspective emerges in both politics and religion, as well as individual differences such as Openness, disgust sensitivity and cognitive ability. Although these two perspectives differ substantially, there is some identifiable common ground between them, particularly the assumption of some psychological differences between liberals and conservatives. We discuss some remaining open questions related to worldview conflict reduction, causal processes, the robustness of the assumptions of the traditional perspective, and differences between political elites and the public.

In three studies, Wilkins and Kaiser found that both chronic and experimental salience of racial progress in the United States increased the perceptions of anti-White bias only among people high in status-legitimizing beliefs (SLBs). We conducted four preregistered high-powered replications of this research. Studies 1, 2, and 3a were close replications of studies 1–3, respectively. Study 3b was a close replication that included an additional experimental condition. Contrary to the original findings, none of the four expected interaction effects tested were statistically significant in the predicted direction, and only one of the four survived a “small telescopes” analysis. We provide additional tests addressing whether changing social contexts explain our failures to replicate, with mixed conclusions. Whereas it is possible that changing social contexts may have eliminated a once true effect, it is also possible that the original results were false positives.

Findings that money priming increases socioeconomic system support have proven difficult to replicate. Schuler and Wänke found that subjective socioeconomic status (SES) moderates money priming effects on system justification and belief in a just world. We conducted three preregistered replications of this research, with sample sizes 3 times those of the original studies. Replication 1 was a conceptual replication that combined elements from the original two studies, and Replications 2 and 3 were close replications of Studies 1 and 2, respectively. None of the four subjective SES × Money Prime interaction effects tested were statistically significant, and only one of the four survived a “small telescopes” analysis. We discuss reasons for our general failure to replicate the original findings and implications for money priming effects.

Nam, Jost, and van Bavel (2013) found that conservatives were more likely than liberals to avoid dissonance-arousing situations (viz., writing counter-attitudinal essays in a high-choice situation). A close replication of this original research was unsuccessful, as both liberals and conservatives avoided writing counter-attitudinal essays to similar degrees. We conducted an additional experiment that aimed to conceptually replicate Nam et al. (2013) , and to examine whether people whose ideology is threatened might be more likely to avoid dissonance-arousing situations. Again, liberals and conservatives were equally likely to avoid writing counter-attitudinal essays. Threat had no effect on these decisions. A meta-analysis of Nam et al.’s (2013) two studies, the two studies presently reported, and a third supplemental study provide no evidence for asymmetry in dissonance avoidance.

We consider how valid conclusions often lay hidden within research reports, masked by plausible but unjustified conclusions reached in those reports. We employ several well-known and cross-cutting examples from the psychological literature to illustrate how, independent (or in the absence) of replicability difficulties or questionable research practices leading to false positives, motivated reasoning and confirmation biases can lead to drawing unjustified conclusions. In describing these examples, we review strategies and methods by which researchers can identify such practices in their own and others' research reports. These strategies and methods can unmask hidden phenomena that may conflict with researchers' preferred narratives, in order to ultimately produce more sound and valid scientific conclusions. We conclude with general recommendations for how social psychologists can limit the influence of interpretive biases in their own and others' research, and thereby elevate the scientific status and validity of social psychology.

Two recent experiments found evidence for what we term the social category label (SCL) effect-that the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and prejudice against gay men and lesbians can be reduced or even eliminated when the target group is labeled "gay men and lesbians" rather than "homosexuals" (Rios, 2013). Although this appears a promising approach to reduce self-reported sexual prejudice, with both theoretical implications for the meaning of RWA itself and practical implications for question wording for assessing these attitudes, there are several reasons to further examine these findings, including (a) inconsistencies with extant evidence, (b) small sample sizes in the original 2 experiments, and (c) concerns with the RWA measures used in the 2 experiments. We tested the SCL hypothesis with a nationally representative sample (Study 1) and close and conceptual replications of Rios' (2013) 2 studies (Studies 2-5) using multiple measures of RWA and prejudice. Across 23 tests of the SCL hypothesis, we obtained 1 statistically significant and 1 marginally significant effect consistent with the hypothesis, 2 significant effects opposite the hypothesis, and 19 nonsignificant effects. A meta-analysis of evidence reported here and in Rios (2013) indicates that RWA strongly predicts antigay prejudice, with no significant variation by label. This confirms the typically robust association between RWA and antigay prejudice and confirms that the SCL effect is not robust. We discuss potential limitations of these studies, theoretical, methodological, and practical implications for our failures to replicate the original SCL studies, and future directions for examining social category label effects. (PsycINFO Database Record

Previous research finds that lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice. We test two unresolved questions about this association using a heterogeneous set of target groups and data from a representative sample of the United States ( N = 5,914). First, we test “who are the targets of prejudice?” We replicate prior negative associations between cognitive ability and prejudice for groups who are perceived as liberal, unconventional, and having lower levels of choice over group membership. We find the opposite (i.e., positive associations), however, for groups perceived as conservative, conventional, and having higher levels of choice over group membership. Second, we test “who shows intergroup bias?” and find that people with both relatively higher and lower levels of cognitive ability show approximately equal levels of intergroup bias but toward different sets of groups.

Are stereotypes accurate or inaccurate? We summarize evidence that stereotype accuracy is one of the largest and most replicable findings in social psychology. We address controversies in this literature, including the long-standing and continuing but unjustified emphasis on stereotype inaccuracy, how to define and assess stereotype accuracy, and whether stereotypic (vs. individuating) information can be used rationally in person perception. We conclude with suggestions for building theory and for future directions of stereotype (in)accuracy research.

Past research shows that people like others who are similar to themselves, and that political partisans tend to dislike those with opposing viewpoints. Two studies examined how initial person impressions changed after discovering that the target held similar or dissimilar political beliefs. Using potential mates as targets, we found that participants liked targets less, were less romantically interested in targets, and rated targets as less attractive after discovering political dissimilarity with them. Further, they became more uncomfortable with targets after discovering ideological dissimilarity. Theoretical implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.

We introduce the balanced ideological antipathy (BIA) model, which challenges assumptions that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) predict inter-group antipathy per se. Rather, the effects of RWA and SDO on antipathy should depend on the target’s political orientation and political objectives, the specific components of RWA, and the type of antipathy expressed. Consistent with the model, two studies ( N = 585) showed that the Traditionalism component of RWA positively and negatively predicted both political intolerance and prejudice toward tradition-threatening and -reaffirming groups, respectively, whereas SDO positively and negatively predicted prejudice (and to some extent political intolerance) toward hierarchy-attenuating and -enhancing groups, respectively. Critically, the Conservatism component of RWA positively predicted political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward each type of target group, suggesting it captures the anti-democratic impulse at the heart of authoritarianism. Recommendations for future research on the relationship between ideological attitudes and inter-group antipathy are discussed.

People with extreme political opinions are alternatively characterized as being relatively unthinking or as confident consumers and practitioners of politics. In three studies, we tested these competing hypotheses using cognitive anchoring tasks (total N = 6,767). Using two different measures of political extremity, we found that extremists were less influenced than political moderates by two types of experimenter-generated anchors (Studies 1–3) and that this result was mediated by extremists’ belief superiority (Study 2). Extremists and moderates, however, were not differentially influenced by self-generated anchors (Study 2), which suggests that extremists differentiated between externally and internally generated anchors. These results are consistent with the confident-extremist perspective and contradict the unthinking-extremist perspective. The present studies demonstrate the utility of adopting a basic cognitive task to investigate the relationship between ideology and cognitive style and suggest that extremity does not necessarily beget irrationality.

Three studies examined ideological symmetries and asymmetries in political intolerance and prejudice toward political activist groups. Using both student and non-student samples, and two alternative methodologies for studying political intolerance, the results of these studies converge on three important and novel conclusions. First, consistent with the ideological conflict hypothesis, both liberals and conservatives were politically intolerant and prejudiced toward ideologically dissimilar groups, to similar degrees. Second, whereas political intolerance and prejudice are related intergroup phenomena, they have different threat-based antecedents. Specifically, whereas symbolic threat significantly predicted prejudice, it did not predict political intolerance of the same groups. Finally, the threat-based antecedents of political intolerance depended on the political objectives of the group itself. Across studies, only safety threat predicted intolerance of left-wing groups. In Studies 1 and 2, only realistic threat predicted intolerance of right-wing groups; however, Study 3 revealed that those effects are attributable to beliefs that right-wing groups are a threat to people's rights. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, including their relevance to political intolerance and prejudice reduction interventions.

After briefly reviewing the overwhelming evidence that social psychology suffers from a massive ideological skew to the left, and how that leads to both discrimination against individual social psychologists, suboptimal scientific practices, and invalid or distorted scientific conclusions, this chapter focuses on solutions. Nearly all chapters in the book offered recommendations for improving political diversity, improving scientific practice, or both. Those recommendations, however, are scattered across many chapters, as well as scholarly literature preceding this book. Therefore, the main contribution of this chapter is to summarize every recommendation we could find for improving social psychology in a relatively brief form, readily usable by researchers wishing to limit their own propensities for political biases.

Liberals and conservatives both express prejudice toward ideologically dissimilar others (Brandt et al., 2014). Previous work on ideological prejudice did not take advantage of evidence showing that ideology is multidimensional, with social and economic ideologies representing related but separable belief systems. In 5 studies (total N = 4912), we test 3 competing hypotheses of a multidimensional account of ideological prejudice. The dimension-specific symmetry hypothesis predicts that social and economic ideologies differentially predict prejudice against targets who are perceived to vary on the social and economic political dimensions, respectively. The social primacy hypothesis predicts that such ideological worldview conflict is experienced more strongly along the social than economic dimension. The social-specific asymmetry hypothesis predicts that social conservatives will be more prejudiced than social liberals, with no specific hypotheses for the economic dimension. Using multiple target groups, multiple prejudice measures (e.g., global evaluations, behavior), and multiple social and economic ideology measures (self-placement, issue positions), we found relatively consistent support for the dimension-specific symmetry and social primacy hypotheses, and no support for the social-specific asymmetry hypothesis. These results suggest that worldview conflict and negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors are dimension-specific, but that the social dimension appears to inspire more political conflict than the economic dimension. (PsycINFO Database Record

Decades of research in social and political psychology have demonstrated that political conservatives appear more intolerant toward a variety of groups than do political liberals. Recent work from our three independent labs has challenged this conventional wisdom by suggesting that some of the psychological underpinnings of intolerance are not exclusive to people on either end of the political spectrum. These studies have demonstrated that liberals and conservatives express similar levels of intolerance toward ideologically dissimilar and threatening groups. We suggest directions for future research and discuss the psychological and political implications of our conclusions.

Previous research has linked disgust sensitivity to negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians. We extend this existing research by examining the extent to which disgust sensitivity predicts attitudes more generally toward groups that threaten or uphold traditional sexual morality. In a sample of American adults (N = 236), disgust sensitivity (and particularly contamination disgust) predicted negative attitudes toward groups that threaten traditional sexual morality (e.g., pro-choice activists), and positive attitudes toward groups that uphold traditional sexual morality (e.g., Evangelical Christians). Further, disgust sensitivity was a weaker predictor of attitudes toward left-aligned and right-aligned groups whose objectives are unrelated to traditional sexual morality (e.g., gun-control/gun-rights activists). Together, these findings are consistent with a sexual conservatism account for understanding the relationship between disgust sensitivity and intergroup attitudes.Keywords: Disgust sensitivity, Prejudice, Intergroup attitudes, Sex

On the eve of the 2012 U.S. Presidential election, we conducted an initial investigation into the determinants of people's attitudes toward the U.S. military's use of drone strikes in Pakistan. Drawing on existing research and theory in social and political psychology, we examined the effects of political ideology, framing effects (national security vs. human costs), value orientations, and the salience of Presidential candidate endorsement (Obama vs. Romney) on attitudes toward drone policy. The perceived relevance of security values and universalism values to judgments of drone policy mediated the relationship between ideology and drone policy attitudes. Additionally, a human costs frame increased the relevance of universalism values and decreased the relevance of security values to drone policy attitudes relative to a national security frame, and, through these values, decreased support for drone strikes. Neither of these effects was moderated by candidate salience. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings, and identify several avenues for future research on this important and controversial policy.

Decades of scholarship have identified several determinants of political intolerance, including authoritarianism and normative threat. Previous attempts in the literature to associate other individual difference variables (i.e., social dominance orientation [SDO]) and situational variables (i.e., out-groups' gains in power and status) have been unsuccessful. Using a dual-process motivational (DPM) model framework, in Study 1 we found that SDO predicted political intolerance of groups with hierarchy-attenuating political objectives. This relationship was consistent over and above other well-known predictors of political intolerance, including right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). RWA predicted intolerance of groups with both hierarchy-attenuating and cohesion-reducing objectives. In Study 2, we manipulated whether an immigrant-rights group was described as presenting a normative threat or as gaining power and status. Consistent with extant findings, RWA moderated the effect of normative threat on political intolerance. More interestingly, SDO moderated the effect of gains in power and status on political intolerance. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right-wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.

Source memory for the speaker’s voice (male or female) was investigated when semantic knowledge (gender stereotypes) could and could not inform the episodic source judgment while event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Source accuracy was greater and response times were faster when stereotypes could predict the speaker’s voice at test. Recollection supported source judgments in both conditions as indicated by significant parietal “old/new” ERP effects (500–800 ms). Prototypical late ERP effects (the right frontal “old/new” effect and the late posterior negativity, LPN) were evident when source judgment was based solely on episodic memory. However, these two late ERP effects were diminished and a novel, frontal-negative ERP with left-central topography was observed when stereotypes aided source judgments. This pattern of ERP activity likely reflects activation of left frontal or left temporal lobes when semantic knowledge, in the form of a gender stereotype, is accessed to inform the episodic source judgment.

This study tested the dual-process motivational (DPM) model, which posits that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) differentially predict attitudes toward socially threatening or subordinate groups, respectively. Participants read articles on same-sex relationships and affirmative action and evaluated the article content and the biases of the article authors. The article conclusions (i.e., pro- or anti-same-sex relationships and affirmative action) were varied between subjects. As expected, only RWA predicted evaluations of the same-sex relationships articles and authors, whereas only SDO predicted evaluations of the affirmative action articles and authors. These results extend applications of the dual-process model by demonstrating that RWA and SDO differentially predict evaluations of political information that pertains to socially threatening or subordinate groups, respectively.

Research recently published in Political Psychology suggested that political intolerance is more strongly predicted by political conservatism than liberalism. Our findings challenge that conclusion. Participants provided intolerance judgments of several targets and the political objective of these targets (left-wing vs. right-wing) was varied between subjects. Across seven judgments, conservatism predicted intolerance of left-wing targets, while liberalism predicted intolerance of right-wing targets. These relationships were fully mediated by perceived threat from targets. Moreover, participants were biased against directly opposing political targets: conservatives were more intolerant of a left-wing target than the opposing right-wing target (e.g., pro-gay vs. anti-gay rights activists), while liberals were more intolerant of a right-wing target than the opposing left-wing target. These findings are discussed within the context of the existing political intolerance and motivated reasoning literatures.

Despite an abundance of evidence to the contrary, a substantial number of Americans believed that President Barack Obama was not born in the United States, even almost two years into his administration (CNN, 2010, July). Both anecdotal and polling evidence at the time suggested that Republicans and political conservatives were more likely to hold these inaccurate beliefs. This study demonstrated that across a variety of operationalizations of political orientation, both explicit and implicit beliefs that President Obama was foreign were related to political conservatism. Potential sources of these beliefs are considered.

This paper introduces the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), which predicts that biased political judgments will emerge on both the political left and right, but only when the premise of a judgment is not ideologically objectionable to the perceiver. The IOPM generates three hypothesized patterns of bias: biases among both those on the left and right, bias only among those on the right, and bias only among those on the left. These hypotheses were tested within the context of the dual process motivational model of ideological attitudes (DPM; Duckitt, 2001), which posits that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are related but distinct ideological attitudes. Across two studies, all three IOPM hypotheses were tested and supported on the RWA ideological attitude dimension, and two of the three IOPM hypotheses were tested and supported on the SDO dimension. These findings indicate that the context of the judgment is an important determinant of whether biases emerge in political judgment.

This article introduces the political person perception model, which identifies conditions under which perceivers rely on stereotypes (party membership), individuating information (issue position), or both in political person perception. Three studies supported the model’s predictions. Study 1 showed that perceivers gave primacy to target information that was narrowly relevant to a judgment, whether that information was stereotypic or individuating. Study 2 found that perceivers relied exclusively on individuating information when it was narrowly relevant to the judgment and relied on both stereotype and individuating information when individuating information was not narrowly relevant to the judgment but did imply a political ideology. Study 3 replicated these findings in a more ecologically valid context and showed that people relied on party information in the absence of narrowly relevant policy positions and when individuating information did not imply a political ideology. Implications for political person perception and theories of stereotyping are discussed.

We examined properties of culture-level personality traits in ratings of targets (N = 5,109) aged 12 to 17 in 24 cultures. Aggregate scores were generalizable across gender, age, and relationship groups and showed convergence with culture-level scores from previous studies of self-reports and observer ratings of adults, but they were unrelated to national character stereotypes. Trait profiles also showed cross-study agreement within most cultures, eight of which had not previously been studied. Multidimensional scaling showed that Western and non-Western cultures clustered along a dimension related to Extraversion. A culture-level factor analysis replicated earlier findings of a broad Extraversion factor, but generally resembled the factor structure found in individuals. Continued analysis of aggregate personality scores is warranted.

Openness to experience is consistently associated with tolerance. We suggest that tests of the association between openness to experience and tolerance have heretofore been incomplete because they have primarily focused on prejudice toward unconventional target groups. We test (a) the individual difference perspective, which predicts that because people who are high in openness are more open to diverse and dissimilar people and ideas, they will express more tolerance than people who are low in openness and (b) the worldview conflict perspective, which predicts that people high and low in openness will both be intolerant toward those with different worldviews. Four studies, using both conventional and unconventional target groups, find support for an integrative perspective. People high in openness do appear more tolerant of diverse worldviews compared with people low in openness; however, at the same time, people both high and low in openness are more intolerant of groups whose worldviews conflict with their own. These findings highlight the need to consider how individual difference variables and features of the target groups may interact in important ways to influence the expression of prejudice.

“Getting it right” is the sine qua non of science (Funder et al., 2013 ). Science can tolerate individual mistakes and fl awed theories, but only if it has reliable mechanisms for correction. Unfortunately, science is not always selfcorrecting (e.g., Ioannidis, 2012 ; MacCoun, 1998 ; Nickerson, 1998 ). Equally unfortunately, although the potential political distortion of psychology has been recognized for some time (MacCoun, 1998 ; Redding, 2001 ; Tetlock, 1994 ), calls for corrective action have gone largely unheeded. This chapter reviews and critically evaluates the evidence suggesting that: (1) liberals are disproportionately represented in social psychology; (2) pernicious factors (hostile environment, discrimination) contribute to that disproportion; (3) conclusions in political social psychology are consistently biased in ways that fl atter liberals. We also identify possible solutions to the problems of political bias in social psychology.

Although large international studies have found consistent patterns of sex differences in personality traits among adults (i.e., women scoring higher on most facets), less is known about cross-cultural sex differences in adolescent personality and the role of culture and age in shaping them. The present study examines the NEO Personality Inventory-3 (McCrae, Costa, & Martin, 2005) informant ratings of adolescents from 23 cultures (N = 4,850), and investigates culture and age as sources of variability in sex differences of adolescents' personality. The effect for Neuroticism (with females scoring higher than males) begins to take on its adult form around age 14. Girls score higher on Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness at all ages between 12 and 17 years. A more complex pattern emerges for Extraversion and Agreeableness, although by age 17, sex differences for these traits are highly similar to those observed in adulthood. Cross-sectional data suggest that (a) with advancing age, sex differences found in adolescents increasingly converge toward adult patterns with respect to both direction and magnitude; (b) girls display sex-typed personality traits at an earlier age than boys; and (c) the emergence of sex differences was similar across cultures. Practical implications of the present findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

This experiment investigated differences in event-related potentials (ERPs) observed in 2 types of source monitoring decisions. Participants discriminated between self-generated, heard, and new words (reality monitoring) in one condition; in another they discriminated between words heard in a male or female voice and new items (external source monitoring). The data support the source monitoring framework, which argues that reality monitoring discriminations differ from external source monitoring discriminations. Analysis revealed better overall source accuracy during reality monitoring than during external source monitoring. In the external source monitoring task, an early old-new ERP difference was observed at parietal electrodes followed by frontal old-new effect that persisted longer, replicating previous ERP results. However, early ERP amplitude differences between sources were observed at parietal electrode sites during reality monitoring, suggesting that self-generated items activate more differentiated information during remembering. Furthermore, there were no frontal old-new ERP differences during reality monitoring, suggesting that different decision processes are used in these types of source monitoring decisions.